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A SHORT HISTORY 



OF THE 



ROMAN REPUBLIC 



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

Eonbon: FETTER LANE, E.G. 

C. F. CLAY, Manager 




ffitiinfiursb: loo, PRINCES STREET 

JStrlm: A. ASHER AND CO. 

iLeipjig: F. A. BROCKHAUS 

^tto Hori: : G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

JSombao anK ffalcwlta: MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd. 



All rights /-(served 



A SHORT HISTORY 

OF THE 

ROMAN REPUBLIC 



BY 

WKE. HEITLAND, M.A. 



Cambridge : 

at the University Press 

1911 



::s\c^ 






\K 



>- 



PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 



?/ 






PREFACE 

IN preparing a short history of the Roman Republic 
intended for junior students, I have not been contented 
with a mere abridgement of my larger book on the same 
subject. Though following in the main the same plan 
and often using the same words in dealing with the same 
matters, I have rewritten the whole as a new book. The 
necessary compression compels omission of many a detail 
which I would gladly have retained, and references to 
authorities must be wholly abandoned. In the text I have 
striven to avoid mentioning unimportant persons by name 
wherever I could do so without obscuring the sense. It 
has been my endeavour constantly to bear in mind that 
the story of republican Rome is only a part (a very signifi- 
cant part) of the general World-history of states ancient 
and modern. Defective though our tradition often is, the 
leading facts of the narrative are well-established, and the 
story they tell is one that no political student can afford 
to neglect. 

In writing for junior students I do not attempt to write 
down to a supposed childish level of apprehension. Baby- 
talk is rightly resented by young readers who are no longer 
children, even in England. I have therefore tried to say 
what I have to say in the plainest language, only avoiding 
extreme technicalities. As in my larger book, such words 
as Assembly (a general term including the several kinds of 
Assemblies), Allies (the Italian socii), Centimes and Tribes 
(the Roman groups so named), are printed with capital 
initial letters to indicate that, where thus printed, they are 



vi Preface 

used in the special sense here given in brackets. And I d6 
not employ the term Oligarchy at all in speaking of Roman 
politics, as it is liable to convey a false impression. 

The division of the matter into chapters differs some- 
what from that of the larger book, and a certain amount 
of new matter has been introduced into the earlier chapters. 
Of maps, some are repeated from the larger book, and a 
few are added. The pictures of coins are a new feature. 

I take this opportunity of thanking the scholars who 
have reviewed the larger book. All the reviewers who 
shew a knowledge of the difficulties of the subject have 
given me much encouragement. They know how hard it 
is to deal judicially with so various a collection of evidence 
as that which makes up our record. But I must in parti- 
cular acknowledge the private generosity of Mr J. Wells 
of Wadham College, Oxford, who has kindly sent me a 
number of notes on points of detail, for which I am most 
grateful. 

A few notes are placed at the foot of the page ; in most 
cases they are cross-references added in order to avoid 
repetitions. But it is in the Index that this object has 
principally been kept in view. The existence of Mr P. E. 
Matheson's Skeleton Outline seems to make the addition of 
a full Chronological Table unnecessary. 

The coins figured in the plates are photographed from 
casts of the originals in the British Museum, and in 
selecting and describing them I have used Dr B. V. Head's 
Guide to the Coins of the Ancients (1881). In one case I 
have preferred to choose a coin from the general B.M. 
catalogue. 

W. E. H. 

February 1 9 1 1 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAP. 
I. 

2. 

3- 

4- 
5- 
6. 



90 



-166 

-178 

., and in 



Introductory. §§ i — 5 .... 
Early Rome. §§ 6 — 17 .... 
The Regal period. §§ 18—22 . 
The Republic 509 — 449 B.C. §§ 23 — 36 . 
The Republic 448 — 367 B.C. §§37—51 . 
The Republic 366—265 B.C. §§ 52—60 . 

7. Conquest of Italy 366—265 B.C. §§ 61 — 79 

8. Organization of Italy. §§ 80 — 83 

9. Rome and the Romans 366—265 B.C. §§ 84 

10. Carthage. §§ 91—96 

11. First Punic War 264 — 241 B.C. §§97 — 108 

12. The interval 241 — 218 B.C. §§ 109 — 118 . 

13. Second Punic War 218 — 201 B.C. §§ 119- 

14. The situation created by the war. §§ 167 

15. Wars and policy in the East 200 — 168 B.C., and in the West 

200 — 194 B.C. §§179—232. 

16. Wars and policy in the West 193 — 167 B.C. §§ 233 — 24 

17. External affairs 167 — 133 B.C. §§ 242 — 269 

18. Internal history 201 — 133 B.C. §§ 270 — 310 

19. The Sicilian slave-war 134 — 132 B.C. §§311 — 313 

20. Tiberius Gracchus 133 B.C. §§ 314 — 322 . 

21. The interval 132 — 123 B.C. §§ 323 — 332 . 

22. Gains Gracchus 124 — 121 B.C. §§ 333 — 348 

23. From the death of C. Gracchus to the end of the Jugurthine 

War 121— 105 B.C. §§ 349—367 .... 

24. The invasion from the North 109 — loi B.C. §§ 368 — 374 

25. The second Sicilian slave-war, and external affairs 105 — 92 B.c 

§§ 375—382 

26. Internal history 104 — 91 B.C. §§ 383 — 396 

27. The great Italian or Marsic war 90 — 87 B.C. §§ 397 — 413 

28. Marius and Cinna 87 — 86 B.C. §§ 414 — 418 . 

29. Sulla in the East 87 — 84 B.C. §§ 419 — 424 

30. Cinna, Carbo, and Sulla 85 — 82 B.C. §§ 425 — 429 . 



7 
21 

27 

43 
58 
66 

83 

87 

92 

98 

108 

ri6 

146 

155 
193 
200 
217 
247 
249 

255 
261 

272 
286 

291 
297 

307 
321 

325 
330 



viii Table of Contents 

CHAP. PAGE 

31. Sulla 82— 78 B.C. §§430—448 334 

32. Rome and Italy 78 — 70 B.C. §§ 449 — 459 .... 348 

33. Wars abroad. Sertorius and Mithradates. 79 — 67 B.C. §§ 460 

—469 357 

34. Affairs in Rome 69 — 66 B.C., and the preeminence of Pompey 

67—62 B.C. §§ 470 — 482 365 

35. Cicero and Catiline 66—63 B.C. §§ 483—501 .... 375 

36. The 'years of uncertainty 62 — 60 B.C. §§502 — 509 . . . 389 

37. Caesar's first consulship and the removal of Cicero and Cato 

59— 58 B.C. §§510—521 395 

38. Caesar in Gaul 58 — 56 B.C. §§ 522 — 530 .... 404 

39. Affairs in Rome 58 — 55 B.C. The conference of Luca 56 B.C. 

§§ 531—540 412 

40. Caesar in Gaul 56 — 50 B.C. §§ 541 — 552 .... 420 

41. Roman affairs from the conference of Luca to the outbreak of 

the great civil war 55—49 B.C. §§ 553—573 ... 429 

42. The civil war to the battle of Thapsus 49 — 46 B.C. §§ 574 — 

595 445 

43. From the battle of Thapsus to the death of Caesar 46 — 44 B.C. 

§§ 596—615 460 

44. Failure of the attempt to restore the Republic 44: — 42 B.C. 

§§ 616—637 474 

45. Literature and Jurisprudence as illustrating the life of the 

revolutionary period. §§ 638 — 654 ..... 490 

46. From Republic to Empire. §§ 655 — 671 ..... 501 



Indes 



513 



LIST OF PLATES 

Plate I to face page 72 y 

1. Coin of Tarentum [Taras], 4th cent. B.C. 

2. Coin of Massalia, 

3. Coin of Carthage, ? late 4th cent. B.C. 

Plate II ,, ,, 104^^ 

4. Roman silver coins, after 268 B.C. 

5. Coin of Hiero II of Syracuse, 3rd cent. B.C. 

Plate III „ „ i68\/ 

6. Coin of Philip V of Macedon (220 — 178 B.C.). 

7. Coin of Aetolian League (? 192— i B.C.). 

8. Coin of Rhodes, about 200 B.C. 

Plate IV „ „ 1841/" 

9. Coin of Perseus of Macedon (179 — 168 B.C.). 

10. Coin of the second of the 4 Macedonian re- 

publics 167 — 146. 

11. Coin struck by Faustus Sulla about 62 B.C. 

Plate V . » >, 296/ 

12. Coin of Mithradates VI Eupator, 75 B.C. 

13. Coins of Italian confederates, 90 B.C. 

Plate VI „ „ 408 V" 

14. Gaulish gold coin, imitated from a Macedonian 

stater. 

15. Gold coin of M. Brutus, coined 43 — 2 B.C. by 

one of his lieutenants. 

16. Denarius of 41 B.C. 



LIST OF MAPS 

1. Map of early Italian peoples (conjectural). § 4. 

2. Site of Rome. § 6. 

3. Neighbourhood of Rome. § 32. 

4. The Southward advance of Rome. § 63. 

5. Campania and Samnium. § 70. 

6. The chief Etrurian cities. § 72. 

7. The region of Magna Graecia. § 76. 

8. Map of Sicily for the Punic Wars. § 99. 

9. Occupation of the ager Gallicus. § no. 

10. Syracuse in 214 B.C. § 145. 

11. Part of Sinus Tarentinus. § 148. 

12. Map of Campania in the Second Punic War. § 149. 

13. Sketch map of Balkan peninsula 200 B.C. § 187. 

14. Sketch map of Balkan peninsula about 170 B.C. § 227. 

15. Outline of Carthage. § 259. 

16. Southern Transalpine Gaul. § 353. 

17. Cisalpine Gaul with Liguria about 100 B.C. § 356. 

18. Map of Italy 90 B.C. § 400. 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

I. The history of Rome first meets us in the dim legendary 
story of a small community planted on the left bank of the 
Tiber. We can fix no certain date for its beginning, nor is it 
easy to say when it ended. It is not the history of a nation, 
but of a government. The last remains of a government con- 
tinuously descended from that of ancient Rome did not disappear 
till 1453 A.D., when Constantinople was taken by the Turks. 
But Roman law, the supreme product of Roman government, 
is still living, for it is the foundation of many of the legal systems 
still in force. We may divide Roman history for convenience 
sake into periods according to the form of government in use. 

(i) Regal period, our knowledge of which is very slight and 
indirect. 

(2) Republican period. 

(3) Imperial period. 

It is with the second of these that we are concerned. The 
states of the ancient world, great or small, seem all to have been 
originally governed by kings, and the rise of republics was not 
found consistent with great and permanent extension of territory. 
The history of the free states of Greece is the stock instance of 
politics on a small scale. The city-states (TroXets) of Hellas were 
weak from want of size and mutual jealousy. The loose cantonal 
unions lacked the cohesion necessary for exerting joint power 
with effect. No large political unit was efficiently organized in 
the Greek world until the rise of the national kingdom of 
Macedon. In the East large monarchies were the rule. The 
conquest of the Persian empire by Alexander made no change 



2 Republics [ch. 

in this respect, and the vast dominion divided at his death fell 
into the great monarchies of the Successor kings. The weakness 
of a popular government as ruler of subjects was illustrated in 
the inability of imperial Athens to secure the hearty loyalty of 
her subordinate allies. The empire of Carthage was essentially 
a money-making enterprise ; to exploit, rather than to govern, 
was its chief aim. When Carthage had to assert her power, she 
relied mainly on mercenaries hired abroad, having no solid 
empire and no mass of loyal allies to support her at a pinch. 
And, so far as our knowledge goes, the general characteristic of 
ancient Republics was a jealous exclusiveness. The line between 
citizen and alien was sharply drawn, and admission of the latter 
to the privileges and duties of the former was extremely rare. 
Thus expansion was checked in the several states. On the other 
hand, there was no necessary limit to the size of monarchies, 
but their strength varied with the character of the monarch, and 
the mere fact of subjection to a single ruler was not enough to 
give cohesion or unity of sentiment to a motley aggregate of 
various peoples. 

2. It was therefore a momentous event when the obscure 
community by the Tiber began to absorb and incorporate its 
neighbours, and even more momentous when it threw off 
monarchic government and still continued to expand. In the 
case of a city-state this was a new thing, for it was not by 
conquering, but by keeping her conquests, that Rome became 
great. Among the ups and downs of her early struggles, recorded 
only in untrustworthy legends, the one thing certain is that on 
the whole she had the art of keeping allies and incorporating 
conquered communities in the stable organization of the Roman 
state. Progress was in the case of Rome not a brilliant over- 
running of Italy sword in hand. It was the slow building-up 
of a fabric able to endure the strain of disaster and gradually 
to inspire confidence in its solidity. The character of its progress 
was determined by the nature of its government aided by the 
condition of the ItaHan peoples and by the physical configuration 
of the peninsula, in which Rome occupied a position of peculiar 
vantage. In ceasing to depend for leadership on one able in- 
dividual, Rome passed under the rule of an aristocracy with its 
striking merits and defects. Tradition represents it as selfish 
and jealous of privilege and power, but capable of concession 



i] Italy 3 

in order to avert the disruption of the state. Internal strife was 
thus not fatal, and the cohesion which was the life of city-states 
was not destroyed. External policy was continuous and firm, 
guided by hard-fisted aristocrats whose interests coincided with 
their patriotism. The success of this government, so long as the 
governing class remained sound and uncorrupted ; its miserable 
failure, once they became seriously corrupt ; the tedious and 
bloody process by which the inevitable was at length achieved, 
and the empire brought under a single master : — these are the 
main features of the story which it is our business to trace. 
Surely the history of the Roman Republic is the most wonderful 
phenomenon of the ancient world. With all its clumsiness and 
blundering, it did its work so thoroughly that all rivalry had 
ceased, and all the peoples round the Mediterranean confessed 
the supremacy of Rome. The character of the aristocracy might 
and did change outwardly. Inwardly it remained practically the 
same to the last. Democratic movements might disturb it, but 
true democracy was not a possible form of government at Rome. 
The suppression of the government virtually aristocratic meant 
the coming of the Empire. 

3. Italy. The land. Take a map including the countries 
round the Mediterranean. The central commanding position of 
the Italian peninsula strikes the eye at once. But the importance 
of its position was increased by the fact of its lying between 
the old civilizations of the East and the undeveloped resources 
of the ruder West. Then take a map of Italy shewing the 
physical features of the peninsula. The leading facts are these. 
The long Apennine range forms a backbone roughly dividing 
the country, while its spurs in many parts serve to mark off 
districts. Good natural harbours are singularly few, but ancient 
shipping was able to use many spots on the coast inaccessible 
to modern vessels of deeper draught. And we must bear in 
mind that the coast-line has been much altered in the course of 
centuries by the deposits of silt, the wastage of the hills, swept 
down by streams into a practically tideless sea. The region of 
the Po did not become Italian until Italy had been united under 
the leadership of Rome. In Italy proper there were no easily 
navigable rivers : the lower reaches of the Tiber were the only 
waterway of the kind worth mentioning. Mountain torrents, 
serving rather to divide than to unite, were the commonest 

I — 2 



4 Rome and the [ch. 

feature of the land. If Italy was ever to be organized as a 
whole, and thus enabled in virtue of its central position to play 
a leading part in the history of the Mediterranean world, it 
was necessary to make or improve communications between the 
various parts of the peninsula. To control the coasts was not 
enough. The hill-barriers must be pierced, for the main work 
of consolidating the strength of Italy had to be done inland. 
In default of a great conqueror to weld the Italian peoples into 
one great monarchy, the task was only possible to a community 
itself at once solid and able to expand without losing its cohesion. 
Loose leagues of cities or cantons were insufficient for such a 
work, as events were to shew. A centre, in short a city, must 
be found, to serve as a nucleus for the gradual concentration 
of Italian power. And among all the civic communities of Italy 
none was so favoured by central position, and by ready access 
to both land and sea, as the city on the Tiber. 

4- Italy. The peoples. But the union of Italy could 
hardly have taken place in the way it did, if the various groups 
of independent communities had been generally "alienated from 
each other by deep-seated differences, of race customs and 
language. The ethnology of ancient Italy is still matter of 
dispute, but the only people now commonly admitted to have 
been foreign intruders, not of Indo-European (Aryan) origin, 
were the Etruscans. In the early twilight of Italian history we 
find them a conquering race, settled in walled towns as a ruling 
aristocracy of warrior-nobles. The chief seat of their power was 
the fine district known as Etruria, but they held also a large 
part of the northern region beyond the xA.pennine, and much of 
Campania in the South : that they were at some time over-lords 
in a good deal of central Italy is probable. Whether they had 
entered the peninsula by sea or by way of the Alps has been 
disputed. Tradition said that they came from Asia Minor. In the 
mountain district of the North-West were the Ligurians, probably 
driven back into the hill-country, having once occupied a far 
wider area. In the South-East, an arid and partly unwholesome 
district, were the people known as lapygians or Messapians. The 
race-affinities of both these groups are still matters of some 
doubt, but it seems practically certain that they were at least 
nearer to the Romans than to the Etruscans. The great mass 
of the Italian peoples, settled along the flanks of the Apennine 



I] 



Italian Peoples 



range and spreading into the lowlands, were more or less nearly 
akin to each other, all of Aryan origin. In the North were the 
Umbrians ; next came a group of peoples of whom the Sabines 
were the most important. In the lower country reaching to the 
southern coast below the Tiber were the Latins, with several 
smaller peoples to East and South of them. Following the 




Map of early Italian peoples (conjectural), (g) Outlying 
seats of Etruscan power. 

Apennine southwards, the rest of central Italy was held by 
kindred tribes, the most famous group of which were known by 
the common name of Samnites. The name Sabellian includes 
them and the Sabines and others as well ; their dialect was called 
Oscan. In the South of Italy were the remains of weaker 
peoples called by various names, probably of Aryan race ; among 



6 Local independence [ch. i 

them were the Itali, from whom the early voyagers are said to 
have called the country Italia. The Sicels in Sicily belonged 
to the same stock. Of the Greek colonies on the coast we 
shall often speak below. Their wealth and splendour caused 
the southern seaboard to be called the Great Greece. Thus the 
bulk of Italy was held by peoples not parted off from each other 
by any insuperable difference. A conquering power of kindred 
race could form them into a confederate whole, and assimilate 
rather than exterminate them or reduce them to serfdom. 

5. In tracing the union of Italy under the headship of 
Rome we shall find the extension of Roman dominion promoted 
by the general attachment of communities to their local in- 
dependence. The looseness of the ties that bound together 
the various leagues or groups is clearly to be detected in their 
incapacity for continuous common action. We find this much 
the same in the case of Etruscan cities and in the tribal cantons 
of the Sabellians. The groups recognized some community of 
race and interests, and common festivals gave expression to this 
feeling : but, so far as we know, there were no true federal 
unions, each made effective by possessing a central directing 
authority. It was the possession of a central authority in Rome 
that differentiated the Roman confederacy, even in its humble 
beginnings, from the inefficient unions of her neighbours. Rome 
furnished the necessary Head, the firm consistent policy, and 
the far-sighted diplomacy which won more certain triumphs than 
the sword. These general remarks must serve to introduce a 
narrative which in its earlier stages can only be an outline 
sketch. 



CHAPTER II 



EARLY ROME 



6. Rome. The city of Rome was formed by" the occupation 
of some low hills about 15 miles from the mouth of the Tiber, 
and the union of these settlements into a single community. 
When the first settlement took place is not known ; probably it 
was long before 753 B.C., the conventional date of the foundation 
of Rome according to the calculation of a Roman antiquary. 
Nor is it known under what conditions the settlements coalesced 
or how long the process took. It seems that the first point 
occupied was the Palatine hill, and that the settlers were all or 
most of them drawn from the people called Latins, whose towns 
or hamlets were scattered over the low country east of the Tiber, 
or perched on the Alban hills or the spurs of the Sabine 
mountains. These were presently faced by a second settlement 
of Sabine origin with its headquarters on the Quirinal hill. 
Somehow these two communities merged in one, probably after 
conflict, in which the warlike Sabines had the upper hand. The 
result was the formation of the city Roma, membership of which 
was expressed by calling the men of Roma Romani. If this 
account be correct, we have already the picture of a composite 
community, and are led to expect that its institutions would 
shew traces of the mixture that had taken place. Such is indeed 
the case. In many particulars, mostly connected with religion, 
modern research has detected Latin and Sabine elements existing 
side by side. Tradition asserted that at one time the kings were 
alternately Latin and Sabine, and it is known that a number ot 
the families of the old nobility of birth boasted Sabine descent. 
Others traced their origin to the noble houses of Latin towns 
incorporated by Rome, with what right we do not know. It is at 



populus 



[CH. 



all events significant that Romans regarded Rome as a city owing 
its state-existence from the first to compromise and combination. 
For this character is clearly marked in the tradition of the early 
Republic, only dying out by degrees as Rome became supreme in 
Italy. 






I S4 




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Site of Rome, shewdng hills and swamp. 



7. Populus and civitas. The regular term for 'community' 
was populus. It seems to have implied that the community had 
some sort of town as a stronghold or rallying-point, a centre of 
its common life. It had a territory (ager), small or great, and 
some of its members might live in detached hamlets, but as a 
populus they had only one centre. A league of such communities 



ii] Early Rome 9 

was not a populus but a group oi populi. Thus there was no 
populus Latinus, but a nomen Latinum, including the populi who 
called themselves by the name of 'Latins.' But Tusculum, 
a Latin town, was the headquarters of a populus Tusculanus and 
its territory was ager Tusculanus. BeHef in common descent, 
indicated by a common name, was expressed by a common 
worship. Thus the Tusculans took part with other Latins in the 
Latin festival {feriae Laiinae). But each populus was an inde- 
pendent unit, and common action was a matter for special 
agreement of two or more communities for a special purpose. 
The term to express membership of a community was civis; 
a man was civis Tusculanus or Praenestinus as belonging to 
Tusculum or Praeneste. So too with civis Romanus, but at 
Rome we find traces of an earlier term guiris, probably derived 
from a Sabine word meaning ' spear.' It lived on in the custom 
of addressing a Roman meeting as guirites, not as cives, and 
in certain forms of expression. The civil law peculiar to Roman 
citizens was tus guiritium. The quality of membership was 
his civitas or franchise, which gave him certain rights in the eye 
of the law. These rights were expressed at Rome by the more 
ancient term caput, his ' head ' or legal personality. A citizen 
could lose his civic rights, wholly or partly, by legal degradation, 
or incidentally by loss of Hfe. A slave could only acquire caput 
by ceasing to be a slave, when his owner in solemn form set him 
free from his control {nianu misit). It is important to note that, 
while all citizens had civic rights, it did not follow that all enjoyed 
them in the same degree. Civic rights did not carry with them 
what we should call political rights. This was marked at Rome 
by the distinction between 'private' rights (iura privata) and 
' public ' {iura publico). The distinction existed elsewhere, as in 
Greece. But at Rome it was particularly clear. 

8. The Roma?i people. That the early Romans were before 
all things tillers of the soil and keepers of flocks and herds is 
a probable tradition. The same was doubtless true of the Italians 
in general. But it is not likely that the presence of the river was 
without effect on the rise of the city. The Latin towns appear as 
united in a League, and Rome as having dealings with the League. 
But we do not know that Rome was ever a mere ordinary member. 
At all events she was able at a very early date to displace Alba 
Longa from the presidency of the League and to become herself 



lO Clan and Family [ch. 

the leading member. The record of Alba's former presidency 
remained in the common temple of Juppiter Latiaris on the 
Alban mount, but the yearly festival held there was conducted by 
Rome. It would seem that the growth of Rome was far more 
rapid than that of an ordinary Latin town, and that she soon 
came to hold an exceptional position by the side of the League. 
Now tradition, which points to an early coalition with warlike 
Sabines and early incorporation of neighbouring towns in the 
Roman state, also represents the mythical founder Romulus 
as having opened a refuge for outlaws and other aliens, and as 
having thus strengthened the population of his infant city. If 
this legend contains any kernel of fact, it must surely be this, 
that Rome was from the first a place that attracted immigrants. 
And this is not hard to believe, if we attach any importance to 
the river as a means of intercourse with the outer world. How- 
ever rudimentary the commerce of primitive Rome may have 
been, no other town in that part of Italy had equal opportunities : 
if any site was fitted to attract a mixed population, surely it was 
Rome. Therefore we need not suppose that agriculture, though 
no doubt the main industry of the early Romans, was the sole 
occupation of the people gathered together on the spot. 

9. Citizens and inhabitants. But we must always bear in 
mind that residence did not confer citizenship. Naturahzation 
and acquisition of the franchise in a state have only been made 
easy in quite recent times. In ancient communities we find 
the line of true membership, carrying with it rights and duties, 
most strictly drawn. At Rome it appears that originally none 
but the members of recognized clans {gentes) were accounted full 
citizens. The members of each clan all bore its distinctive name 
{gentile nomen) and shared its peculiar religious rites, and originally 
its common property also. The clan consisted of a number of 
households {familiae) and in course of time it became customary 
to use a family surname {cognomen) in addition to the gentile 
name. Each male of a family had a fore-name {praenomen) 
of his own, such as Marcus Gaius Lucius Publius Titus, but 
of these fore-names there were always very few in use. A man 
was formally described by adding the fore-name of his father (and 
often of his grandfather) after his gentile name. Thus Lucius 
QuincHus Licci filius Luci ?iepos Cincifinatus shews us that three 
successive members of the Quinctian clan bore the fore-name 



ii] Patricians and Plebs 1 1 

Lucius, and that the last of them at least had the surname 
Cincmnatus, a nickname which became a family surname. This 
clumsy nomenclature clearly indicates the immense importance 
of families and clans, and the hereditary nature of membership 
in the primitive community. The family included all under the 
government of the head or Father {paterfamilias), that is, wife 
children slaves and the family estate. Over all these the Father 
was supreme ruler, with power even of life and death, but strictly 
as Father, not as an individual. The maintenance of the house- 
hold and its religious observances was his duty. But on his death 
the succession to his rights and duties passed to the next successor 
in the male line, normally to his eldest son. Sons were qualified 
to succeed their father, or to found families of their own. 
Daughters were always subject to the head of some family or 
other, and the mother or unmarried sister (if any) were in the 
position of daughters to their son or brother when he became 
head of the house. But tradition, probably with truth, represents 
the subjection of women as consistent with high respect and 
domestic dignity, and the position of slaves as a tolerable 
bondage, very different from the cruel brutality of later times. 
lo. Pairicia7is and Plebs. The existence of a privileged 
class, owners of all or most of the land and monopolizing what- 
ever political rights are attached to citizenship, is a common 
phenomenon in primitive states. This institution, generally a 
trace of conquest, was sometimes explained by a claim of the 
nobles to be descended from the original founders of the state. 
Their laws and customs were paramount, including their religion. 
At Rome we find a clearly-marked class of this kind, the ' men of 
fathers' {patricii) whose descent was proved genuine by their 
membership of a family included in some recognized clan. But 
that these Patricians ever formed the whole population of Rome 
cannot be proved. The name implies distinction, and we know 
of no Rome in which there were not other inhabitants. But 
these others were politically of no account ; they merely helped 
to ' fill up,' and were called the plebs or plebes, a name suggesting 
the notion of filling. Thus by the side of the privileged class 
there was a mass of unprivileged persons, whom we may call the 
dependent class. In order to carry on their occupations in 
security, these Plebeians needed the protection of the Patricians. 
Accordingly we hear that many of them were attached to the 



12 imperium and consilium [ch; 

Patrician families and clans as clientes, that is listeners or de- 
pendants. Some of them were perhaps descended from persons 
settled on the spot from very early times. Some would be 
immigrants attracted by the prospects of a growing community. 
Tradition adds a third element, the lower orders of towns 
conquered and destroyed by the early Romans, forcibly removed 
to Rome. It is supposed that these last were in the regal period 
not clients of the great families, but directly dependent on the 
ruling king. Be this as it may, we have no reason to doubt the 
early and rapid growth of a dependent population, or the fact 
of its long struggle for emancipation and equality. Nor need we 
doubt that it was mainly if not wholly of Latin origin, drawn 
from the country near. The settlement of the relations between 
the two ' Orders ' was the making of Rome. 

II. imperium, consilium, auctoritas. Before v/e go further, it 
will be well to consider certain notions that underlay the structure 
of Roman society and powerfully contributed to give the Roman 
state its peculiar character. They expressed themselves in terms 
for which it is hardly possible to find exact equivalents. The 
lawful power of command, implying the power of enforcing com- 
mands, the so-called imperium, was a notion so ample and 
fundamental, so necessary for the working of Roman institutions, 
that a true parallel is hardly to be found elsewhere. The power 
of an absolute monarch is not the same thing. The imperium as 
we hear of it was clearly a growth from within, following the 
lines of the rule of the Father in the household. In ages of 
conflict such a power easily proved its utility. It appears as 
strictly impersonal, but of course vested in persons; at first 
in a King, afterwards in magistrates, always as the effective means 
of directing the forces of the state to definite ends, such for 
instance as victory in war. In principle the imperium was subject 
to no limits, and so liable to be abused. It was highly character- 
istic of Rome that the check on its abuse was found in the force 
of custom. From time immemorial Roman custom enjoined 
that all holders of sovran power should not take a final irrevocable 
step without first consulting suitable advisers. The head of a 
family considered important decisions with the help of relatives 
or friends. The chief magistrate took the state-council, the 
Senate, into his confidence. The final act was the act of the 
individual holder of power, and was in any case valid. But the 



n] Religion 1 3 

moral obligation to hear the views of a consilium was so strong 
that to act without it was felt to be usurpation, save only in the 
case of military command. To follow the advice given was not 
necessary. It was necessary to avoid secret and ill-considered 
decisions. So much was required by the ancestral custom itnos 
maiorum) which, so long as the Roman state remained healthy, it 
was hardly possible to ignore. Tradition represented it as one of 
the chief offences of the last King that he passed judgment on 
citizens without employing a consilium. Thus sovran power was 
morally limited in practice. Of any earlier state of things, that is 
absolute monarchy, we know nothing. So far we have spoken 
only of the understood principle that holders of power should 
exercise it in a formal and deliberate way. But there were 
departments of private and public life in which the persons 
primarily concerned could not perform a valid act without the 
sanction or guarantee of others {auctoritas). Thus no woman 
or minor could act without the consent of an aucfor, that is the 
guardian {tutor), who must be a person of full legal capacity. 
And in early Rome we find that many public acts of the people 
in Assembly were held to require the sanction of the Fathers 
(patres), perhaps the originally Patrician Senate. The gradual 
change in the relative force of these notions, as the necessity 
of the ' sanction of the Fathers ' died out, while the imperium was 
weakened, and the Senate as the advisory board of the state 
{publicum consilium) more and more took the real direction of 
affairs, is no small part of the internal history of Rome. For old 
notions died hard, and constitutional changes were slow. Old 
institutions survived long after they had lost their effect, and 
Roman public life was full of make-believe. Hence the gradual 
modifications of opinion and precedent were in this highly con- 
servative community far more politically important than the actual 
changes of constitutional law. 

12. Religion and Law. Roman religion seems originally to 
have been the simple Nature-worship common among primitive 
peoples. When we first come upon traces of it in use, it has 
become the worship of unseen powers or influences {numi?ia) 
sometimes still supposed to reside in natural objects. To avert 
the ill-will of these powers is the purpose of worship, which 
consists in the exact performance of special rites. Religion is 
thus essentially a bargain; if the man does his part without 



14 nuTfien. prodigiuTfi [ch. 

a flaw, it is assumed that the power addressed will grant his 
favour. But the god is attached to the worshipper rather than 
the worshipper to the god. There are gods of the household, of 
the clan, eventually of the whole community, and they are 
expected to hear only those entitled to address them. Hence, 
though a few special gods had each a special priest in very early 
times, there was no priestly caste. The head of each social 
group, the Father in the house, the chief magistrate in the state, 
was the proper representative of the group in its relations to the 
divine powers. The members of the group were alone concerned 
to see that their religious observances {sacra) were not allowed to 
lapse. When Rome conquered and destroyed or incorporated 
another community, it was usual to take over the worships of the 
conquered. In besieging a town it was usual to invite its local 
gods to come over to the Roman side and accept Roman worship. 
For the gods of a state were a part of the state, and its capture, 
implying their favour to Rome, made that favour an object 
of Roman care. There was no doubt a general resemblance 
between the worships of Rome and the Italian peoples. When 
the gods began to be conceived as human in form, we do not 
know. Rude images of divine beings early took the place of 
stocks and stones. Rude shrines would then form the first 
temples. The impersonal numen was then passing into a personal 
deus. But this transition only became complete at a later time 
when the imagination and art of Greece took hold on Rome. 
Among the beliefs that powerfully influenced the Roman mind 
was the notion that natural phenomena (thunder and lightning, 
rain, earthquakes, etc.) were the outcome of divine agency and 
had a special significance for mankind. To learn the meaning of 
such occurrences, and to take the right steps to propitiate the 
divine anger, were matters of importance. This department of 
religion was largely developed under Etruscan influence, for 
among that strange people this form of superstition had been 
reduced to an elaborate system. In short, any event out of 
the ordinary, such as monstrous births or unusual behaviour 
of animals, might be regarded as a prodigium, probably of evil 
import : in times of nervous strain imagination saw prodigies 
everywhere. Again, the desire to act only in harmony with the 
divine will impelled men to try and learn it before acting. This 
was supposed possible in various ways, chiefly by observing the 



n] Auspices. Law. Marriage 15 

flight of birds; this was done in accordance with precise rules, 
and was the duty and privilege of the magistrate, who ' took the 
auspices ' before every important public act. The hereditary 
character of religion is shewn in the fact that at first only 
Patricians were entitled to take auspices on behalf of the state. 
Its political importance long consisted in the consequent limitation 
of the magistracy to Patricians. This restriction cost long 
struggles to remove, and its removal was a momentous change. In 
general we may say that Roman religion {religio almost = 'scruple '), 
if not exactly a spiritual force, was at least, from its presence in 
all relations of life, a force promoting caution formality and 
order. 

13. Hand in hand with formal religion went formal law. 
The two were closely connected, in fact parts of the same set of 
notions, as seems to have been normally the case in ancient civili- 
zations. The exact use of forms of words and performance of 
symbolic acts was far more important than the known intention 
of the actors. In the conveyance of things bought and sold, and 
in early forms of contract, all turned on the avoidance of any flaw 
in the ceremonial details. The presence of competent witnesses 
was necessary for the validity of any legal act, and in the days 
before written instruments the evidence of the witnesses would be 
the record of the transaction. All matters aff'ecting the family 
were the subject of peculiar care. In the highest form of Patrician 
marriage religion and law met as one. This union could only be 
dissolved with difficulty, by an exact reversal of the solemn 
formalities. Plebeian marriages were a simpler matter in every 
way, and tended to supersede the Patrician form as the old family 
and clan system gradually decayed. Plebeians it is true appear 
in the historical period as grouped in families and clans more or 
less modelled on those of the Patricians, but these groups had no 
longer the direct political importance of the olden time. The 
basis of society was changed : the strict claims of descent, confined 
to the Patrician blood, had disappeared. Now it is clear that the 
close formal bonds of religion and law were a painful check on 
all the movements of life. Some device was needed to avoid 
constant deadlocks. This was found in a system of make-believe, 
common in primitive societies, and carried to great perfection at 
Rome. Evasive tricks simplified the fulfilment of religious duties, 
and fictions made workable the niceties of law. To pretend that 



1 6 Adoption. The Pontiffs [ch. 

something was something else, that one place was some other 
place, that a clod of earth from a field was the field itself, and so 
forth, were the Roman road out of many a difficulty. The best 
instance of practical fiction is found in the sphere of the family. 
This is adoption, an institution not peculiar to Rome, but of 
peculiar importance in Roman life. The reason for it was not 
sentimental. It was simply a means by which a man who had no 
son provided a successor to himself in the family headship. The 
extinction of a family was a calamity to be averted. Some one 
had to be found to take the position of the Father, a successor 
{/leres) to the estate and the rights and duties connected with it. 
This was done by adopting a son from some other family. The 
adopted was ' emancipated,' that is freed from the hand or control 
(manus) of his natural father, and thus completely severed from 
his former family. He passed into the ' hand ' of the adopting 
father, and was thenceforth on exactly the same footing as a 
natural heir. He would succeed to the control of all female 
members of the family, and be duly qualified to approach the 
family gods. It was the emancipation that was the more difficult 
part of the process. For a Father to divest himself of his power 
{patria potestas) over a son was no light matter according to 
Roman notions. Not only were the formalities elaborate, but 
it was a step not to be taken without the advice of the family 
consilium. 

14. Law and religion were thus twined together at every 
turn. There is no better illustration of this than the distinction 
between lucky and unlucky days {fasti, nefasti). As the term for 
law, regarded as the traditional rule of right, was ius, so from the 
point of view of religious scruple it was/«j. Very early in the 
history of Rome a religious gild of Pontiffs {collegium pontificum) 
determined the character of days. But their rules were kept 
secret and their authoritative calendar also. Now legal acts could 
only take place on lucky days. Thus the pontiffs not only fixed 
the dates of religious events such as festivals, but had a direct 
influence on the administration of law. In their hands too were 
the traditional rules for the formal acts and phrases necessary to 
make procedure valid, and these too were kept secret. These 
prerogatives enabled them to gain enormous power, and they clung 
to it tenaciously. Even after many of their secrets had been 
made public, they contrived to keep their position as great lawyers, 



"] Appeals 17 

and the first professional jurists were all pontiffs. In the primitive 
age, when written statutes were probably unknown, their importance 
can hardly be overrated. As witnesses were before written docu- 
ments, so the pontifical tradition, written or not, was before 
statutes. The treatment of what we should call Crimes calls for 
particular notice. There was no general conception of Crime, 
but only of Wrong requiring redress. Wrong done to the indivi- 
dual (robbery violence murder etc.) was no doubt originally righted 
by the private revenge of the wronged person or his relatives. 
This first found recognition in the traditional rule of equivalent 
retribution {talio, an eye for an eye etc.), and then developed into 
a system of satisfaction by compensation. But many Wrongs 
could also be regarded as Sins, breaches oi fas rather than ius, 
and from this point of view could only be righted by acts of 
expiation, which it was the province of the pontiffs to prescribe, 
and so to avert the divine wrath. Wrongs done to the community 
as a whole (and many acts might be so interpreted) were dealt 
with by the chief magistrate on behalf of the state, in virtue of 
his iffiperium. But he could allow the offender to appeal to the 
community {provocare ad populuni) against his sentence. To 
convert this permissive appeal into a legal right, assured to all 
citizens, appears in tradition as one of the first and most important 
achievements of the Roman Republic. The procedure was in 
effect the taking of a vote of the assembled people on the particular 
case. The question was really whether they did or did not mean 
to treat the offender as a public enemy {perduellis). If they did, 
then he would be put to a shameful death; if not, he would 
go free, subject to expiation as required. This right of appeal 
remained in force for centuries, and was never formally abolished. 
It only died out under the gradual development of regular courts 
of penal jurisdiction. Each appeal led to a separate act of the 
Assembly, as independent as an act of legislation ; but strictly 
legislative acts were beyond doubt very rare in the early days of 
Rome, perhaps rarer than appeals. 

15. civis and hostis. In speaking of a modern state, we 
think of its government under three heads. Legislature Judicature 
Executive. At Rome, as in primitive states generally, the first 
and second of these were only rudimentary, the third was all- 
important. The internal duty of the Executive was chiefly the 
maintenance of custom, keeping the state solid within. The 

H. 2 



1 8 fetiales. civis. hostis [ch. 

means of slow progressive change existed in fiction and creation 
of precedents. The pressure of an unprivileged population, 
claiming rights, came in due time. Externally the chief duty of 
the Executive was to secure the safety of the state. This meant 
that the relations of the state to other powers must be satisfactory 
both in peace and war. Success in war meant superiority in 
peace. To attain this success three things were of use, military 
organization, alliances, and divine favour. Discipline and diplo- 
macy were early and lasting growths of the Roman system. But 
the cause of Rome must, to secure divine approval, always appear 
as the rightful cause. Hence the formalities attending a declara- 
tion of war were punctiliously carried out under precise rules of 
the same character as those governing the relations of citizens to 
each other, and of each and all to their gods. So too in concluding 
peace and making treaties. These matters were all managed 
through an ancient religious gild {collegium fetialium). Other 
Italian peoples had the same institution, and at Rome at least 
there was an elaborate system of ius fetiale. The Fetials decided 
points of ' international ' law, and a deputation from their college 
went to the frontier to perform the needful acts. The spirit of all 
these international dealings was the same as that prevailing at 
home, the aim being to get an advantage and if possible to put 
the other side technically in the wrong. When the growth of 
Rome brought her into contact with enemies outside Italy, various 
difficulties arose, which were met by fiction and modification of 
practice to suit new circumstances. But the Fetials and Fetial 
law lasted far into the days of the Empire. 

1 6. When the line of division between communities was so 
clearly drawn, and their relations on such a formal footing, it was 
but natural that Citizen and Alien should be sharply distinguished. 
So we find on the one hand the civis, the man whose position 
is determined by the rules of the state to which he belongs, on 
the other the hostis, the man who has no part in that state or its 
gods, but whose allegiance is due elsewhere. In Latin the word 
hostis came to mean ' enemy,' and the technical term for ' alien ' 
became peregrinus ; but the notion of ' alien ' still hung about the 
older word. The stranger had no rights as such in any state. 
He might be favoured by the grant of privileges, but it was a fixed 
rule at Rome, and probably elsewhere in Italy, that a man could 
only be civis in one state at a time. The ancient custom of guest- 



ii] foedus. commercium. conubium 19 

friendship {hospitiuni) between members of different communities 
no doubt helped to promote intercourse, but each hospes would 
be protector of his friend at home and protected abroad. It was 
a further step in civilization when one state guaranteed free access 
and friendly reception to all citizens of another state ; this was 
hospitium publicum. But the clearest and most satisfactory settle- 
ment was reached by concluding a definite treaty {foedus) ; this 
fixed the rights and duties of the two states to each other, and 
the privileges granted to citizens of each state in the other. 
Between the states it was a question of an alliance, offensive 
or defensive or both. What affected the individual citizens was 
the granting or withholding of two important privileges. One 
was the right to buy and sell, to hold and inherit property, in the 
state with which their own had made a treaty, of course under 
the legal rules of that state. The other was the right to contract 
legal marriages on equal terms, so that the wife would become 
a recognized member of her husband's family, and the children 
legitimate under the rules of the state to which he belonged. 
These two were known as the rights of commercium and conubium. 
To the citizen in his own state they were a birthright, to the alien 
a granted privilege. To establish reciprocity of this kind between 
two states tended to bind them together, and the use made of this 
fact by Roman policy had an immense influence on the history 
of Italy. For if state A were thus connected with states BCD, 
while no such reciprocity existed between B C or B D or C D, 
clearly the gainer by the general arrangement was A. And, the 
more states there were connected with A but isolated from each 
other, the greater became the advantage of A relatively to the rest. 
Now Rome took care to be A, and this policy is the external 
history of Rome in a nutshell. Where a group of communities 
were confederated, however loosely, in an union that expressed 
itself in a common name, such as Latini Volsci Hernici Marsi 
etc., it seems that reciprocal privileges of some kind prevailed 
throughout the group. This was a part, perhaps the chief part, 
of what gave them cohesion. Accordingly to make use of the 
group as a whole so long as it served her purpose, and to break it 
up when it became troublesome, was the consistent method of 
Rome in dealing with the Italian Leagues. 

17. In order to avoid obscuring the following narrative with 
frequent explanations I have given a sketch of the conditions 



20 Progress in Italy [ch. ii 

prevailing at Rome and in the neighbourhood, so far as tradition, 
supported by traces surviving in historical times, enables us to 
infer them. No attempt is made to furnish an exact chronology, 
the materials for which do not exist. The picture is neither clear 
nor brilliant. In the arts of civilization the Italian peoples were 
undoubtedly far behind the Greeks, whose maritime enterprises 
led to splendid developments in many lands. From the ninth to 
the sixth century B.C. Greek colonies were springing up along the 
coasts of Sicily and southern Italy, and their seaborne commerce, 
largely displacing that of the Phoenicians, grew in proportion to 
the spread of their settlements. But the progress of the Italians 
was slow. Their greatness was only achieved by unification 
gradually effected from within, a colourless and prosaic process. 
Rome itself long remained a centre of simple Hfe, the men mostly 
engaged in the labours of the field, the women busy with the 
spindle and loom. Value was reckoned in terms of domesticated 
animals, such as sheep oxen or swine. Long after copper came 
in as a medium of exchange, it was only taken by weight. A real 
coinage in bronze is thought to have begun only in the fifth 
century. The coarse grain spelt {far) was the staple food of the 
people. Wooden huts or houses of sun-dried bricks {lateres) were 
their dwellings : earthworks with palisades, and walls of soft local 
stone rudely hewn in squared blocks, seem to have been their 
fortification according to the nature of the ground. But progress, 
if slow, was sure. It was surely an advantage to Rome that she 
was not too civilized, too far ahead of the hardy and fertile inland 
peoples, ever spreading in swarms for want of room. She was 
able to capture and organize their strength, and to save whatever 
Greek cities they had not already destroyed in the South. In the 
North, she was able with their support to appear as champion 
of Italy against invading Gauls. The object of the foregoing 
pages is to give in brief outline some notion of the conditions 
under which the Roman community started on its wonderful 
career. 



CHAPTER III 



THE REGAL PERIOD 



i8. Regal Rome. The first stage of the Roman constitution 
recorded by tradition is one in which a sovran guide or ruler {rex) 
presides over the state. His imperium is conferred on him by 
vote of the whole community in Assembly {comitia), and held for 
life. But the Assembly could only approve or disapprove. There 
was no true 'election.' A name was submitted, and we are left 
to infer that it was accepted. The Patrician elders, who in these 
days formed the Senate, nominated a ' between-king ' (interrex) 
who proposed a name to the people, acting doubtless under 
instruction of the elders. Further formalities followed the people's 
approval, and the new ruler was made. He was supreme in 
religious functions on the state's behalf, supreme judge, supreme 
leader in war. He could appoint deputies as he saw fit. The 
council of elders is represented as chosen by the King from the 
Patricians, members of the ancient clans. The community in 
general, the populus, appears as divided into curiae, sometimes 
rendered 'wards.' These Curies were the only divisions that 
had a directly political character. According to the Roman 
system of voting, each Cury would count as one group-vote, 
and its vote would be decided by the majority within the group. 
As the number of Curies was an even one (always 30), an equal 
division was possible. It was not until later, when state questions 
had come to be decided by a popular vote, that care was taken 
to have an odd number of voting-groups. We have a tradition 
of a time when the whole community was in three parts {tribus), 
each Tribe containing ten Curies, and an assumption that there 
were ten clans [gentes) to each curia, ten families in each clan. 
This assumption could only be an ideal. But that there was 



22 The early Kingdom [ch. 

an ideal scheme seems shewn by the further tradition that the 
primitive army consisted of 3000 foot and 300 horse. Thus the 
numbers 3 and 10 formed the traditional basis of organization. 
What was the origin of the three Tribes {Titles Ramnes Luceres) 
is doubtful. So too is the composition of the curiae. They 
probably contained not only the true (Patrician) members of the 
clans but the dependent clientes (Plebeian) attached to each clan 
or family. Probably there were other Plebeians not so attached, 
and so not included, for subsequent changes are more satisfactorily 
accounted for on this supposition. It is important to note the 
tradition as to the division of the land. Roman territory was 
either state-land, over which the state retained direct control, or 
private land {ager publicus or privatiis). The legend was that 
the first king had assigned the latter in equal allotments to all 
citizens, meaning no doubt all heads of families. There are 
traces, very slight, of land owned by clans once upon a time. 
The word tribus seems from the first to have had a territorial 
meaning, but about the three primitive Tribes we know practically 
nothing. 

19. Progress in regal period. Here we have nothing but 
traditions, for the most part doubtful, some certainly false. 
Perhaps the most credible is that of the occupation of the river 
mouth {ostium) by a fortified post. This was a colonia, a town 
of settlers each having an allotment of land {colonus, from colere). 
It was called Ostia, the first of a long series of colonies. The 
land was part of the ager Romanus, and the colonists citizens, 
who remained part of the Roman community. We hear also 
of the conquest of small towns in the low country now called 
the Campagna, which appears as thickly inhabited in early times, 
and presumably healthy. The destruction of Alba Longa, and 
the succession of Rome to the presidency of the Latin League, 
referred to above, are also attributed to the time of the Kings, 
The tradition that the conquered people were in many cases 
removed to Rome, and the leading men received as Patricians, 
will account for the growth of the city, which it is clear from 
the sequel took place somehow or other, and in particular for 
the increase of the Plebeians. It is now supposed that the great 
works, such as the Main Drain (cloaca Tnaxima) by which the 
swampy ground between the hills of Rome was cleared of water, 
and the so-called ' Servian ' wall enclosing the whole city, do not 



Ill] The ' Servian ' reform 23 

belong to the Regal period. That is, the existing remains are 
assigned by experts to a later date. That some drainage took 
place, and that some fortification was erected, is possible. It is 
said that a fort was also built on the Janiculan hill on the right 
side of the river, and access provided by construction of the 
famous pile-bridge {pons sublicius). In early times great works 
seem to have been commonly carried out under single rulers, 
and we cannot assume that Rome was an exception. But the 
most famous event traditionally connected with the regal period 
is the great internal reform attributed to Servius Tullius, last but 
one of the traditional kings. 

20. Omitting details, this change appears as a new organiza- 
tion of the whole community for military purposes, only later 
becoming invested with a political character. Whatever its details 
and date, it marks a great step in the transition from birth to 
wealth as the foundation of civic importance. We are left to 
infer that the original military system was inadequate, throwing 
on members of the ancient clans a burden greater than they 
could well bear. Religion would forbid interference with these 
clans, so a new principle of organization had to be applied, if 
the army of the state was to keep pace with its growth. We 
must assume that some Plebeians had acquired considerable 
property, while some Patrician families may have become poorer. 
The notion that the citizen settled on the land {adsiduus) was 
bound to bear arms for the state was probably of immemorial 
antiquity, and not peculiar to Rome. So long as all owners of 
land belonged to the old nobility of birth, it was natural that 
the core of the army, serving in full panoply, should consist of 
Patrician clansmen. Plebeians furnishing at most a body of light 
troops. But it was commonly recognized in ancient communities 
that only men of property could provide for themselves a suit of 
armour and good weapons. We find this distinction in Greece, 
and it has been thought that the Servian reform was partly copied 
from a Greek model. The Patricians being no longer the sole 
landowners, the principle of the change was to provide that 
owners of land. Patrician and Plebeian alike, should share the 
duty of army service in proportion to their property. For this 
purpose the people were divided into five ' callings ' or * summon- 
ings' {classes), from the rich in the first class (called specially 
classict) down to the poor in the fifth. Those who had nothing 



24 The Army, legio [ch. 

worth taking into account were lumped together in a single group 
and were not liable to military service. The richest of all were 
those able to afford to serve on horseback, and required to do 
so. A few special services, artificers and musicians, were also 
provided for. The military nature of the scheme appears in the 
division of the classes into Centuries. The word centuria (loo 
of anything) had ceased to bear its primary meaning, as is clear 
from the fact that half the centuries in each class were of seniores 
(men from 47 to 60), half of iuniores (men 1 7 to 46). The latter 
of course contained more men. The seniors formed the home- 
army or garrison, the juniors the field-army. Thus beside the 
distinction based on property there was that based on age. The 
number of centuries in the several classes is given thus i (80) 
II (20) III (20) IV (20) V (30) = 170 of infantry. Add 4 for the 
artificers and trumpeters, and 18 centuries of cavalry (equites), 
and the total was 192. The mass of unqualified poor were 
counted as a single century, making the final total 193. The 
equipment of the combatant centuries varied from the full outfit 
of the first class down to that of the fourth, who carried spear 
and javelin only. In battle order the first class stood in front, 
with the second and third behind them. The fourth and fifth 
seem to have served as skirmishers, the latter being slingers. 
Thus there was a sort of solid phalanx of heavy-armed foot with 
light troops moving freely. The cavalry according to tradition 
were the flower of the army, far more important than in later 
times. The word for an army embodied for service was legio^ a 
' picking ' or ' levy.' At some early date the necessity of forming 
more than one such military unit caused it to be applied to two 
or more corps. So it came to mean a ' legion ' in the well- 
known sense. 

21. To establish such a system as this, a general review 
of the people and their estates was necessary. Tradition there- 
fore ascribed to Servius the institution of the periodic assessment 
{census) which was a notable feature of Roman public life. It is 
most probable that at first it took account of landed property 
only. Also that the owning of land up to a given amount laid 
the obligation to serve in a given class on all members of the 
family of military age. We hear of no place assigned to men 
over 60, but they would often be heads of families. It would 
seem that they had no place themselves, but their sons had. 



in] census. New Tribes 25 

It is said that a special arrangement was made to meet the 
expenses of the cavalry-service. The state found horses, but 
feeding and grooming would be costly. So we hear of a tax 
laid on the estates of women and minors towards this outlay. 
These cases can only have been few, for such persons would 
nearly always be under the power of some head of a family, and 
so have no estate of their own. Expensive the service of equites 
was and remained. But no part of the reform was more important 
than the introduction of a Tribe-system wholly different from 
that of the three primitive divisions. Servius is said to have 
divided the community into parts {tribus) on a purely local basis, 
a measure represented as being taken for the convenience of the 
census. We hear of four Tribes in the city, but whether this 
division included the country outside, whether the four are meant 
to be the total, does not appear. At any rate the principle of 
locality was one that became more and more firmly established 
as time went on. Tradition adds that, when the various details 
of the new scheme were complete, the king held a grand review 
of the whole people assembled under their new divisions as an 
army {exerdtus), and that he performed a solemn religious purifi- 
cation with sacrifice. This ceremony, the lustratio, was always 
the proper conclusion of a Roman census, and the presiding 
magistrate was said first censuni agere, and then to ' put by ' or 
complete the purification (condere lustrum). Whether the origin 
of this reform is rightly placed in the regal period and connected 
with a king Servius (whom some declare to be a mythical figure), 
I cannot say. It is at all events ancient, and the power of 
organization implied in it is fully consistent with what we know 
of Roman growth. For it was surely her early advance in respect 
of systematic organization that gave Rome a permanent advantage 
over her neighbours. But that such business as that of a census 
could be carried out effectively without some kind of written 
record is hardly to be assumed. 

22. End of the Kingdom. The tradition that the ancient 
monarchy lasted 244 years (753 — 510) deserves no credit. And 
the legends of its latter days are mostly wild stories, some of 
them directly borrowed from the Greek. The reigns of the last 
three kings, Tarquin the Elder, Servius Tullius, and Tarquin 
the Tyrant {superhis), are made to appear a time of great activity 
and progress at home and abroad. Some have thought that we 



26 End of the Kingdom [ck. hi 

have in the name Tarquin a trace of an Etruscan {Tarckna) 
dynasty, but this is very doubtful. The accounts of the growth 
of the city, of the predominance of Rome among the Latins, of 
the spread of Roman power, of collision with other groups, 
Rutuli Volsci Aequi, to the South and East, may contain some 
truth. But the last king is a figure modelled on that of a Greek 
Tyrant, a work of imagination, formed to account for his ex- 
pulsion by a justly enraged people. When we note that the 
fall of the monarchy was followed by an aristocracy of Patrician 
nobles, it appears certain that the portrait of Tarquin, as an 
usurper who disregarded all customary rules of right and oppressed 
the poor, is historically worthless. It has even been doubted 
whether such an event as the sudden deposition of the last king 
ever took place. But the suggestion that the monarchy died out 
very gradually, functions being taken from the kings bit by bit, 
is hardly more easy to believe. We have in short a drama before 
us. The curtain falls on the single ruler, and rises again on a 
chief magistracy held by two colleagues. I do not think we can 
with reasonable confidence say any more. The circumstances in 
which the election of consuls first took place are no less fictitious 
than the tragedy of Lucretia. Somehow or other the Patrician 
nobles had their will. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE REPUBLIC 509—449 B.C. 

23. Magistracy. Little trust can be placed in the dates 
of this period, and they are given for whatever the tradition may 
be worth. We hear that the sovran imperium was now held by 
two ' leaders ' {praetores) at once. Both had it in full, for there 
was no division of function, so that each could neutralize at will 
the command of the other. Their power was thus in effect 
limited by the possibility of disagreement, and another limit 
was that of yearly tenure. We do hear of disagreements, but 
as rare occurrences, never pushed so far as to endanger the safety 
of the state. Friction was lessened by the growth of a custom 
of taking turns to officiate. One praetor took duty for a month, 
attended by his beadles {lictores) bearing the bundles of rods 
{fasces) which were the sign of imperium. His partner took the 
next month, and so on alternately. At the end of the year there 
was no power to compel them to resign office or to hold an 
election of successors. It seems that custom, created by general 
understanding, was enough. Nor need we doubt that common- 
sense and good faith sufficed to establish a wholesome tradition 
in the early Republic. Aristocratic governments, ever jealous of 
individual encroachment, have always taken care to keep their 
magistrates in order. And the moral force of precedent was the 
soul of Roman politics. At some early but uncertain date the 
name consules (almost ~ * colleagues ') superseded that of praetores 
as the title of the chief magistrates, thus laying the chief stress 
on their equality. Clear traces of the old kingship remained. 
A titular King was still kept {rex sacrorum) for the performance 
of certain religious functions. This post, of no political import- 



28 Senate [ch. 

ance, was never abolished, and was held to the last by Patricians 
only. Moreover, in the event of neither consul being able to 
hold the election of successors, the same old plan was followed 
as on a vacancy of the throne, namely the appointment of an 
interrex by the Patrician senators, with a temporary imperium for 
the purpose. When the consuls had to assign some special 
function, such as command in war, to one of the two, this was 
done either by voluntary agreement or by casting lots. Such was 
Roman unity in duality. 

24. Senate. The Senate of this period was a continuation 
of the old Council of the King, but the choice of members had 
passed to the consuls. The normal or ideal number was 300. 
Senators had to be men of ripe age, at all events over 46 years. 
In practice they held their places for life, unless removed on the 
ground of acts customarily regarded as disgraceful. Whether any 
Plebeians were actually included in their number has been doubted. 
In any case they must have been very few. No doubt the choice 
of members amounted to a sort of rough representation of the 
Patrician clans. The House seem to have been addressed 
collectively as J>aires, for after the admission of Plebeians we 
hear that thepatres and those enrolled with them {conscripti) were 
addressed jointly as patres conscripti. Senators soon, if not from 
the first, came to be allowed a foremost place on all public 
occasions, and certain distinctions of dress. Grades of rank 
soon arose among the members, for those who had held public 
oflfice continued to wear the semi-royal gown of the consul. At 
first no doubt the Fathers were simply the Advisory Board of the 
consuls, but as a permanent body by the side of changing 
magistrates they could hardly help acquiring more and more 
influence. The Senate quickly became the store-house of ex- 
perience, the exponent of public custom and precedent. It was 
able to meet on short notice and give advice in emergencies, for 
the members normally lived in the city or within easy reach. 
The right to make proposals {sententiam dicere) and to vote by 
division (discessio) existed early, and enabled the opinion of the 
majority to be ascertained with ease. But the power of the 
presiding magistrate, great even in later times, was probably 
dominant at first to an extraordinary degree. It lay with him 
to put a question to the House or not, and opinions could only 
be expressed at his invitation. But in this primitive procedure 



iv] Assemblies 29 

were the germs of the senatorial debates of a later age. For the 
present we need only remark that the republican Senate began its 
wonderful career as the organ of Patrician conservatism, the head- 
quarters of opposition to those Plebeian claims of which tradition 
has so much to say in the next 150 years. 

25. Assemblies. The history of popular Assemblies in the 
first years of the Republic is very obscure. Tradition represents 
the election of the first consuls as taking place in the Assembly 
by Centuries. This cannot be trusted, but it is possible. That 
military organization did at some early date become a voting 
body, but we do not know when. At all events two forms of 
Assembly existed side by side, that meeting by Curies and that by 
Centuries. Both alike were group-systems, in which the vote of 
each group, large or small, counted as one. No Assembly voting 
by heads as a single body ever existed in Rome. The only body 
of political importance in which account was taken of the 
majority of the whole number of those present and voting was 
the Senate. Of the Curies we know that they were connected 
with the ancient Patrician organization of clans. Whether all 
Plebeians were included in them we do not know ; probably not. 
At any rate many of the Plebeians were clients of Patrician 
houses, and compelled to follow the lead of their protectors 
{patroni). But all men of military age were included in the 
Centuries, and those over 60 soon found a place there, when 
once the civic army became a political Assembly. The Curies 
were based on the hereditary system of the past, the Centuries on 
the property-standards of the present. The transfer of power 
from the former to the latter was probably a gradual process, 
of which we hear nothing. One thing is clear. The revolution 
that ended the old monarchy was not in the interest of the mass 
of poor Plebeians. By the arrangement of the Centuries the 
power was in the hands of the wealthy, for the first Class (80 
Centuries) together with the equites (18 Centuries) controlled 
more than half of the total (193 Centuries) of group-votes. And 
these wealthier classes voted first, and seldom disagreed, so that 
by Roman custom, once a majority of Centuries had voted one 
way, voting ceased, and the rest were seldom called on to vote at 
all. It is plain that elections could be, and doubtless were, in 
practice a mere matter of agreement among the rich, chiefly 
Patricians. As for legislation (probably a rare event in these 



30 contio. comitia. Tribunate [ch. 

days), or for the use of political pressure, to remove grievances 
and better the condition of the poorer classes, the Assemblies 
provided no machinery at all. If any movement were to be made 
in this direction, some new machinery must be devised. It was 
and remained a fixed rule in Roman public life that no formal 
Assembly could do anything but vote for or against a proposal 
laid before it by the presiding magistrate. There could be no 
amendments and no debate. If the magistrate wanted to address 
the people (surely a rare thing in this period), he spoke to an 
informal meeting {contio). Once the people broke up into their 
voting-units, the stage of ' groupings ' {cofniiia) was reached ; it 
was an Assembly. And the power of the magistrate was immense, 
even at an election. He could refuse to receive votes for a 
candidate if he thought him unfit. And all public formal pro- 
ceedings began with taking auspices to secure the approval of the 
gods. This reminded all men of the sacred character which the 
consul inherited from the king. In truth we may say that in these 
early days the awe inspired by the consuls as men accepted by the 
gods was more important than the fact of their election by the 
votes of men. They were Patricians, nominees of Patricians, 
and utterly unlikely to take part in any movement calculated 
to lessen the privileges attached to Patrician birth. To gain 
anything, it was necessary for the Plebeians to find a means 
of putting forward their claims. 

26. The Tribunate. Tradition represents the cruel law of 
debt as the main grievance of the Roman Commons. This is 
credible enough, for the debt-question appears as causing trouble 
in the early history of many states. A good instance is found in 
ancient Athens. High rates of interest and inability to pay, 
followed by the loss of the debtor's land and bondage of his 
person, pledged to the creditor, are the common phenomena. 
At Rome we hear that this question was complicated with that of 
the state domain-lands. The ager publicus was being more and 
more granted to the rich, chiefly or wholly to Patricians, as 
tenants of the state. Poor Plebeians wanted allotments, but there 
was now no king able if willing to protect their interests. So the 
land was passing more and more into Patrician hands, either 
under the pretext of reserving state-domains or under the operation 
of the law of debt. This picture is probably coloured by details 
borrowed from the circumstances of a later age, but that there 



iv] secessio. auxiliufn. intercessio 31 

was some sort of land-question already is likely enough. We can 
also believe that frequent wars led to the devastation of farms, 
and so impoverished many. It appears also that one who had 
become his creditor's bondman still remained a citizen liable to 
serve in war. The situation, however doubtful the details may 
be, was intolerable, and the only means of extorting any con- 
cession from the ruling class was to refuse army service under 
present conditions. Here we come upon the famous story of the 
first 'withdrawal' {secessio) of the Plebs. We hear that they 
marched out in a body to a spot by the river Anio, the 'sacred 
mount' {mons sacer), and only consented to return under con- 
ditions which amounted to a treaty solemnly sworn to by both 
parts of the state, in fact to a recognition of the Plebs as a 
separate community within the state. The story is made up of 
legendary details ; all we can gather from it is that the Roman 
Commons insisted on having officers of their own to look after 
their interests, and the military necessities of the time enabled 
them to carry their point. These officers they called 'tribe- 
leaders' {tribuni) of the Commons {plebis), taking the name from 
the tribe- officers of the army-system. They were at first two 
in number (like the consuls), but were soon raised to five, and 
afterwards to ten. Their duty was to protect the Plebeians 
against oppressive use of the imperium. Theirs was a negative 
power, known as 'succour' {auxilium). If one consul gave an 
order, and his colleague refused to interfere, a tribune could 
' come between ' {infercessit) and block proceedings. This power 
could be used at critical moments to extort further concessions, 
and so it was ; tradition records a rapid growth of Plebeian 
privileges through the use of this weapon. The power of the 
Tribunes gradually became positive as well as negative. Why 
then did it not supersede that of the consuls and completely 
dominate the state ? First, it carried no imperium. The tribune 
of the Plebs could not command the army. Secondly, it was 
confined to the city precinct. The tribune could not block the 
orders of the consul in the field. Thirdly, a single tribune could 
block the proceedings of the rest, and unanimity was not always 
to be attained. And in point of yearly tenure it was on the same 
footing as the consulship, while it lacked the awe inspired by the 
consulship in virtue of its religious character and the outward 
ensigns of magisterial power. Still it is evident that we have 



32 provocatio [ch. 

before us a fact of the first importance in the knowledge that the 
long political conflict between these two offices did not bring 
about the disruption of the Roman state. We may call this 
a proof of the political genius of the Roman people, thereby 
meaning that the ruling class, with all their stubbornness, knew 
when to give way rather than push opposition to fatal extremes. 

27. Imperium and provocatio. In connexion with the begin- 
nings of the Tribunate we may look at the changes which the 
overthrow of the kingdom unavoidably caused in the powers of 
the chief magistracy. We are told that the privilege of appealing 
(^provocatio') against the magistrate's sentence was made a general 
legal right, not a matter of special leave. But appeal was to the 
populus in Assembly, and no Assembly existed in which the Plebs 
had effective voting-power. Moreover it did not avail beyond the 
city precinct as against the decision of a consul commanding an 
army in the field. In short a marked distinction was growing up 
between two degrees of the imperimn, the apparently-regal at 
home idomi) and the truly-regal in the field irnilitiae). It must 
have begun very soon, and the clear limitations of the right 
of appeal and tribunician auxilium shew how firmly it took root. 
The distinction was a thoroughly sound and practical one, restoring 
unity of power just where it was most wanted, in war. Not less 
practical was the arrangement soon developed to make the local 
distinction work efficiently. The so-called pomerium, a sacred 
space within and without the whole line of the city wall, was the 
boundary of the district in which the citizen could always appeal 
and the tribune interpose. An ideal line drawn at the distance of 
a Roman mile beyond the wall, probably marked in some way on 
the roads leading in the various directions, was the boundary 
beyond which the imperium of the consul became automatically 
regal, subject to no checks. Between these bounds was a space 
in which the effect of the limitations depended on circumstances. 
If the consul had duly taken the auspices, made his vows to 
Capitoline Jove, and solemnly marched out arrayed for war, then 
his full powers as general began the moment he passed the 
pomerium. But formal acts of the imperium, such as the holding 
of a military levy or the great census-review, could take place in 
the between-space. In the city they were not allowed, and the 
review-ground was the ' plain of Mars ' {campus Martius) to the 
north of the Capitoline hill. On such occasions provocatio and 



iv] The Executive 33 

auxilium were not barred. An outward sign of the greater or 
less fullness of the imperium was seen in the fasces borne by 
the consul's lictors. In war-array each bundle of rods had an 
axe in the middle of it ; otherwise he was escorted with the rods 
alone. 

28. Dictatorship. In the early days of the Republic Rome 
was constantly engaged in wars with her neighbours. The consuls 
were often absent in the field, either in joint command of the 
army, or operating at different points with separate forces. To 
maintain the executive in vigour at home was meanwhile a necessity. 
It was natural that the old regal power of delegating authority 
should pass to the consuls, and custom soon regulated the 
principles of its use. Only the absence of both consuls made it 
necessary. The one last to leave the city then appointed a 
deputy to perform the functions of the magistracy at home until 
one or both of them should return. The deputy was ' set over 
the city ' {praefectus urbi\ and no doubt administration of justice 
was his chief duty, though he could summon the Senate and 
Assembly at need. It seems to have been the rule that such 
delegation of powers must take place whenever the consuls were 
going beyond the frontier. This was in these days generally a 
distance of about six miles, more or less. The Alban mount was 
not in the ager Romanus^ so a prefect was appointed during the 
absence of the consuls at the Latin festival. Afterwards, when 
the executive during war was otherwise provided for, the custom 
of leaving a formal deputy during the festival still remained. 
But, apart from the provision to meet the absence of consuls, it 
was sometimes convenient in seasons of internal trouble or external 
danger to place the sovran executive power in the hands of one man, 
and thus regain for a time the unity of direction lost by abolition 
of monarchy. Very early under the Republic this need was met. 
One of the consuls (chosen by lot or agreement) solemnly named 
a particular person as 'sovran of the community' {niagister populi). 
This was an act not likely to be undertaken without consulting 
the Senate, and it was probably in connexion with such emergen- 
cies that the influence of the Senate on the magistrates became 
established. The new supreme magistrate might also be a consul, 
and the acting consul not seldom did name his colleague. There 
was no form of popular election. But even in the city the axe 
appeared among the rods, and the right of appeal and the succour 
H. 3 



34 Responsibility, Initiative, Nomination [ch. 

of tribunes fell into abeyance for a while. The appointment was 
strictly for a purpose ; the dictator, as he was afterwards called, 
was expected to lay down his office so soon as his work was done, 
and in any case not to hold it more than six months, a term 
calculated no doubt to suffice for a campaign, war being waged 
only in the milder or warmer seasons of the year. He was in 
effect a temporary King. 

29. Working of government. We have sketched Magi- 
stracy Senate and People and considered their relations to each 
other. It remains to speak of three important departments of 
public life, responsibility, initiative, and what we may call nomi- 
nation. The Roman constitution at no time found room for an 
official body or person authorized by statute to supervise the 
Magistrates and bring them to account for misdeeds. Nor was 
there any power to force the present holder of imperium to stand 
a trial, had there been a court to try him. Thus while in office 
he was practically irresponsible for his acts. On leaving office he 
came under the imperium of his successors, who could judge him 
a traitor or enemy to the state, leaving him to appeal to the 
Assembly. But the Assembly by Centuries, which now heard 
these appeals, was arranged so that its decisions turned on the 
votes of the rich, mostly his brother Patricians, the very men who 
had previously conferred sovran power on him in the name of the 
sovran people. They would not lightly condemn one of their 
own order to the loss of his life or civic existence {caput). More- 
over he could not have acted without at least the acquiescence 
of his equal colleague : thus the moral guilt was not all his own. 
If such trials ever did occur (which is doubtful), responsibility so 
enforced was illusory. Later it became more serious, when the 
tribunes became strong enough to deal with offences against the 
Plebs. For the present it was practically non-existent, and never 
became regular or effective under the Republic. As for power of 
initiative, in form it rested with the Magistrate, but in practice 
the consultation of the Senate no doubt enabled that body to 
influence Magistrates from the first. So too in matters of nomi- 
nation. Either in meetings of the Senate or in private gatherings, 
the Patrician elders were able to promote the choice of trustworthy 
candidates for office, to advise a consul when and whom to name 
Dictator, to put pressure on him to choose a suitable man to serve 
under him in the subordinate post of quaestor. These three topics 



iv] Progress of the Plebs 35 

are concerned with the practical working of the constitution rather 
than its outward form. We have no tradition of any value to help 
us, but imagination may perhaps safely venture thus far. And we 
must not forget that in the back-ground of public life was the 
ever-present force of religion, directed by the permanent college 
of pontiffs, who would lose no opportunity of adding to their 
power. 

30. Progress under the Republic 509 — 449 B.C. Tradition 
records a few points, but neither dates nor details are above 
suspicion. As to the land, we hear of its being divided into 
21 parts {tribus) in 495. That there were 21 such divisions (4 
in city and 1 7 in country) at this early date is very hard to believe. 
In 486 we hear that the consul Spurius Cassius proposed to 
distribute some land in allotments to the poor citizens and to the 
Latin Allies who had helped to conquer it. The story adds that 
he was defeated, chiefly owing to the jealousy of the Roman 
poor, and put to death on the charge that his aim was to make 
himself king. This is surely nothing but a fancy picture made up 
of details belonging to a later age. But that there was land-hunger 
in early times we may well believe, and there are stories of 
pestilence and famine. In 456 it is said that the Aventine hill, 
hitherto state-land, was allotted in parcels to poor Plebeians and 
became a regular dwelling-place. It seems too that the Tribes 
were felt to be the natural basis for the grouping of the Plebs. 
In 47 1 we hear that a law authorized the Plebs to hold its own 
meetings {concilia) arranged by Tribes. Hitherto they are sup- 
posed to have been arranged by Curies. In any case they were 
simply meetings of the Plebs, not Assemblies of the whole com- 
munity {comitia) competent to make laws. The result of their 
voting was a ' resolution ' {scitum), not a binding statute {lex), 
which must be passed by the populus. But the tribunes had now 
a powerful lever in their control of these great meetings. Their 
persons were inviolable {sacro-sancti) in virtue of the solemn 
compact sworn to in 494. They were even protected from inter- 
ruption when addressing the Commons by a law or compact of 
492, under severe penalties. Thus their power steadily increased, 
for as presidents of the ever-growing Plebs they were more and 
more supported by the irresistible force of numbers. As the 
consuls had their subordinates the quaestors, so the tribunes had 
under them two aediles. The tribune claimed the power to arrest 

3—2 



36 coloniae [ch. 

and fine the consul himself if he ventured to injure Plebeian 
interests. The encroachment was no doubt gradual, but in time 
the Plebeian officer became a match for the Patrician magistrate 
in civil life, and the Roman community openly split into two 
antagonistic sections. 

31. How far the planting of town settlements (coloniae), in 
which each colonus received an allotment of land, may have 
appeased the land-hunger of Roman Plebeians, is an obscure 
matter. That these ' colonies ' were primarily garrisons is clear 
from their position. All those traditionally referred to this period 
were planted in the country of the Volsci or on the fringe of it, 
thus serving to hold a persistent enemy in check. It appears 
that they were founded by the Latins and Romans in common, 
and were nominally offshoots of the League. But no doubt they 
were in practice more nearly related to Rome than to any single 
Latin city, and the chief gainer by their foundation was Rome. 
This institution was greatly developed later. Meanwhile it is 
probable that Roman Plebeians joined these garrison-settlements 
freely, becoming ' Latins,' citizens of the towns in which they 
settled. Where there was a considerable old population, as at 
Antium on the coast, we hear of difficulties. Traditionally 
founded in 467, the place was not securely held by Rome till 338. 
This matter of colonies, closely connected with foreign policy, 
leads us to the wars of the early Republic, of which we can 
extract but a very hazy story from a mass of legends and fictions 
put together in a later age and coloured to satisfy Roman 
vanity. 

32. The legends connected with the fall of the monarchy 
dwell upon the wars with Etruscans and Latins, attributing them 
to attempts of the banished Tarquins to recover their lost king- 
dom. We hear of a great Etruscan invasion under Porsenna. 
It seems that Rome was taken, or at least compelled to accept 
hard terms, a truth disguised by the stories of Roman heroism, 
Horatius holding the bridge, Scaevola and his burnt-off hand, 
Cloelia and her maidens swimming the Tiber. The Etruscan 
lords in their strongholds were a great power, whenever the 
several cities chose to act together, and their friendship with the 
Phoenicians of Carthage added to their other resources the control 
of the sea. But their cities never acted together for long, and the 
danger from Etruria died down into a rivalry between Rome and 



IV] 



Wars of the early Republic 



Z1 



the Etruscan city of Veii, some ten miles away. The legend of 
the destruction of the 306 Fabii, the males of a Patrician clan, is 
an ornamental fiction in the story of the Veian wars. But in 
474 the first great blow fell on the Etruscan power south of the 
Apennine. The Greeks of Sicily had destroyed a Carthaginian 
force which invaded the island in 480. Led by Hiero the ruler 
of Syracuse, they now asserted their power at sea, and in a great 
battle off Cumae in Campania they defeated the Etruscan navy. 
The Etruscan power in Campania now quickly declined, and the 




Neighbourhood of Rome. 

blow was doubtless felt in Etruria also. Turning to the Latins, 
we hear of a coalition of the League-cities against Rome, and 
a war so alarming that it led (501) to the appointment of the first 
Dictator. This was ended by the famous battle of the lake 
Regillus. But it seems that Rome and the Latins needed each 
other, for in 493 the league between them was renewed through 
the consul Sp. Cassius. In 487 we hear of a war in which the 
Hernici were subdued and, as usual in such cases, a large part 
(f) of their territory annexed. But the League of Hernican 
communities lay in a position of great strategic value, between 



38 Foreign Policy. The Claudii [ch. 

the Volsci and Aequi, the two peoples especially troublesome to 
Rome and the Latins on the South and East. So the Hernici 
were admitted or compelled to join the alliance of Rome and the 
Latins. This is the first instance of a far-sighted foreign policy 
never afterwards neglected by Roman diplomacy. Wars with 
Volsci and Aequi were chronic, and lasted on well into the next 
period. The stories of Coriolanus and Cincinnatus are legendary 
episodes of the long struggle. But so long as the triple alliance 
remained unbroken under Roman guidance the result was a 
certainty. Another characteristic trait of Roman policy appears 
in the tradition of Rome's relations with the Sabines. We still 
hear of wars, and Roman victories are claimed. It is not unlikely 
that the hill-men wanted more room for their surplus population, 
and that Rome had to resist pressure on the north-eastern border. 
This she must have been able to do, for the expansion of the 
Sabines and other Sabellian peoples was diverted to the South. 
But tradition speaks of them as troubled by internal quarrels, and 
in 504 a chief named Attius Clausus is said to have migrated with 
all his clan and clients, and to have been received as an accession 
to the Roman state. Land was assigned them beyond the 
Anio, where they held the border for Rome. Under the name of 
Appius Claudius the chief became a Roman Patrician, the founder 
of a family that played a notable part in Roman history. We 
must bear in mind that many of the Patrician houses were con- 
fessedly of Sabine origin, and in a later period we shall find an 
exceptional readiness to admit the Sabine communities to the full 
franchise of Rome. The story of Clausus seems to imply that 
the Roman nobility of birth kept up a friendly connexion with 
the nobles elsewhere. So the tradition that the Tarquins allied 
themselves with the chief men of other states finds a parallel. In 
general, the traditional picture of Rome's external relations in 
this period is consistent and probable. The weakness that 
followed the expulsion of the Tarquins was gradually overcome by 
the wise policy of the aristocratic leaders, as the internal troubles 
were met by wise concessions, unwilling, but enough to avert the 
disruption of the state. The tradition that Rome made a treaty 
with Carthage at the very beginning of the Republic is too doubt- 
ful to be discussed here. 

33. The Decemvirate. In the latter years of this period we 
hear of a momentous struggle, which must be treated by itself. 



iv] The Decemvirate 39 

We are told that in 462 a tribune, C. Terentilius Harsa, began an 
attack upon the imperium vested in the consuls. Their power of 
jurisdiction was the chief point assailed. It was very great ; and 
it is said that one of their early titles was that of indices. Their 
decisions were arbitrary, for there was no written law to control 
them. The tribune proposed that a commission should be ap- 
pointed for drafting statutes to put an end to this evil. The 
details of what followed are very doubtful, for legends soon 
formed about so striking an event as the change to written law. 
Not until 454 was an agreement reached. Three envoys were 
sent to Greece to study the laws of various states, in particular 
those of Solon at Athens. They returned in 452, and in 451, 
after more bickering, the constitution was suspended by the 
appointment of ten commissioners to draw up statutes {decemviri 
legibus scribundis). They had consular imperium, and there were 
meanwhile to be neither consuls nor tribunes. Their power was 
absolute during their year of office, for there was no appeal 
against their decisions. Plebeians, it is said, were to be eligible, 
but in fact only Patricians were chosen. Their leader was Appius 
Claudius, probably son of the Sabine immigrant. Their year's 
work, besides a popular administration, was ten tables of law, 
which were exposed for criticism and, after some amendment, 
passed as statutes by the Centuriate Assembly. But there was 
still enough matter left lo fill two tables more, so it was agreed to 
appoint Decemvirs for another year to finish the work. Appius 
now appears in the story as laying aside all scruples. He procured 
by various arts the election of nine insignificant persons, five of 
them probably Plebeians, all amenable to his influence, and in 
defiance of custom (for he presided at the election) himself as 
the tenth. After this he threw off the mask. A reign of terror 
followed, and men soon longed for the restoration of the old form 
of government. The treacherous murder of the popular champion 
Siccius, and the affair of the maiden Verginia, are episodes in the 
tradition of decemviral tyranny. As usual in the story of early 
Rome, what relieved the internal distress was the pressure of 
external war. Two armies had to be raised to meet the Sabines 
and Aequi, and the march of these armies on the city, followed 
by a 'secession' of Plebeians, overthrew the Decemvirs. The 
tribunate and the consulship were restored, and two Patricians of 
popular tendencies, L. Valerius and M. Horatius, were made 



40 Law of the Twelve Tables [ch. 

consuls. The two supplementary tables were passed, and the 
whole set, the famous Twelve, engraved on bronze tablets and 
posted up in public view. 

34. The Twelve Tables. A few points in reference to these 
statutes must be mentioned. From the fragments preserved by 
later writers it is clear that they were drafted in a brief and jerky 
style, needing comment to extract the meaning. From this 
necessity arose Roman jurisprudence, a science which began with 
explaining the intended effect of the clauses in relation to actual 
cases, but soon felt constrained to interpret more freely, reading 
into the text more than its framers had intended. It appears that 
the laws regulated legal procedure, but did not supply the verbal 
forms on which the validity of pleadings generally turned. Thus 
a most important part of the procedure still remained in the hands 
of the pontiffs. It is said that the sums of fines etc. were not 
stated in heads of stock but in metallic money, a striking in- 
novation. Whether this was strictly coin (taken by the piece) or 
stamped copper or bronze (taken by weight) is not certain, but 
pecunia took the place of pecus. The statutes were mainly con- 
cerned with the law of property, family rights, successions (in- 
cluding a limited power of testamentary disposition), contracts 
(including debt), personal wrongs admitting retaliation or compen- 
sation. But there were also rules for upholding good customs such 
as simplicity of funeral rites. There were also constitutional rules, 
as that by which the appeals in cases affecting a man's civic ex- 
istence {caput) were reserved to the Assembly by Centuries, and 
that by which it was forbidden to propose laws aimed at indi- 
viduals {privilegia). Two notable provisions are attributed to 
the supplementary tables. First, the refusal to legalize marriage 
between Patricians and Plebeians, that is to allow the children of 
such a marriage to succeed to the status of the father. Secondly, 
the affirmation of the principle that a later law supersedes an 
earlier one on the same subject. The Twelve Tables as a whole 
may be said to have contained three elements. First, Survivals, 
or the translation of old customary law into written Statutes. 
Secondly, simplifications and improvements. Thirdly, direct 
borrowings from foreign systems. Of these three the first was surely 
much the most important. And the mere fact of having something 
fixed in writing, as a point of departure for future development, 
was perhaps a greater achievement than any immediate gain. 



iv] leges Valeriae Horatiae 41 

35. The Valerio-Horatian Laws. The consulship of Valerius 
and Horatius (449) was in later days held to have marked a great 
advance in the political growth of Rome. They carried laws 
which were famous as the charter of the recovered rights of 
the Plebs. One of these enacted that the Plebs meeting by 
Tribes should have power to pass resolutions binding on the whole 
community. Probably some confirmation of these was required. 
It is suggested that a regular method of procuring the sanction of 
the Senate or the Centuriate Assembly, or both, was provided. 
The tradition is incomplete. But it seems that this change led 
to the institution of another formal legislative Assembly {comitia 
tributd) which included Patricians as well as Plebeians, and was 
grouped by Tribes. The number of Tribes was small (not more 
than 21), the members of each were landholders enrolled in that 
Tribe ; rich or poor, each man had an equal voice in determining 
the vote of his Tribe. This simple grouping had been used in 
Plebeian meetings since 471. But the steps by which a regular 
Assembly of the populus on a Tribe-basis was evolved are not 
known. It had no appeal-jurisdiction in cases of a 'capital' kind. 
These the Twelve Tables reserved to the Centuries, perhaps because 
tribunes had been usurping jurisdiction over opponents of Plebeian 
claims, with appeal to their separate Plebeian meetings. On this 
supposition the Plebeians now lost their capital jurisdiction, retain- 
ing a power to impose fines, while they gained in the direction of 
legislative power. This latter power was not completely freed from 
restrictions till 162 years after. Another law forbade the election of 
any magistrate from whose judgment there should be no appeal. To 
make this rule operative the responsibility was laid on the presiding 
magistrate guilty of declaring such an election : he was outlawed, 
and might be put to death with impunity. But the non-elective 
dictatorship, and the sovran power of the consul in the field, were 
left as absolute as before. To this law a corollary was added in a 
resolution of the Plebs, declaring that whosoever ' left the Plebs 
without tribunes' should be scourged and put to death'. This was 
a direction to the tribunes to provide successors in their office. 
No Plebeian institution existed corresponding to the Patrician 
interregnum^ and we may believe that by this time the Roman 
Commoners had learnt the impossibility of dispensing with the 
power of initiative vested in regular leaders. The Plebs had 
now recovered its hard-won rights, and gained something more \ 



42 The Republic [ch. iv 

and the scene closes dramatically with victories over the Aequi 
and Sabines. 

36. Such is in outline the picture of the early Republic and 
its progress within and without under conditions of strain and 
stress. The struggle of the two Orders was only begun, but each 
concession gave the Plebeians a lever to extort more, and their 
growth in numbers (and probably in wealth) foreshadowed the 
inevitable end. The extension of Roman dominion was as yet 
trivial, but the avoidance of bloody revolutions, the slow consoli- 
dation of the state, and the beginnings of a far-sighted foreign 
policy, were signs of something hitherto unknown in the history 
of the world. The Roman People was in the making, growing 
from within and incorporating or attacking others from without, 
in a way never seen before. Among all the legendary corruption 
of annals composed long after this period, of which we have but 
reports at second or third hand, without any statistics to check 
them, this much may I think safely be affirmed. 



CHAPTER V 

THE REPUBLIC 448—367 B.C. 

37. Magistracy. In a period of just over 80 years the 
republican system now took a form which later generations were 
to modify in practice but not professedly to reconstruct. The 
development of the Roman magistracy was made necessary by the 
growth of the state, but it was carried out only after a series of 
concessions and evasions which make up the long struggle of the 
Orders. The first consular prerogative to go was the right of the 
consul to appoint his own quaestor. In 447 we hear that election 
took the place of nomination. The quaestors would be elected for 
the following year, and clearly they were on their way to become 
real magistrates. In 421 their number was raised from two to 
four, and Plebeians made eligible. In 445 a proposal of the 
tribunes to throw open the consulship to Plebeians was met by 
an evasive Patrician scheme, which was carried. Each year there 
was to be an option. The chief magistrates might be either two 
Patrician consuls, or 'tribunes of the soldiers with consular power,' 
who might be Plebeians. In the ensuing 78 years we hear of this 
makeshift office 5 1 times. The number of these consular tribunes 
was at first three, then four, and in the latter part of the period six. 
The increase in the number of holders of imperiu7?i was an impor- 
tant step, perhaps dictated by growing needs. The advance of the 
Plebs was seen in the election of the first Plebeian to this office in 
400. Things were moving; in 407 three out of four quaestors 
were Plebeians. In 443^ the recent proposal (445) in regard to 
the consulship probably had some effect in hastening the reason- 
able transference of some hitherto consular duties to new officers. 

■^ In 435 according to Mommsen. 



44 Censorship [ch, 

These duties were those connected with the census, and the officials 
were called censores, two equal colleagues, charged with the periodi- 
cal revision of the register of citizens and their properties. The 
normal revision-period was every fourth year, the fifth by the old 
Roman reckoning, and the consuls had not the leisure to do the 
work regularly. It was necessary to see that every citizen was 
placed in his proper Class Century and Tribe, in order to deter- 
mine what his rights and duties in relation to the state were to be 
until the next census. This involved the preparation of the list of 
senators, and that of the eqicites or 'Knights' liable to cavalry- 
service. Such functions, at first regarded as subordinate (the 
censor had no imperium), were likely to become more important in 
time. And the classification of citizens according to property was 
not all. It was the censors' duty to degrade those whose behaviour 
in peace or war was a scandal to Roman notions of right. Thus 
they had to inquire into men's life and conduct {mores) judged by 
the standard of approved Roman practice {disciplina), an arbitrary 
jurisdiction which was soon held to include the right of interfer- 
ence in matters of private life. That the powers of the censorship 
grew we shall see later. An important department of its work was 
the supervision of state-contracts {publico), whether the right to 
collect state dues was granted to lessees for a fixed payment, or 
public works let to contractors at a fixed price. The bargain held 
good until the next census. Under this farming-out system a 
regular class of state-contractors {publicani) grew up, and the 
censorship became the chief organ of finance. No responsibility 
attached to ex-censors for official acts. The term of office was a 
year and a half The censorial period of four (afterwards five) 
years was at first not strictly observed. No statute seems to have 
confined the office to Patricians, but in practice it was so confined 
till 351. No doubt the religious function of the closing purifica- 
tion {lustrum) had much to do with this, for no Plebeian censor 
performed that ceremony till 280. The office was soon regarded 
as one of supreme dignity, only to be held by ex-consuls, in short 
the crown of an official career. 

38. Thus by the loss of certain powers and functions the 
consulship was steadily becoming less regal in character. But it 
was still felt to be the normal chief magistracy, and the Patricians 
clung firmly to their monopoly of it. The expedient of consular 
tribunes was a temporary one. Once Plebeians began to be 



v] The struggle of the Orders 45 

elected, and no harm came of it, their demand to share the 
consulship grew stronger. Another Patrician device was the 
appointment of dictators, resorted to 15 times in this period, 
not always under the pressure of war. M. Furius Camillus, the 
great man of the time, was five times dictator. But this plan also 
was one that could not be in constant use, for fear of reviving the 
monarchy. Yet the Patricians struggled on. It seems that already 
there was a division of interests among Plebeians, and that the 
Tribunes of the Commons were not unanimous. Thus in 417 
we hear of a bill {rogatid) for allotments of some conquered land, 
which is said to have fallen through owing to some tribunes 
blocking the proposal made by others. We shall see below how 
this weakening division was ended and the Plebeians won the 
consulship. Meanwhile the tribunate was steadily gaining ground. 
It appears that the tribunes had acquired the right to sit by the 
door of the senate-house and watch proceedings. We hear of 
their intercessio against decrees of the House. In fact, so long as 
they pulled together and had the whole Plebs to support them, 
there was no way of resisting their obstructive po.ver. 

39. Senate. Two sets of causes affecting the position of the 
Senate were at work in this period ; their effects become manifest 
in the next. On the one hand, great emergencies threw the 
direction of state policy more and more into the hands of a body 
which according to traditional dates (509, 449) had now the 
authority given by 60 years of free experience. On the other, the 
growth of the Plebs and the struggle of the Orders tended to 
weaken the hands of a body still in the main Patrician. That 
Plebeians of wealth and position were finding their way into the 
House may be inferred from the fact that they had been eligible 
for the Decemvirate and were now admitted to the quaestorship 
and consular tribunate. But it seems certain that they were few. 
With the extinction of some old Patrician houses it was necessary 
to strengthen the Senate by including Plebeians, but the men of 
the old clans were slow to recognize the necessity. It was probably 
in this period that the procedure of the House took its regular 
form, little modified in later times. The order in which the 
presiding magistrate called on members to express their views, 
magistrates and ex-magistrates having the precedence, the rules 
of debate, the methods of division, with power to count votes 
when desired, were the chief features. A final order or ruling of 



46 Senate [ch. 

the House was a ' conclusion reached in common ' (called 
consulium) : viewed as a concurrence in the magistrate's order 
it was a ' decision ' {decretum). The two terms were afterwards 
used loosely as equivalents, when the Senate had become in 
practice a governing body. It was recorded in writing at the end 
of the sitting, and the correctness of the draft attested by adding 
the names of those senators who had watched its preparation. 
But a magistrate of powers equal to those of the chairman could 
interpose a Veto, so that the conclusion became invalid, and this 
right was in this period successfully claimed by tribunes of the 
Plebs. In these circumstances it soon became the custom to 
record the conclusion nevertheless. It was not a formal cotisultum 
but a ' resolution of the House ' (senatus auctoritas) which on 
removal of the hindrance might be agreed to as a final order 
without further debate. We can see how strong the power of 
magistrates still was. The presiding consul decided what question 
he would put, and the old notion that the Senate was his Advisory 
Board was by no means extinct. In bringing the matter to 
a vote he was said to make {facere) an order of the Senate. 

40. But the real influence of the Senate was certainly 
growing. A strong dictator backed up by the collective wisdom 
of the Fathers gave Rome at a critical moment six months of the 
most effective government known, concentrated power and moral 
force. And it became more and more difficult for the strongest 
magistrate to ignore or reject the opinion of the House. By 
degrees it was getting into its hands all matters in which the 
policy of the state, rather than the enactment of statutes, was in 
question. Thus it dealt with public religious worships, with 
jurisdiction in cases where a precedent had to be created, with 
the provisions for raising and equipping an army. Commanders 
sought its advice on doubtful points, and received from it the 
honours that rewarded victory. Dealings with Allies, the treat- 
ment of conquests, terms of peace with enemies, and external 
policy generally, came before the Senate. The finance of the 
state was soon brought under its control, and this enabled the 
House to interfere in other departments, by voting or refusing 
special grants of money. In internal administration, such as the 
maintenance of order or provision against dearth, it became the 
regular custom for magistrates to seek the approval of the Senate 
for the measures necessary, in short for every departure from 



v] Assemblies 47 

routine. And every time its approval was thus sought one more 
precedent was added to the existing heap, till the weight became 
irresistible. For the present magistrates still kept some indepen- 
dent power, and the right of the Senate to interfere in so many 
various departments was not conferred on that House by statute- 
law. But unwritten custom was at work, slowly converting the 
power of ' sanction ' or ' guarantee ' {auctoritas) into a means of 
controlling the whole machinery of government. It was only the 
struggle of the Orders during this period that effectually delayed 
the Senate's attainment of such a control. Let the Plebeian once 
be equalized with the Patrician, and this check on senatorial 
aggrandizement would be removed. 

'4;'. Assemblies. The Assemblies of the community could 
now be held in three forms, by Curies Centuries or Tribes {curiatim^ 
centuriatim, tributim). The first method was in practice obsolete, 
save for certain formal and religious purposes. The second was 
the sovran Assembly for legislation, capital appeal-trials, and 
declaration of war. The third was new, hardly as yet in full 
activity, not yet possessed of final legislative power, but on the 
way to gain it. Meanwhile it could pass resolutions, and the 
growth of the Plebeian majority made it more and more difficult 
for the Centuries and the Senate to refuse to accept and confirm 
them. These three were comitia of the populus, and it was recog- 
nized that from the populus all sovran power was derived. The 
Assembly by Tribes grew out of the ' meeting of the Commons ' 
{concilium plebis), in which Patricians had no part, but in true 
Roman fashion the development of the comitia tributa did not 
abolish the Plebeian meeting. Strange it is, but it seems certain, 
that the two existed side by side to the last age of the Republic. 
As the ancient clans dwindled, and Patricians became few, the 
composition of the voting Tribes was practically the same in both 
cases. But they differed in respect of their presiding officers. 
For regular comitia a regular magistrate was required, but the 
tribune of the Commons, not as yet a regular magistrate and 
never possessed of imperium, was from the first the regular 
president of Plebeian meetings, and it was in these meetings that 
the tribunes were elected. Nor did they stand in the same 
relation to rehgion. The Plebeian officer could not as such take 
the auspices on behalf of the state {publica), for his powers were 
not derived from the populus, SQ the exclusively Plebeian meeting 



48 lex Canuleia [ch. 

did without them. This does not mean that an unlucky sign (an 
earthquake etc.) would be disregarded, but that signs from birds 
would not be looked for, or only as a personal matter {privata). 
The number of Tribes was raised in this period (389) from 21 
to 25. 

42. Progress under the Republic 448 — 367 B.C. The first 
serious sign of the coming collapse of Patrician opposition 
appeared in the year 445, when the tribune Canuleius succeeded 
in having his proposal, to recognize marriages between Patricians 
and Plebeians as legal, passed into law. If the tradition be 
sound, he would seem to have thus procured the repeal of a law 
of the Twelve Tables. Henceforth the child of a mixed marriage 
would be Patrician or Plebeian according to the status of the 
father ; the child of a Plebeian mother could succeed to all the 
religious quality hitherto vested solely in those of pure Patrician 
blood. This change clearly points to a recognition of the simpler 
forms of a Plebeian marriage as valid from the point of view 
of Patrician family law. Patricians could and did still use their 
elaborate ancestral forms among themselves, and a few old priest- 
hoods were still reserved to the offspring of such marriages. But 
the door was opened for a blending of the Orders, and the case 
for Patrician monopoly of iviperium and auspiciutn was given up 
from the religious side, just as it was from the political side by 
the expedient of consular tribunes. The capacity of the Plebeians 
for equal rights was virtually admitted, and the tendency of the 
formal Roman religion to become a mere political instrument no 
doubt strengthened. In short, we are at the beginning of a new 
division of interests in the state, a cleavage marked by a line 
between Rich and Poor, destined to shew itself clearly, and to 
become permanent, so soon as the struggle of the Orders came 
to an end. The frequent wars and devastation of farms would 
assuredly cause much distress. It is not wonderful that we hear 
of a great dearth of food. Tradition tells how one Sp. Maelius 
tried to relieve the poor by doles of imported corn, and was put 
to death (439) on the ground that he aimed at monarchy in thus 
courting popular favour. So too we hear of the pressure of debt, 
of the attempt of M. Manlius (the defender of the Capitol against 
the Gauls) to give relief, and his execution (384) on the same 
ground. These stories are coloured by later imagination, but the 
picture of distress is probably founded on fact, and it helps to 



v] The Army 49 

explain the long agitation at the end of this period, ending in the 
Licinian laws. 

43. In a state where Citizen and Soldier were the same, two 
characters in one person, where the Army and the sovran Assembly 
were one, in an age when the sword was the active organ of foreign 
policy, the importance of a good military system was naturally 
immense. We hear that in 406, when the warfare with Veii 
entered on its last stage, the necessity of winter operations led to 
a change in the conditions of service. It is said that the state- 
treasury undertook to provide pay. The details of the change 
are obscure, but it is enough that the burdens of the citizen 
drawn away from his civil occupations were in some way lightened. 
And it seems fairly certain that the new organization of the field 
army, which was in working order during the next period, was at 
least begun in the present, and probably due to Camillus. It was 
partly a change of formation. The old order of battle consisted 
mainly in a solid phalanx or column of foot, with the best-armed 
men in front. It must have been very clumsy, and hardly to be 
reformed when once broken. We may guess that in 390 it had 
proved a failure against the Gauls. In the new order each corps 
or army-unit {legio) consisted of thirty companies or ' handfuls ' 
{manipuli), and each maniple was divided into two sections 
{centuriae). There were three fighting lines. First stood 10 
maniples (120 men each) of hastatt, the younger men. Next 
10 (120 each) q{ principes, men of ripe manhood. Behind them 
were 10 (60 each) of triarii, old soldiers. Their special functions, 
to lead the attack, to push it home, and to act as a steady reserve, 
are obvious. To these 3000 infantry of the line were added 1200 
light troops {velites) and 300 cavalry, and the combatant legion 
was complete. The foot were so arranged that there was standing- 
room for a maniple between each two maniples of the same line, 
while those of the next line stood opposite these gaps. Thus the 
new order gave great freedom of movement, and, if one part of the 
line was thrown into disorder, the rest of the companies, trained 
to act as separate units, need not lose their fighting efficiency. 
Moreover, the skirmishers could retreat through the gaps without 
throwing the main body into confusion. The horse, in this period 
still efficient, fought on the wings. The one grave defect of the 
manipular legion was that it could be rolled up into a mass by a 
sudden charge of cavalry. 

H. 4 



50 The Legion. Allied contingents [ch. 

44. The arms and armour of the soldiers were also improved. 
A handy sword, good for thrusting, was introduced now or soon 
after, and other changes made. The chief of these was that the 
spear {hastd) was used by the triarii only. To the men in the 
first and second lines was given a heavy javelin {pilum), which 
was hurled at the enemy and followed up at close quarters with 
the sword. This method of attack, perhaps developed by expe- 
rience in the next period, became the characteristic movement of 
Roman tactics. When the regular system of encampments, with 
earthwork and palisade, first came in, is not known, but it seems 
to have been already in use, and the spade did much to promote 
the advance of Roman power. Of officers we need only note that 
each legion had six captains {tribuni militiim), and each maniple 
two centurions or sergeants, one to each century. On the 
embodiment of a legion every man took the solemn military oath 
{sacramentum), binding him to obey orders and flinch from no 
danger, and there were no limits to the power of a general in the 
field. Such in brief outline was the Roman army. But we 
must not forget the Allies, the Latin and Hernican contingents 
furnished according to treaties. No doubt they were good 
soldiers, probably equipped and organized very much like the 
Romans, perhaps not with quite the same uniformity. And 
troops drawn from a number of scattered communities would 
hardly attain full military cohesion in the course of a short 
campaign. But on the whole we have good reason to believe 
that no combination so effective and so capable of development 
as that of Rome and her Allies existed in any part of Italy. It is 
clear that the tendency of the Roman army-reform was to employ 
each soldier-citizen in the kind of work for which he was best fitted, 
discarding obsolete considerations of social and political status. 
In the long run this would have a levelling influence on politics. 
And frequent contact with the Allies as comrades in arms would 
surely promote some assimilation, enough to make jealousies 
and quarrels less bitter. These tendencies should be borne in 
mind, for they were working powerfully both now and in a later 
age. 

45. The general course of Roman expansion in this period 
is to be traced by the foundation of colonies and the allotment 
of land. The tradition on these points agrees on the whole with 
the story of the wars. We hear of five ' Latin ' colonies, Ardea 



v] Colonies. Land-allotments 51 

(442) Satricum (385) and Setia (382) in the land of the Rutuli 
and Volsci, and Sutrium with Nepete (383) in Etruria. These 
mark the advance of Rome southwards and northwards. The 
settlers would be * Latins,' some perhaps drawn from the Latin or 
Hernican Allies, but probably most of them Roman Plebeians 
who migrated to secure plots of land, giving up their Roman 
citizenship. We also hear of land allotted in parcels to Roman 
citizens, as the territory of conquered Veii (393) and some of the 
Pomptine lowland (383). Whether the earlier allotment at Labici 
(418 or 417) took the form of founding a citizen-colony is doubt- 
ful. But in any case it seems clear that a considerable relief of 
land-hunger took place without a corresponding increase of 
Plebeian citizens. This was surely no accident, but deliberate 
policy guided by the Senate. In 387 there were four new Tribes 
formed in the Veientine district, but this was all. That the land- 
hunger was not at an end we shall see below. It is also clear that 
the removal of discontented Plebeians to garrison-towns both 
relieved political pressure within and strengthened the hold of 
Rome on her own territory. The first shock of invasion, and the 
damage of border-raids, would fall either on the garrison colonies 
or on the Latin-Hernican Allies, while the old ager Romanus 
would suffer little. The stories of conflict and the temporary loss 
of colonies, which had to be recovered or reinforced, particularly 
on the Volscian seaboard, serve to confirm this view. We must 
also note that most of the advance of Roman posts is placed 
after the Gaulish invasion (traditional date 390). That willing 
colonists were found may be a result of Roman distress. That 
posts could be found in which to plant them may be a sign of the 
extent to which the neighbouring peoples had been shaken by the 
coming of the Gauls. 

46. The story of the wars of Rome is still full of legendary 
matter, dressed up by later writers to please the Romans and 
gratify the pride of great houses. A few points are fairly certain. 
First, the Aequi and Volsci had by the end of this period ceased 
to be serious rivals of Rome and her Allies. They never re- 
covered from their overthrow in the war of 431. We hear of 
risings in 389 and 385, both unsuccessful. But our tradition 
says that in these later wars they had sympathy and secret help of 
volunteers from Roman Allies. This tradition is not to be ignored, 
for about this time the relations of Rome and her Allies seem to 

4—2 



52 Latins. Etruscans [ch. 

have been changed, a change of which we have no direct account. 
It is inferred that Rome put a stop to extensions of the Latin 
League. Henceforth no newly-founded Latin community was 
admitted a member of the League. The League as a federal 
organization was left on its present footing, to become more and 
more a shadow. The new Latin colonies were connected by 
reciprocity of private rights {commercium and conubiuni) with 
Rome only, not with the old Latin towns or with each other. 
This ingenious device, doubtless the Senate's work, became a fixed 
principle of Roman policy. The connecting threads formed by 
the blending of private interests were meant to meet in Rome as 
a centre. By this centralizing influence, always operative, Rome 
could go on binding new communities to herself over a wider and 
wider area, without sacrificing her position as their natural leader 
or creating rivals. The final settlement with the League had to 
wait for another half-century, but the present change of policy 
foreshadowed the end. Meanwhile we hear of war between Rome 
and some old Latin cities, such as Praeneste and Tusculum. 
The latter, on its submission in 381, is said to have received the 
Roman franchise. Whether this was the full civitas, including 
the * public rights ' with enrolment in a Roman Tribe, or the half- 
franchise (the later civitas sine suffragio), is not certain. In either 
case the Tusculans would have no political connexion with any 
other power than Rome. 

47. The advance of Rome northwards is a strange story, 
not to be trusted in details, but its general truth will be shewn by 
explanations given below. At first we hear of border warfare as 
before. Fidenae, the town commanding a well-known passage of 
the Tiber, is taken and retaken, but Veii, backed by Capena, 
is the centre of Etruscan resistance. Then comes the ten-years 
siege of Veii (406 — 396) full of edifying legends, in short a later 
Roman echo of the tale of the Trojan war. The hero is Camillus. 
Rome is now in so strong a position that Camillus, charged with 
embezzling booty, is driven into exile. The Etruscans of Clusium 
in 391 appeal to her for aid against the Gauls, though she had 
been striking at their kinsmen of Falerii and Volsinii since Veii 
fell. Rome provokes the Gauls by an injudicious embassy, and 
in 390 they march southwards and defeat and break up the 
Roman army by the river Allia. Rome is taken and burnt, but 
amid general disaster and paralysis the Capitoline citadel holds 



v] The coming of the Gauls 53 

out for more than six months. This part of the story is a mass 
of legends, such as the tale how M. Manlius, waked by the sacred 
geese, drove off a surprise-party of the besiegers. Such too is the 
dramatic scene when Camillus, recalled from banishment, rescues 
Rome just when a ransom was being paid to Brennus the Gaulish 
king. No doubt the Gauls, unskilled in sieges and probably 
reduced by hunger and sickness, agreed to go on payment of 
a ransom. The damage done to the power of Rome was surely 
exaggerated in a later age as a background for pictures of Roman 
heroism. The burning of the city may well be true, and with it 
the destruction of all or most of whatever records then existed. 
We hear that the citizens were helped by the state to rebuild their 
houses, but no care was taken to enforce building in regular streets. 
Some modern archaeologists hold that this was the time when 
Rome was girt with the great line of fortification commonly called 
the Servian Wall. After the departure of the Gauls we have an 
astounding picture of the Roman revival. We have already seen 
her advance to the South and her treatment of the Latins. But 
we hear also of her pressing on into the district of Tarquinii, one 
of the chief Etruscan cities, and becoming so dominant in southern 
Etruria that she could hold her fortress-colonies in the teeth of 
Etruscan opposition. 

48. We must now look far beyond the Roman borders, 
where we find events happening that account for most of the 
above strange story. About 425 b.c. the power of the Etruscans 
was falling fast. In the North it had been hard pressed by the 
Celtic invasion from beyond the Alps. Tribe after tribe of Gauls 
poured into the lowlands, and by 396 they were practically masters 
in the region of the Po, afterwards known as Cisalpine Gaul. In 
the South the Etruscan hold on Campania was lost. Their chief 
city Volturnum (later Capua) was taken in 424 by the Samnites, 
who soon occupied all that rich country, and in 420 even took the 
Greek city of Cumae. The Etruscan system was clearly out of 
date. The lords of the cities of Etruria could neither assimilate 
their serf-population nor act effectively in concert among them- 
selves. Hence Rome had been able to hold her ground against 
them, and the pressure of the Gauls had so occupied the northern 
cities that they now allowed southern Etruria to fall into Roman 
hands. When the Gauls came upon them from beyond the 
Apennine, they sought Roman aid to little purpose. When the 



54 The Western Greeks [ch. 

remnant of the barbarians, after burning Rome, withdrew with 
their booty to the North, the disastrous effect of their invasion 
probably left the cities of Etruria exhausted. They were evidently 
not growing communities like Rome, and so Rome was for the 
present able to work her will. It is said that one reason for the 
retreat of the Gauls was that their own Cisalpine homes were 
threatened by an invasion of the Veneti, an amphibious people 
dwelling among the lagoons and mouths of the Po. Their 
presence at Rome had perhaps had another effect. Latins and 
other peoples near had witnessed the fury of their onset, and the 
impression made was never forgotten. At Rome the term ' dis- 
turbance ' or ' alarm ' {tumultus), suggesting sudden peril in Italy, 
became almost the technical name for a Gaulish inroad. And the 
Gaulish terror was not confined to Rome. Among the claims of 
Rome to Italian support in later times not the least was this, that 
she shewed herself the only competent champion of Italy against 
the dreaded Gauls. 

49. Not less important were the events happening in the 
South, though their effects did not appear clearly until the next 
period. The Greek cities of southern Italy and Sicily were to 
suffer for their splendid isolation and their quarrels. In Sicily the 
utter destruction of the Athenian expedition (413) had lulled them 
into vain security. In 409 and 406 Carthage took her revenge for 
the past. Great mercenary armies overran most of the island and 
destroyed several of the chief cities. The remnant of Greek 
power was only saved by concentration under the tyranny of 
Dionysius of Syracuse. He waged war against the Carthaginians 
with various fortune, but his efforts to create a Greek empire in 
southern Italy greatly damaged the Greek cities there. At his 
death (368 or 367) Syracuse was strong but the Greek cause 
weakened. Indeed the ' Great Greece ' was in no small danger. 
The southward movement of the fertile and warlike Sabellian 
peoples went on unchecked all through the fifth century b.c. We 
have seen how Samnites conquered Campania ; only a few spots 
such as the Greek Neapolis kept their freedom. Another swarm 
pushed on and conquered the district known after them as 
Lucania, while some penetrated almost to the Sicilian strait, 
and were known as Bruttians. The pressure of these migrations 
was fatal to some of the smaller Greek cities ; the larger still 
existed, but became subject either to the Lucanians or to 



v] Sabellians. leges Liciniae 55 

Dionysius. Tarentum alone was strong and independent, but 
its danger was plain. Western Greek civilization was sorely 
shaken by all these disasters, and in some coast-districts the 
Greek tongue gave way to Oscan. But it was not in the West 
alone that the gifted Greeks were working out their own ruin. 
The notable fact in southern Italy was the spread of the Sabellian 
peoples. By the end of the fifth century they held most of the 
country. They covered a much larger area than Rome and her 
Allies. But we find no trace of any common purpose or direction. 
They settled down in separate cantons as conquerors. Those in 
Campania seem to have lost touch with their kinsmen of Samnium. 
Modified by easier life in a genial climate, they still kept their 
restless and warlike character. Mercenary service abroad drew 
off numbers of the Campanian and Samnite youth. They com- 
peted with Gauls and Iberians for the blood-wages of Carthage or 
Syracuse, according to the demand. In short their progress was 
a striking contrast to that of Rome. 

50. The Licinian laws. We now turn to the great political 
agitation by which the end of this period is maiked, the effect of 
which was to close the long struggle of the Orders and give unity 
to the Roman people. Doubtful details do not discredit the 
main outlines of the traditional story. Of the Plebeians, the 
mass were poor. But there were also men of substance. The 
latter doubtless filled all or most of the Plebeian offices, and had 
made their way to the state-offices of the quaestorship and the 
consular tribunate. But they had set their hearts upon gaining 
the consulship. And they saw from past experience that they 
must stand out for a reserved right to one place : to be eligible 
and not elected would not be enough. In order to create the 
popular pressure needed for their purpose, they must engage the 
support of the poor Plebeians. Now what the poor wanted was 
more land and relief from debt. The result was a combined 
movement uniting the claims of both sections. The Plebeian 
leaders were C. Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius, tribunes in 377. 
The scheme of their bills was as follows. First, that interest 
already paid should be deducted from the principal of a loan, and 
the balance repaid in yearly instalments within three years. 
Secondly, no one was to be allowed to hold as tenant of the state 
{possidere) more than 500 iugera (over 300 acres) of public 
domain-land, or to keep (so it is said) more than a certain number 



56 The struggle for equal rights [ch. 

of cattle or sheep on the part devoted to pasture. The story 
that there was a proposal to compel the employment of a certain 
minimum of free labourers on farms in proportion to the slaves is 
surely no more than an anticipation of a much later time, when 
great slave-gangs were common. Thirdly, the consulship was to 
be restored as the regular chief magistracy, and one consul was 
always to be a Plebeian. The first was a temporary measure to 
relieve an intolerable situation. The second provided no allot- 
ments, but it offered a prospect of resuming land for future allot- 
ment. The third was meant to confer a share of Patrician 
privileges, and to bar all Patrician attempts to nullify the con- 
cession in practice. To carry these projects into law needed 
a stubborn fight, said to have lasted ten years. Year after year 
Licinius and Sextius were reelected tribunes. At first their efforts 
were foiled by the ' intercession ' of some of their colleagues, 
for the Patrician nobles bought off some of the wealthier Plebeians 
by letting them share the 'possession' of state-land. The two 
leaders retorted by blocking the elections of the regular magistrates. 
Tradition says that the imperium was thus held in abeyance for 
five years. Be this as it may, the struggle was evidently an 
obstinate one. In 368 it reached its height. But the end was at 
hand. The credit of having dealt with the crisis so as to avert 
a violent revolution is given to Camillus. The bills became law 
in 367. But the Patricians, though compelled to yield on the 
matter of the consulship, managed to extort a concession of 
practical importance. The ordinary duties of civil jurisdiction 
were becoming too much for the busy chief magistrates. If 
Rome was henceforth to have only the two consuls, not six 
consular tribunes, there was good reason why these duties should 
be otherwise provided for. It was agreed to create a special 
office for the purpose. The new magistrate was an inferior 
colleague of the consuls : he too bore the title of praetor, but 
their imperium was superior to his. Whether the new office was 
by law confined to Patricians is doubtful ; at all events it remained 
in their hands for some 30 years. Thus the sphere of the consul- 
ship was further limited, and the office lost something more of its 
regal character. At the same time two ' curule ' aediles were to 
be appointed, officers of the whole populus (not of the Plebs only) 
and as such entitled to use the official chair of state {sella 
curulis). These were also meant to be Patricians, but it soon 



v] The result 57 

became the practice for them to be Patrician and Plebeian in 
alternate years. 

51. So the great struggle of the Orders was virtually at an 
end, at least as far as legislation could end it. To pass laws 
was easier than to get them carried out. The richer Plebeians 
had fought their way to the consulship, and all other offices 
were in time sure to be gained also. But even the law opening 
the consulship was evaded now and then in the following years. 
That regulating the possession of public land was found not easy 
to enforce. Among those who evaded it and were fined for land- 
grabbing shortly after (357) was Licinius himself. So at least says 
our tradition. And the relief of debtors was temporary. The 
general result then was that the rich Plebeians won a lasting 
advantage, while the poor did not. Improvement in the condition 
of the poor did take place in the next period, but it was mainly 
due to allotments of land and foundation of colonies in new 
territory acquired by conquest. 



CHAPTER VI 



THE REPUBLIC 366—265 B.C. 

52. The century after the passing of the Licinian laws may 
be called the first half of the golden age of Republican Rome. 
The vital question of the constitution was now settled. It had 
only to develope in the course of working, as its various parts 
gradually found their places in relation to each other. In this 
period the Roman system, clumsy but effective, begins clearly to 
shew its superiority to other governments, and Rome acquires the 
strength which was to prove irresistible in the course of the next 
hundred years. 

The equalizing of the Orders was in progress. The new 
praetorship was first held by a Plebeian in 337, the censorship in 
351. In 339 it was made law that one censor must be a Plebeian. 
The dictatorship was held by a Plebeian as early as 356. But 
the struggle for actual possession of the consulship, now once 
more the normal chief magistracy, was not yet ended. By some 
means or other the Patricians managed to secure both places in 
several of the years between 356 and 342, but in the latter year a 
threat^ of further legislation in the Plebeian interest put an end to 
this evasion. There was evidently a difificulty in getting the poorer 
Plebeians to support the richer continuously. However, in the 
long run the Licinian law was observed. And the strength of the 
levelling movement was finally proved by the legislation^ of 
the year 300, when the number of members of the great religious 
colleges was raised, and Plebeians admitted to these strongholds 
of the Patrician Order. In short, the old nobility of birth gave 
place to a new nobility of wealth and ofifice. Great Plebeian 

^ See § 63. ^ lex Ogitlnia, 



CH. vi] The new Nobility. Consulship 59 

families grew up. Wealth brought them to the front, and the 
attainment of offices carrying the imperium marked their members 
as ' known ' or ' men of mark ' [nobiles). The clan-system took 
root among them, and they soon formed a powerful class, as proud 
and as devoted to their own interests as their Patrician models. 
Only ten years after the passing of the Licinian laws we hear that 
Licinius Stolo himself was punished for an evasion of the rule 
limiting the amount of public domain-land that could legally be 
' possessed ' by an individual. 

53. But the position of the restored consulship, now open 
to both Orders, was not the same as it had once been. On the 
one hand its range of functions had been narrowed by assigning 
some of its old duties to the censors and the new praetor. 
During the last period the state had done without it for many 
years, and employed a substitute. On the other hand the vast 
expansion of Roman activities and Roman dominion in this period 
undoubtedly added to its importance. The consuls were the 
normal representatives of Rome beyond the frontiers, and these 
hundred years 366 — 265 include the conquest of Italy. What 
with campaigning abroad and routine duties at home, they had 
generally quite enough to do, and the functions of military 
command and civic presidency were just those most held in 
honour. Thus the consulship was changed, but by no means 
degraded. It certainly lost somewhat of its independent initiative, 
as the Senate more and more assumed direction of public policy. 
But the influence of a consul was still great, and senatorial control 
as yet only beginning. It was neither possible nor desirable to 
interfere much with a consul commanding in the field, and tradition 
represents the generals as acting with great freedom. In 327 a 
notable step was taken for practical reasons. Neapolis was being 
besieged, and its surrender was expected. In order not to with- 
draw the consul in charge of the siege, it was arranged^ that he 
should remain at his post ' in a consul's stead ' {pro consule) until 
his work was done. This device gave him consular imperium 
within his special sphere of operations, not in Rome. This inno- 
vation was the beginning of a practice which became common in 
later times. The so-called Pro-magistracy, an extension of magi- 
sterial power on service abroad, was one of the most important 
institutions of the later RepubHc. 

1 See § 68. 



6o Changed position of [ch. 

54. The same method of extension was soon appHed to the 
Praetorship also. For the frequent need of generals to command 
detached forces acting in support of the main armies led to the 
employment of praetors in the field, at least during the campaigning 
season, and it was not always convenient to supersede an 
experienced man at a given moment. Judicial business must 
have been chiefly despatched in the winter months. The strain 
of wars sometimes prevented either consul from presiding at the 
consular elections. Then it was necessary to proceed either by 
an interregnum or by appointment of a dictator. The latter plan 
was feasible, for a consul could make the nomination at his own 
headquarters. But the dictatorship, like the consulship, was 
gradually changing its character. We begin to hear of dictators 
appointed to discharge certain formal duties, such as holding an 
election of consuls, and not with a view to revive a concentrated 
monarchic power for military purposes. In this period we find 
dictators of both kinds, old and new. This exceptional office was 
evidently no longer in favour. It could no longer be used as 
a party weapon of the Patrician nobility. And, as the two Orders 
gradually coalesced, the new senatorial nobility more and more 
preferred the consular system. It suited the aristocratic ideal, of 
sharing preferment among the members of a limited class, better 
than the exceptional autocracy of an individual. But this limita- 
tion of a dictator's sphere of action seems to have been enjoined 
by moral pressure only; we hear of no statute passed for the 
purpose. It is possible that the right to appeal to the Assembly 
against a dictator's sentence (within the city precinct) may have 
been granted in this period by a lex Valeria of the year 300. If 
so, this is a further indication of the tendency to weaken the 
office. For the present it remained in use during a time of 
great wars, but in the next period we shall see it decay and 
disappear. 

55. The censorship was steadily rising in importance. The 
spread of Roman dominion and the settlement of Roman citizens 
on conquered territory led to the formation of new Tribes (two in 
each of the years 332, 318, 299, bringing the total to 33), and 
there was also the admission of new citizens. There was also on 
occasion the undertaking of great public works, of which the chief 
instances were the great road and aqueduct named after Appius 
Claudius, censor in 312. The improvement of the city water- 



vi] the Magistracies 6i 

supply was a great boon. The via Appia was a solidly-built 
military road from Rome to Capua by the coast-route. It secured 
Roman communications with Campania, an object of the first 
importance in the crisis of the Samnite wars. But it was the 
radical policy expressed in the work of registration that made the 
censorship of Appius a landmark in Roman history. He placed 
on the senatorial roll a number of his own supporters, even sons 
of freedmen, and distributed the mass of city handworkers^ among 
all the 31 Tribes, thus leaving the rural freeholders liable to be 
outvoted by those better able to attend. We hear of much indig- 
nation, and it is said that his list of the Senate was even disregarded. 
Tradition attributed to him further acts of wilful usurpation : it is 
at least clear that the Patrician reformer was well hated by the 
aristocratic class from whom the Roman annalists were drawn. 
The leaders who looked for support in the lower ranks never 
appear to advantage in the traditions of Rome. 

56. Of the minor offices, the aediles, once subordinates of the 
tribunes, were now more independent. Their police duties in the 
city, supervision of markets, repairs of public buildings, and the 
duty of bringing to justice all breakers of the public law, gave 
them plenty to do. And they were already charged with providing 
for the shows held on public festivals, a duty destined to grow. 
In short, their business brought them more into contact with 
consuls, and sometimes perhaps with censors, than with the 
tribunes. The quaestorship was much as before, but the wars, 
carried on now at a greater distance from Rome, probably made 
it more important. Besides the charge of the military chest, the 
quaestor attached to a consul in the field had often to act under 
his chief in operations of war, and so enjoyed opportunities of 
distinction. We also hear of legionary officers {tribuni militum), 
some of them chosen by the people, and of two officers appointed 
now and then to superintend the fitting-out of a fleet when 
required. But of the beginnings of a Roman navy little is 
known. 

57. The tribunate of the Commons has been kept to the 
last, because it is best considered in connexion with the Senate. 
Its original work, the championship of the Plebeian Order as 

^ These no doubt were many of them freedmen. The censors of 304 
upset this arrangement by placing the ' rabble of the Forum ' in the four city 
Tribes only. See §1x1. 



52 Few magistrates [ch, 

such, was now for the most part done. Patrician supremacy was 
at an end, and a crude embodiment of negative power was no 
longer needed. But the office remained, and the right of any 
tribune to thwart the wishes of the rest was enough to prevent 
serious trouble arising from official agitators. Its position rapidly 
changed. It became normally the tool of the wealthy Plebeians 
now passing freely into the Senate. As the Patricio-Plebeian 
nobility became a more united body, it was to the tribunes that 
the Senate more and more looked for the means of enforcing its 
will. For about two centuries, in spite of occasional outbreaks of 
independence, the tribunate normally served the Senate as a check 
on other magistracies. It appears now as a magistracy of the 
community ; at what date first so regarded, is uncertain, but 
tribunes now sat in the Senate. It is however clear that it was 
still so far devoted to the interests of the Plebeian Order that, in 
case of friction between the leading Plebeians and the Patricians, 
the tribunes took the side of the former. But hostility to Patri- 
cians as such seems to have passed away. As a distinctly civihan 
office the tribunate was naturally jealous of the military power. 
When in 357 a consul held an Assembly in his camp and passed 
a law, the tribunes announced that they would in future treat such 
an act as a ' capital ' matter. For they were now the regular 
accusers in cases of a political nature, and public trials before the 
Assembly were the only means of punishing offences against the 
state. But instances of men being brought to trial for misconduct 
while in office were at present very rare. 

58. In general the most striking fact about the Roman 
magistracy is the smallness of the numbers. The censorship was 
intermittent, the dictatorship exceptional. The yearly officials for 
the work of peace and war were — consuls (2), praetor (i), aediles 
(4), quaestors (4), in all 11. Adding the tribunes (10), we have 
only 21, but we can hardly class the tribunes as administrative 
officers. That so small an administrative staff sufficed for the 
work of the state in a period of rapid expansion is indeed wonder- 
ful. When we reflect that the power of colleagues was equal and 
a deadlock possible at any moment, that the assignment of special 
spheres of duty was left to private arrangement {comparaiio) or 
the working of the lot {sortiiio), our wonder is increased. More- 
over, there were no official salaries, and, if we may trust tradition, 
honesty and devotion to public duty were normal with hardly an 



vi] Senate 63 

exception. The clashing of official colleagues seems to have been, 
indeed must have been, extremely rare. This long-continued 
exhibition of patriotism and good sense may remind us that moral 
force was the secret of Roman government and Roman success. 
And the moral force of Rome in the golden age found its most 
effective expression in the Senate. 

59. We have already noted the permanence of the Senate, 
its steady accumulation of experience, and the residence of its 
members, as causes of its acquisition of power. Its ranks were 
now being more and more recruited by admission of leading 
Plebeians. In fact a senatorial Order was beginning to form. 
Patricians and Plebeians in the House were assimilating as 
common aims and sympathies, not to mention intermarriage, 
overcame old jealousy. Naturally its power grew. The times 
called for much intelligent direction of foreign policy, and con- 
spicuous success justified the Senate's management. It was not 
itself the Executive, but to the magistrates it was a prudent guide. 
It was not a Legislature, but a harmonious Senate could exercise 
much influence in promoting or checking legislation. Indeed 
most of its powers were the product of circumstances, assumed 
under stress of real or apparent necessity. Precedents once 
created hardened into custom, and became a part of the constitu- 
tion for lack of challenge. Thus the growing power of the Senate 
rested on no statute ; the Assembly had not abdicated its sovranty, 
and a later age was to learn that the powers usurped in days when 
the Roman People were a sound community could be resumed 
by the people in the days of their corruption. No doubt the 
leading men in the Senate were mostly ex-magistrates, who in 
their term of office had been largely guided by the advice of the 
great Council, and would expect to exercise the same influence 
on their successors. These men would tend to promote the 
growth of the Senate's power at the expense of the magistrates. 
And so guidance would tend to become control, as we shall see it 
did. Two old survivals may be noted in connexion with the 
Senate. In the event of an interregnum the Interreges were still 
Patrician. And the formal ' sanction of the Fathers ' was still a 
step in completing legislation and elections. Who these patres 
were is not quite certain, but they were either the whole Senate 
or its Patrician members. As their auctoritas was clearly a relic 
of the past, and was in this period turned into a meaningless form, 



64 Assemblies [ch. 

it is more probable that the Patricians alone are meant, and that 
the custom was a survival from the time when the ancient clans 
were a political power. 

60. A change was coming over the popular Assemblies. 
Both the Centuries and the Tribes appear in this period as sovran 
legislative bodies. Both were presided over by regular magistrates 
with imperium, being Assemblies of the whole people. But in 
practice legislation was more and more passing into the hands of 
the Tribe-Assembly. Its simplicity may have been partly the 
reason for this, but Plebeian magistrates may have preferred the 
Tribe-grouping for its own sake. No legislative sanction seems to 
have been required for the change : the cofnitia tributa was a law- 
ful Assembly, and its right to give a final answer to the question 
put by a regular magistrate seems to have been admitted. It 
became in course of time the ordinary Assembly for general 
purposes. In election the Centuries held their ground. They 
elected consuls praetors and censors, the Tribes only curule 
aediles, quaestors, and some minor officials. Beside these 
Assemblies it is strange, but apparently the fact, that the separate 
Meeting of the Plebs still went on. It elected tribunes and 
Plebeian aediles, and its proper president was a tribune. This 
last fact was probably the chief cause of its continuance, for the 
tribunes would not readily give up the meetings in which they 
played the chief part. The vigour of the concilium plebis is shewn 
in this period by the final removal (287) of all restrictions on its 
capacity for legislation. Tradition loosely asserts that Resolutions 
of the Commons {plebi scita) were made binding on the whole 
populus by a Valerio-Horatian law of 449, a Publilian law of 339, 
and a Hortensian law of 287. This was either a case of reenact- 
ing a rule that had been evaded, or (more probably) restrictions 
still remaining were successively removed by the later laws. At 
all events after 287 the Plebs by itself was free to legislate for all. 
The Plebeian dictator Hortensius is said to have been appointed 
to deal with a crisis arising from debt and distress. The sedition 
had even got so far that a ' secession of the Plebs ' took place in 
the old style, and the result was some concession of their claims. 
With the attainment of this full right of concurrent legislation by 
the Plebs the Roman Republic had outwardly reached its complete 
form, a mass of inconsistencies and makeshifts. But the new 
nobility understood how to make the clumsy machine work : the 



vi] Policy of the new nobility 65 

checks and causes of friction were overcome somehow, and the 
ship of state went ahead. Beyond all doubt one of their chief 
cares was to prevent the election of self-willed and refractory 
tribunes. Another was to see that, in appointing members of the 
sacred colleges, suitable men were chosen, that the scruples of 
religion might at least not be used to impede the policy of the 
Senate. 



CHAPTER VII 

CONQUEST OF ITALY, 366—265 B.C. 

61. In order to keep this book within moderate limits it is 
necessary to give a very brief outline of the Roman wars. And 
the wars by which Rome became the mistress of Italy cannot 
be described with any fulness and certainty, for our record, 
chiefly preserved in Livy, is far from trustworthy. The annalists 
whom Livy followed wrote with a patriotic bias, and family 
traditions tending to glorify ancestors of great houses have un- 
doubtedly corrupted the story. Some of its main features are 
sufficiently clear to be stated with confidence. The conquest 
falls naturally into four periods or stages in the advance of 
Rome. 

62. First stage, 366 — 338. The interest centres chiefly on 
two points, the failure of hostile powers to the North, and the 
spread of Roman influence and organization to the South-East. 
The second was made possible by the first. We hear of two 
wars with the Gauls, 361 to 358 and 350 to 349, in both of 
which the advantage is claimed for Rome. Single combats are 
recorded in both cases ; in the former a Manlius wins the 
honourable nickname Torquatus from the golden collar {torquis) 
of the slain Gaulish champion ; in the latter a Valerius is helped 
at a pinch by a raven perching on his helmet and disconcerting 
the Gaul. Hence Corvus became an after-name of his Valerian 
house. Such stories perhaps indicate that the victories in these 
wars were hardly won, and that the repulse of invading swarms 
seeking easy conquest and plunder was the net result. Between 
these two wars is placed one with some of the Etruscan cities, 
ending in Roman victory and a long truce with Tarquinii and 



CH. vii] Rome and her Allies 67 

Falerii, two of the leading cities of southern Etruria. Caere, 
which lay nearer to hand and had for some time been on friendly 
terms with Rome, was in 351 incorporated on special conditions. 
The Caerites became Roman citizens without the ' public ' rights 
of voting or holding office. It seems that they retained self- 
government for strictly local affairs, but they were not enrolled 
in any of the Roman Tribes. This arrangement left them 
subject to the Roman government in all external relations, and 
bound to bear all the burdens of citizenship. It was found a 
convenient plan for keeping certain communities in a state of 
dependence, and the precedent was often followed afterwards. 
But more important for Rome than even these wars were the 
strained relations with their own Allies. A Hernican revolt is 
dimly recorded as suppressed, and it is probable that the terms 
of their treaty were now revised in favour of Rome. The 
wavering of the Latins was far more serious. It seems that 
they did not stand firmly by Rome against the Gauls : Tibur 
is even charged with helping the enemy. But some revision of 
the terms of the confederacy took place, and thj help of Latin 
contingents enabled Rome to end the war. The discontents 
however revived with the withdrawal of the enemy, and after 
the second repulse of the Gauls matters came to a head. 
The rupture between Rome and the League was inevitable. 
We hear that Rome had made an alliance with the Samnites, 
and that the Volsci intrigued with the. Latins. In 349 the Latins 
refused contingents for the Gaulish war, but for some reason did 
not immediately rise in arms. 

63. During the years 345 to 341 Rome was pushing south- 
wards. Our confused tradition tells of the occupation of the 
district between the Volsci and Campania. The Roman policy 
seems to have been to cut the Volsci off from the sea. So the 
small peoples, Aurunci and Sidicini, were subdued, and Rome 
came into touch with Campania. The Samnites settled there, 
threatened by an invasion of their kinsmen in Samnium, sought 
Roman protection. This brought Rome and the hill-Samnites 
to blows. We hear of a Samnite war 343 — i, followed by 
renewal of their treaty. But it was fortunate for Rome that 
Latins and Samnites did not draw together. Tradition even 
said that when Rome made peace the Latins carried on the 
war themselves, a doubtful story. In 340 the Latins openly 

5—2 



68 



The great Latin war 



[CH. 



demanded equality with Rome, claiming it is said that one 
consul should be a Latin. Union on these terms was refused, 
and Rome had to face a great Latin war (340, 339), in which 
her adversaries had Volscian and Campanian aid. The story 
of this war is a confused mass of legends. There is some reason 
to think that more perfect unanimity promptitude and discipline 
were the true causes of the Roman victories. This is the war 
in which were placed two heroic episodes. Manlius Torquatus 
the consul put to death his son, who had slain a Latin champion 




ETR V R I A 



I Namia 

S a b i n i 



Vestini 
Sutrium Marrucini' 

Nepete Carseoli Paeligni y. 

Aequi Alba ^e 

Marsi 



Labini Hernici Aesernia „Bovianum 

» Sora ° _ 
,0 

^ " l-Tivemuir ' 





.Mintumae 
Ca2eg 



I0. 



Capua ° BeceventAOT 
• Nola 



VeiniHia 



The Southward advance of Rome. 

in single combat, for disobeying the order forbidding acceptance 
of such challenges. His Plebeian colleague P. Decius Mus, in 
obedience to divine warnings, devoted himself to certain death 
in battle when his part of the army was giving way, and with 
the help of the gods restored the fortune of the field. The 
stories, true or not, suggest a record favouring the Plebeian 
nobility : it is remarkable that the Patrician attempts to recover 
their lost monopoly of the consulship were only repressed by the 
Plebeian resistance ■^ two years before, and that the need of active 
harmony between the Orders was in this present crisis supreme. 



' See § 52. 



vii] Roman organization 69 

64. But it was not by valour and victories that Rome 
became mistress of Italy. It was the politic settlements made 
in the hour of triumph that enabled her to secure her gains as 
no other power had hitherto done. The year 338 saw one of 
her masterpieces. The Latins were reorganized to suit Roman 
purposes. Some communities were merged in the Roman people, 
with the full Roman franchise. Others remained Allies, nominally 
free, but placed in relation to Rome, and isolated from each other, 
by new treaties. Each treaty-state enjoyed the rights (spoken of 
above) of conubium and commercium with Rome only, but Rome 
with them all. Thus the Latins were either made Romans, or 
placed in a position where their connexion with Rome must ever 
tend to grow more close through the steady operation of private 
intercourse in time of peace. The old League, with its meetings 
and mutual rights between city and city, was ended. The Latin 
festival, already under Roman presidency, remained as a religious 
function only. The Volscian League was further weakened by 
the loss of the coast-district. Rome now took over the trouble- 
some Antium and planted a colony of citizens there. In Campania 
the revolted Allies were dealt with after the precedent of Caere. 
They were made half-citizens of Rome with only the 'private' 
rights. Thus business-connexions and intermarriage were left 
gradually to attach them to Rome, while the Roman government 
could interfere as it saw fit. This half-franchise seems to have 
been specially suited to peoples not closely related to Rome by 
race and language. In Campania Oscan and Greek were spoken, 
and some Etruscan may still have lingered in parts. We hear 
also of a policy destined to be often repeated in later times. 
The ' knights ' of Capua {equites Campani), evidently a warrior- 
aristocracy of Samnite origin, had been faithful to Rome in 
the recent troubles. They were now confirmed in a privileged 
position. The principle was a simple one ; the wealthy minority 
who had something to lose were more likely to be true to the 
Roman connexion than the poorer majority. So a pro-Roman 
party was kept alive by self-interest in all inferior communities 
connected with Rome. 

65. All the conquered peoples were required to cede a 
portion of their territor}', and all classes of Romans benefited 
thereby in some degree. The rich no doubt profited largely as 
lessees of the lands reserved for state-domain. The allotments 



70 The Romans in Campania [ch. 

of land in private ownership served to relieve the necessities of 
the poor, and to place districts of strategic value in the firm 
grasp of Rome. Thus the rich Falernian country was occupied 
by Roman settlers, and others were planted on land taken from 
Latin and Volscian communities. The distinction between Latin 
and Volscian districts was disappearing as the latter became 
merged in an extended Latium. The remaining Volscians were 
now hemmed in by Rome on most sides, for the Aurunci to the 
South submitted to Roman overlordship. Rome had now fairly 
started on her imperial career. There could be no turning back. 
To conquer or be conquered was the only choice. Already she 
was a considerable Italian power, and we hear of her importance 
being recognized by the visits of embassies from Carthage. The 
first, in 348, is said to have led to a treaty, perhaps the renewal 
of an earlier one. The second, in 343, is represented as a 
formal visit to congratulate the Romans on successes against the 
Samnites. But the relations between the two powers were at 
present only agreements to define the facilities offered for 
commerce and the restrictions imposed on such intercourse. 
Campania was a Carthaginian market, and it was probably the 
interest of the great trading city to be on good terms with the 
new masters of that wealthy land. 

66. Second stage, 337 — 303. The early years of this period 
were comparatively quiet, but further pacification of the districts 
to the South-East was soon necessary. In 330 a revolt of the 
Volscian town Privernum gave a pretext for putting an end to 
the last relics of Volscian independence. The plan followed was 
to give the half-franchise to the conquered, and to plant full 
citizens on some forfeited land. The intention of Rome to 
control communications with the South had been recently shewn 
by subjugating the Aurunci more completely, and by founding 
the Latin colony of Cales (334) between the Liris and Volturnus 
to command the inland route to Capua. Now a citizen colony 
on the coast at Anxur (329) and a Latin colony at Fregellae on 
the Liris (328) served to command both routes at points nearer 
Rome, and to secure the new territory. The Latin colonies are 
to be noted as the first founded by Rome since the suppression 
of the Latin League. There was now no pretence of cooperation 
in founding these colonies. They were strictly coloniae Latinae 
populi Romania fortress-towns holding strategic positions for 



vii] The western Greeks 7^ 

Rome. The status of the settlers as 'Latins' marked them 
out as different from ordinary Allies. They were part of the 
' Latin name ' as much as old Latin cities like Praeneste or 
Tibur. 

67. We must now turn to Rome's dealings with the Greeks 
and Samnites, for the two ran together with momentous results. 
Let us first note that the old Hellas was now under the new 
Macedonian power. Alexander the Great ran his career in 
336 — 323. The eyes of most of the Greek world were turned 
to the East. In the West Syracuse still held part of Sicily, 
though weakened by internal troubles. The pressure of Carthage, 
successfully repelled for a time under the guidance of Timoleon 
(344 — 337), again was felt under a weaker government. In 317 
the ruffian Agathocles became tyrant, and ruled in blood till 289, 
the terror alike of Carthage and the western Greeks. In Italy 
many Greek cities had either disappeared or become 'barbarized,' 
losing their Greek character by conquest or forced union with 
Bruttian or Lucanian masters. Tarentum alone stood strong in 
a position of exceptional vantage and wealth gained by commerce. 
But she too was affected by the degeneracy widespread in the 
Greek world of this age, unable to use freedom with judgment, 
and to allow for changed circumstances. The scale of states 
was larger than in the great age of Greece, and the city-state on 
old Greek lines was out of date. To withstand the advance of 
Samnites and Lucanians needed a military strength such as the 
easygoing Tarentines could not or would not create by their own 
exertions. They looked for champions to defend them. First 
came king Archidamus of Sparta (338), only to fall in battle 
against the Lucanians. A few years later Alexander of Epirus, 
king of the Molossi, landed in southern Italy to uphold the 
Greek cause, but evidently with imperial designs. He won 
victories over Samnites Lucanians and Bruttians, and saved some 
Greek cities for a time. He is said to have come to a friendly 
understanding with Rome. But he was murdered by a Lucanian, 
and so ended, in the year 327. Nothing effectual had been 
achieved by these means in the way of averting disaster from 
the Greeks, but for Rome they had done much. The attention 
of the Samnites was diverted to the South, while Roman organiza- 
tion was taking root in newly-acquired districts. For the strength 
of Rome was built up by sure and silent development in times of 



72 Neapolis [ch. 

peace. It was now that she got a grip of the upper valley of the 
Liris, which the Samnites claimed as their own. 

68. The remnant of Greeks in Campania were in as bad 
plight as the rest. Their strength was centred in the city of 
Neapolis. This was still Greek, but had in it Campanians also, 
probably confined to a quarter walled off from the rest. Somehow 
they quarrelled with Rome, now mistress of most of Campania. 
They looked round for help. Tarentum failed them, but they 
received a Samnite garrison and stood a siege. This was in 327. 
The great importance attached to winning Neapolis is shewn by 
the retention^ of Q. PubliHus Philo in command as pro consule. 
In 326 some of the chief Neapolitans betrayed the town to Rome. 
It was granted favourable terms, and became an Ally, the prin- 
cipal condition of its treaty being the provision of a naval con- 
tingent. Neapolis had really found a protector. The decay of 
Greek civilization was so far stayed that 300 years later the city 
still kept a Greek character. It was more than ever the local 
centre of Greek influences, holding a territory of its own, and 
steadily loyal to Rome from the time of its alliance. But mean- 
while war had broken out between the Romans and the Samnites, 
who were now free to turn their attention to the North. Our 
traditions of this struggle, known as the second or great Samnite 
war, are hopelessly corrupted by the bias of Roman annalists and 
family legends. But we can detect the advantage enjoyed by 
Rome in the more effective organization of her forces, the concen- 
tration of authority, and in the far-sighted guidance of a tenacious 
policy. It was doubtless not easy to maintain cooperation among 
the cantons of independent dalesmen for any length of time 
under direction of a single leader. Personal bravery was not 
enough, and the fine temper of Roman discipline was probably 
never attained in Samnite armies. Nor had the armies at their 
back any such wise and permanent body as the Roman Senate, 
consistently keen to turn circumstances to account. The general 
impression left by our imperfect record is this. To the Samnites 
the war was mainly a matter of military effort, with a certain con- 
sciousness that victory would leave them lords of Italy. To the 
Romans, that is to the Senate, it was more a matter of business. 
It was skilful diplomacy, and the pains taken to secure new 
acquisitions, that brought about their final triumph, far more 

^ See § 53. 



Plate I 




Coin of Tarentum [Taras], 4th cent. B.C. 
obv. Horseman. 

rev. Taras on dolphin. TAPAS. 
See § 67. 




Coin of Massalia. 

obv. Artemis with sprigs of olive in hair. 

rev. Lion. MAS2A. 

See § 79. 




Coin ot Carthage, ? late 4th cent. B.C. 

obv. Head of Persephone, copied from coins of Syracuse. 

rev. Horse and palm tree. 

The work of a Greek artist. 

See § 92. 



vii] Great Samnite war "jt^ 

than clever strategy of commanders or enthusiasm in the rank 
and file. 

69. The war lasted from 327 to 304, with a temporary truce 
in 318. The stories of Roman victories cannot be trusted. The 
most famous episode was the entrapping of two consuls and their 
armies (321) in a defile known as the Caudine Forks. Pontius 
the Samnite is said to have exacted severe terms and then to 
have let the Romans go, first degrading them by making the 
whole force pass beneath the so-called ' yoke.' But the consuls 
had no power to make final concessions, and the Roman govern- 
ment disowned the compact. The chief Roman heroes of the 
war were L. Papirius Cursor and Q. Fabius Rullianus. The 
strength of Roman discipline is illustrated by the determination 
of the former when dictator to put Fabius his master of horse to 
death for disregard of orders, and the extreme difficulty with 
which his wrath was appeased by the entreaties of the people at 
large. In such traditions the Romans portray the quibbling 
legality and the sternness which were confessedly marked traits in 
their character. Traces of the true story of this great struggle 
appear in the notices of Roman relations with the Apulians and 
Lucanians. The Apulian country, lying beyond the Apennine, 
was strategically important as a position from which to threaten 
the rear of the Samnite confederacy. Of the peoples dwelling 
there the Dauni in the North were at present chiefly concerned, 
but all were probably willing to secure the help of Rome against 
their aggressive neighbours. Rome came to terms with them, 
but communications with them were not easy, and the alliance 
seems to have been interrupted for a time by fear of the Samnites. 
In Lucania there seems to have been disunion, the leading men 
favouring Rome. But the Greeks of Tarentum were now more 
afraid of the Romans than of the Samnites, and alarmed at the 
fall of Neapolis. Their agents contrived to effect a democratic 
revolution and detached the Lucanians from Rome. Roman 
efforts were now directed to getting a firm footing in Apulia, 
where they established a strong post at Luceria, a much-contested 
city in the course of the war. Clearly the Samnites had a hard 
task, for the other Sabellian groups did little. The Vestini seem 
to have made a small diversion in their favour, soon suppressed, 
but at present the northern peoples mostly stood aloof. After 
319 the war continued in obscure campaigns, but on the whole 



74 



Roman progress 



[CH, 



Rome held what she had won, and improved her organization in 
the Campanian district. 

70. In the course of the war (320) the Tarentines had tried 
to dictate peace to the armies facing each other in Apuha, but a 
vain threat of intervention was disregarded. In the following years 
Rome gained the upper hand in that region and in 314 occupied 
Luceria with a strong Latin colony. A victory over the Samnite 
Frentani opened another route to northern Apulia. Lucania too 
was invaded. The warfare in Campania 314 — 310 was also in 
favour of Rome. Nola and Nuceria were taken, and became 
Roman Allies, with arrangements placing the richer citizens in 



PALLIGNI .. 
MARS! 




Campania and Samnium. 

power. Meanwhile a vigorous advance of the Samnites was 
repelled and Roman dominion forcibly asserted in the valley of 
the Liris. Further planting of Latin colonies proved the intention 
of Rome to hold the disputed borders, Suessa and Saticula 313, 
Interamna 312. Another was sent to the Pontian islands in 313. 
The ways to Campania were to be in Roman control by land and 
sea. The improvement of the coast-route by construction of the 
solid via Appia has been mentioned above. When the Romans 
were able to strengthen their position by these means, and the 
Samnites could not keep them out of Apulia, it is manifest that 
the Samnite cause was already failing. It was probably the 



vii] and consolidation 75 

striking superiority of Rome, and the fear of falling under Roman 
dominion, that led to a number of risings in various parts of Italy. 
To overcome these immense efforts were necessary, but the 
soundness of the Roman system was equal to the strain. 

71. In 311 we hear of an Etruscan invasion. The war 
lasted about three years. Roman victories were followed up by 
an advance into the heart of Etruria through the Ciminian forest, 
hitherto a barrier, and also into Umbria, where resistance was soon 
overcome. In 308 quiet was restored in these parts, and the 
Sabellian Marsi and Paeligni forced to submit to Rome or at 
least abandon the Samnites. It is clear that the northern peoples, 
not at present threatened by the Gauls, were alarmed at the growth 
of Rome, but that their attempt to check it was made without 
proper combination and too late. Next came the turn of Rome's 
old Allies the Hernici. Among the Samnite prisoners (for war 
was going on in Samnium) Hernican volunteers were found. 
Rome required explanations, and part of the Hernican League 
rose in rebellion. The rising was promptly put down. The rebel 
towns received the half-franchise, the loyal were left as Allies 
with all their old privileges, and we hear no more of the Hernici. 
While this settlement was going on (306) the Samnites made 
further efforts, but in vain. A truce in 304 led to a peace and 
renewal of their old treaty with Rome. Rome, it seems, had had 
enough of them for the present. But the regular work of con- 
solidation went on. In 304 the remnant of the Aequi were 
crushed, and a strong Latin colony at Alba (303) near the lake 
Fucinus asserted the sovranty of Rome in that district. Another 
at Sora, beyond the Hernici, held an important position on the 
direct line between Rome and Samnium. The Marsi and Paeligni 
were compelled to become Roman Allies, and order was restored 
in Umbria. The rise of Rome is very manifest at this stage. It 
surely had not escaped the notice of foreign powers. In 306 
came another embassy from Carthage and a new treaty was the 
result. And about the same time friendly relations, not a treaty, 
were established between Rome and the honourable island-republic 
of Rhodes. 

72. Third stage, 302 — 282. The advance of Rome had for 
some time caused uneasiness at Tarentum. It was no doubt 
Greek intrigues that had promoted a rising in the lapygian or 
Sallentine country, the heel of Italy, in 307. The Tarentines now 



76 



The Romans in the North 



[CH. 



(302) induced the Spartan prince Cleonymus to land in Italy. 
His freebooting expeditions with mercenary forces did no good, 
and only left the Greek interest weaker. But it seems that Rome 
acted as protector of the Sallentine district. She was in truth 
claiming to be the leader of Italy. In the North she intervened 
in the affairs of Etruria, and pacified the smaller Sabellian peoples, 
Marsi Paeligni Vestini Marrucini, who were still restless. Force 
was used where necessary, as with the Aequi, who drop out of 
history : a Latin colony at Carseoli (298 or 302) strengthened the 
hold of Rome on these parts, and another at Narnia (299, 
formerly Nequinum) in southern Umbria commanded the route 
to the North along the line of the Nar. An Umbrian rising was 
put down, and a treaty made with the Picentes. Rome was 



^--, 


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C . PopJonic 


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A1 .o'Kdenat 

\--''ORoina 



The chief Etrurian cities. 



beginning to look towards the Adriatic, while her citizens were 
elsewhere spreading over a wider area. Between 318 and 295 
four new Tribes were formed of Romans settled on confiscated 
land. But a desperate struggle was coming. Hitherto, thanks 
to diplomacy and good fortune, Rome had been able to deal with 
her enemies one by one or in small ineffective combinations. It 
remained to be seen whether she could withstand a widespread 
coalition, able to bring into the field great armies working for a 



vii] War with the great coalition "]*] 

common end. We shall see that she was equal to the task. Our 
tradition incidentally betrays the secret of her success, when we 
hear that her legions were supported by strong contingents of 
Latins and other Allies. That is, the peoples who had sufficient 
experience of the Roman alliance were persuaded of two things. 
They could not stand alone, and no other connexion seemed to 
offer them a better alternative. Moreover the merits of Rome were 
recalled to the minds of men by the reappearance of the Gauls. 

73. Under the year 299 we hear of Gauls threatening 
Etruria, and an attempt to hire their services for a war with 
Rome. But they treated the bribe as a ransom, and withdrew. 
Meanwhile war broke out again, but soon shifted to the South, 
where the Samnites were busy in Lucania and Apulia. In both 
these districts Roman intervention was necessary, but it was not 
until 296 that a serious crisis was reached. Samnite forces had 
to be driven out of the Aurunco-Campanian borderland, and 
citizen colonies were planted at Minturnae and Sinuessa to guard 
the coast-route. Other Samnite armies were beaten in Samnium. 
But now a sudden change took place. The buik of the Samnite 
forces marched off to Etruria, where an army of Gauls was in the 
field. Rome now had to face a grand coalition of Etruscans 
Umbrians Samnites and Gauls. But the failing Etruscans were 
drawn off by an invasion of their country, while the main army of 
Rome and her Allies routed that of the confederates in the great 
battle of Sentinum (295) in Umbria. The consul Decius is said 
to have devoted himself to death, as his father had done in the 
Latin war, to restore the fortune of the day. The great coalition 
had failed, and the cities of the North had to submit for the time 
on various terms. The stubborn resistance of the Samnites went 
on for a time^ but they were exhausted. In 292 their great leader 
Pontius was taken and beheaded after the consul's triumph. In 
291 Roman supremacy in the South was declared by the founda- 
tion of the great Latin colony of Venusia in the Daunian country, 
a fortress to watch Apulia and Lucania in the rear of Samnium. 
Then in 290 we hear that the Samnites sued for peace and 
obtained again renewal of their old treaty. This may be true, for 
Rome was weary, and could afford to wait the effect of time. 

74. At this point the Sabines, who had apparently held 
aloof from the struggles of the age, are suddenly mentioned as 
at war with Rome. We hear of their being subdued and made 



78 Mamertini. Tarentum [ch. 

Roman half-citizens, but the record is incomplete. The next 
business was in the South. Agathocles of Syracuse, whose 
activities had extended from Carthage to Corcyra, died in 289, 
and a change came over the fortunes of the Western Greeks. 
In Sicily the Carthaginians soon began to recover lost ground, 
and a body of mercenaries, paid off after the tyrant's death, 
treacherously seized Messana, killing the men and taking their 
wives and properties. They were Campanian Samnites, and, 
rather than return to their homes under Roman rule, they formed 
themselves into a new robber-state. They called themselves 
Mamertini (sons of Mamers or Mars), and ravaged much of 
Sicily to the injury of the Greek interest. But in Italy the 
Greeks, relieved from the fear of Agathocles, breathed more 
freely, and hopes of expansion revived in Tarentum. Rome 
however was now free to turn her attention to the South. She 
intervened in Lucania, where the Greek town of Thurii was in 
danger, and compelled the Lucanians to cease their attacks. 
For some years (289 — 282) she had to keep watch in these parts 
and chastise both the Lucanians and the Bruttians beyond them. 
The Tarentines were busy making trouble for Rome in southern 
Italy, for they did not want to see the Greek cities pass under 
Roman protection. At last in 282 the inevitable collision took 
place. A squadron of Roman ships appeared north of the 
Lacinian foreland, in contravention of a treaty. A Tarentine 
fleet put to sea and captured them ; but^ instead of making com- 
plaint at Rome, the Greek government put to death or enslaved 
the prisoners. A Roman embassy sent to demand satisfaction 
was insulted. The sequel will be described below. 

75. Meanwhile in the years 285 — 283 there had been war 
on a large scale in the North, of which we have a very dim record. 
Internal quarrels in Etruria led to the invitation of Gaulish aid 
against Roman intervention. Two Gaulish tribes responded to 
the call. The Senones were cut to pieces in battle. Their 
territory, a strip of land in the coast-district of northern Umbria, 
was invaded and cleared by exterminating the rest of the tribe. 
In this district a citizen colony was planted on the coast at Sena 
Gallica (283) and the whole strip, known henceforth as ager 
Gallicus, annexed by Rome. The Boii also suffered severely 
in the fighting, and were driven back into their own territory in 
the region of the Po. The Roman government had now taken 



vii] ager Gallicus. Pyrrhus 79 

a long stride towards the ever-menacing Gauls, and for more than 
forty years there was peace on the northern frontier. The district 
along the Adriatic south of the ager Gallicus, known as Picenum, 
had not been overlooked. A Latin colony had been planted at 
Hatria in 289, and was now followed by a citizen colony at 
Castrum Novum in 283. The Roman heroes of this latter part 
of the period of conquest were Manius Curius Dentatus and 
Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, names renowned in Roman tradition, 
not only for military success, but as classic patterns of public 
virtue and frugal simplicity of life. 

76. Fourth stage, 281 — 265. The Tarentines found them- 
selves at war with Rome, and under a new protector. This was 
Pyrrhus of Epirus, the Molossian king, one of the most adven- 
turous and brilliant figures among the younger Successors of the 
great Alexander. In defying Rome their trust was in him and in 
a hoped-for rising of the southern Sabellians. The democratic 
party came into power. But when Pyrrhus arrived, with his 
Epirotes and Greek mercenaries trained on the Macedonian 
model, he found the citizens indisposed to submit to his drilling, 
and had to act as an autocrat. Hence there was discontent with 
the new deliverer, and the Sabellian peoples were not eager to 
back him. But he added to his army, and his battle-elephants 
were an alarming force, new in Italian warfare. Meanwhile a 
Roman consul was despatched with an army to watch him, and 
a Roman garrison, chiefly Campanians, posted at Rhegium to 
guard the strait commanded by the Mamertines of Messana. 
This garrison mutinied, seized Rhegium for themselves in imita- 
tion of their neighbours, and for about ten years lived as a robber- 
state. Pyrrhus gained a victory over the Romans in Lucania (280) 
at Heraclea, and pushed on into Campania, and even into the 
Hernican country, not far from Rome. But the Romans had 
now two armies to meet him, for a local rising in Etruria had 
been suppressed. Already aware of the magnitude of his under- 
taking, he made proposals of peace, but was told that he must 
first leave Italy. He fell back on Tarentum to prepare for 
another campaign. But the Samnite and Lucanian auxiliaries, 
of whom his victory had led numbers to join him, were less 
forward since his retreat. In 279 he entered Apulia and again 
defeated the Romans at Ausculum. But his losses were again 
heavy. His Epirotes were thinned out, and troubles in Epirus 



8o 



Pyrrhus in Sicily 



[CH. 



stopped the supply. The resources of Rome were too great. 
Above all (so Roman tradition boasted) offers of bribes, a normal 
engine of Greek and Oriental war, did not buy him the help of 
Roman traitors. His allies were selfish, and he could not find 
trusty garrisons to hold the Greek towns. So he withdrew to 
Tarentum once more, and shortly sailed for Syracuse, on an 
invitation to expel the Carthaginian forces now overrunning the 



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The region of Magna Graecia. Only those cities that play a considerable 
part in Roman history are marked. 

island. This move was not wholly unexpected. In 279 Rome 
and Carthage concluded a special treaty for defence against the 
invader. But not much came of this, owing to the jealousy of 
the two parties. In about two years Pyrrhus conquered all Sicily 
save Lilybaeum and Messana. He could neither force his terms 
upon Carthage nor induce the Greeks to make further sacrifices. 
Nobody wanted him now, so he fought his way back by sea and 
land, assailed by Carthaginians Mamertines and the men at 



vii] Rome Head of Italy 8i 

Rhegium, to his depot at Tarentum some time in 276. Next 
year he marched into Samnium for one more efifort, but was 
badly beaten by M'. Curius near Beneventum. The game was up. 
He left Italy for Greece, where he fell in a street-fight {272) at the 
siege of Argos. 

77. Samnites Lucanians Bruttians, all had been punished 
by Roman armies while Pyrrhus was in Sicily. They had now 
only to submit and become Allies, with their swords at the service 
of Rome. The mutineers at Rhegium were then dealt with. The 
town fell in 271 and no mercy was shewn. At Syracuse a young 
soldier named Hiero had come into power. He attacked the 
Mamertine ruffians, but they were saved by Carthage, and Messana 
was held by a Punic garrison. Things were becoming complicated 
in those parts, with two great powers each wishing to command 
the strait. Hiero wished to be at peace with both, but he helped 
the Romans at Rhegium. That city was now refounded as a 
Greek Ally of Rome, and the surviving exiles restored. Rome 
was now the patron of the Italiot Greeks. At Tarentum Milo 
an officer of Pyrrhus held the citadel for about three years. After 
his master's death he came to terms with the Romans and with- 
drew, leaving them the fortress. A Punic fleet cruising off the 
city had to withdraw also, and Carthage had to explain its presence 
as a friendly design. A few outlying districts only remained to 
be brought under Roman dominion more effectively. A small 
Samnite rising was quelled, the northern Umbrians and the 
Picentes finally subdued, and a part of the latter transplanted 
to southern Campania, When the Sallentini of the far South- 
East had shared the common fate, Italy from the Gaulish frontier 
to the Sicilian strait was united under the headship of Rome. 

78. The closing years of the conquest saw the foundation 
of a number of Latin colonies. Of these, Cosa on the Etrurian 
coast (273) watched a district now obedient to Rome. The last 
Etruscan rising was put down in 280, and Rome now only inter- 
fered (as at Volsinii in 265) to keep the decaying aristocracies in 
power. Paestum, a revival (273) of the Greek Poseidonia, was on 
the western coast of Lucania. Ariminum (268), on the northern 
coast of the Ager Gallicus, watched the frontier. Beneventum 
(268), in the heart of Samnium, served to watch and divide 
Rome's most stubborn adversaries. In 263 it was followed by 
Aesernia, doing the same for the northern Samnite cantons. 
H. 6 



82 New position of Rome [ch, vii 

Another was planted at Firmum in Picenum (264) to secure 
a district recently disturbed. Thus Roman fortresses, holding 
important points, were spread over a wider area, and roads con- 
necting them, improved as time went on, gave ready communication 
with every part of Italy. Moreover Rome now held not only the 
Campanian harbours but the two best ports of the South-East, 
Tarentum and Brundisium. All the Greek nautical skill remaining 
in the ports of the South was at her disposal. Rhegium Locri 
Croton and other towns could regain some of their old prosperity 
under her protection. And the actual territory of the Republic, 
the ager Romanus, had been greatly extended in the course of 
a century of conquest by the annexation of forfeited lands. Her 
beaten enemies, now her Allies, were split up by colonies (each 
with its territory) or by wedges of Roman land driven in between 
them. Samnium in particular was so reduced and broken up that 
an effective revival of the Samnite confederacy was hardly possible. 
But in order to rule Italy with any comfort it was desirable to 
increase the number of full Roman citizens. This was probably 
the reason why the full franchise was in 268 granted to the Sabines. 
We have seen that many of the old Patrician families claimed a 
Sabine origin, and there was probably little to be done in the way 
of assimilation. 

79. But supremacy in Italy brought with it a wider outlook 
in foreign relations. As a protector of Greeks Rome came into 
touch with the outer world far more than she had done hitherto. 
Her alliance with Massalia was of very old standing, and she was 
also on friendly terms with Rhodes and with Apollonia on the 
Adriatic. And now her new position as a Mediterranean power 
was strikingly recognized. In 273 an embassy came from the 
court of Alexandria. Ptolemy II Philadelphus had grasped the 
meaning of events, and it seems that his proposals were well 
received and a treaty made. But Egypt was thriving under 
the Macedonian dynasty largely at the expense of the cities of 
Phoenicia. Fear of Carthage (for the Cyrenaic province of Egypt 
bordered on Punic territory) was felt at Alexandria as well as by 
the western Greeks. There was thus a prospect of a conflict 
between the two great powers watching each other across the 
Sicilian strait, and a certainty that in it Greeks would bear a part 
and be deeply interested in the result. 



CHAPTER VIII 

ORGANIZATION OF ITALY 

80. The main causes of Roman supremacy in Italy are not 
far to seek. A superior military organization did much, a con- 
sistent policy did more. The divisions of her opponents and her 
own central position enabled her to profit by useful alliances and 
to operate on 'inner lines.' Moreover there wa3 enough affinity 
of race between the Romans and most of the Italian peoples to 
make a general union, and eventually a blending, not too difficult. 
But all these advantages would hardly have sufficed, had not the 
Roman headship rested on a moral superiority. Without a leader, 
Italy might well have been parcelled out, like the East, under 
royal dynasties, rising and falling with the personal qualities of 
the rulers, or overrun by the barbarians from the North. Now 
Rome was the best leader to be had in the age of which we have 
been speaking. Clumsy as the republican government was, it had 
gone far towards inventing a machinery effective in maintaining 
order and promoting unity, without a precarious dependence on 
the virtues of a single ruler. Roman rule was hard, but on the 
whole just. Above all, it was not wavering or capricious. And 
her protectorate was real. It was not Rome that invited Gaulish 
tribes or Epirote kings into Italy : and her dealings with these 
invaders were to foreigners as well as Italians an object-lesson 
not to be mistaken. That ' Italy for Italians ' meant Italy under 
Rome, was the practical logic of circumstances. As things stood, 
to object to it was idle. 

81. Let us briefly consider the organization of Italy, reaching 
from Ariminum down to Rhegium. Connexion with Rome rested 

6—2 



84 cives and socii [ch. 

either on citizenship {civitas) or treaties {foedera). That is, all 
free men were in some sense either cives or socii. We may 
tabulate them thus 

A. cives with full rights, domiciled (a) in Rome {b) on the 

ager Romanus (c) in the citizen colonies. 
cives with ' private ' rights only, domiciled (a) in municipia 
. with or without local government {U) as a sub- 
ordinate class in the citizen colonies. 

B. socii of the 'Latin name,' domiciled {a) in old Latin 

towns ip) in Latin colonies, on various terms. 
socii not of Latin status, domiciled in treaty-states 

[civitates foederatae), on various terms. 
In group A there was only one civitas, that of Rome. But it 
differed in degree, according as the holders were enrolled in 
Roman tribes and enjoyed the 'public' rights, or were placed 
on a separate list and so excluded from the Assemblies and from 
office. In group B each community had a civitas of its own, and 
was technically a state {civitas in the concrete sense), nominally 
independent. But its sovranty was limited by the terms of its 
treaty ; for the charter {lex) of a Latin colony was virtually equi- 
valent to difoedus creating a new civitas. The territory of group A 
was ager Romanus, and it was under Roman law. Even in the 
communities of half-citizens {municipes) the local laws were gradually 
superseded by Roman, as the jurisdiction of circuit-judges {praefecti) 
sent from Rome got into working order. The territories of group B 
were all ager peregrinus, and the laws those of the several states, 
unless any community by its own act chose with the leave of 
Rome to adopt Roman law. The one restriction common to 
them all was that they could have no foreign policy. From this 
point of view Rome was Italy^, and the mark of Allies (in this 
period all Italian save perhaps Massalia) was that they were by 
treaty bound to furnish contingents to Roman armies or fleets, 
while Friends {amici, such as Rhodes) were not. But the con- 
tingents furnished by the socii were clearly distinguished from the 
citizen troops of Rome. They were organized in smaller bodies, 
commanded by their own local officers of subordinate position, 
and equipped and paid by their several states. The maximum 
number due from each state was fixed by a schedule {formula), 
but it would seldom be necessary for the consuls when raising an 
army to call out all the available forces at once. 



viii] The Allies 85 

82. It would seem that the Italian Allies, from the point of 
view of mere defence, got powerful protection at a very moderate 
price. No doubt they did, and there is reason to think that in 
the golden age of the Roman Republic treaties were faithfully 
observed and interpreted with strict and formal justice. But 
all subordination of state to state is apt to gall the weaker party 
to a compact. The system of graduated privilege, which made 
some communities fear to lose their present advantages, while 
others might hope to better their position, was a masterpiece of 
Roman statecraft. The yoke probably pressed most severely on 
the Roman half-citizens, but they had the best prospect of pro- 
motion. The main differences in the status of the Allies lay in 
the degree of dependence on Rome required by the terms of the 
treaty in each case. If the two contracting parties were mutually 
bound by the same conditions, the treaty was ' level ' {aequum) ; 
if one was in some respect bound while the other remained free, 
it was ' uphill ' or ' unfair ' {iniquum) to the inferior party. At its 
best, the sovranty of an Ally included the right to receive Roman 
exiles and protect them. This reciprocity existed between Rome 
and a few favoured cities such as Tibur Praeneste and Neapolis. 
At its worst, it left a local government, but reserved the citadel 
for a Roman garrison, as at Tarentum. Few details are known, 
but the lines of the system are clear. Of the Latin colonies we 
may say that they took the place of the old League as a favoured 
class of Allies. But there was no League, nor anything to connect 
them with each other, any more than in the case of other Allies. 
Their connexion with Rome was direct, at first including the rights 
of conubium and commercium, and a ' Latin ' colonist could migrate 
to Rome and become a Roman, provided he left a son behind 
able to fill his place. There is reason to think that in the 
later colonies, from 268 onward, some of these privileges were 
reduced. The military character of the Latin colonies was 
marked in the ceremonies of foundation, and we must not forget 
that the poorer class of Romans supplied some, perhaps many, of 
the coloni. For in them the allotments of land were substantial 
farms, while the Roman franchise was not as yet valued for 
exemptions and perquisites attached to it. Others were drawn 
from the Treaty-states, and so the total was made up, generally 
a large one. We hear of 20000 sent to Venusia, but 2500, 4000, 
6000, are the ordinary figures. 



86 The Treaty-states [ch. vm 

83. The Latin colonies were as a rule planted inland, and 
the citizen colonies always on the seaboard. Such at least was 
the practice in this period. Concerning the Treaty-states it may 
be remarked that they were very various in structure, and that the 
Roman government wisely took them for what they were. If 
they were detached cities (such as the Greek or Etruscan), the 
city was the unit dealt with in a treaty. If they were cantonal 
groups of hamlets (as in Samnium and other Sabellian lands), the 
canton-group was treated as a whole. If a city stood at the head 
of some confederate towns (as Nuceria), that group formed the 
unit. In short there was the least possible interference consistent 
with efficiency. We must not suppose that, when open resistance 
came to an end, Rome at once stepped into the position of a 
proud imperial mistress in a conquered Italy. Her statesmen 
knew better than to act thus, and the system established by their 
judgment, after enduring the uttermost strains of war and the 
internal wrongs of a later age, was not finally overthrown for 
nearly 200 years. 



CHAPTER IX 

ROME AND THE ROMANS 366—265 B.C. 

84. I have spoken of this period as the first half of Rome's 
golden age. It was surely the better half, for the spread of Roman 
power beyond Italy, while giving her imperial grandeur, under- 
mined the moral strength necessary for the Republic, and led in 
due course to the conversion of the state into an imperial machine. 
For moral force was the backbone of the whole Roman system. 
The Italian confederacy had no true Federal Government, but 
a strong Head, whose place no other power was competent to 
take. Rome herself was under no Oligarchy on a Greek model, 
but all the chief items of state policy were in practice settled by 
a small body of leading men, whose fitness for the work none 
could deny. By brute force Rome could not have ruled in Italy 
or the Senate in Rome. 

85. The qualities summed up under the term 'moral strength' 
were both the cause and the effect of a sound private life, passed 
in the wholesome atmosphere of the Roman home. The power 
and responsibility of the Father, the dignified domestic position 
of the Mother, the apprenticeship of the sons to the former and 
the daughters to the latter, were the main features of the family 
world. The system was good for both old and young : so far as 
it went, it could hardly have been bettered. Its weak point was 
its narrowness, for it tended to keep men in a groove. This defect 
was destined to do serious harm in later times, but for the age 
of Italian conquest the old training sufficed. Slaves there were, 
human chattels in the eye of the law, but probably not in great 
number. The slave was generally speaking a mere personal 
helper, often highly trusted, a bondman with a good prospect 



88 Roman life [ch. 

of freedom as the reward of useful service. Tradition, probably 
with truth, represents the typical Roman home as the seat of order 
and obedience, and the ways of life as simple and frugal. The 
meals, mostly of vegetable food, were taken sitting. Wine was 
little drunk by men, by women not at all. Silver plate was hardly 
in use. Fabricius when censor is said to have struck an ex-consul 
off the roll of the Senate for keeping some. Thrift was a virtue 
in high esteem, and the duty of keeping careful accounts was 
always a part of Roman ideals of life. A close-fisted people, the 
Romans expected a man to keep what he inherited and if possible 
to add to it. Vain display was discouraged, and even the Twelve 
Tables had forbidden extravagant funerals. But a funeral in a great 
family was a solemn affair. The ancestors of the dead, represented 
by men wearing their portrait-masks, were in attendance, and the 
head of the house held forth to those present in the Forum on 
the virtues of the late departed. So the feeling of continuity was 
maintained, and the young generation, ever reminded of the past, 
were invited to share and extend their fathers' renown. 

86. If I speak mainly of the great houses, it is because in 
social matters the great houses were Rome, and we have little or 
no knowledge of the ways and feelings of the poor. It would 
seem that their first object was to keep out of debt and the 
clutches of the laws that bore hardly on the debtor. Connected 
with this was the constant land-hunger, much relieved in this 
period of conquest by allotments of land forfeited to Rome. But 
we hear of attempts to limit the rate of interest or even to get rid 
of it altogether, and of restrictions on the power of the creditor. 
The story of the 'secession' of 287 has been referred to above. 
Clearly there were discontents in Rome, and it is a reasonable 
inference that the removal of clamorous Plebeians to colonies or 
distant farms left the new nobility a free hand to carry on the 
government and deal with problems of policy as they arose. The 
agitations leading to the Valerian legislation of 300 and the 
Hortensian of 287 were temporary ripples on a generally quiet 
surface of public life. As a rule the Roman Assemblies did what 
the governing class, whose organ was the Senate, told them to do. 
But they did not surrender their sovran power. The Senate had 
to humour them, and did. Thus the Roman constitution, out- 
wardly a balance of monarchic aristocratic and popular forces, 
was in practice steadily becoming a veiled aristocracy. The 



ix] Agriculture. Dress. The city 89 

Commons had their votes, and in moments of excitement they 
could rally and enforce their will. Meanwhile the real direction 
of the state was in the hands of the men most competent to 
guide it. 

87. Agriculture was still the chief industry, and it was in 
a thriving condition. Pyrrhus is said to have been impressed by 
the discipline and bravery of Roman soldiers, and also by the 
good cultivation of Roman farms. The two things were in truth 
the same, for the average soldier of the legions was a yeoman 
tilling his land in time of peace. The age of farmer-heroes, rightly 
honoured in Roman literature, was not yet gone : Manius Curius 
is a successor of the half-legendary Cincinnatus, a historical figure, 
and on a larger scale. Among the domestic duties of women the 
weaving of wool still held an important place, for woollen clothing, 
from the jersey {tunica) to the gown {toga), was the ordinary wear. 
Of these two articles, the former was worn by all. The latter was 
by custom indispensable on all public occasions. The farmer 
doffed it in his working hours, and donned it to attend an 
Assembly or when called to arms. The soldie. wore it girt up 
in a special way, if it be true that it was worn in the field. But 
the sagum, which eventually superseded it as the military uniform, 
is mentioned in this period. The Italian Allies had the right to 
wear the gown, and the register according to which their con- 
tingents were called out for service was styled formula togatorum. 
In Rome and other towns there was a population engaged in the 
manual trades suited to the requirements of common life. What 
were their numbers, and what proportion of them were freemen, 
we do not know. The sedentary trades were not highly esteemed, 
and we hear that persons of this class were only enrolled for army- 
service in great emergencies. 

88. Rome itself was not a splendid city. Narrow streets 
and low houses seem to have been the rule. Public buildings 
other than temples must have been few and small; and the 
temples, even that of Capitoline Juppiter, were chiefly built of 
wood. Wooden shingles were still used for roofing houses, and 
the quantity of wood present in beams rafters doors, not to 
mention the numerous shops and booths, made fire an ever- 
present danger. Unbaked bricks {lateres) were a common 
material for walls, and were liable to give way when reached 
by a Tiber flood. The stone in use was all or mostly of soft 



90 Dwellings. Arts. Works [ch. 

kinds, easily cut, but unsuited for columns and too weak to supply 
architraves. The houses even of great men were humble dwellings. 
The chief feature was the atrium, a small court into which various 
rooms opened. The roof sloped inwards, dripping, when rain fell, 
into a central tank or cistern {imphivimn). No windows opened 
on the street. This exclusive privacy was one of the most charac- 
teristic points about Roman houses of importance. Shrines, small 
chapels, and other sacred spots abounded in the city, some of 
them very ancient, and in every house there was a place for the 
household gods. Public business was transacted in the open air. 
The Senate alone met under cover. Hence it was easy to know 
what was going on. To listen to speakers addressing informal 
meetings {contiones), to watch the proceedings in law-courts, 
Assemblies, and business-transactions of all sorts, was no small 
part of a young Roman's education. 

89. The arts seem to have been in a very rudimentary state. 
We hear of statues set up in public places, and of a painting on 
a temple wall. But at present Etruscan influences were prevalent 
in matters of decoration, and no doubt the works were rude. 
Gold ornaments are said to have been worn by ladies, but men 
only wore gold rings when acting as ambassadors abroad. As in 
the city, so in the people, a plain exterior was the rule. Silver, 
long used by weight, was first coined at Rome in 269. Rome was 
now in direct relations with the Italian Greeks, and the new 
standard coin, the 'tenner' [denarius— 10 asses), vf as equivalent 
to the Attic drachma, widely current in Mediterranean commerce. 
For the present the old copper and new silver currencies went on 
side by side as legal tender, silver no doubt gaining ground as 
more convenient. But if Rome lagged behind in these respects, 
there were matters of public utility in which she had made a good 
beginning. How far the sewers {cloacae) served to carry off filth 
as well as flood-water and rain, is not easy to say. The open 
drains were converted into arched culverts ; when, is uncertain, 
but this step is probably to be connected with a gradual raising 
of the level of the Forum. The most striking and useful of the 
public works of this period were the two aqueducts, agua Appia 
(312), already referred to, and the Anio, led from the upper waters 
of that stream in a circuitous course of 43 miles. The latter was 
begun by Manius Curius in 272, and the spoils of the Pyrrhic war 
applied towards the cost, but was not finished till about ten years 



ix] Character. Flavius and the lawyers 91 

later. These works did something to improve the water-supply, 
hitherto confined to rain water and surface-wells. That we hear 
less of pestilences may be partly due to an improvement of public 
health from this cause. 

90. Compared with any of the great Greek or Graeco- 
oriental cities, such as Syracuse Tarentum or Alexandria, Rome 
would no doubt have seemed commonplace or even mean. Nor 
were the Romans a brilliant people, impressive to a casual observer. 
Greek writers seem already to have included Rome in the fictions 
that professed to continue the tale of Troy. But there is little 
reason to think that the significance of the rise of Rome was as 
yet understood by the Greek literary world. The gallery of Roman 
worthies was not a showy series : the greatness of the Roman state 
was a new phenomenon, a new experiment in government, and its 
testing was yet to come. Among the Roman figures of this period 
Appius Claudius the bold reformer occupies a notable place. His 
censorship and his public works have been noticed above. Another 
enterprise with which he was connected will bear mention at the 
end of this chapter. In the work of the Roman law-courts two 
points were all-important; first, the knowledge of the days left 
free for legal proceedings by the religious rules of the calendar, 
and secondly, the observance of minute correctness in the forms 
of pleading {adiones) by which alone legal remedies could be 
secured. Both these details were in possession of the Pontiffs, 
and this gave them excessive power. We hear that a certain 
Gnaeus Flavius patiently acquired the necessary knowledge by 
attendance in court, consultation of the pontifical lawyers, and 
carefully noting down the details as learnt. At length in 304 
he was able to publish a sort of handbook of court-days and 
pleading-forms, and so to break the monopoly of the pontiffs. 
The man was son of a freedman, and a dependant of Appius 
Claudius, under encouragement from whom he is said to have 
ventured on this bold step. The pontiffs did not cease to supply 
most of the legal skill of Rome, but the rise of a class of non- 
pontifical lawyers was now possible. The way in which this 
reform was carried out was clumsy ; but it was better than a great 
agitation, and the thing was done. 



CHAPTER X 

CARTHAGE 

91. From their cities, Tyre Sidon and others, planted in a 
little strip of land on the Syrian coast, the Phoenician navigators 
sailed to foreign countries, and in early times most of the seaborne 
commerce was in their hands. As Greek competition developed, 
they were driven to turn their attention mainly to the West. Their 
habit was to occupy fortified posts on the seaboard as centres of 
trade, and islands in convenient positions. In working westwards 
they pitched on the North of Africa as a suitable region for their 
purposes, and held the island of Malta, with stations on the coast 
of Sicily. Among their colonies in northern Africa was Carthage, 
the advantageous site of which caused it to grow into a great city. 
Tradition placed its foundation in the ninth century B.C. As the 
need of holding their ground against barbarian neighbours, and 
the Western expansion of the Greeks, became pressing, the Phoe- 
nicians ceased to be purely commercial and became imperial. A 
concentration of their power took place in the form of an alliance 
of the western Phoenician colonies, and the disproportionate 
growth of Carthage converted this into a Carthaginian empire. 
But conquest was not the object of the Phoenicians. As they 
kept their Semitic language and their eastern religion, so wealth 
gained by commerce was still their aim. They spread westward 
along the African coast, and their far-off colony of Gades shews 
their firm determination to find markets in Spain. Their posts 
on the seaboard were numerous, and no effort was spared to 
prevent intruders from interfering with their monopoly of com- 
mercial exploitation. In the fourth century B.C. three great 
movements seriously affected the balance of power in the Medi- 
terranean world. The free Greek states were weakened by their 



CH. x] Carthaginian empire 93 

long-continued quarrels. The rise of the Macedonian kingdom 
was followed by the eastern conquests of Alexander. The union 
of Italy under the headship of Rome was in full progress. Thus 
Greek rivalry in its old form no longer menaced Phoenician 
commercialism. But the parent-cities of Phoenicia were either 
ruined or passed under an imperial power less easy-going than 
the old Persian monarchy : moreover a strong competitor in the 
eastern Mediterranean appeared in the rising city of Alexandria. 
In the West, if the Greeks were weaker, the growth of an imperial 
power in Italy changed the situation, how greatly, none could tell. 
Then came the expedition of Pyrrhus, which left Rome stronger 
than it found her, and revealed the fact that neither of the western 
rivals could afford to leave the other in possession of Sicily. 

92. Events had made Carthage the real centre of Phoenician 
power, and the wealthiest city in the world of that age. Her 
dominion included (a) the home-province, which the Romans 
called Africa, (b) a long strip of land reaching eastwards along 
the coast some 600 miles to the Cyrenaic frontier, and {c) a 
great part at least of the seaboard westwards up to and beyond 
the Pillars of Hercules. Her control over the various districts 
varied in degree, from supremacy over trading colonies and their 
territories to friendly relations with local chiefs and tribes. The 
western islands were held for her, and in Sardinia and Corsica 
she was mistress by her occupation of the ports. In short her 
empire was a great commercial concern, and it was only in the 
interest of her commerce that she resorted to the use of force. 
In Sicily her position was peculiar. Over and over again the 
Greeks had rallied under some great leader and won great 
victories over the Punic armies, but had never been able to 
expel them altogether. Carthage always kept some foothold, 
from which her forces in due time advanced to win back all she 
had lost, and more. The failure of Pyrrhus before Lilybaeum 
had left her free to reoccupy the greater part of the island. 
Some even of the Greeks, worn out with fruitless warfare, were 
ready to accept her yoke : it was less wretched to be exploited 
by Carthage than to go on indefinitely suffering the miseries 
entailed by the political futility of their own race. Unable to 
act in effective concert save under pressure of danger from 
without, and even then only under the irregular despotism of 
a Tyrant, they could never find strength in a free Union. 



94 Constitution [ch. 

Syracuse alone had never succumbed to Carthaginian attacks, 
and even Syracuse now had a population no longer purely Greek. 
The weakness following the withdrawal of Pyrrhus was ended by 
the rise to power of a young soldier named Hiero, who built up 
a Syracusan kingdom in south-eastern Sicily and ruled it well. 
But its prosperity was only that of a minor power, and the king 
wisely strove to keep on good terms with mighty neighbours. 
We have seen that Messana was held by the Mamertine robbers. 
The rest of the island owned the supremacy of Carthage, and 
the policy of Carthage was to avoid provoking rebellions by gross 
misgovernment. 

93. But if Carthaginian rule was at its best in Sicily, we 
have no reason to suppose that it was anywhere utterly bad. 
Its weak point seems to have been the absence of sympathy 
between rulers and ruled. The differences of race and religion 
were too great. The eastern civilization of the Phoenicians gave 
them an advantage over rude peoples, but it did not promote the 
blending of conquerors and conquered. We have no trace of 
any institutions such as the incorporations and alliances by which 
Rome built up her Italian confederacy. . In the third century B.C. 
ruling power was centralized at Carthage to a degree then unknown 
in Rome. And what little is known of the constitution of Carthage 
agrees with the narrow-minded and jealous policy traditionally 
imputed to its Home Government. We hear of two Suffets, 
yearly magistrates, compared with the Roman consuls in many 
respects, of a Senate, and of a popular Assembly, apparently 
more like a Greek Ecclesia than the group-Assemblies of Rome. 
We also hear of the excessive influence of great families from 
time to time, and of the creation of a special supreme court or 
committee to hold such influences in check. The jealousy of 
the Punic merchant-princes was evidently as active as that of 
Roman nobles a century later. But the characteristic and vital 
force in Carthaginian politics was before all things money. The 
fortunes of the rich were colossal, and bribery, the sheer purchase 
of official power, was normal. In a population chiefly devoted to 
buying and selling, many of them often absent at sea, this traffic 
in the interests of the state easily took root, with fatal results. We 
are not to suppose that the Assembly was often called together to 
vote for any other purpose than elections. If the two Sufl"ets and 
the Senate agreed, their decision was final, and the Assembly was 



x] People and army 95 

only appealed to in case of their not agreeing. Thus a chief 
magistrate of strong views could in the last resort seek the support 
of the popular body, and perhaps carry through his designs. Such 
cases were most likely rare. To effect anything considerable, a 
Suffet would have to secure his own reelection (which seems to 
have been allowed) and also to keep the favour of the Assembly 
at his back. But the government as conducted by a clique of 
millionaires did at times arouse general discontent, and we shall 
see that, when Carthage came to blows with Rome, a kind of 
democratic movement in support of great leaders gave a peculiar 
character to the Punic wars. 

94. If it be true that the population of Carthage in 149 B.C. 
was 700,000, after all her disasters, it may well have been over a 
million in 265, at the height of her prosperity. What percentage 
of the whole were Phoenician citizens we do not know. Probably 
there were many aliens, certainly many slaves. The number of 
hands employed in the labour of the port must have been very 
great, for it was the policy of the government to centralize all 
foreign sea-borne trade at Carthage itself. Carthage was the 
headquarters of the navy, and the centre of military organization. 
But her means of waging war were in striking contrast to those 
of Rome. There was a citizen army, once perhaps efficient, but 
in these days only embodied for service in great emergencies. 
Arms and armour, engines, and service-elephants, in short all 
materials of war, were kept ready, and the vast fortifications of 
the city defied a sudden attack. A standing army was not needed, 
and for wars abroad Carthage depended mostly on mercenaries. 
Contingents were furnished by her subjects, Liby-Phoenician 
crossbreeds and Libyan tribesmen. But the allegiance of these 
subject allies was not trustworthy enough to make it safe to rely 
on them alone. Money was the foundation of a Punic army. It 
hired men of warlike races, Gauls, Iberians, Ligurians, Campanian 
Samnites, and for special services a few Greeks, whose skill was 
worth a good price. Carthage supplied a commander and the 
higher officers, probably also a bodyguard at headquarters. The 
general's business was to make an army out of his motley forces, 
and to conquer at all costs. He had ample powers, and the blood 
of hirelings was of no account. Failure made him liable to cruci- 
fixion. So the wars of Carthage were apt to be carried on with 
great brutality and bloodshed, of which the Greek cities in Sicily 



96 Navy [ch. 

had had awful experience. Of the navy we know that ships of 
war, oars and tackle, stores of timber and so forth, were kept 
ready in great quantity. The docks and arsenal were famous 
models of their kind, and the post of High Admiral was one 
of great importance. Of skilled navigators there were plenty : 
the merchant captains of Carthage were of the best, and as 
explorers they were unrivalled. 

95. It is therefore remarkable that we hear of no signal 
achievements of the Punic navy in war, either in the past or in 
the time now coming. There must be some good reason for this. 
Now we do not hear that the fleet of war-ships v/as kept in com- 
mission, indeed it is practically certain that it was not. Vessels 
of war were manoeuvred by means of rowing, and in the third 
century B.C. the prevailing type of battle-ship was large and 
clumsy. Even great maritime communities found their own 
citizens averse to the labours of the oar. Slaves, bought or cap- 
tured, were regularly employed for this service. Hired oarsmen 
were probably few in all navies of the time. When the lower 
classes of the local population, such as freedmen, served as rowers, 
it was under compulsion in all or most cases. Polybius reckons 
the normal rowing crew at 300 men, and we hear of over 300 ships 
in a single fleet. None but strong men were of use as oarsmen, 
and to control a vast throng of sturdy pressed-men, if kept in and 
about the port, would have needed a standing army. No wonder 
then that we find the Punic war-fleet laid up in time of peace, and 
hastily manned with crews drawn from any and every quarter on 
the outbreak of war. Once afloat, the unarmed rowers were at 
the mercy of the fighting crew of 120 men per ship. The officers 
were Carthaginians, perhaps also some of the fighting men, but 
mercenaries in the pay of Carthage seem to have been the 
majority. Under such conditions it is clear that the mobilization 
of a Punic fleet would take no small time, and that to make it 
thoroughly efficient as a fighting force would be a long business. 
From the subsequent course of events it is equally clear that the 
inherent difficulties of the system were never fully overcome. 
That Carthage was a great naval power, a true ruler of the waves, 
like Athens in the fifth century, is surely a notion unwarranted by 
facts. Even in nautical skill as applied to warfare it is not clear 
that her seamen were superior to those of the western Greeks, 
who had on the whole held their own on the water. The one 



x] Carthaginian politics 97 

marked advantage of the Phoenician power in a conflict with 
Rome lay in its prodigious wealth. 

96. Perhaps the most wonderful characteristic of Carthage 
was that which drew the attention of the greatest of Greek poli- 
tical observers. Aristotle speaks of the remarkable stability of 
the government, though in criticizing the constitution he finds 
far more to blame than to praise. Carthage had been free from 
revolutionary faction and from Tyranny to an extent quite amazing 
to one who judged by Greek experience. Nor does the later 
history of Carthage seem to have followed a different course. 
Many causes may have contributed to this general stability. It 
was not by pushing principles to an extreme in pursuit of a logical 
perfection that the Carthaginian plutocrats retained their political 
power. It was by keeping their trading population in general 
good humour. No doubt a large percentage of the citizens were 
constantly on the move. What with bribes at home, and oppor- 
tunities of gain abroad as traders or colonists, their desires were 
fairly well satisfied. Politics afforded sufficient scope for party 
struggles and individual ambitions, provided only that sufficient 
money were forthcoming. The rich might use power selfishly in 
their own interest, but their interest would seldom be directly 
opposed to the interests of the state. And so Carthage was able 
to 'muddle along.' Such is the explanation to which the few 
facts at our disposal seem to guide us. No doubt Phoenician 
blood and Phoenician traditions, and in particular the mysterious 
force of their religion, contributed to keep up a certain continuity 
in Carthaginian public life. But our knowledge of these influences 
is too scanty to enable us to trace their effects with any confidence. 
From a political point of view it is to be noted that, as Carthage 
was to Aristotle a specimen of a ' mixed ' constitution, so was 
Rome to Polybius. That is, neither could be classified as a 
government of One or the Few or the Many, according to the 
political philosophy of Greece. In Greece the mixed constitution 
of Sparta was felt to be abnormal. But it was just this mixture, 
with all its imperfections, that enabled the various parts of the 
state to act at a pinch, to check each other so far as to stave off 
revolutions, and to keep the machine working somehow. Gradual 
change was possible, and the political career of the city-states 
of Carthage and Rome was more permanently successful than 
that of the city-states modelled by the far more gifted Greeks. 
H. 7 



CHAPTER XI 

FIRST PUNIC WAR. 264—241 B.C. 

97. Outbreak of war 264 B.C. The inevitable war for pos- 
session of Sicily was at last brought about by that troublesome 
community of robbers, the Mamertines of Messana. The story 
is very obscure. Neither Carthage nor Hiero of Syracuse could 
put up with their aggressions ; the two powers combined to 
chastise the freebooters. Rome could not sit still and see 
Messana added (as it surely would be) to the dominion of 
Carthage, unless she meant to let all Sicily fall into her rival's 
hand. The pressure of circumstances drove her to accept the 
invitation of a party among the Mamertines, and undertake 
the relief of Messana. A Roman army was suddenly landed 
near the city. The besieging forces were defeated and the siege 
raised. Rome was now at war with two powers with whom she 
had hitherto been on terms of friendship. But in 263 Hiero 
made peace with Rome, and became her faithful ally. The 
long and mismanaged struggle of the next 22 years was with 
Carthage. The Latin name for Phoenicians was Foeni, and the 
war was called by Romans the first Poenic or Punic war. 

98. First stage, 263 — 260 B.C. Rome had now two strong 
bases at Messana and Syracuse. Carthage raised a great mer- 
cenary army, the headquarters of which were at Agrigentum. 
She had naval bases in the harbours of Drepana (Trapani) and 
Panhormus (Palermo), but her strongest post was at Lilybaeum 
(Marsala). The Romans pushed on to the West, receiving the 
submission of a number of towns, and laid siege to Agrigentum 
in 262. After a long siege the town fell. The Punic army 
escaped, and left the helpless citizens to the mercy of Rome. 



CH. xi] Rome and sea-power 99 

They were barbarously sold as slaves, a blunder which brought 
its own punishment. The war dragged heavily, and the only 
hope of making progress seemed to lie in creating a fleet and 
ceasing to leave Carthage the unchallenged ruler of the western 
seas. Our tradition records how this task was undertaken, how 
vessels of war were built with surprising speed on the model of 
a stranded Punic ship, how crews of oarsmen were meanwhile 
taught to swing together in skeleton ships, great stages or frames 
erected on dry land. But it was not likely that landsmen new 
to the work would at once rival the skill of a seafaring people 
in naval evolutions. Therefore the Roman aim was to reproduce 
as far as possible on the water the fighting conditions of a battle 
on land. A kind of moveable gangway was invented for the 
purpose. When two ships met, the Roman let the gangway fall 
on the enemy's vessel, and Roman soldiers were thus enabled 
to board her and fight hand to hand. Thus the Carthaginian 
superiority in manoeuvring was neutralized, and the superiority 
of the Roman fighting -crews could make itself felt. The value 
of this device was seen in the first great naval action, fought 
off Mylae in 260, when the bold use of these gangways resulted 
in a great victory for Rome. This story of the sudden appearance 
of Rome as a great naval power is not so miraculous as it might 
seem. Roman tradition was seldom generous in recognizing the 
services of the allies whose help the Roman government so un- 
sparingly employed. Rome had at her disposal all the maritime 
resources of the western Greeks. Those in Italy belonged to the 
Italian confederacy of which Rome was the head. Massalia was 
her old and faithful ally; Syracuse, lately won, was zealous in her 
cause. The old enmity of Greek and Phoenician told strongly in 
favour of Rome. All that was most efficient in the Roman fleet 
was probably Greek in design. The seamanship was Greek, and 
the great disasters that occurred in the course of the war were in 
general due to the stupidity of Roman admirals, wilfully deaf to 
the warnings of their Greek nautical advisers. 

99. Second stage 259 — 255. The Romans were now em- 
boldened to attempt larger enterprises. We hear of an expedition 
against Sardinia and Corsica, and some successes. But to keep 
up the naval service was no easy matter. Each quinquereme or 
ship of the line needed 300 rowers, and to make up the numbers 
required for fleets composed of some hundreds of ships was very 

7—2 



TOO 



Naval war 



[CH. 



difficult. The service was hated, and in default of sufficient slaves 
it seems to have been found necessary to press Italian Allies for 
the work. This led to discontent, perhaps to mutiny. But the 
difficulty was somehow overcome, and great fleets were main- 
tained. In 257 we hear of an indecisive sea-fight off the north 
coast of Sicily. Meanwhile the war on land dragged on slowly, 
and the position of Carthage in the West of the island was as 




Map of Sicily for the Punic Wars. 



Strong as ever. Great preparations were made for the campaign 
of 256. The Roman plan was to invade Africa in force, while 
the Carthaginians hoped to confine the land-war to Sicily by 
gaining a great victory at sea. Near Ecnomus on the south coast 
of Sicily the two fleets met. We read of 350 Punic ships of war 
and 330 Roman, with transports in addition, of a battle clumsy 
and confused, and of another Roman victory won by boarding 
in the same style as at Mylae. So the Romans went on, and 
landed near Clupea in Africa. At this point a bold advance with 
their whole army might perhaps have ended the war. But the 
Senate misjudged the situation. Roman armies were meant to 



xi] Regulus. Panhormus loi 

be changed yearly, like the consuls who commanded them, and 
even in a war beyond Italy it was not thought desirable to keep 
troops in the field longer than was absolutely necessary. So 
one consul was recalled, with the bulk of the army; the other, 
M. Atilius Regulus, was left well posted in Africa, but with wholly 
inadequate forces. Still the weakness of Carthage in her Home- 
province was so pitiful that Regulus made a most successful 
campaign. Immense booty was gained in a rich and defenceless 
country, the Punic generals were defeated in a battle, and Carthage 
seemed lost. The traditional story is that Regulus now offered 
to treat for peace, wishing to keep the credit of his successes to 
himself rather than leave his expected successor to reap the fruit 
of his victory. But he is said to have spoilt his own chances by 
demanding terms that nerved the Carthaginians to a desperate 
resistance. Just then a body of mercenaries, hired for Carthage 
in Greece, arrived. Their chief, the Spartan Xanthippus, gained 
the confidence of the Punic government, and soon turned the 
tables on Regulus. Few of the Roman army escaped from their 
defeat. Regulus was taken prisoner. But the xiaval superiority 
of the Romans enabled them to beat a Carthaginian fleet and 
bring off the remnant of their troops. Nautical skill alone was 
required to complete the homeward voyage; but the Roman 
consuls would not heed the warnings of their Greek skippers. 
A storm caught them before they could double cape Pachynus, 
and three quarters of their fleet were wrecked on the southern 
coast of Sicily. 

100. Third stage, 254 — 250. There was now little prospect 
of an early peace. New fleets were built, and new expeditions 
undertaken, but no great sea-fight is recorded. A Roman fleet 
sailed to ravage the African coast, but narrowly escaped utter 
destruction through ignorance of the perils of navigation in those 
waters. On the voyage home half their number perished in a 
storm. At sea Carthage now had the advantage, but as usual 
nothing came of it. The chief events of the war in these years 
were connected with Panhormus. This important fortress and 
naval station was taken by the Romans in 254 and held with a 
garrison. A good base of operations in western Sicily, in easy 
communication with Italian ports, was thus secured. In 251 
Hasdrubal the Punic commander felt strong enough to attempt 
the recovery of the place, and led a great army, including 



I02 Lilybaeum [ch. 

elephants, to besiege it. The Roman consul L. Caecilius Metellus 
made a stout defence, and early in 250 utterly defeated the be- 
siegers in a battle which broke up the chief Punic army for the 
time. But the money no longer needed to pay those captured 
or slain could be used to engage new mercenaries. The resources 
of Carthage were not seriously impaired by the disaster of Pan- 
hormus. Roman confidence revived, and shipbuilding, neglected 
since the late losses at sea, was by order of the Senate resumed. 
The exhibition of captive elephants signalized the triumph of 
Metellus, and mint-masters of that famous family in later times 
were proud to stamp the figure of an elephant on their coins. 

loi. Fourth stage, 249 — 241. Fourteen years of war waged 
without consistent strategy had produced small results. Still 
Rome had gained ground. But it was clear that a peaceful 
possession of Sicily, not necessitating the presence of a Roman 
army, was impossible so long as Carthage retained a firm footing 
in the island. This footing was the maritime fortress of Lilybaeum. 
As its walls had defied Pyrrhus, so they now foiled all the vast 
efforts of the Romans. Year after year the fruitless siege went 
on. The approach from the sea was difficult, owing to reefs ; 
but the seamanship of Phoenician skippers and Greeks in the 
Punic service was equal to the task of revictualling the town. 
Even when repeated disasters had compelled the Romans to turn 
the siege into a blockade, food still found its way in. All the 
movements of the last nine weary years of the war were conducted 
with reference to the winning or keeping of the western strong- 
hold. A Punic fleet lay at Drepana, which was no doubt a station 
of blockade-runners. In 249 the consul P. Claudius Pulcher 
attempted to surprise and destroy this fleet, but was outman- 
oeuvred by Adherbal and defeated with the loss of most of his 
force. At last a Carthaginian admiral seemed to know his busi- 
ness. Roman ships off Lilybaeum were taken or burnt. Roman 
convoys off the southern coast were chased and driven to perish 
in a storm. Only the land-route was open to send food to the 
besiegers of Lilybaeum. Still the Romans doggedly kept up the 
war in the West. But their financial resources were failing. For 
some four or five years they seem to have given up the naval war 
and built no ships. Here was the opportunity of Carthage. But 
it was missed, no doubt owing to the blindness or jealousy of her 
rulers, and it did not come again. 



xi] Aegussa. Peace 103 

102. In 247, while the Romans with Hiero's help still 
watched Lilybaeutn, a strong man was sent from Carthage to face 
them in Sicily. This was Hamilcar, of the great family of Barcas. 
He was not properly backed up by the government at home. But 
he saw the most effective way of using his mercenary troops, by 
avoiding pitched battles, and harassing the Romans in irregular 
warfare by sea and land. He made sudden descents on the 
Italian coast. At last he ventured to seize a rocky stronghold 
near Panhormus, and here he held his ground for years, raiding 
the rich country as he chose, and defying the power of Rome. 
As time went by, he grew more enterprising, and weakened the 
position of the Romans in western Sicily. It became clear that 
the war could only be ended by one side winning the command 
of the sea. Tradition records that Roman patriotism solved the 
problem. A fleet of 200 ships was provided by the voluntary 
generosity of the wealthier citizens, and every care was taken to 
make it thoroughly efficient. The main object was to destroy a 
Punic fleet, on its way with supplies for their western garrisons. 
The consul C. Lutatius Catulus (whose year rr-n from ist May 
242) won a great victory over this fleet, ill equipped for a battle, 
off the island of Aegussa in March 241. Rome had now the 
mastery at sea, and the end was in sight. Carthage sued for 
peace, and left Hamilcar to make the best terms he could. 
Rome was exhausted, and Catulus eager to have the credit of 
ending the war. 

103. Peace. The terms agreed upon by the commanders 
were that Carthage should evacuate Sicily, make no war upon 
Syracuse, give up all Roman prisoners, and pay to Rome 2200 
talents (over ^^500,000) in 20 yearly instalments. Ten commis- 
sioners sent from Rome with full powers insisted on the evacuation 
of all the smaller islands between Sicily and Italy, and made the 
indemnity 3200 talents payable in 10 years. Carthage submitted. 
Her hireling troops were shipped off" in batches to Africa, to be 
paid off and rewarded for their great services, and Rome took 
over the fortress of Lilybaeum. The position in Sicily was now 
this. The Syracusan kingdom, in area about i or ^ of the island, 
was of course undisturbed. The much larger part fell to Rome 
as the successor of Carthage. Rome had no experience in 
governing subjects, and the arrangements of the Italian con- 
federacy were not thought suitable to be applied outside Italy. 



I04 The new provincia [ch. 

But it was necessary to find some method of asserting the 
sovranty of Rome in her newly-acquired territory. The Senate 
found a way of doing this by an extension of old Roman prin- 
ciples. Each state official had a sphere or department (^provincia) 
in which he acted. So Roman Sicily was made the ' province ' of 
a Roman Governor, a yearly officer, endowed with ample powers, 
charged with the general superintendence of the administration. 
The details of his appointment are obscure. Local precedent 
was followed in the important matter of revenue. Hence came 
the tithes^ of yearly produce and the customs dues, which were 
the normal imposts levied in Sicily. Thus Rome began a new 
experiment, the taxation of subjects for her own benefit. The 
so-called allies {socii) in Sicily were thus on a different footing 
from the Italian Allies, whose obligation to the leading power 
consisted in furnishing and paying fixed military contingents. 
They were subjects of Rome as they had been of Carthage. In 
peace or war, they were tributary, save in so far as exemptions 
were specially granted to a few favoured communities. The old 
Roman policy of isolating the towns by graduation of privileges 
seems to have been employed in Sicily. In particular the right 
of acquiring property outside a man's own township (the commer- 
cium enjoyed by Roman citizens) was only granted in a very few 
cases. The several towns were left free to manage their internal 
affairs under local governments, but care was taken to place the 
power in the hands of the wealthier burgesses. Of course the 
communities that had resisted longest were placed in the most 
unfavourable position. But we have no reason to think that the 
province was harshly governed in its early days. The miseries of 
Roman Sicily belong to a later time. 

104. The combatant powers. Polybius well remarks that the 
different character and resources of Rome and Carthage are best 
displayed in the story of this war. From her own citizens and 
from her Italian confederates Rome could draw an inexhaustible 
supply of loyal soldiers, an indigenous army of fairly uniform 
quality, amenable to discipline, and able to bear up under the 
strain of waiting and hardship, even of repeated disasters. But 
they were a raw militia, not a standing army, and in Italian war- 
fare the custom had been to raise fresh legions year by year. In 
Sicily the men must some of them at least have been kept under 

1 See § 288. 



Plate II 




(a) 



(/') 



(^) 



4. Roman silver coins, after 26S B.C. 

(a) denarius [x] "j obv. Roma in winged helmet. 
{b) qinnarhis [v] V rev. Tlie Twin Bretliren, mounted, chart 
{c) sestertius [lis] J ing. ROMA. 

See §§ 89, 104, 175, 




Coin of Hiero II of Syracuse, 3rd cent. B.C. 
obv. Head of Hiero with diadem. 
rev. Nike in chariot. BASIAEOS lEPONO:: 
See §§ 77, 97. 



xi] The combatants compared 105 

arms for more than one campaign. If the soldiers were not 
regular professionals, the generals were even less so. Year by 
year new consuls took over the command, untrained in the art 
of war, and seldom able to use with effect the fine material 
abundant in the ranks. Moreover the Romans were in great 
straits for want of ready money. Their financial system was 
still very rude. A silver coinage had only begun in 268. During 
the war the clumsy bronze coin (the as), already reduced far below 
its original weight, was further' lowered. We have seen with what 
difficulty the cost of keeping up a navy was met. There is no 
reason to doubt the tradition that only patriotic devotion to duty 
enabled the financial burdens to be borne. In general the Roman 
people was still simple and sound. The constitution was a lum- 
bering machine, but it worked somehow, thanks to the guidance 
of the Senate. The citizen body, uncorrupted as yet by faction 
and bribery, were of one mind in devotion to the state. Beside 
them stood the Allies, of whom we hear little in our record. But 
it was their support that made the Rome of this period a power of 
the first rank, and their loyalty that was the surest proof of the 
merits of the Roman system. 

105. Carthage, to judge from such evidence as has reached 
us, presented a very different picture. No confederacy of loyal 
allies stood at her back. Her armies, bought with pay or pro- 
raises, seem generally to have held to their bargain, and they 
could be kept in the field continuously, till they became pro- 
fessional soldiers. But the faith of mercenaries has never been 
an effective substitute for a patriotic sqnse of duty in enabling 
men to bear discouragement and defeat. Late in the war we 
hear of mutiny in a Punic fleet and desertions from the Punic 
army. And worse was soon to come. Nor was the navy a credit 
to a great maritime state. The reasons for its disgraceful in- 
efficiency, which the war exposed, have been discussed above. 
Carthage had good admirals, but she did not give them a fair 
chance ; when she might have seized command of the sea, she 
left Rome time to revive. The one merit of her war-policy was 
that she kept a good general in command for years together. 
But when Hamilcar did great things in western Sicily, he appears 
to have been left without sufficient reinforcements or pay for his 

^ For this difficult question see Mr G. F. Hill's Historical Roma^z Coins, 
pp. 28-33. 



io6 Place of the Greeks [ch. 

troops, and the final effort to send in supplies was mismanaged. 
It is almost certain that the state of Carthaginian politics was to 
blame for most of this blundering. The government was in the 
hands of a clique of wealthy nobles, who controlled the senate. 
Party-spirit ran high in Carthage, and the Barcid family, to which 
Hamilcar belonged, leant on the support of the popular Assembly. 
The noble clique led by Hanno (the ' Great ' as he was called) 
seem to have been more concerned to keep their opponents out 
of power at home than to do the best for their country abroad. 
In short Carthage, wealthier by far than Rome, but already 
corrupt and factious, was no match for her poorer rival. Her 
weakness in Africa was shewn in the campaign of Regulus. 
Only the clumsiness of the Roman system enabled her to 
make a fight of it so long, while using but a part of her re- 
sources. 

io6. That this comparison of the two combatants is a fair 
one I think the sequel will shew. The help derived from Greek 
skill by both sides has been noted. It was the destiny of that 
brilliant race to serve peoples intellectually inferior to themselves, 
not to build up a great Greek empire and rule it according to 
Greek ideas. Why they could not turn their cleverness to account 
in imperial politics on their own behalf, is a question not within 
the scope of this book. The fact remains, and is worth noting, 
that great empire-states were formed, not Greek, and that Greek 
influences penetrated them, inspiring or corrupting, sowing seeds 
of good and evil. As seeker creator teacher and critic the Greek 
was unrivalled and irresistible. We shall see Rome become 
supreme in the civilized world only to become dependent on 
Greek leading in Art and Literature, and in all progressive de- 
partments of thought. Such was the power of a subject race, 
whom the Romans had some excuse for despising. So profound 
is the difference between intellectual brilliancy and the duller 
qualities that go to make up what we call political capacity. 

107. During the first Punic war the public life of Rome 
seems to have moved on the old lines. A Plebeian chief pontiff 
in 252 reminds us that the blending of the two Orders was 
practically complete. On his death Metellus the victor of Pan- 
hormus succeeded to the post. He was the typical hero of the 
period, a man distinguished in all things in which a Roman noble 
loved to excel. Another honoured figure was C. Duilius, the 



xi] Roman progress 107 

victor in the sea-fight of Mylae. Simple privileges granted to 
such men still sufficed to shew Roman appreciation of merit. 
The first appearance of gladiators as a show at a funeral, a 
horrible spectacle of bloodshed destined to become common at 
Rome, is placed in 264. The custom is said to have been bor- 
rowed from Etruria, but Roman society does not seem to have been 
shocked by it. In politics we hear of the appointment (in 243) 
of a second praetor, for jurisdiction in legal disputes in which 
aliens [peregrim) were concerned. This increase of the magis- 
tracy was a good thing, and it points to the growth of legal 
business. But at first the new officer was wanted for military 
duties. Indeed it happened that the consul Catulus was laid up 
with a wound, and the new praetor commanded the fleet in the 
final battle of the war. 

108.. Meanwhile the founding of colonies, to guard the 
coasts and secure the hold of Rome on Italy, went on in spite 
of the war, partly because of the war. Citizen-colonies occupied 
the coast of southern Etruria, threatened by Punic fleets. Colonies 
in Umbria seem to be a preparation for dealing -'ith the Gauls in 
the North. In the South-East a Latin Colony was planted at 
Brundisium in 244. Thus the best harbour on the Adriatic was 
held by a Roman fortress, and was destined to become more and 
more important as Rome became interested in the peoples and 
questions of the East. In short, even the exhausting struggle 
with Carthage did not interrupt the steady consolidation of Roman 
power. This was the work of the Senate, the Standing Committee 
for watching over the interests of Rome. The efficiency of this 
wonderful body in the third century B.C. was at its height. It 
could neither pass a law, nor elect a magistrate, nor judge an 
offender, nor declare war. Yet its moral force was the mainspring 
of the political machine, and the fact that moral force was able to 
guide public poHcy is the simplest and truest explanation of the 
greatness of Rome. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE INTERVAL 241—218 B.C. 

log. The first Punic war lasted 23 years : 23 years only 
passed before Rome and Carthage were again actually at war. 
The difference between the two powers shewed itself more clearly 
than ever in their several experiences during this interval. 

Carthage. The Punic government was shortsighted enough to 
concentrate all its returned mercenaries in one place and then 
mean enough to try and cheat them of part of their promised pay. 
The revolt provoked by this criminal folly came near to being the 
ruin of Carthage. For about three years Africa was the scene of 
a war in which no quarter was given, waged with ever-increasing 
barbarity on both sides. The warlike mercenaries, drawn from 
various races, had no common language and no one supreme 
leader. But Hanno and the government forces could make no 
head against them ; only the employment of Hamilcar saved the 
state when all seemed lost. Mercy was of course out of the 
question. But prompt and generous payment would probably 
have been far less costly than the horrible struggle in which they 
were at length exterminated. Moreover new mercenaries had to 
be employed for their suppression, and doubtless well paid. This 
revolt had not been encouraged by foreign powers. Both Rome 
and Syracuse in various ways helped the Carthaginian government. 
Rome did not occupy Sardinia when a revolt of the Punic merce- 
naries there left the island at her mercy. But in 238, when 
Carthage at last felt able to reassert her control of Sardinia and 
Corsica, Roman jealousy forbade it, and even extorted a further 
indemnity as the price of abstaining from war. Rome herself 
annexed the islands as a province, occupied some ports, and 



CH. XIl] 



Carthage and Rome 



109 



appointed a governor. So the near presence of Punic garrisons 
was prevented, but Rome was busy in Italy, and the effective 
conquest of the new territories was not completed for many years. 
At Carthage the popular party, headed by the Barcid family, now 
got the upper hand. Their policy was to increase the resources 
of the state with a view to settling scores with Rome. After the 
recent losses there still remained one land in which Carthage 
already had a footing, and in which it was possible to build up a 
new Punic empire. In Spain Hamilcar hoped to find the means 
of avenging his country's sufferings. But before he left for the 
West he had to organize means for holding in check the peace- 
party at home. They had, when in power, never loyally supported 
him in Sicily, and he could not trust them now. 

no. Rome. From 241 to 231 the record is very meagre. 
It seems that there was war with the Ligurian hillmen on the 



GAULS 




Occupation of the ager Gallicus. 

northern frontier of Etruria, probably in connexion with the 
annexation of Sardinia and Corsica, where there was also fighting. 
But the chief move in Italy was directed against the Gauls. They 
were restless and menacing, but seldom able to act together for 
long. They wanted to win back the strip of land from which 
Rome had expelled the Senones in 283, but an expedition for 
this purpose in 236 was a failure. The Romans soon shewed 



I lo Roman Policy. Flaminius [ch. 

their intention to keep the territory, the so-called ager Gallicus. 
In 232 the tribune C Flaminius carried a law for assigning this 
land in allotments to Roman citizens. Of the war provoked by 
this challenge we shall speak below. But Roman policy was now 
beginning to look beyond Italy. Rome and her Allies were now 
interested in the Adriatic, and the nuisance of lUyrian piracy 
could not be endured. An embassy to the court at Scodra was 
refused redress. War followed in 230 — 228. The defeat and 
submission of the Illyrians put an end to their raids for the time. 
But the chief importance of this little war was that it brought 
Rome into touch with a number of the Greek states beyond the 
sea. Some cities on the seaboard of lUyria and Epirus became 
' friends ' of Rome, and some inland tribes also. To the republics 
and federations of Greece proper the suppression of piracy was 
most welcome, and they expressed their gratitude in various ways. 
But there was another side to the picture. The present king of 
Macedon, Antigonus Doson, resented the interference of Rome 
in Greek affairs. It might be a bar to his regaining the practical 
control of the Greek states that had been enjoyed by some of his 
predecessors. So from this time onward persons hostile to Rome 
were received with favour at the Macedonian court. 

III. The period between the two great Punic wars was one 
of great internal activity at Rome. After the peace of 241 we 
find the formation of new Tribes resumed. The two then added 
brought up the number to 35, and this total was never exceeded. 
Why, we do not know. Districts continued to be added to 
Roman territory, but the citizens settled there were enrolled in 
existing Tribes, which thus no longer stood for local units^ their 
members being scattered. And it cannot have been long after 
this that a great change was made in the Assembly by Centuries. 
All we know is that in some way Centuries and Tribes were 
brought into connexion, so that a Century was in future a part of 
a Tribe. The details of the reform and the process by which it 
was carried out are alike obscure. It seems that changes in the 
order of voting and the distribution of voting-power both tended 
to lessen the great advantage hitherto enjoyed by the rich, and 
that the movement was presumably of a popular character. The 
great popular leader of this period was Gaius Flaminius, and he 
may have been the moving spirit, but we do not know. The 
clumsiness of the Centuriate Assembly was not lessened, perhaps 



xii] Freedmen. New praetors 1 1 1 

even increased. But this Assembly was now seldom employed for 
anything but elections ; for passing laws the people were generally 
summoned by Tribes. In this period we meet with a question 
that afterwards became one of the great troubles of the Roman 
Republic. When a slave was set free by his owner {dominus), he 
ceased to be servus, and became the freedman (libertus) of his 
former master as protector {patronus). But his position in the 
state was that of a free man bearing a taint of former slavery. 
As a citizen he was not recognized as an equal of the free-born 
{ingenuus). How were such persons to be admitted as citizens 
and yet not treated as equals ? This question was answered by 
reviving the old distinction' between country-Tribes and city- 
Tribes. The latter were only four in all, the former were 31. 
By enrolling citizens of servile extraction {libertini) only in the 
city-Tribes they would only have a share in determining four 
Tribe-votes. This appears to have been the policy of the Roman 
reform-party, carried out by Flaminius as censor in 220. The 
object was to put all free-born Romans as far as possible on a 
level, not to equalize Romans born and citizens o"" alien birth. 

112. The same jealous spirit, and the absence of levelling 
ideas, were shewn in a law ilex Claudia of 218) forbidding a 
senator to own more than one ship of burden. Its effect was to 
shut out the active governing class from taking a direct part in 
commerce. Thus they were practically compelled, so far as law 
could make them, to invest their growing fortunes in land, and 
become more than ever a nobility of great landlords. The need 
of providing for the government of Rome's new acquisitions led to 
an increase of the magistracy. About 227 the number of praetors 
was raised from two to four. The two new posts were for the 
charge of the Sicilian and Sardinian departments {provinciae), 
and with them began the regular series of provincial governors. 
That is, Roman magistrates were set to rule subject peoples, and 
Rome took up an imperial position outside Italy, different from 
that which she held as head of the Italian confederacy. In the 
inner life of Rome we hear of a few details, the first signs of 
things destined to become important later on. Such was a free 
distribution of corn in the city, the bounty of Hiero of Syracuse 
when he visited Rome. A story of a citizen divorcing his wife 
for barrenness is recorded as a notable fact in those days. The 

^ See § 55. 



112 Livius and Naevius. Spain [ch. 

first free foreigner (a Greek) to settle in Rome as a practising 
surgeon is said to have come in the year 219. Greek specialists 
in this and other professions were generally slaves or freedmen. 
The rude beginnings of a written Roman literature also belong to 
this period. A Greek named Andronicus, brought as a slave 
from Tarentum, took the name Livius from the master who 
emancipated him, and kept a school. He translated the Odyssey 
and some Greek tragedies into Latin. Younger than Livius was 
Cn. Naevius, a Campanian. Beside versions from the Greek, he 
attempted original poetry on the model of the native songs of 
Italy. Very little is known of either of these men. But the 
mere fact of a beginning being made is worth noting as a sign 
of the development of Rome during the interval of the Punic 
wars. 

113. The Barcids in Spain. For nine or ten years Hamil- 
car worked hard, fighting and negotiating. He brought a number 
of the southern tribes to accept the overlordship of Carthage. 
He raised a strong force of native troops, but the army thus 
formed was quite different from the mercenary hosts of the old 
model. The men were not simply hired for a campaign, but kept 
on the regular establishment, drawing Carthaginian pay year after 
year, and becoming a professional standing army, proud of their 
great leader. With these and his African troops, he was well able 
to make Carthage respected, and the resources of the country 
supplied him with money. In 228 he fell in battle. His son-in- 
law and successor Hasdrubal maintained the Punic cause by 
diplomacy and skilful management. He took a great step forward 
in shifting the headquarters from the old Phoenician city of Gades 
(Cadiz) in the far South- West to a point on the South-East coast. 
Here he founded a ' New Carthage ' (Carthagena) and fortified it 
strongly. The new civil and military centre was in fact a challenge 
to Rome. But neither side was as yet ready for war. A Roman 
embassy visited Hasdrubal, and an agreement was come to, by 
which the river Iberus (Ebro) was to be the boundary between 
the spheres of the two powers. But after this the Roman govern- 
ment did not take possession of northern Spain. They only 
formed alliances with some towns on the seaboard, and one of 
these towns, Saguntum, was South of the Ebro. And it is not 
certain that the agreement with Hasdrubal was ever officially 
approved by the government of Carthage. 



xii] Hannibal 113 

114. Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221, and Hannibal the 
eldest son of Hamilcar, then 26 years old, succeeded him. He 
was already a thorough soldier, and both the natives and the 
Punic officers in Spain could see in him a chief of exceptional 
powers. But what gave the young man his chance of putting his 
father's designs in practice was the fact that the popular party led 
by the Barcids was in power at Carthage. On the other hand, it 
was no easy matter to hold that party together for a length of 
time, and so to give effectual support to an absent leader on 
whose success the fate of Carthage depended. Hannibal needed 
a great loyal statesman at home to cooperate with him in his 
efforts abroad. Now we hear of no Barcid partisan equal to the 
task. Our tradition is all from the Roman side, but there is no 
reason to doubt its truth when it represents Hannibal as being 
thwarted and crippled by the folly of the Home government in 
the critical moments of the second Punic war. That is, the rich 
merchant-princes of the peace-party stood their ground, and 
regained enough power to make the policy of Carthage weak and 
wavering. Meanwhile Hannibal was wholly possessed by the 
resolve to humble his country's great foe, and he went ahead with 
an intensity that seems to have blinded him to the real strength 
of Rome. To a Carthaginian it was perhaps impossible to 
believe that the Allies of the Italian confederacy had good 
reasons for loyalty to their Head, and would hesitate to rebel 
unless sure of bettering their condition. Certainly no such bond 
of common interest existed between Carthage and her subjects in 
Punic Africa. 

115. For about two years Hannibal was busy consolidating 
and extending the Carthaginian power in Spain, perfecting his 
army, filling his war-chest ; in short, preparing for his great enter- 
prise. In 219 he felt ready for war, and Rome was engaged 
elsewhere. So he picked a quarrel with the Saguntines and laid 
siege to the city, though allied with Rome. The Roman Senate 
vainly hoped to save Saguntum by negotiations and protests, 
addressed first to Hannibal and then to the government at 
Carthage. But the Punic government did not repudiate Hanni- 
bal's action. Saguntum fell early in 218. The prestige of Rome 
was broken. Carthage had defied her former conqueror, and the 
rival powers were once more openly at war. We must now turn 
and see what had lately been occupying the attention of the 

H. 8 



114 Rome busy [ch. 

Roman government and causing it to display such feeble indecision 
in its foreign policy in the West. 

Ii6. Rome and the Gauls. The truth is that one of Rome's 
chief claims to the support of her Allies was her employing the 
forces of united Italy to keep at bay the restless Gauls, and that 
this part of her task was incomplete. A forward policy in the 
North was necessary, for not to go forward was, in dealing with 
such warlike tribes, the same as going backward. The Gauls saw 
that it was time for a great effort to stop the Roman advance. 
So they called to their aid a number of their kinsmen beyond the 
Alps, and in 226 an immense host of them poured into Etruria. 
Irresistible at first in the open field, the barbarians ruined them- 
selves by stupid strategy, and in 225 were destroyed at the great 
battle of Telamon. The Romans now pushed on boldly to 
occupy the region of the Po. They had long been friends with 
the Veneti who held the mouths of the great river, and had lately 
made terms with the Gaulish Cenomani. The years 224 — 222 
were employed in conquering the two chief tribes of hostile Gauls, 
the Boii and Insubres. In 223 the popular leader Flaminius was 
consul, in 222 M. Claudius Marcellus, the dashing soldier after- 
wards famous for his services in the second Punic war. In 221 a 
campaign in Istria quieted some restless local tribes. Rome 
clearly meant to be supreme in the country called Cisalpine or 
* hither ' Gaul, and to extend Italy up to the Alps, The northern 
way to Ariminum was turned into a great military road in 220 by 
the censor Flaminius, and in 218 two strong Latin colonies, 
Placentia (Piacenza) and Cremona, were founded on the Po. 
But the conquest of the country was far from complete, and the 
beaten Gauls were longing for their revenge. 

117. Polybius tells us that at the time of this struggle with 
the Gauls the forces at the disposal of Rome were officially 
reckoned at 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse. He also records 
that in the pressure of danger the Allies eagerly came forward to 
back up their Head in a common cause. Evidently their terror 
of the Gauls was a powerful stimulant to their loyalty : this we 
must bear in mind. But the victories over the barbarians were 
mainly due to the superiority of Roman discipline and Roman 
weapons. They were ' soldiers' battles.' The strategy of the 
civil magistrates who commanded in the field was very crude, 
and they trusted to their men to ' pull them through ' at a pinch. 



xii] elsewhere 115 

No Roman general understood the art of handling large bodies of 
troops with effect. And the government seems to have been quite 
unaware that this deficiency was a serious danger in the face of 
the great general and the highly-trained army now on the march 
from Spain. 

118. But it was not only the war with the Gauls that had 
kept Rome from asserting herself in the West. In 219 the lUyrian 
war broke out again. It is true that the pirates were promptly put 
down and order restored. But Demetrius of Pharos, the adven- 
turer who had caused the trouble, escaped to Macedon, where he 
was received by king Philip, who had lately succeeded to the 
throne. At this time the Macedonian kingdom was more pre- 
dominant in Greece than it had been for many years ; and the 
young king was especially desirous to expel the Romans from 
their foothold on the eastern side of the Adriatic. Their presence 
was a check to his ambition. So he was watching for an opportu- 
nity, and Demetrius remained at the Macedonian court, intriguing 
against Rome. On the other hand the Aetolians, whom Philip 
had defeated in war, were longing to be revenged on him. Thus 
there were the materials for a fresh conflict in the Greek peninsula. 
But in the middle of the year 218 there was no obvious reason for 
alarm in Italy. Nobody imagined that the approach of Hannibal 
could mean actual fighting south of the Alps before the end of 
the year. Even were this possible, the Roman government, with 
its vast numbers of brave men at disposal, seemed able to crush 
an invader at once. We shall see that the masters of Italy had 
still much to learn. 



CHAPTER XIII 

SECOND PUNIC WAR 218—201 B.C. 

119. Importance of the war. The Hannibalic or second 
Punic war was the turning-point in the history of Rome both 
internal and external. Internally it found the Senate powerful, 
it is true. But the close of the war left the Senate so much more 
powerful that it became for a long period the virtual government 
of Rome. The constitution stood nominally unchanged, but its 
working was different. In the course of this war many things 
happened that were foreshadowings of the coming supremacy of 
the Senate: there were also a few signs of popular discontents 
by which individual leaders rose for a time to power. In these 
leaders we may see the early fore-runners of the great anti- 
senatorial movement, the revolution in which the Republic 
(again without ostensible change) became a mere name, an 
unconfessed but real monarchy. Externally Rome began the 
war as Head of Italy, sovran of the greater part of Sicily, and 
over-lord of Sardinia Corsica and the N.W, part of Spain. But 
none of the last three countries were as yet conquered : Rome 
had just enough hold on them to keep out a rival. When the 
war ended, the overthrow of Carthage left Rome supreme in the 
western Mediterranean, and practically committed to a struggle 
with the eastern powers. Less than forty years of wars and 
diplomacy were then enough to destroy her opponents one by one 
and leave her the one Great Power in the Mediterranean world. 
That the process took so long was largely due to the obstinate 
reluctance of the Roman aristocracy to profit by the military 
lessons of the second Punic war. 



CH. xiii] The combatant powers 117 

120. Factors in the struggle. We have seen what enormous 
numbers of men were at the disposal of Rome. But we must 
bear in mind that these forces were a raw militia, brave but 
untrained, and that the cavalry was always a weak point in the 
Roman armies. On the other hand the army of Hannibal was 
no longer a mere mercenary force hastily got together, like the 
old Carthaginian armies, but a highly-trained force, used to war- 
fare and accustomed to follow a great leader in whom they had 
full trust. The cavalry was particularly efificient, as events were 
to prove. The elephants may be ignored, as they were of no 
service. Hannibal's greatest advantage was in his own genius 
and independent control of his army. Roman generals were a 
succession of honest soldiers, who had not learnt to handle large 
bodies of troops with effect, and who were on the Roman system 
superseded just when they were beginning to learn. The strain 
of the war forced the Roman government to give up this system 
of constant changes for the time, but it was revived after the war. 
On the other hand the citizen-generals were backed up by Rome 
with all available resources, while Hannibal received hardly any 
support from Carthage. Hannibal's party at home could prevent 
concessions to Rome and so virtually declare war. But they seem 
to have been unable or even unwilling to carry on the government 
in exact accord with the instructions of their absent leader. And 
so it came that the resources of Carthage were not, as they needed 
to be, effectively directed by a single mind. The mismanagement 
that resulted from this is clearly shewn in the Carthaginian naval 
policy. The war was not a naval war. Not a single great sea-fight 
occurred in the course of it. But it was surely of the first import- 
ance to gain the mastery at sea and to keep in touch with the 
Punic leader in Italy. The sea was not swept by Roman fleets 
able to stop a great armada from Carthage. That Hannibal was 
able to communicate with Carthage by sea shews that it would 
have been possible to send him men and money enough, if the 
Punic government had only chosen to do so. 

121. But we shall see that the Punic government chose to 
judge for themselves rather than follow the better judgment of 
Hannibal, and with fatal results. There was however a weak 
point in the calculations of Hannibal also. In boldly invading 
Italy he reckoned on finding support from two quarters. By 
representing himself as come to put an end to Roman supremacy 



ii8 Gauls and Italians [ch. 

he hoped to induce Rome's Italian AUies to rise against the Head 
of the Confederacy, and at the same time to procure the numbers 
necessary for his undertaking by enlisting great forces of Gauls. 
He had yet to learn that these two hopes were inconsistent with 
each other. To lead Gauls into Italy was a step certain to alarm 
the Italian Allies : fear of the Gauls would check secession. More- 
over the Gauls were not to be trusted. Whether the advantages 
of employing them would be so great as to outweigh the dis- 
advantages was the question ; a question which, looking back on 
the past, we may answer in the negative. How was Hannibal led 
into this miscalculation ? Surely by information falsely coloured. 
He took vast pains to learn the facts bearing on his enterprise. 
But he was misled by an influence that is always present when 
two or more forces try to cooperate against one. His aim was to 
use Gauls and Italians against Rome, while they wanted to use 
him. Each partner would expect too much from the other, and 
give too little. Accordingly both Gauls and Italians were willing 
to be relieved by Hannibal from the yoke of Rome, and his spies 
brought encouraging reports. But neither Italians nor Gauls 
desired to set up a Carthaginian empire in Italy. They wanted 
him to set them free and then withdraw, and this state of mind 
made them unwilling to submit to his control. He was never in 
a position to give them freedom, even if he wished it, without 
great sacrifices on their part. Thus in Italy he was leaning on 
a broken reed, while he was never properly backed up by the 
people at home. 

122. Meanwhile the power of placing great armies in the 
field was only a part of the defence of Italy. All the best harbours 
and landing-places in the long seaboard were guarded by fortified 
colonies or allied cities. Many of the cities were Greek, and the 
western Greeks were true to Rome, their protector against their 
old Phoenician enemy. The inland peoples were some of them 
very willing to see Rome humbled. But they were watched by 
fortresses planted in carefully chosen spots, the Latin colonies, 
which for their own security against hostile neighbours depended 
on their connexion with Rome. To them no invader could be 
welcome, and these fortresses formed invaluable bases for the 
operations of Roman armies. They could only be taken by siege, 
and Hannibal's forces, excellently fitted for movements in the 
field, were wholly unfitted for the strain of siege-works or the 



xin] Authorities 119 

slow patience of a blockade. Hannibal in short had to carry 
Italy with a rush or to be baffled by circumstances; and this 
is the simple story of the second Punic war. 

123. The three stages of the war. We may divide the war 
into three parts, {a) 218 — 216 B.C., ending with the defection of 
certain Allies that followed the great disaster of Cannae, {b) 215 — 
209 B.C., ending with the recovery of Tarentum by the Romans, 
{c) 208 — 201 B.C., ending with the collapse of Carthage. The 
first left Rome apparently prostrate, the second ruined Hannibal's 
projects by proving that he could not protect those who joined 
him, the third is a series of vain efforts to avert the final defeat 
already certain. 

Authorities. We have the whole narrative comprised in ten 
books of Livy's History, written about 200 years after the war; 
also considerable fragments of the History of the Greek statesman 
Polybius, who wrote about 50 years after the war, and had con- 
versed with survivors. Both these, our chief authorities, write 
from the Roman side. For Polybius was long resident in Rome, 
and became a great admirer of Roman institutions. He enjoyed 
the favour of the noble family of the Scipios, and doubtless made 
the most of their exploits. The other authorities are of less im- 
portance, and also represent the Roman tradition. Two Roman 
writers left contemporary accounts, used by their successors. 
These were Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus. Both 
wrote in Greek, the dominant literary language of the civilized 
world. A single fragment (Greek) of a writer on the other side 
only serves to shew that Greeks were as usual to the fore in 
Roman naval operations. A narrative of this war must therefore 
be given with hesitation for whatever it may be worth. The 
general outlines do not admit a serious doubt, but the personal 
details are certainly coloured by patriotic bias and the partiality 
of Roman tradition in glorifying certain great families. 

124. First stage, 218 — 216 B.C. In 218 Hannibal crossed 
the Ebro and quickly occupied the part of northern Spain that 
belonged to the Roman sphere. He left his brother Hasdrubal 
in charge of Spain and entered Transalpine Gaul, where he had 
already secured friends among the local tribes. He skilfully 
forced the passage of the Rhone, and made his way with the 
help of friendly Gauls to an Alpine pass. Winter was coming 
on, but in spite of the difficulties of the march and the hostility 



I20 Trebia [ch. 

of the mountain tribes he brought his army safely down into Italy, 
that is Cisalpine Gaul. He was soon joined by large numbers of 
Gauls. After leaving behind him an army in Spain, and after the 
losses incurred on his journey, his force was probably from 20,000 
to 30,000 strong. In training it was immeasurably superior to any 
troops that Rome could bring against it. But it was too small to 
support the wastage of war for any length of time. It was there- 
fore Hannibal's policy to economize such valuable lives. He 
contrived that the losses in battle should fall mainly on the 
auxiliary Gauls, of whom there was a plentiful supply. His 
troubles with these fickle and quarrelsome allies seem to have 
begun early. But they were on the whole ready to back him up, 
for the Romans by confiscating lands and founding colonies had 
shewn that they meant to be masters in the region of the Po. 

125. Meanwhile the Roman government had been expecting 
the conflict to take place in Africa and Spain, and was in no 
hurry. The consul Sempronius with a fleet and army was to 
assail Carthage at home, while P. Cornelius Scipio met Hannibal 
south of the Pyrenees. A Punic naval expedition against Sicily 
was feebly conducted, and easily beaten, off". Sempronius took 
Melita (Malta) and was in a fair way to carry out his plans, when 
he was recalled with his army to take part in the defence of 
northern Italy. All the Roman arrangements had been upset 
by the movements of Hannibal. Scipio, delayed by the diversion 
of some of his force to meet a Gaulish rising in the North, had 
started too late. At Massalia he learnt that the Punic general 
had crossed the Rhone, and he could not force him to give battle. 
So the consul sent on his army to Spain with his brother Gnaeus 
Scipio in command, and returned to meet Hannibal in the North 
with the forces already posted there. The first battle was an affair 
of cavalry on the Alpine stream Ticinus, in which the Romans 
were beaten and Scipio badly wounded. When Sempronius 
came up he took command. Hannibal soon lured him into 
a general engagement on the river Trebia and defeated him with 
great loss. By this time the Gauls had practically all revolted 
from Rome and joined the Punic deliverer. Yet Rome still 
kept a hold on Cisalpine Gaul. The fortresses of Placentia and 
Cremona, and other posts along the Po, were victualled by way 
of the river : for the Veneti, who held the mouths, were in alliance 
with Rome. Hannibal wintered in Liguria, much worried by the 



xiii] Traslmene 121 

tiresome Gauls, who were anxious that the conqueror and his 
army should move on. 

126. Early in 217 he crossed the Apennine into Etruria. 
At Rome the people were angry at the news of defeat, and had 
made the great reformer C. Flaminius a second time consul. 
His colleague Servilius went to command in the North, while 
Flaminius faced Hannibal in Etruria. The reformer was even 
less successful than the nobles whom he had blamed. On the 
northern edge of the Trasimene lake he was entrapped by 
Hannibal and destroyed with most of his army. It was said 
that he had neglected due formalities, particularly in matters of 
religion. At all events his rashness had lost a great army, and 
left Hannibal, after a signal victory, posted between Rome and 
the other consul's army in the North. The alarm in Rome was 
extreme. It was decided to place supreme power in the hands 
of a dictator, and, as no consul was within reach, to appoint the 
dictator by election. This was a departure from precedent, justi- 
fied by necessity. The Senate managed to secure the election of 
Q. Fabius Maximus, a noble with a reputation /or firmness and 
caution. He performed the observances of religion with precise 
care, and raised a fresh army. Fabius was the first among the 
Roman commanders to perceive that he had to deal with a general 
and an army wholly different in kind from the adversaries hitherto 
encountered by Rome. 

127. We must turn for a moment to the war in the West. 
Cn. Scipio had to recover the footing of Rome in Spain, and he 
appears to have done so speedily. The hold of Carthage on the 
Roman sphere was destroyed, and naval operations in 217 were 
all to the advantage of Rome, helped by the Greeks of Massalia. 
Another fleet sent from Carthage effected nothing. Meanwhile 
P. Scipio was sent out as proconsul to take the chief command 
with additional forces, and the two brothers began a series of 
successful campaigns. The Celtiberian tribes (of mixed Gaulish 
and Iberian blood), who held most of central Spain, were hostile 
to the Carthaginian power. A number of hostages, detained in 
the interest of the Punic government, were betrayed by a trusted 
Spaniard to the Scipios. This chance enabled the Roman leaders 
to win the help of many tribes by sending the boys home. The 
importance of the Spanish war was understood at Rome, for the 
military resources of Carthage were largely dependent on the 



122 Fabius [ch. 

control of her empire in Spain. Hence we find both sides 
earnestly set upon winning the upper hand in that country. 
For the present the Romans were gaining ground. 

128. Hannibal had from the first treated Italian prisoners 
with special favour, Roman citizens with severity, hoping to 
induce the Italian Allies to rise against Rome. After Trasimene 
he set the Italian captives free. But when he entered Umbria 
he met with a disappointment. The Latin colony of Spoletium 
refused to admit him, and repulsed an assault. Checked by a 
fortress that he was not prepared to besiege, he moved eastward 
to the Adriatic and passed on towards southern Italy, laying waste 
the country in his leisurely march. He re-armed his African 
troops with captured Roman armour, and generally improved 
his army. But the expected support of Latins and other Roman 
Allies was not forthcoming. He reached Apulia, unopposed but 
unwelcomed. Evidently there was no belief in his offers of free- 
dom : an invader bringing with him Gauls was not wanted in Italy. 
At Carthage the news of his victories was received with joy, and 
reinforcements voted, but for the present nothing seems to have 
been done. 

129. When his army was ready, the dictator set out to find 
the enemy ; not to give him battle with raw troops, but to watch 
and annoy him, while he trained his own army. He played a 
waiting game with such extreme caution that he earned the 
nickname of Slow-goer or Dawdler {cmtctator). He followed 
Hannibal as he moved from Apulia into Samnium and from 
Samnium into the rich district of Campania. Hannibal could 
neither shake him off nor beat him, and the great city of Capua 
was for the present saved to Rome. But in an attempt to entrap 
Hannibal's army in the mountains Fabius failed, and the enemy 
got safely back to winter in Apulia. The discontent both in the 
army and at Rome was great, for even now men had not learnt 
that in pitched battles they had no chance against Hannibal. 
The dictator's second in command, Minucius, blamed the strategy 
of Fabius. He claimed a victory in a trifling engagement fought 
while Fabius was in Rome for a temporary duty. Soon the 
popular leaders in Rome induced the Assembly to give the 

^ Master of the Horse equal powers with the dictator. There 
were thus two dictators, which was an absurdity, for the use of 
the office consisted in its being held by a single person. The 



xiii] Cannae 123 

story goes on to say that Minucius soon proved his own incapacity, 
and was only saved from a great disaster by Fabius. We cannot 
trust the details, but it seems that Fabius resumed the supreme 
command and avoided defeat as before. The effect of this affair 
was to weaken the dictatorship, for the advantage of having a 
single ruler, to deal with urgent dangers calling for united action, 
could no longer be relied on. 

130. Defeats and losses had not driven the Senate to 
despair. Embassies were sent to uphold the claims and interests 
of Rome abroad. And the loyalty of her Greek allies was 
attested by some deputations offering gifts. Money was at 
present declined with thanks, but military aid in corn and light 
troops sent by Hiero . of Syracuse was accepted. The Senate 
however was not Rome. The popular irritation at the delay and 
sacrifices of the war shewed itself in the election of consuls for 
the next (216) year. After much friction the popular leader 
C. Terentius Varro was elected, and the nobles had to be content 
with carrying L. Aemilius Paullus as his colleague. Varro was 
certainly not the mere demagogue that tradition depicts him, 
but he seems to have had little or no military experience. Vast 
preparations were made for the coming campaign, and care taken 
to keep the armies efficient in northern Italy, Sicily, and Spain. 
It should also be remembered that in all seasons of great nervous 
excitement the Romans were deeply affected by religious terrors. 
Any occurrence, however trivial, that did not lend itself to im- 
mediate explanation in the present state of knowledge, was 
regarded as a ' prodigy,' an event foreboding some evil to come. 
There were means employed, under the direction of the college 
of pontiffs, for appeasing the supposed wrath of the gods and 
so averting calamities. Thus the popular nervousness was calmed. 
In all the great crises of the second Punic war these outbreaks 
of superstitious fears occurred. Indeed they form no small part 
of the Roman story of the war as told at length by Livy. 

131. In the summer of 216 we find the consuls Varro and 
Paullus with an army of some 80,000 men facing Hannibal with 
about 50,000 in Apulia. Hannibal drew the Romans after him 
into country suited to the operations of his superior cavalry. It 
was near the little town of Cannae on the river Aufidus that the 
armies met. The consuls were under instructions to fight, and 
Varro was eager to do so. They were taking command in turns, 



124 New strategy [ch. 

so that PauUus, who preferred to wait for a good opportunity, 
was not able to prevent his colleague from giving battle. The 
tactics of Hannibal made the Roman numbers useless. He 
routed the Roman cavalry, and rolled the bodies of foot into 
one great helpless mass : only the men on the edges could use 
their weapons. Few escaped the butchery that followed. The 
Roman losses seem to have been about 50,000 ; Hannibal's about 
6000 or 7000, the greater part of whom were Gauls. Paullus 
and a number of noble Romans were among the dead. We 
hear of survivors some 15,000 or more, who escaped to Canusium 
or Venusia. After a few days of utter despair, when a party of 
young nobles are said to have thought of flying from Italy and 
taking service with one of the eastern kings, the remnants of 
the beaten army were collected, and Varro resumed command. 
The disaster of Cannae was one of the blackest spots in the 
history of Rome. But the story abounds in exaggerations and 
doubtful legends. There can be no doubt that Roman tradition 
painted it in the darkest colours, that the wonderful recovery of 
Rome might stand out all the more glorious by the contrast. 

132. For the Roman system was not destroyed even by 
the blow of Cannae. The Italian confederacy was not broken 
up, and the Senate in Rome, led by Fabius, and now supported 
by the people, took matters in hand. All possible precautions 
were taken to prevent a panic at home. Forces meant for other 
service were sent to the front. New troops were raised, and 
even slaves enlisted as volunteers, and allowed so to earn their 
freedom. An army had to be kept in the field at all costs. But 
for the moment Sicily, menaced by hostile fleets, had to be left 
to shift for itself. As usual, the Punic commanders did not use 
their chance vigorously, while old Hiero stood firmly by Rome, 
and the island was saved. The return of Varro, recalled to 
Rome, is the subject of a famous story. Citizens poured out to 
meet the unlucky consul, and the Senate thanked him for not 
having despaired of the commonwealth. Such, said Roman 
tradition, was the patriotic resolve to pull together and save the 
state. And indeed we find Varro afterwards entrusted with 
important public duties. But the policy of Fabius is seen in 
the changed conduct of the war. Pitched battles were avoided, 
and the young troops allowed time to learn their business. It 
was clear that the war could not be ended in a hurry, and that 



xiii] Defections in the South 125 

mere numbers were of no avail against a trained force under a 
Hannibal. Tradition also records a story to illustrate Roman 
constancy. Hannibal offered to let the Romans redeem the 
prisoners, of whom he had now many, at a price. This the 
Senate refused. Rather than make a precedent for approving 
the surrender of Roman soldiers, they would buy slaves from 
their owners to fill the ranks. Of the truth of such stories we 
cannot judge : they served at least to edify young Romans in a 
later age, and we need not wholly disbelieve them, 

133. The fear that Hannibal would march on Rome passed 
away; he knew better than to attempt a great siege. But the 
day of Cannae had a powerful effect in southern Italy. The 
South had been conquered and brought into the confederacy 
later than the rest of Italy, and the Samnites in particular were 
willing to shake off the supremacy of Rome. Roman influence 
was largely maintained by keeping the local governments of the 
several communities in the hands of the wealthier members. 
The poorer folk, who had little or nothing to lose, saw their 
chance of power by gaining the help of Hannibal. The move- 
ment spread, and soon the bulk of southern and south-eastern 
Italy joined the invader. But even in this dark time the Latin 
Colonies and the Greek cities on the coast remained true to 
Rome, a most significant fact. Hannibal had nothing to offer 
that it was worth their while to accept. If he went away, who 
would protect them against Rome? If he were come to stay, 
who was willing to be a subject of Carthage ? Surely not those 
whose interests were bound up with those of Rome, and who 
found in her confederacy a freedom far greater than Carthage 
allowed to her subjects in Africa. And those Italians who did 
join Hannibal wanted protection and freedom. Now he had 
not troops enough to protect them without their own hearty 
cooperation. This burden it was their tendency to shirk ; and, 
if he forced them to bear it, what became of their freedom ? So 
the first stage of the war ended with great losses to Rome. But 
what was lost to Rome was by no means clear gain to Hannibal. 
And the Punic government seems never to have grasped the 
truth that, if their champion's victories were to be turned to 
account, they must at once reinforce him. 

134. Second stage 215 — 209 B.C. That the Roman Senate 
had at least learnt something from defeat, is shewn by the 



126 Capua [ch. 

new strategy. The attempt to crush the invader was given up, 
the new method was to wear him out. Smaller armies were 
employed, and more of them. While one force faced Hannibal, 
but avoided a battle, other forces could do useful work in other 
quarters. The great enemy could not be everywhere. For 
Hannibal the most pressing need was to get possession of a 
good harbour within easy sail of Carthage, that he might be 
in constant communication with the Punic government. For 
the present Tarentum was not to be had, so he naturally looked 
toward the Campanian coast, the most convenient seaport on 
which was Neapolis. Into Campania he therefore marched, but 
he could make no impression on the walled Greek city. At this 
juncture he was helped by one of the weaknesses of the Roman 
system. There was much discontent in the great city of Capua, 
which commanded the rich Campanian plain. The people were 
not Allies, but Roman citizens of the inferior class (the so-called 
'half-citizens'), bearing the burdens of Roman citizenship, but 
only sharing a part of its privileges. The Roman government 
saw to it that the local government of Capua was in the hands 
of the ' knights ' or men of property. The poorer classes got 
no benefit from the coniiexion with Rome, and a democratic 
revolution placed the city in the power of Hannibal. The 
leaders are said to have hoped that with his aid they might raise 
Capua to the headship of Italy in the stead of Rome. But they 
were not inclined to be his obedient subjects. He was driven 
to use arbitrary measures, and it soon appeared that he and his 
new allies had very different ends in view. Meanwhile the Punic 
government, roused by the report of his victories, voted to send 
him fresh troops, but for the present no reinforcements reached 
him, while his responsibilities were growing and his army wasting. 
135. The period of great defeats was over. Religious 
matters had been carefully attended to, partly in consequence 
of a message brought back from the Greek oracle at Delphi, 
and Roman confidence was reviving. By the side of Fabius 
M. Claudius Marcellus plays a great part in the war. He was 
a prompt and enterprising soldier, ready to seize opportunities 
of acting on the offensive. But the traditions of the war in 
Campania during the winter of 216 — 5 are very obscure and 
defective. Hannibal gained ground, but the important town 
of Nola was saved for Rome by Marcellus. The fortress of 



xiii] Spain. New senators 127 

Casilinum on the Volturnus was stoutly defended by a garrison 
of Roman Allies, and only surrendered after a blockade. Some 
of them were Latins. It is said that these declined the offer 
of Roman citizenship made to them as part of the reward of 
loyalty; so well content were they with their present condition. 
If this be true, Hannibal had indeed misunderstood the nature 
of the Italian confederacy. That he won over a few of the 
Greek or half-Greek towns in the far South, such as Croton and 
Locri, gave him one or two second-rate harbours. And some 
reinforcement seems to have reached him from Carthage, but 
not enough for the work in hand. The main fabric of the 
confederacy was as yet hardly shaken. It is at this time that 
our confused tradition brings in the story of the demoralization 
of Hannibal's army. It is said that he put the bulk of his force 
into winter-quarters at Capua, and that they were never again 
equal to their old reputation in the field, enervated by debauchery 
and ease. This is almost certainly an exaggerated moral tale. 

136. Outside Italy the war dragged on. Rome was so far 
exhausted that she could not act effectively in Sicily or Sardinia. 
In Spain Hasdrubal under orders from Carthage tried to lead 
an army to support his brother in Italy. But the power of 
Carthage was not what it had been in Spain. Hasdrubal was 
met and utterly defeated by the Scipios. Roman fears were 
relieved, and Carthage had to make great efforts to keep her 
footing in the country. A number of Spanish tribes now went 
over to Rome. On the other hand a Roman force was waylaid 
and destroyed in Cisalpine Gaul. Meanwhile important things 
were happening at Rome during the winter months. 

137. The treasury was empty, and exceptional measures 
of finance were needed. But the chief business was the filling 
up of vacancies in the Senate. Many members had fallen in 
the war, and the numbers were far below the normal 300. A 
remarkable proposal was made in the House. It was that from 
each Latin town two members of the local senate should be 
made Roman citizens and put into the Senate of Rome. The 
proposal came from a man connected in politics with the reformer 
Flaminius. The House, led by Fabius, rejected it as likely to 
unsettle the ordinary Allies rather than gratify the communities 
now enjoying the ' Latin right,' probably^ about :^6 at this time. 

1 See §§ 154, 171- 



128 Great efforts of Rome [ch. 

The choice of new senators was not left to censors. The senior 
ex-censor was nominated dictator for this purpose only. He 
added to the roll ex-magistrates as usual, but the majority had 
to be freely chosen on the ground of military merit. It is to be 
noted that there was already a dictator commanding an army in 
the field. The appointment of a second dictator for a special 
purpose is a clear sign that this great office was decaying. At the 
election of consuls for 215 L. Postumius and Tiberius Sempronius 
Gracchus were chosen. The former was absent in the North. 
News soon came of his death in battle, and a successor had 
to be elected. Marcellus was then chosen, but a thunderclap 
followed. The augurs declared this an evil omen, and he resigned 
office. Religious precautions were receiving special attention. 
The vacancy was filled by the election of old Fabius. 

138. The strain on the resources of Rome was now extreme. 
The war-tax (tributum) had to be doubled, and of its repayment 
(for it was a loan) there was at present no prospect. Armies of 
various strengths were maintained at all points of the theatre of 
war. Three were in Campania, one in Apulia. Another was at 
Tarentum, with a fleet cruising to watch the Adriatic coast up to 
Brundisium. A force in Picenum was on guard in the North. 
Troubles in Sardinia kept another army and fleet employed. 
There seems to have been a second northern army at Ariminum 
to hold back the Gauls in the Cisalpine. To Sicily a force of 
inferior quality, in which were the survivors of Cannae, was sent; 
there was also a fleet, with its base at Lilybaeum. And beside 
all these there were the army and fleet under the Scipios in 
Spain. Nor was Rome itself wholly denuded of troops, for the 
practice was to keep two new legions at home in training for later 
service in the field. We have no trustworthy statistics as to the 
exact numbers under arms, how they were fed and communi- 
cations kept up. But we can form some faint notion of the 
greatness of the task. And some at least of the garrisons of 
fortresses consisted of the men on the spot, not mobilized for 
campaigns. 

139. The meaning of these great scattered efl"orts is plain. 
The blunder of Cannae was not to be repeated. Hannibal was 
to be watched, and foiled by declining battle: meanwhile chances 
would occur of gaining successes at other points. This was a 
sound policy. The interest of Carthage was to defeat it by 



xni] Philip and Hannibal 129 

concentrating her forces in Italy, where they could and would 
be turned to the best account. Roman power once destroyed 
in Italy, it would fall of itself outside Italy. But the Punic 
government made a fatal blunder. News came of the disaster 
in Spain, and the force made ready to support Hannibal was 
diverted to support Hasdrubal in the West. Another force was 
raised to recover Sardinia. Thus the war in Italy was left to 
languish, and time was telling in favour of Rome. 

140. The futile warfare in Greece had ended in 217, and the 
king of Macedon was free to resent the interference of Rome 
in lUyria. The news of Hannibal's great victories led him to 
send envoys and propose an alliance against Rome. Those sent 
in 216 were captured on their way home by Roman cruisers, 
but in 215 the alliance was actually concluded. Whatever were 
the terms of the compact, it is clear that the first necessity was 
for Philip to support Hannibal at once in Italy, that Hannibal 
might be free to support Philip in Greece. But Philip was too 
much occupied with his own designs to act thus boldly. The 
Romans had time to strengthen their fleet and aimy at Tarentum, 
and with little additional effort to provide for keeping the king 
of Macedon employed at home. The failure of the Punic 
expedition against Sardinia, and a victory over the Sards, removed 
an anxiety and left the island in the power of Rome. 

141. In the season of 215 no great events occurred in 
Italy. But a number of minor operations proved that the 
Roman forces were alive, and various successes were gained. 
The duty of protecting his allies was too much even for Hannibal, 
with his insufficient forces. When he drove back one Roman 
army, another took advantage of his absence. To guard Capua 
he had a camp on mount Tifata. But even the Campanian plain 
was ravaged by the Romans. And he could not take Nola, still 
less NeapoHs. The long awaited reinforcements from Carthage 
are said to have joined him, and shared his repulse from Nola. 
We hear also of desertions from his army. But all these stories 
are doubtful. At last he withdrew to winter-quarters in Apulia. 
The Romans were now free to post their armies as suited their 
needs, and to prepare for the coming year. Their chief difficulty 
was to get money for the costs of the war in Spain. We read 
that the publicani, the capitalists who undertook state contracts 
{publico), consented to furnish supplies and wait for their payment 

H. 9 



130 Death of Hiero. Roman policy [ch. 

till better times. But they made a hard bargain, insisting on 
being indemnified by the state for all losses at sea. We shall 
see that this led to great abuses. However, the government 
made shift to clothe and feed the armies. 

142. At this point in the war the Roman cause received a 
serious blow. In 215 old Hiero of Syracuse died. He had been 
a most loyal and helpful ally, and would in any case have been 
sadly missed. Under him Syracuse had flourished wonderfully. 
As a fortress it was stronger than ever ; for to the walls of Diony- 
sius were now added the ingenious machines of the mathematician 
Archimedes. But the old Greek population was now mixed with 
all manner of aliens, mercenary soldiers, runaway slaves, and de- 
serters from Roman fleets. Hieronymus, Hiero's grandson, who 
succeeded him, was a lad of 15, wholly unfit to rule this mongrel 
mass. He fell under the influence of agents sent by Hannibal. 
After a short spell of misrule, he was assassinated in 214. Re- 
volution and utter confusion followed. War was declared against 
Rome. The two Punic agents were the real chiefs of the city, and 
instead of a valuable ally Rome, already exhausted by the war, had 
another dangerous enemy. 

143. And yet the position of Rome was not really worse. It 
was her own blundering that had brought her disaster. It was 
wiser management that enabled her to hold her ground now, and 
to wear out her enemies by her superior strength. The consuls 
for 214 had both held office before, and were elected on the 
ground of former good service. The same principle guided other 
elections and appointments. Good officers were kept on in various 
commands as proconsuls or propraetors, and this not only in Spain. 
Thus experience was turned to account. Till the end of the war 
it became the normal practice to continue generals of tried capacity 
in their commands, either by reelecting them as magistrates or by 
continuing them as pro-magistrates. The forces employed were 
as large as before, or larger. In order to man the great fleets, the 
wealthier citizens were called upon to provide slaves as oarsmen, 
and they did. The tradition of this time is a scene of patriotic 
economy and sacrifice, perhaps not much exaggerated. It includes 
a sumptuary law {lex Oppia), passed to restrict the dress and 
ornaments of Roman ladies in this season of sore need. In short, 
Rome was not yet beaten, and did not mean to be. We are told 
that in the army the cavalry and centurions agreed to wait for their 



xiii] Capua. Tarentum. Sicily 131 

pay; also that capitalists again offered to let their claims stand over. 
The last, if the story be true, were probably keen unsentimental 
judges of the final result of the war. 

144. Hannibal was bound to protect Capua, where the de- 
termined attitude of Rome caused alarm. But his campaign of 
214 in Campania was barren. An attempt to gain the rising 
seaport of Puteoli was a failure, Fabius having fortified the place. 
Cumae Neapolis and Nola were strongly held for Rome, and 
Casilinum threatened. And while Hannibal was kept occupied 
in Campania some of his other forces were defeated on their way 
to join him. Samnium Lucania and Apulia began to suffer from 
the vengeance of Rome, while he was tied by Capua. At last he 
moved away, tempted by an offer of some Tarentine democrats to 
betray their city. Tarentum was the very place to suit his require- 
ments, particularly with a view to his receiving aid from Philip. 
But the Roman garrison had been reinforced and the plan failed. 
So he was compelled to retire and find winter-quarters in Apulia 
once more. 

145. Late in 214 the consul Marcellus reached Sicily and 
began his difficult task with the help of the praetor Appius 
Claudius. Syracuse could not be taken by storm, and it could 
easily be victualled by sea. The siege lasted the greater part 
of two years, in spite of extraordinary efforts of the besiegers. 
For the first time in the history of the city the besieging forces 
did not melt away by pestilence through encamping in the neigh- 
bouring swamp. We cannot here discuss this interesting siege in 
detail. It was the lack of discipline and loyalty within that in the 
end caused the fall of Syracuse. Attacks on the walls by land and 
sea were utterly foiled by the machines of Archimedes. The delay 
enabled a Punic force to stir up a rebellion in other parts of Sicily. 
But the most important posts, above all Lilybaeum, were held by 
Rome, and no real conquest was possible. And Carthage as usual 
conducted naval operations weakly. Supplies of food were thrown 
into the city, for an effective blockade could not be maintained 
day and night in all weathers. But there was no fighting at sea. 
At last Marcellus got news of a great religious feast on a fixed day, 
when the sentinels would probably be careless ; and a party of his 
men scaled the northern wall by night. Thus he won the western 
part of the city, but Achradina and the Island (Ortygia) held out, 
for the garrison were a desperate band, deserters many of them. 

9—2 



132 



Siege of Syracuse 



[CH. 



An army attempted to relieve the place, but were compelled to 
encamp on the swampy ground, and wasted away. The last 
convoy of food-ships was driven off by the Roman fleet. The 
Punic admiral had more vessels of war than Marcellus, but did 
not dare to risk a battle. The Island was soon betrayed by a 
Spanish captain of mercenaries, and the surrender of Achradina 
followed. The sack of the city so long Rome's faithful ally, the 




Syracuse in 214 B.C. 

carrying away of the glorious works of art with which it abounded, 
the death of Archimedes, killed it is said by mistake, all made the 
siege and fall of Syracuse an impressive and shameful story. But 
the feeble policy of Carthage, and the danger of trusting to her for 
protection, were no doubt far more impressive to contemporaries 
than the greater or less brutality of Rome. 

146. In these years (214 — 212) the fortune of war varied. 
To the East, a vigorous ofificer took the offensive against Philip 
in the Adriatic, and upset the king's plans. Roman allies on the 



xin] Spain. Numidia. The capitalists 133 

lUyrian coast were protected and no invasion of Italy was now 
possible. In the West, Syphax king of western Numidia was 
induced to join Rome, but was defeated by the king of eastern 
Numidia, an ally of Carthage. Rome thus gained no foothold 
in Africa. In Spain things were worse. The Carthaginian army 
there had been reinforced ; while the Scipios seem to have trusted 
too much to the support of the native tribes, who were not heartily 
attached to either Rome or Carthage. In 212 the two brothers, 
each at the head of an army, were in turn defeated and destroyed. 
A brave officer collected the remnants of the beaten armies, and 
kept some hold on northern Spain. But for the time the power 
of Rome in the peninsula was broken. In this campaign a body 
of Numidian cavalry did good service for Carthage, as their coun- 
trymen had done in Italy under Hannibal. Their leader was 
Masinissa, son of Gala, king of eastern Numidia. He was one 
of the most notable men of the age. 

147. The situation in Italy remained unfavourable to Han- 
nibal. Roman Allies no longer came over to him ; a few returned 
to the Roman alliance. Roman armies kept tiie field and took 
advantage of opportunities. They interfered with the supply of 
Gaulish recruits by blocking the way from the North. The result 
of minor engagements was various, but the losses on the whole told 
against the side weaker in numbers. The change in the character 
of the war is seen in this, that the chief object of each side was 
now to gain a city. The Romans wanted to retake Capua, Han- 
nibal to become master of Tarentum. But at this stage of the 
war Rome appears to have suffered from internal troubles, which 
shew that all was not well within. We hear of a great outbreak 
of ' superstition,' that is following after strange gods and foreign 
rites. With some difficulty this was checked. Public festivals 
were celebrated with peculiar care. The duties of the two praetors 
concerned with jurisdiction {urbanus dcndperegrinus) were entrusted 
to one individual, thus setting more praetors free for military 
duties. Special measures were found necessary for raising suffi- 
cient recruits to keep up the strength of the armies. These 
however were old troubles. The collision with the capitalists 
was far more serious. Great frauds had been committed by 
contractors engaged in supplying the forces. Old hulks laden 
with rubbish had been scuttled, and the state held liable for the 
loss of sound ships and good cargoes. The trial of a notorious 



134 



Roman severity 



[CH. 



offender before the popular Assembly was broken up by a riotous 
attack from the publicani and their friends. The end of the affair 
was that the chief offender and his associates had to go into exile 
to escape the penalties of high treason {perduelUo). But the power 
and audacity of the Roman capitalists had been revealed. Their 
mischievous influence was destined to grow and to become the 
worst instrument in the later corruption of Roman policy. 

148. It was of course the power of this greedy and selfish class 
that had prevented the Senate from bringing offenders to justice 
before. Soldiers were dealt with severely enough. The survivors 



( 


PORTVS TARENTINVS \ 


r'4^ 


CO 

1 


V 


1 

1 


1 

\ 


Site of the \ ___,-^-~'~^ 

city of Tarentum 


"T 




\ 


Part of Sinus 




\ 


Tarentinus 




\ 



The outer roadstead is sheltered by two islands. The old entrance to the 
inner harbour was spanned by a bridge, probably in part a drawbridge, 
in ancient times. The citadel is marked in black. AB is the line of the 
artificial cut, dating from the 15th century of our era, enlarged in the 
18th, and recently adapted to admit the largest vessels of war. See Nissen, 
Italische Landeskunde, 11 pp. 865 — 70. 

of Cannae, cooped up in Sicilian garrisons, begged to be allowed 
once more a place in the line of battle. Whatever concession was 
made, it is said that at least they were still disqualified for any 
rewards of valour. Roman tradition always represented the men 
of this great generation as hard. Soon after, the hostages held to 



XIIl] 



Tarentum 



135 



insure the fidelity of certain Greek cities tried to escape, but were 
caught and put to death. No mercy was shewn, though there was 
good reason for conciliating the Allies, Disaffection was suspected 
in Etruria, and a Roman force was actually watching that district. 
But nothing that looked like giving way to pressure seemed wise 
to the Roman government. It happened that one of the Greek 
cities affected by the recent severity was Tarentum. The news 
strengthened the anti-Roman democrats. A plot for betraying 
the city to Hannibal now succeeded. But the citadel was still 




Map of Campania in the second Punic war. Only the chief roads, mountains, 
etc. are shewn. The territories of three Roman Allies are indicated (after 
Beloch) by dotted lines: (i) Neapolis, (-z) Nola with Abella, (3) the 
confederation of the four towns headed by Nuceria. 

held by a Roman garrison, and it commanded the mouth of the 
great inner harbour, which it was Hannibal's chief object to secure. 
Nor could he ever win the citadel, which was revictualled by sea, 
for all his efforts. Without it, he was only in possession of one 
more city which he was bound to defend. And the people of 
Tarentum soon tired of obedience and discipline. As their fathers 
had treated Pyrrhus, so they treated Hannibal. 

149. We must bear in mind that in this year occurred two 



136 Capua [cH. 

other great events, the disaster in Spain and the taking of Syra- 
cuse. The exact chronology is not known, but this was clearly 
one of the most momentous years of the war. In Italy several 
minor battles were fought, some victories for Rome, some defeats. 
But the revival of Rome was marked by the persistent effort to 
retake Capua. Casilinum had been recovered, and great prepara- 
tions made. The armies closed in on Capua, and began the siege. 
Hannibal appeared and relieved the place. But he withdrew to 
carry on operations against Brundisium and the Tarentine citadel. 
As yet he had received no help from Philip of Macedon, and the 
need of a good harbour was urgent. But he failed at both points, 
and meanwhile the Roman forces closed in again on Capua. 
Three great camps were formed, and double lines of palisaded 
earthworks constructed to unite the camps and complete the 
blockade. Hannibal promised to come again in time to scatter 
the Roman armies. But the months went by; the Roman 
generals, continued in command, completed the circuit of the 
siege-works, and kept a tight grip upon the town, through the 
winter. Could Hannibal save his allies ? That was the question, 
in which Italians generally were deeply interested. 

150. To finish the story of Capua. In 211 a last appeal 
came from the starving city, and Hannibal was forced to give up 
operations at Tarentum and march to its relief But it was too 
late, and he could not force the Roman lines. The only chance 
left was to draw off the siege armies by marching on Rome. But 
his design leaked out through deserters, and it was found possible 
to provide for the defence of Rome without slackening the blockade 
of Capua. The walls of Rome had lately been repaired, and with 
the help of a corps from Capua there were plenty of troops to man 
them. He could not besiege the city, and withdrew again to the 
South. A Roman army pursued him, only to be soundly beaten. 
For on the battlefield he was still supreme. But he did not turn 
aside into Campania. He hurried southwards in hope to surprise 
Rhegium, but was once more too late. Abandoned Capua soon 
fell, and the Romans made it an object-lesson to Italy. Those of 
the local senate who did not take their own lives were scourged 
and beheaded. The mass of the people were sold for slaves. The 
city of Capua was left for the convenience of its buildings, but it 
was to be a mere group of buildings, not a city. No civic institu- 
tions were allowed to exist : justice was to be administered by an 



xiii] Greece. Spain. Scipio 137 

officer from Rome. The whole territory of Capua and its depen- 
dent towns (the ager Campanus) became state property of Rome. 
It was farmed out to state tenants, the rents from whom were 
afterwards a mainstay of the Roman treasury. Such in brief 
were the consequences of putting trust in the great Carthaginian. 
The prestige of Hannibal in Italy never recovered from this blow. 

151. No help came to Hannibal from Philip. The naval 
activity of Rome in the Adriatic, and her skilful diplomacy, were 
enough to prevent it. In 2 1 1 the warlike Aetolians were induced 
to join Rome, and some other Greek states soon after. In parti- 
cular, Attalus king of Pergamum was a hearty ally, fearing that 
Philip had designs on his kingdom. Philip was kept more than 
busy, for when he marched into Greece Macedonia was raided by 
Thracian and lUyrian chiefs stirred up by Rome. From him then 
there was no prospect of aid. In Sicily too the rebellion fostered 
by Carthage was gradually put down after the fall of Syracuse. 
The year 210 saw peace restored in the island, and Rome could 
withdraw a part of her forces for other service. In Spain the 
Romans kept a footing, but at present not much more. Till 
the fall of Capua in 211 little was done to regain the ground 
lost by the disaster of the Scipios. The commander now sent 
out, C. Claudius Nero, is said to have done no great things in 
Campania. Nor did he do much in Spain, but he distinguished 
himself greatly later on, if our record is to be trusted. The 
importance of the war in the West was well understood, for no 
one could tell what might happen if Hasdrubal were free to 
bring a second highly-trained army to join his brother in Italy. 

152. Publius Scipio who fell in Spain had left a son of the 
same name. The young man had served in Italy with distinction. 
He was now only 24 years of age, but we find that he was ap- 
pointed to the command in Spain as proconsul. To account for 
so strange a fact, a number of fictitious stories were handed down 
by later writers. These stories doubtless come from the family 
traditions of the Scipios, who were a powerful family belonging to 
the great Cornelian clan. The new proconsul was a man popular 
energetic ambitious and proud, but he would hardly have been 
promoted to so great a charge had he not been a Cornelius. In 
210 he reached Spain with a fleet and army. As usual, the Greeks 
of Massalia were helpful allies. He learnt that the three Punic 
armies were none of them within easy reach of their great naval 



138 Navy. The recusant colonies [ch. 

and military base, New Carthage. Early in 209 he made a sudden 
attack on this place, and took it. The stores of war-material, 
workshops, artisans, ships, oarsmen, money, and hostages for the 
fidelity of Spanish tribes, all fell into his hands. All were turned 
to good account. Here was a case in which the one side really 
gained as much as the other lost. The Carthaginian generals had 
henceforth to wage war at a great disadvantage. Their base was 
now as in former times the city of Gades, far away in the South- West. 

153. Eight years of war had strained to the utmost the 
resources of Rome. To keep effective fleets at sea was wisely 
recognized as necessary, but to find rowers was a difficult matter. 
We hear that the wealthier classes made great sacrifices to meet 
the need, but the financial distress was extreme. The one naval 
defeat suffered by the Romans in this war was in an attempt to 
revictual the citadel of Tarentum.. The victors in this fight were 
a Tarentine squadron. Naval apathy or mismanagement seems 
to have marked the policy of Carthage throughout. We read of 
expeditions of Punic fleets, but ever misdirected and futile. 
Meanwhile Hannibal was never sufficiently reinforced, and of his 
original army a large part must by this have perished. Our 
accounts of the fighting in Italy in 210 are obscure, but Hannibal 
at least gained no important success. His Italian allies began to 
make their peace with Rome, and he could only operate in a 
restricted area of the South and South-East. Rome it is true was 
in great straits. Corn was scarce, and the motive of an embassy 
to Egypt, and renewal of alliance and friendship with the king 
(Ptolemy IV), was probably to get a supply. We hear of religious 
observances, expiation of prodigies, and so forth. But the chief 
cause of nervousness was the fear that Hasdrubal would soon 
come from Spain. The last reserves of the treasury were taken 
to equip the forces for a supreme effort in the year 209. 

154. At this point our very dramatic record brings in a 
strange story, no doubt true in the main, but imperfect in detail. 
There were at this time thirty Latin colonies. All had hitherto 
borne their share in the burdens of the war. Twelve of them 
now refused to furnish their yearly contingents, professing that 
they had neither the men nor money to pay them. The other 
eighteen stood by Rome as before. Somehow (it is not clear how) 
the Senate managed to keep the armies in strength at the front. 
Hannibal was kept occupied, and bit by bit the revolted Allies in 



xiii] Nero and Livius 139 

Samnium and Lucania were being brought back into obedience 
to Rome. The great event of the year was the recapture of 
Tarentum. Old Fabius, aided by treachery within, took the city. 
The usual scenes of slaughter, slave-market, and plundering were 
enacted here. No more Roman Allies would now risk Roman 
vengeance. The only remaining hope of effecting anything 
against Rome in Italy lay in the coming of Hasdrubal from Spain. 
^55- Third stage, 208 — 201 b.c. The last years of the war 
comprise two matters of great interest, the battle of the Metaurus 
and the final defeat of Carthage in Africa. But there is no doubt 
that our record consists of stories highly coloured by family 
partiality. The general outline is probably true : the exploits of 
Nero and Scipio are mixed with legendary detail. 

156. It is an indication of the discontent still smouldering 
in Italy that an army of observation had to be kept in Etruria to 
prevent a local rising. Even now no Roman commander could 
cope with Hannibal in battle. With reduced forces^ abandoned 
by allies, he was able to move freely from Bruttium to Apulia and 
back again as suited him. In 208 he faced the armies of the two 
consuls, of whom Marcellus was one. Both these Roman generals 
fell into a trap. Marcellus died on the field, and his colleague 
soon after. But here Hannibal's success ended. An attempt to 
use the signet ring of Marcellus, for the purpose of procuring the 
surrender of a town in obedience to a forged order, only ended 
in the loss of a detachment of his best fighting men, entrapped 
and killed by the forewarned garrison. He could effect nothing of 
importance, while the Romans had leisure to choose with care 
two consuls for the coming year (207). Their fleets were strong 
and active. The war in Greece was serving its purpose in keeping 
Philip busy, but the fear of Hasdrubal remained. The story says 
that the choice of consuls was difficult, but C. Claudius Nero and 
M. Livius, long personal enemies, were induced to waive their 
hatred and serve the state together. 

157. Scipio had continued his successful career in Spain. 
That he won some victories and gained ground for Rome, is 
probably true. But he seems to have been also busied in forming 
connexions in Africa, particularly with Masinissa the Numidian. 
At all events he failed in what was perhaps his first duty. Has- 
drubal gave him the slip, and entered Gaul, where he wintered 
among friendly tribes and raised more troops for his expedition. 



140 Metaurus [ch. 

The news of his coming caused great alarm in Rome. Every 
nerve was strained to strengthen the two main armies. The lot 
assigned to Nero the charge of facing Hannibal in the South, to 
Livius the duty of meeting the new invader in the North. In the 
spring of 207, so soon as the Alpine passes were open, Hasdrubal 
entered Cisalpine Gaul unopposed. His army is said to have 
been over 50,000 strong, but only a part consisted of trained 
troops from Spain. He sent a letter to his brother, to arrange for 
their junction. The bearers fell into the hands of the Romans, 
and were brought to Nero. Nero left most of his army to watch 
Hannibal, and set out by night with a picked corps for the North. 
The eager cooperation of the country people on the line of march, 
the agony of suspense at Rome, the crowding of Nero's men into 
the camp of Livius in order to conceal the reinforcement, the 
discovery of the presence of both consuls through the double 
bugle-call next morning, are details that survive in the dramatic 
tradition of this supreme moment. Hasdrubal fell back to gain 
time, but his army, disordered by a night march, was brought 
to battle by the pursuing Romans at the river Metaurus, and 
annihilated. The failure of the attempt to conquer Rome in Italy 
had been certain ever since the experiences of Syracuse Capua 
and Tarentum. It was now plain even to men whose nerves had 
been shaken by Cannae. But it took some six years more to 
gather the fruits of the victory. In Rome business revived with 
the removal of a great fear, and money circulated freely. Nero 
marched back to his own district, and broke the news to Hanni- 
bal by flinging him his brother's head. On their own shewing the 
Romans were close-fisted and hard, at times downright brutal. 
Such they had been, and such they were yet to be. 

158. The years 207 and 206 passed without any great events 
in the West. It is probably true that Scipio gained some victories 
over the Punic generals, and that very little of Spain remained 
subject to Carthage. But Spain was not conquered for Rome. 
The Spanish tribes wanted to be independent. Rebellions took 
place, probably encouraged by Carthage. Long service and pay 
in arrear caused a mutiny among the Roman troops. And Scipio 
was now chiefly interested in preparing the way for war in Africa. 
He became close friends with Masinissa, and negotiated with 
Syphax the king of western Numidia. Meanwhile the Punic 
government, at last understanding that the war in Italy was the 



xni] Peace in Greece 



141 



main thing, changed its policy. Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother, 
was ordered to leave Gades, to proceed by sea to the Ligurian 
coast, to raise a force of Gauls and Ligurians, and renew the Italian 
war. By the end of 206 Gades had surrendered, Carthage had 
lost her footing in Spain, and Scipio had returned to Rome. 

159. In the years 208 to 206 the eastern war went on, 
wasting the resources of the Greek states, whether they fought for 
or against the king of Macedon. The efforts of Rhodes, Egypt, 
and other powers interested in peace, to put an end to the war, 
were unsuccessful. Philip, beset on all sides, made a good fight 
of it on land, while the Romans, no longer fearing him in Italy, 
were less active at sea. Attalus of Pergamum was drawn off to 
defend his own kingdom, invaded by Philip's ally Prusias of 
Bithynia. The year 205 brought peace, for all were weary of the 
war. But the Aetolians led the way by coming to terms with 
Philip on their own account, without reference to their allies, and 
this conduct gave offence at Rome. When shortly after Rome 
and Philip concluded a treaty of peace for themselves and their 
aUies on both sides, no mention was made of the Aetolian League, 
In general we may note that Rome was now connected with a 
number of states in Greece and the Aegean. Her foreign policy 
had undergone a marked extension. To any intervention of the 
Romans in Greece Philip was firmly opposed, as being an en- 
croachment on the sphere of Macedonian influence. But 
Macedon needed rest, and Rome had not yet done with Carth- 
age, so a peace suited both parties for the time. 

160. After the battle of the Metaurus it was natural that 
attention should be turned to measures for restoring order in Italy 
and strengthening the position of Rome. We hear that Etruria 
still needed watching, and that efforts were made to revive the 
prosperity of the colonies of Placentia and Cremona. They had 
been held as fortresses during the war, and supplies had no 
doubt reached them by river through help of the friendly Veneti. 
Now pressure was put upon colonists who had left their homes 
to return, under protection of a Roman force stationed in 
the North. It is also said that an attempt was made to induce 
the refugee farmers, who had fled from the country to Rome when 
Hannibal was ravaging Italy, to go back to their farms. This, it 
is added, was not easy. It seems that the corn procured from 
various quarters had in part served to feed these people in idleness, 



142 Roman revival [ch. 

and that many preferred this life to resuming hard work on derelict 
lands. Here we may see the beginnings of that Roman populace 
which we find later as a monstrous urban mob, the plague of 
Roman public life. But the record of all these things is slight 
and doubtful. It is more certain that activity in matters of 
religion, referred to above, continued to the end of the war. In 
208 the games of Apollo, hitherto held irregularly on occasions, 
were made a fixed yearly festival. In 205 the worship of the 
' Great Mother,' with its exciting orgies, was introduced from the 
East, and gave rise to the Megalensia, another regular festival. 
Both these innovations seem to have been connected with out- 
breaks of epidemic sickness. The longing for superhuman aid, and 
the readiness to receive religious novelties, are not to be overlooked. 
They are signs of Roman feelings at the time of the great war. 
161. It is said, perhaps truly, that Scipio on his return from 
Spain was warmly welcomed by the people in general, but viewed 
with jealousy by the Senate. He was elected consul for 205. 
His intention of carrying the war into Africa was no secret. The 
Senate yielded so far as to assign him the war-province of Sicily. 
He might if necessary cross over to Africa, but this forward policy 
was hindered by giving him insufficient forces. It took him some 
time to raise additional volunteers and complete his preparations. 
We hear that a number of Italian Allies sent contingents and 
war-material. Delay was caused by the barbarous misconduct of 
one of his subordinates at Locri in southern Italy. Scipio had 
recovered this city from Hannibal, and the man left in charge 
by him had made it a scene of horrors. A senatorial commission 
was sent to inquire and make redress, at the same time to keep 
an eye on Scipio. What was done to the culprit from Locri is 
uncertain : Scipio proved that he at least was not neglecting his 
business. With great skill he had organized his naval and military 
forces, and no further attempt was made to molest him. In 204 
he was able to start, and he landed unopposed on the Hermaean 
promontory to the East of Carthage. 

162. We have no Carthaginian version of these events, but 
the Roman tradition is probable, and of a piece with the general 
policy of Carthage. The government had all along missed its 
chances. Its fleets were generally ineffective ; even the squadron 
sent to help Philip in the Greek war had been useless. Alarmed 
by a descent already made by Scipio's friend Laelius, they were 



xiii] Carthage failing 143 

hurriedly trying to save themselves at home by vigorous action 
abroad. Hannibal had done wonders, but was now much too 
weak to do as they wished and keep back Scipio by offensive 
operations in Italy. Nor could Mago in the North, though rein- 
forced, do more than just hold his ground. Philip had now made 
peace with Rome, and in any case he could not have invaded 
Italy. The simple truth was that Carthage had no national army 
or navy. She depended on her wealth, and to turn money into 
the means of war needed time. It was now too late. True, the 
wavering Syphax was at last won over to the cause of Carthage. 
But against him there was to be set Masinissa, claimant of the 
kingdom of eastern Numidia ; a prince at present driven from his 
country by Syphax, but who in the sequel proved to be a valuable 
ally of Rome. Scipio seems to have plundered Punic territory as 
he chose, but no notable success was achieved in the season of 
204, owing to the numbers brought into the field by Syphax. In 
203 he surprised and burnt the enemies' camp, and killed many, 
but the war went on. In a great battle he defeated them with 
great loss. Now at last the Punic governmen*: sent to recall 
Hannibal and Mago. 

163. The war was dying down in Italy, and Rome could 
act more freely. In 204 the twelve Latin colonies, disobedient 
five years before, were taken in hand. They were made to furnish 
contingents of double strength, a tax (perhaps only till the end of 
the war) was imposed on them, and their census, the schedule of 
their citizens and properties, was in future to be conducted on the 
Roman model and delivered to the Roman censors. This was a 
beginning of interference in the internal affairs of members of the 
Italian confederacy, a first sign of the inferior position of the Allies 
in relation to Rome, which was a result of the Hannibalic war. 
A beginning was also made of repaying some of the debts of the 
state. A census was held. The censors were Livius and Nero, 
the consuls of 207, who are said to have indulged in unseemly 
squabbling, their old animosities having revived since the triumph 
for the victory of Metaurus. But the general trend of Roman 
policy was judicious. Commanders as a rule were continued in 
office, and the fleets kept in good fighting trim. Care was taken 
to supply the forces in Africa with all things needed for the 
campaign of the year 203. Meanwhile a consul took severe 
measures in Etruria, and quelled the disaffection renewed by 



144 Zama [ch. 

hopes from the expedition of Mago. In 203 Mago's turn came. 
His army, a motley force raised with difficulty, was met and 
defeated by the Roman army of the North. On his retreat he 
received the order of recall, and sailed with the remnant of his 
troops for Carthage, but died at sea of a wound. Hannibal had 
been standing at bay in the South, holding a district near Croton, 
from which the Romans were unable to dislodge him. He too 
obeyed the call of Carthage, and went. He left behind in the 
temple of Hera Lacinia a Punic inscription to record his doings, 
a monument afterwards consulted by the Greek historian Polybius. 
Italy was now clear, and Africa the seat of war. 

164. It was no light task for Hannibal to form an army in 
haste out of miscellaneous mercenaries and African troops. His 
remaining veterans from Italy were a sound nucleus. But they 
were few, and much of the material at hand was unmilitary or 
untrustworthy. Roman tradition alleged that Philip sent a Mace- 
donian corps. Scipio on the other hand was much strengthened 
by the result of his recent victory, which had been followed by 
the overthrow and capture of Syphax. Masinissa recovered his 
father's kingdom, and was now in a position to be of great service 
to Rome. In Carthage itself there was a peace-party, and a truce 
had been arranged to allow an embassy to visit Rome. This 
truce was said to have been broken by an attack upon some 
Roman corn-ships, and war was renewed. When the two armies 
met in 202, Scipio gained a decisive^ victory. Carthage had now 
to submit, and Hannibal, ever a true patriot, undertook the 
unpopular duty of persuading his fellow-citizens to bow to this 
necessity. Scipio, still in command, but fearing to be superseded 
through the intrigues of ambitious nobles at home, was glad to 
expedite matters, and dictated terms. 

165. Peace of 201 B.C. Carthage was left in possession of 
the African territory that had belonged to her before the war. 
She retained her self-government, and was not to receive a Roman 
garrison. But she was forbidden to go to war with any power 
outside Africa. In Africa she was not to engage in war without 
the leave of Rome. She was to surrender all her elephants, and 
all her ships of war save ten triremes, that is, all her larger war- 
ships. All territory that had ever belonged to the ancestors of 
Masinissa was to be restored to him : the settlement of boundaries 

^ Battle of Zama, fought near a place called Naraggara. 



xiii] The peace of 201 b.c. 145 

was deferred. Carthage was to pay a war-indemnity of 10,000 
talents (about ;^2, 350,000) in instalments spread over 50 years. 
She was to give up all prisoners, deserters, runaway slaves, and 
captured goods of every kind ; to feed and pay the Roman forces 
till ratification of peace, and to hand over picked hostages. Thus 
Carthage became a purely African power, depending on Rome in 
all matters of foreign policy. The war-indemnity was a light 
burden. But the * open question ' of boundaries was a menace 
to her prosperity. Any quarrel with Masinissa would have to be 
referred to Rome, and the interest of the umpire was not likely to 
be in favour of Carthage. But at the time it was hardly possible to 
stand out for better conditions. And it must be borne in mind 
that the clique of rich merchant princes, who had always been 
opposed to the war and who had often hampered the activity 
of the popular war-party, were quite willing to court the favour of 
Rome by subserving Roman interests. They do not seem to have 
been able even now to control the Carthaginian government, but 
they remained a pro-Roman influence, blighting the hopes of 
patriots for another fifty years. 

166. In spite of opposition at Rome, the peace was ratified 
and Scipio left in command with full powers to make the 
necessary arrangements. The surrendered fleet was burnt, the 
deserters put to death. Scipio on his return was the first man in 
Rome beyond comparison. But the credit of having seen the 
state safely through the dark days of the war, and thereby made 
the success of Scipio possible, belonged to the Senate rather than 
to any one man. And that aristocratic council was not inclined 
to let any one man, however successful and popular, engross such 
power as to weaken the collective authority of their body. It has 
been already pointed out that, though the yearly magistrates 
shared the sovran imperium, and though sovran power ultimately 
rested with the popular Assemblies, the real working of the govern- 
ment was controlled by the Senate. And the republican principle 
as represented in the Senate was this, that the noble families 
should so far as possible share office and power among themselves, 
and not be thrust into the background by the preeminence of 
an individual. Scipio received by general consent the title 
Africanus, an unofficial nickname of honour. But the old system 
of changing the commanders of armies year by year was at once 
revived now that the danger from Carthage had passed away. 

H. 10 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE V/AR 

167. From a time when Rome had to fight for her existence 
as the Head of Italy we shall pass to a period of great conquests, 
only delayed by the clumsiness of Rome herself in bringing her 
superior strength to bear. It is well to pause and take stock of 
the condition of the Roman state as shewn in the traditions of the 
second Punic war. Most of the matters to be considered have 
been already referred to in passing, but in order to make clear 
the connexion of the story of the Republic before and after the 
great struggle with Carthage it is desirable to sum them up briefly 
and to look at them from a special point of view. 

168. We have seen that circumstances had tended to increase 
the power of the Senate. But we must remember that the consti- 
tution remained in form unchanged, and that the power of the 
Senate, resting on no law, was always liable to be overridden by 
the act of the Assembly. Now the Assembly could only vote on 
what was laid before it. Thus it depended for the means of exer- 
cising its sovran power on the will of magistrates who convened it. 
Therefore it was quite possible to gain a practical control over 
its action, by gaining control of the magistracy. This was what 
the Senate had long been doing, and after the war did more than 
ever. We have noted that the practice of changing the com- 
manders of armies year by year was at once resumed. But this 
only concerned magistrates with imperiimi, capable of holding 
military command. The tribunes, who presided in purely 
Plebeian Assemblies, had no imperium. It was necessary to 
control these also, and the Senate saw to it. As the war dragged 
on, the popular movements, begun by Flaminius in 232 and con- 
tinued by Varro in 217, died away, and the tribunate ceased to be 



CH. xiv] Rome after the war 147 

troublesome. After the war it became the regular tool of the 
Senate. It was also desirable in the interest of the great families 
to control the composition of the Senate itself. The time of the 
great war was unfavourable to the free action of the censors, who 
revised the roll of members. After the war we find the appoint- 
ment of censors at intervals of five years regularly observed for a 
long time, and pains taken to make the House a close body of 
nobles. But the most significant change in poHtical practice is 
seen in the fate of the dictatorship. It had been found necessary 
to resort to it after Trasimene, but when Minucius was raised to 
an equality with Fabius the whole meaning of the office ceased. 
We find dictators in later stages of the war, but none filling the 
important position implied by the greatness of the office. Most 
of them were appointed to perform some special duty not of a 
military kind, which no consul was at hand to undertake. In 
this we may trace the disHke of the Senate for an office carrying 
such unlimited powers. In order not to raise individuals to so 
great a height above their fellow nobles, the Senate contrived 
first to limit the sphere of its functions and after the great war to 
do without it altogether. The revived dictatorship of 120 years 
later was a tyranny created by victory in civil war, only bearing 
an old name. As for the popular Assemblies, they must surely 
have been much disorganized in consequence of the war, by the 
absence of so many men in the armies, by the presence of refugees 
from the ravaged country, and the general disturbance of life. 
Indeed we have several strange scenes in the record transmitted 
by Livy, at elections and state-trials, which are indications of the 
helplessness that was coming over these Assemblies. They had 
to be carefully managed to prevent their acting foolishly. This 
is probably not very greatly exaggerated by the noble writers of 
Roman annals. In the next period the Senate brought the art 
of management to great perfection. 

169. While aristocratic jealousy insisted that the choice of 
commanders on the ground of efficiency should cease with the 
great war, something had certainly been learnt as to the defects 
of Roman armies. It seems that Scipio had in the last stage of 
the war improved the Roman cavalry. Through Masinissa he 
had also secured the help of Numidian horse, once the favourite 
fighting arm of Hannibal. In his two victories in Africa, well- 
handled cavalry had played a leading part. But there can be no 



148 Army and Navy l^h. 

doubt that an improvement, of which we have no record, had also 
taken place in the fighting skill of the infantry. There was how- 
ever no standing army in the system of the Roman Republic. So 
long as the war lasted, and it was necessary to keep men under 
arms for a considerable time, the improvement in skill continued. 
With the return of peace armies were disbanded ; only a few garri- 
sons and the force in Spain were needed. If then a long period 
of peace had followed, what had been learnt under the sharp tuition 
of Hannibal would speedily have been forgotten. But wars followed 
fast. The military tradition was kept up, for in every new army 
there was a nucleus of old soldiers. Many men had become used 
to the excitement of campaigns, and were not disposed to return 
to the monotony of rural life. Hence we begin to hear of volun- 
teers. These would be trained soldiers, excellent from a purely 
military point of view. In the wars that followed, such men served 
to leaven the mass of raw lads in the ranks, and to supply cen- 
turions, on whom the efficiency of the legions mainly depended. 
Only bad generalship was responsible for the checks suffered by 
Roman armies in the later wars. The lack of a standing army 
explains the increased tendency to depend on allies and auxiliaries 
for mounted troops. A cavalry soldier is not made in a day, but 
troopers could be found more or less ready-made in countries 
where the horse was more an animal of common use than was 
the case in Italy. 

170. A navy, even more than an army, cannot be produced 
in a hurry. Ship-building did not take long. The training of 
oarsmen was a slow process, the learning to manoeuvre clumsy 
ships no easy matter. Greek skippers could be had to navigate 
the vessels. But the sea-fights of the age were conducted mainly 
by the fighting-crews, who overawed their own slave-rowers and 
engaged the enemy. We have seen^ that the difficulty of finding 
suitable fighting-crews was probably a cause of the naval weakness 
of Carthage. Rome was evidently better off in this respect. And 
the Roman government shewed wisdom in maintaining efficient 
fleets all through the war and using them boldly. But the navy, 
like the army, was not a standing force. When a fleet was needed 
for a new war, it had to be got together in small detachments from 
the allies (chiefly Greek) who were bound to provide naval con- 
tingents. Rome herself did little in this department, and Roman 

' §§ 94, 95- 



xiv] Rome and Italy 149 

citizens were not willing to serve on shipboard. The duty was 
generally performed by freedmen, and the naval service was never 
a strong point in the Roman system. In the second Punic war 
the work of the fleets was chiefly in guarding the great convoys of 
transports bearing troops or supplies. Of actual fighting there was 
little. 

171. Hannibal's failure left those Italians who had joined 
him to submit to Rome. We have no detailed account, but it 
seems to have been only at the very last that the rebels were 
harshly treated. Thus the Bruttians, subdued after Hannibal's 
departure, were made a people of public serfs, employed in de- 
grading duties such as executions : for some time Bruttianus 
meant 'common hangman.' Most of Bruttium became Roman 
state-land. There were some confiscations of land in other parts 
also. The ' Latins,' that is the 30 Latin Colonies and about six 
old Latin or Hernican towns, had on the whole shewn a splendid 
loyalty to Rome. They had been the saving of Italy. We hear 
of no reward for the faithful, and even the twelve recusant colonies 
of the year 209 seem to have been punished lightly. The truth is 
that the result of the struggle with Carthage had been to differen- 
tiate Rome from her Italian Allies much more than had been the 
case. Sicily was now wholly a Roman ' province/ the department 
of a Roman governor. Sardinia and Corsica were Roman posses- 
sions, only needing complete conquest. Spain was not conquered, 
but Rome claimed a great part of it as overlord, and certainly 
meant to admit no other. But all these provincial territories were 
attached, not to the Itahan confederacy, but to Rome. Foreign 
relations were wholly in Roman hands. Rome made peace with 
Philip and with Carthage. Rome was on terms of friendship or 
alliance with the kings of Egypt and Pergamum, with Rhodes and 
Massalia and other repubUcs, and she was the protector to whom 
Masinissa owed his throne. Thus she was above all things an 
imperial state. Her Italian Allies had no share in her empire. 
They were an aggregate of local communities, their citizens were 
not citizens of Rome. In the view of the outside world they were 
of no account. For international purposes Rome was Italy. And 
we can see that further extensions of Roman dominion would tend 
to increase the difference between Rome and her Italian Allies. 
The more the Head of the confederacy became imperial, the more 
its inferior members became virtually subjects. 



1 50 Agriculture [ch. 

172. The devastation of Italian land in the second Punic 
war has perhaps been exaggerated by tradition. Yet it was no 
doubt considerable, and the diversion of so many men from 
agriculture to war would surely lead to some neglect of tillage 
even in undisturbed districts. But the indirect effects of the 
war were more serious still. It had been necessary to import 
corn on a large scale, to feed both the armies and the refugees 
in the city. To the latter it had to be sold cheap, and the 
practice once begun was not easily discontinued. The state 
therefore needed to get it cheap, and it soon appeared that it 
could be got from abroad more cheaply than in Italy. Foreign 
countries such as Egypt were able to export great quantities at 
low rates : transport by sea was cheaper than by road. Moreover 
there were now great sources of supply under Roman control. 
Not to mention Sardinia, Sicily was beginning to send provincial 
tribute in the form of corn. A momentous lesson was also learnt 
from Carthaginian agriculture. It was practised on a large scale 
by slave labour, and the profits made by great land-owners soon 
whetted the appetite of the capitalists of Rome. Thus, while 
cheap corn was an object to Roman statesmen, the greed of gain 
suggested to rich men the wholesale introduction of slave-tillage 
into Italy. Three circumstances favoured this movement at the 
time. The gradual repayment of debts by the state left more 
capital seeking investments. Many small freeholders, unwilling 
to return to their lands, were willing to sell them. And the supply 
of slaves was larger than usual, owing to the war. Nor must we 
forget that a law {lex Claudia) of 218 B.C. had forbidden senators 
to own ships and engage in commerce. On the whole senators 
were the wealthiest class of Romans, and they were under strong 
pressure to invest in land. The convenience and dignity of being 
great Italian landlords was attractive. Already they held as ' pos- 
sessors ' a large part of the Roman domain-land iager publicus), 
subject to a small quit-rent collected irregularly or not at all. 
They had only to buy out the small owners of neighbouring farms, 
and they would become the territorial lords of a large part of Italy. 
Furthermore, they had only to obliterate the boundaries between 
their own freeholds and the land held in ' possession,' and the 
rights of the state would be so obscured that to distinguish 
and resume public property would be impossible without a 
revolution. 



xiv] Capitalism 151 

173. Thus the effect of the struggle with Carthage was to 
make it Hkely that the numbers of small farmers, hitherto the 
real backbone of the Roman state, would be reduced. And all 
through the following period this process was in fact going on, 
at least in such districts as Etruria Apulia Lucania and wherever 
land suited for agriculture on a large scale was to be found. We 
meet with three main kinds of farming. First, tillage by slave- 
gangs, producing cereal crops on great estates of arable land. 
Second, stock-farming over large areas of highland and lowland 
pasture according to the season of the year. Third, the cultiva- 
tion of the vine and olive on estates of moderate size. All required 
plenty of capital, all employed slaves. The wine and oil of Italy 
were not yet famous, and commanded only a local market. But 
the returns from such crops were slow, and fell to the man who 
could afford to wait. 

174. We have seen that the system of state-contracts had 
been greatly developed by the necessities of the war. The close- 
fisted Roman took readily to this form of enterprise. Joint-stock 
companies or syndicates {societates publicanoruni) became common. 
By allowing the state to defer payment for services they had 
established a sort of claim to favour. They had, in short, specu- 
lated in patriotism and won. Henceforth their wealth and power 
steadily grew, until they became able to influence public policy in 
their own interest. And their interests were purely financial. The 
general good of Rome was not their business ; still less the good 
of Rome's subjects abroad, as we shall see. It was largely owing 
to them that patriotism remained narrowly Roman, and did not 
become imperial with the extension of empire. The true in- 
terest of the imperial Republic was to make its subjects happy 
and prosperous. But the race for wealth that set in after the 
second Punic war corrupted the spirit of Roman administration 
till it became a machine for extorting money to fill private 
purses. 

175. TJie currency. At the beginning of the war the cur- 
rent coin of Rome was on a double standard. 

bronze, the as of 2 ounces (unciae). It is said to have been 
originally 1 2 ounces = a Roman pound {libra). In 
268 it seems to have been already^ lowered. 

^ To 2 ounces, according to Mr G. F. Hill (see above § 104), who points out 
(p. 48) that in 2x7 the weight of the denarius was reduced by about one sixth. 



152 Currency. Religion [ch. 

silver. the denarius or 'tenner,' first coined in 268 as an 
equivalent for the Greek Drachma. It was worth 
10 asses of 2 unciae each. The half, quinarius or 
'fiver,' was worth 5 asses, the quarter, sestertius or 
' two-and-a-halfer,' was worth 2\. 
In 217 we hear of a further lowering of the bronze standard, said 
to have been meant for the relief of poor debtors. The as, then 
of 2 ounces, was evidently the trouble. It was reduced to a single 
ounce, and made ^5- of the Denarius. The weight of the Denarius 
was somewhat reduced. The quarter coin or Sesterce was now 
worth four of the new asses. It became the regular unit of 
reckoning in business, but the old reckoning by the as of 4 ounces 
long remained in use for soldiers' pay. The currency was hence- 
forth on a single standard of silver. Bronze was a token-coinage. 
The financial straits of Rome in the war were shewn not only in 
the state's deferring its payments but in the issue of base coin, 
copper denarii plated with silver. 

176. We may well believe that people in Rome lived for 
several years under a distressing strain of hope suspense or 
despair, and that superstitious fears added to their nervousness. 
We have noted two occasions on which there was a demand for 
foreign rites, partly met by the introduction of a new worship 
from the East. But the old religion had not lost its hold on the 
people. Pontiffs and augurs were busy, and no pains were spared 
to propitiate the traditional jealousy of the gods. It must be 
borne in mind that every public act had its religious side. An 
evil sign could break up an Assembly or vitiate an election. Even 
the Senate, engaged in endless details of business, met in a con- 
secrated place. And the members of the religious colleges, who 
judged questions of religious scruple, held their places for life. 
They were men of high standing, most if not all senators, and 
assuredly inclined to lend their support to the policy of the Senate. 
The general success of the Senate in overcoming outbreaks of 
popular discontent was doubtless in great part due to their in- 
fluence. In the next period, as the upper classes gradually lost 
their faith in the ancient religion, while the masses remained 
superstitious, the use of religious scruples became more and more 
a piece of purely political machinery, in the interest of the nobles 
who led the Senate. For the present Greek scepticism had not 
as yet taken root in Rome. But the great war had prepared the 



xiv] Plautus. Ennius 153 

way for it by bringing Roman officers into close contact with 
Greeks. Roman deputations still sought responses from the 
Delphic Apollo. Apollo was now honoured by a yearly festival 
in Rome. Greek works of art forwarded the tendency to clothe 
divinities with a human form. Above all, there were not a few 
Romans who understood spoken Greek. We have seen that the 
first Roman historians wrote in Greek. And the Latin poets who 
appeared at the end of the war gave to Roman literature its final 
bent of dependence on Greek models. 

177. T. Maccius Plautus, from Umbria, was a translator or 
adapter of Greek comedies. He used a number of Greek metres, 
but his language was pure Latin, and his verses depended largely 
on accent, for the quantity of syllables was often very doubtful in 
early Latin. He produced a great many plays, the popularity of 
which was long-lived. Twenty are still extant. Plautus skilfully 
adapted them to a Roman audience by Roman allusions and broad 
humour of his own. As a writer of Latin he quickly became a 
classic. Tradition places his birth in 254 B.C., his death in 184. 
He began to write during the great war. 

Q. Ennius, born at Rudiae in Calabria, spoke Greek, and 
taught it at Rome. He is said to have lived from 239 to 169. 
He too influenced the Latin language greatly, and became -a 
classic. In particular, he made a start in fixing the quantity of 
syllables, and the prosody of Latin verse is thus mainly due to 
him. He also brought in the Greek hexameter metre, which 
became the favourite measure of Latin poetry. In it he wrote 
his great poem on Roman history, called annales. But he adapted 
Greek tragedies with success, and wrote a number of miscellaneous 
works based on Greek originals. He is an important figure in the 
history of Rome, for through him Greek views on many subjects 
reached men unable to read Greek. He belongs chiefly to the 
period after the great war, but he was a contemporary, and served 
in the army. Later generations regarded him with a peculiar re- 
verence. He was to them the patriotic voice of a great past, the 
strong unpolished singer of Roman endurance and Roman triumph. 
But it was only in the latter part of his life that he became a citizen 
of Rome. 

178. hnperial Rome, 201 B.C. Thus we find the Roman 
state advanced a long step further on the road of its destinies. 
Danger at home no longer threatened Rome. Her mighty rival 



154 The imperial Republic [ch. xiv 

was overthrown. The long war had put to the proof the solid 
qualities of her citizens and the merits of her Italian policy, and 
they had stood the test. A larger policy was henceforth inevitable. 
But Roman statesmen still acted, and long continued to act, as if 
Rome were simply and necessarily an Italian power. Conquests 
abroad were ' departments ' {provinciae) under governors invested 
with both civil and military authority. The whole of her present 
Provinces had fallen to her by the accident of her struggle with 
Carthage. That Carthage might not reoccupy Spain and the 
islands, Rome must keep them. So, in spite of imperfect con- 
quest, she was the paramount power in the western Mediterranean, 
where no local powers existed able to defy her. But the rise of 
Rome was not a matter of indifference to the eastern powers, and 
the condition of the East was wholly unHke that of the West. 
We shall see that in her eastern conquests Rome had to deal 
with peoples more advanced in civilization, and accustomed to 
forms of government which Roman statesmen did not understand. 
Rome in short was not trained for the new imperial duties that 
came upon her as the sequel of the second Punic war. We now 
enter upon a story of blundering, most of it due to sheer ignor- 
ance and the defects of her own republican constitution, destined 
to inflict needless misery for many years upon millions of the 
human race. 



CHAPTER XV 

WARS AND POLICY IN THE EAST 200— 168 B.C. 
AND IN THE WEST 200— 194 B.C. 

179. The union of Italy under Roman headship had made 
Rome by 265 b.c. the first of Mediterranean powers. But her 
superiority to possible rivals in the vital elements of strength was 
as yet not understood. The end of the long duel with Carthage 
left her clearly the head of the West. But it was not yet plain to 
eastern powers that Rome could if she chose overthrow them and 
take her place as mistress of the East. Only a loyal combination 
of the eastern powers offered any chance of opposing permanently 
her eastward progress once begun. But the East was the East. 
The great monarchies, mutually jealous, could not combine, and 
the independent Greek states viewed the kings with suspicion. 
Therefore the wars from 200 to 168 B.C. ended by establishing 
Rome as paramount in the whole Mediterranean. And her 
control in the East became effective more quickly than in the 
West. The West had to be conquered piecemeal by long 
wasteful wars. The East was the scene of a few great decisive 
battles, but the extension of Roman dominion was achieved quite 
as much by diplomacy as by the sword. 

180. The wars of the period 200 — 168 may be arranged thus 

East West 

Second Macedonian war 200 — 197. Wars with Cisalpine Gauls 200 — 191. 

War with Antiochus 192 — 190. Wars in Spain 197 — 195, 185 — 179. 

Aetolian war 189. Ligurian wars 187 — 163. 
Galatian war 189. 
Third Macedonian war 171 — 168. 
Illyrian war 169, 168. 

181. The situation in the East. To begin with Greece. 
Few single city-states now remained. Athens was living on her 



156 Greece. Aetolian League [ch. 

past; the philosophic schools presided over by more or less 
eminent professors were the chief feature of the life in the once 
imperial city; as a military unit Athens did not count. Sparta 
still retained military traditions, but her once famous constitution 
had disappeared. Military tyranny was now the government, 
upheld by mercenaries. The present ruler, one Nabis, was a 
faithless and brutal ruffian. The normal form of government in 
Greece seems to have been that of cities in groups, confederations 
more or less loose. Boeotia is a case in which the several com- 
munities, though recognizing a common interest, evidently retained 
so much independence that they did not always pursue a common 
policy. The disunion of the cities of Thessaly was more marked. 
But none of these small groups was strong enough to pursue a 
really independent policy. Ever since 221, when Antigonus 
Doson of Macedon had relieved the Achaean League by crushing 
Cleomenes of Sparta, the Macedonian kingdom had overshadowed 
Greece, and the question for each of the minor powers was how 
it could best keep such freedom as it yet enjoyed. The choice 
lay between subservience to the king and taking part with his 
enemies in hope of bettering their own condition thereby. 

182. The Leagues. What remained of Greek freedom was 
most effectively represented by the Aetolians. This people had 
come to the front when the great ages of Greece were over, and 
the citizens of the more civilized states took to employing mer- 
cenary troops in their wars. The hardy Aetolians were among 
the best of hired soldiers. From early times they seem to have 
had some confederate union, and they had no great cities to 
hinder combination by local jealousies. Increase of wealth and 
power only strengthened their union. It became a true Federal 
Government, the authority of the central power overriding that 
of its constituent parts. But there seems to have been no means 
of preventing individuals from enlisting for service under foreign 
governments, tempted by prospects of high pay and plunder. 
Thus the military force at disposal in Aetolia varied greatly from 
time to time. The Federation however grew, and now included 
some states in Peloponnesus, others far away, islands, or coast- 
cities in the Propontis. Naupactus was the station of an Aetolian 
fleet. The cities of southern Thessaly had been forcibly attached 
to the League, but in the peace of 205 Philip had brought them 
again under Macedonian influence. The prestige of the Aetolians 



xv] Achaean League 157 

in Greece rested on the leading part taken by them in resisting 
the inroad of the Gauls in 280 — 279, and on their opposition to 
the encroachments of the royal house of Macedon. Polybius 
gives the Achaean view of them as a band of robbers. And it 
is probably true that they were somewhat informal and rough. 
But they had a policy of their own. 

183. The Achaean League was a revival and extension of 
an ancient local union of the small cities of Achaia in the north 
of Peloponnesus. Its great statesman, Aratus of Sicyon, to whom 
its extension was mainly due, was a typical subtle Greek. Old 
city-states, Sicyon Argos Corinth and others, were brought into 
the League, until it included a large part of the Peloponnese. 
But Aratus was a poor soldier, and the revival of Sparta in the 
middle of the third century B.C. was a blow to the Achaeans. 
Aratus was no match for the warrior-king Cleomenes III, and 
only saved the League by calling in Macedonian aid. The price 
of this was the surrender of the Corinthian citadel (Acrocorinthus) 
to Antigonus. Henceforth the king of Macedon held the key of 
Peloponnesus, and the Achaean League, chough free, was in 
foreign policy obliged to consult his wishes. The war begun 
in 214, owing to the alliance of Philip with Hannibal, dragged on 
till general exhaustion led to a general peace in 205. Aratus died 
in 213. The army of the League was inefficient, but a few years 
later it was reformed by a good soldier, Philopoemen, who became 
President or General (a yearly office) for the first time in 208. 
Under him the League prospered. But the outbreak of war in 
200 between Rome and Macedon placed the Achaeans in a 
difficult position, as we shall see. 

184. The Achaean League was a more highly-organized 
union than the Aetolian, partly because it was made up of cities 
(each with its territory) rather than rural cantons. The central 
power was effective. Its assemblies, held at the small city of 
Aegium, were in general orderly and cautious, led by the federal 
magistrates. The vote of each city counted as one. The franchise 
was democratic, but the wealthier citizens could more easily attend 
meetings away from home, and thus their assemblies, held at rare 
intervals, usually consisted of men who had something to lose. 
The relations of the Leagues to Rome in the period before us 
(and later) are painfully interesting. Roman statesmen could not 
or would not understand a Federation. The Greek Leagues, 



158 Antigonids [ch. 

more especially the Achaean, were more thorough unions than 
any in Italy. The persistent attempts of Rome to ignore the 
central government and deal with the members singly, at first 
perhaps in good faith, were the cause, of much of the miseries 
of Greece. 

185. Beside the states of old Greece, and the Hellenistic 
or half-Greek cities belonging to the great kingdoms, there were 
still a few independent republics. Such were Rhodes, long on 
terms of friendship with Rome, and in the north the ancient 
colonies of Byzantium and the Pontic Heraclea. Some of the 
Aegean islands, for instance Chios, were also free states; and 
a number of them belonged to a confederacy, headed by Rhodes, 
for the protection of sea-borne trade against piracy. The coast- 
cities were some of them dependencies of the Egyptian kingdom. 
Crete was a peculiar island. It contained a number of cities, 
each ruled by a warrior-caste, often at war with one another, but 
ready to combine against a common enemy. The Cretan bowmen 
and light troops served abroad for hire in foreign armies. Cretans 
were a byword for treachery and guile, a contrast to the Rhodians, 
whose government, famed for its good faith and honesty, was 
everywhere respected. Rhodes was the banker, and sometimes 
the umpire of disputes, in a large part of the eastern Mediterranean. 

186. The Success or- Kingdoms. Of the kingdoms formed out 
of the empire of the great Alexander three, to all appearance great 
powers, still remained. In each the royal house was descended 
from one of Alexander's marshals, Antigonus Seleucus or Ptolemy 
son of Lagus. Thus the Antigonid Seleucid and Lagid dynasties 
were all Macedonian. The three monarchies differed much, but 
in most important respects were alike. The reigning king was 
practically absolute, and surrounded by a court. Greek was the 
common language. Their diplomacy was formal but unscrupulous, 
for mutual jealousy was extreme. 

187. Antigonids. The present king of Macedon, Philip, 
reigned from 220 to 179. Though nominally bound to consult 
the Macedonian chiefs and notables, he was really supreme in 
the kingdom welded together in the fourth century B.C. by Philip 
the father of Alexander. For the Macedonians were a true nation, 
strong in unity, and a king was the expression of that unity, a 
national institution supported by national loyalty. Cities were 
few, and the court at Pella less splendid than those of the eastern 



xv] 



Seleucids 



159 



kings. Beyond the limits of Macedonia Philip owned a few islands 
and cities, in particular the three fortresses known as the ' fetters ' 
of Greece, Demetrias Chalcis and Corinth. He was overlord of 
Thessaly, and allied more or less closely with several Greek states, 
such as the Acarnanian League. In the recent wars he had shewn 
much vigour and little mercy. Hence the more independent Greek 
powers feared him. With the Achaeans he was on friendly terms, 
but they had had enough of him : the Aetolians, whom he had 
humbled, were waiting for a chance of revenge. 




CGphallenia 
(Aetol) 

Zacynthus^ 



Sketch map of Balkan peninsula 200 B. c. Macedonian kingdom 

WS)^ Macedonian dependencies. V^','f'%^ States inclined to Mace- 
don. ^==1 An ti- Macedonian or allies of Rome. ^jg,^,y^3 Inclined 
to Rome or joined Rome for various reasons. H The three ' Fetters.' 



188. Seleucids. Antiochus HI ruled from 224 to 187. The 
vast empire of Seleucus had once included a part of Thrace in 
the West and most of Asia Minor. Its eastern provinces reached 
far into central Asia, including Bactria to the N.E. and to the S.E, 
the Punjab. Thus it comprised the parts of Alexander's empire 
in which that conqueror had taken the place of the Great Kings 



i6o Lagids [Ptolemies] [ch. 

of Persia. But invasions and rebellions had shorn away many of 
the eastern possessions, and it was only in Syria and the neigh- 
bouring countries that the young Antiochus was effectively obeyed. 
He reconquered some of the lost provinces in the East. His 
ambition nov/ was to reestablish Seleucid dominion to the westward, 
in Asia Minor and even beyond. The city of Antioch, famed for 
beauty splendour and luxury, was the capital of his kingdom. The 
peoples over whom he reigned were united only by subjection to 
a common master. Thus there was no nation, but an empire of 
Oriental type. It contained many flourishing Greek cities, enjoy- 
ing special privileges ; but the ' Greeks ' of the East were a mongrel 
race, largely of Oriental blood. In these cities Greek was spoken, 
and Greek notions and Greek ways formed, imperfectly no doubt, 
the standard of civilization. The court of Antioch was, in spite 
of some Greek details, really the court of a Macedonian Sultan, 
the absolute lord of as much territory as he could win and keep. 

189. Lagids. The Egyptian kingdom had the advantage of 
exceptional security. To invade it was most difficult, for the 
desert borderlands were a natural protection. A submissive 
people furnished an immense revenue to the Lagid kings, whose 
capital was Alexandria, named after its great founder. This city 
had succeeded to a large share of the commerce lost by Tyre and 
Sidon in their decay. It was now the most famous city of the 
Greek-speaking world. For relations with the outside world 
Alexandria was Egypt. It was the most cosmopolitan of all the 
great capitals. Beside the privileged Greek and Macedonian 
population there were many foreigners, among them a colony 
of Jews, and the growing mass of native Egyptians. A strong 
force of mercenaries, largely Greek, were kept to support the 
royal power. There was money to pay them well, but under 
a weak king they were apt to give trouble. As a centre of learning 
Alexandria was unrivalled. Special studies, needing the best 
known appliances, were the peculiar glory of the great school 
of research known as the Museum. Under the earlier Ptolemies 
the power of Egypt had been great. A strong fleet had enabled 
them to extend their influence abroad. Cyprus and the district 
of Gyrene were provinces of the kingdom. A number of Aegean 
islands and coast-towns of Asia Minor were dependencies of Egypt, 
also a large part of Cilicia. But the policy of the Lagids was not 
really warlike. Commerce and security were its chief aims. They 



xv] Attalids. Roman policy i6i 

were old friends of Rhodes, and we have seen that they had long 
ago entered into relations with Rome. But after the death of 
Ptolemy III (222) the Lagid house degenerated. Under weak 
kings the native race began to come to the front, and the power 
of Egypt was declining. The fifth Ptolemy (205 — 181) succeeded 
to the throne as a boy, and the intrigues of courtiers and the 
outbreaks of the turbulent mob of Alexandria form henceforth 
a great part of Egyptian history. 

190. Pergamum and the Attalids. If we roughly label 
Macedon as a national kingdom, Syria as a semi-oriental empire, 
and Egypt as a snug property of a foreign crown, we may call 
the Pergamene kingdom a successful enterprise. Attalus I (241 
to 197) succeeded to the fortress treasure and territory which his 
uncle had seized during the wars of Alexander's Successors. He 
defeated the restless Galatians and took the title of King. The 
country over which he ruled in western Asia Minor was not large 
but rich, and the wealth of Attalus was his strength. He could 
keep up considerable armies and fleets. His capital Pergamum 
was a famous art-centre, and he was much concerned to maintain 
friendly relations abroad, particularly with the Greek states. But 
the three great Successor-Kings looked on him as an upstart, and 
his fear of Philip and Antiochus drove him into alliance with 
Rome. For his kingdom was artificial, not national, and his 
frontiers insecure. 

191. The Roman position. Thus the Roman Senate had to 
face the prospect of disturbance in the East through the action 
of two aggressive kings, Philip and Antiochus. The fatal results 
of letting things drift had been seen in the case of Spain, where 
the neglect to resist Carthage in time had made possible the 
Hannibalic war. Of the ambitions of the two kings there was 
no doubt, for they had in 203 made a compact to divide between 
them most of the outlying dependencies of Egypt. The resistance 
offered by Rhodes and Pergamum had for the moment checked 
this attempted robbery. There was therefore still time for Rome 
to intervene with effect and save her friends. The Senate could 
see that duty and interest alike required her to do so. But the 
people were weary of war, and it was extremely difficult to induce 
the Assembly to accept the challenge of Philip, particularly as 
there were armies needed elsewhere. Spain had to be held by 
a force on the spot, and it was plainly necessary to pacify northern 

H. II 



1 62 Second Macedonian War [ch. 

Italy by conquering the Gauls who had given so much trouble. 
But the Senate found a way out of their difficulties. The troops 
for service in Spain were raised among the Italian Allies. For 
war in Greece pains were taken to secure as many Greek allies as 
possible and keep down the numbers of Roman troops. Thus 
the burden was made lighter for Roman citizens, and the Assembly 
was at last persuaded to declare war. 

192. Second Macedonian war 200 — 197 B.C. Rome could 
not look on while Philip made himself master in the Aegean and 
Antiochus overpowered Egypt. Interest and duty urged her to 
support her friends, Egypt Pergamum and Rhodes, powers whose 
policy was one of peace and trade. But the Senate wisely took 
in hand only the case of Philip for the present. Their plan was 
to fight him in Greece, with the help of Greek allies, and to drive 
him out of the Aegean with a strong fleet. On the water the 
allied fleet was completely successful. On land progress was 
slow. The Greek states generally waited to see what would 
happen. The campaign of the consul Galba in 200 was in- 
decisive, and also that of P. Villius in 199. But RomiC seemed 
to be in earnest and there was a chance of putting an end to 
Macedonian domination in Greece. Roman diplomacy began 
to work on the hopes of freedom. In 199 the Aetolian League 
declared war against Philip, but many of their men were serving 
for hire in Egypt. Philip defeated their forces in Thessaly, and 
also beat back an invasion of barbarians from the North. Mean- 
while Antiochus was victorious in the Syrian war : he patched up 
a peace with Egypt and turned to Asia Minor, hoping to make 
great conquests there while Philip and the Romans were busy. 

1 93. So far the Roman government had not effected much. 
The old soldiers serving in the army as volunteers were discon- 
tented, and the system of placing the yearly consuls, average men, 
in command had not been a success. Greater eff'orts and an able 
general were clearly needed. The Senate changed its policy. 
Scruples were overruled, and a young noble, Titus Quinctius 
Flamininus, was elected consul for 198, though not yet 30 years 
of age. He had served in the Hannibalic war, and his knowledge 
of Greek and sympathy with Greeks made him peculiarly qualified 
for conducting a war in Greece, where diplomacy was not less 
important than the force of arms. While Flamininus was raising 
an army, among them many volunteers, there was danger that 



xv] The coalition against Philip 163 

Rome might lose the help of Attalus. Pergamum was menaced 
by the movements of Antiochus, and Attalus needed all his forces 
to defend his kingdom. But the Senate sent a humble embassy 
and persuaded the Syrian king not to molest their ally. Antiochus 
cared nothing for his ally Philip, and the mutual suspicions of 
eastern kings were thus turned to account in the interest of Rome. 

194. Flamininus drove Philip out of a strong position in 
Epirus and forced him to retreat into Thessaly. The Roman 
army wintered in Phocis, drawing supplies by sea. Meanwhile 
the Roman commander was winning favour in Greece by his 
considerate treatment of the people. At the autumn meeting 
of the Achaean League a great debate took place. Against the 
old connexion of the Achaeans with Macedon was set the prospect 
of recovering Corinth, the key of Peloponnesus, which was still in 
Macedonian hands. After hearing the speeches of envoys from 
both sides, the Federal Assembly voted to join Rome. Omitting 
minor details, it is enough to say that the chief Greek powers 
were now arrayed against Philip. The allied fleet commanded 
the sea, and the armies of the coalition, Roman Aetolian Per- 
gamene and Achaean, were free to operate by land. The extent 
of Roman authority was shewn in the supplies forwarded from 
Sicily and Sardinia, and in the coming of an auxiliary force from 
Numidia, sent by king Masinissa to fight for Rome. Flamininus 
was kept on in command as proconsul in 197. Negotiations for 
peace failed, Philip not being as yet prepared to give up the three 
great fortresses, the ' fetters ' of Greece. So a victory in the field 
was necessary to bring the war to an end. 

195. The armies that faced each other in Thessaly differed 
widely in the organization of their main bodies, the infantry. The 
system of massing men in bodies of great depth, a Greek invention, 
had been developed in the fourth century B.C. by the Macedonian 
kings Philip II and his son Alexander the Great. This famous 
formation, known as the Phalanx, was very effective in a direct 
charge. It broke through the shallower formation of an enemies' 
line, and the disorder thus produced was generally fatal, being 
followed up by cavalry. The weapon of the phalanx infantry was 
the sarisa, a long pike of considerable weight. But when the 
men were formed in the usual depth of 16 files, there was a great 
waste of offensive power. Only five pike-heads could project 
before the front rank : the eleven ranks in the rear held their 



164 Cynoscephalae [ch. 

pikes pointing upwards, their weight alone adding to the shock 
of the charge. The phalanx was a close and clumsy column, very 
liable to be itself thrown into disorder on broken ground, and so 
to become helpless. But it was irresistible when circumstances 
favoured it. Some 70 years before this Pyrrhus had employed 
it in Italy with skill and success. But in course of time military 
pedantry had intensified its defects, and it was now more than 
ever unfitted for the changing conditions of the battlefield. The 
Roman Legion was an elastic formation. The maniples of which 
it was made up had each its own organization, and the rout of 
one did not disorder the rest. The pilum and sword were a far 
handier equipment than the sarisa. The legionary had great 
freedom of movement, and could at need change his front quickly, 
while the phalangite, wedged fast by pressure, was in no position 
to withstand a sudden flank attack. Moreover Roman military 
skill had doubtless improved owing to the recent lessons of the 
second Punic war. 

196. So it was that when the armies met in misty weather 
on the hills known as the * Dog's Heads ' the rigid phalanx was 
a failure. Flamininus won a complete victory. But the Aetolian 
horse had done good service in the battle, and claimed the chief 
credit of the day. The Roman general could not put up with the 
boasting and pretensions of the Aetolian leaders, and was driven 
to ignore their claims in dealing with the affairs of Greece. He 
refused to prolong the war for the purpose of destroying PhiHp, 
or to allow the League to reannex Thessalian cities of which 
Philip had deprived them. Peace, and freedom for Greek cities, 
were the aim of his policy. Philip made submission, agreeing to 
give up his possessions in Greece, such as Thessaly and Euboea, 
to evacuate the three fetter-fortresses, and to pay a war indemnity. 
The peace was ratified at Rome, and in the next year (196) 
Flamininus, still proconsul, was joined by the usual ten com- 
missioners, who under his presidency were to see to the details, 
and to settle Greek affairs generally. Several minor operations 
of war occurred in the meantime in various parts, but we need 
not dwell on them. The victory of Cynoscephalae had decided 
that Greek questions should for the present be submitted to 
Roman arbitration : and so they were, to the disgust of the 
enraged Aetolians. But it was the policy of Rome to restore 
order and contentment in Greece so far as possible. The move- 



xv] Roman policy in Greece 165 

ments of Antiochus were causing anxiety, and there had been 
grave disasters in Spain. 

197. '■Freedom'' of the Greeks. The peace in its final form, 
dictated by the Senate, included the evacuation by Philip of 
towns held by him in Asia Minor, the surrender of his fleets and 
clauses restricting his freedom of warlike action. If he was for- 
bidden to keep an army of more than 5000 men, the clause was 
not strictly enforced. In short, he was confined to his ancestral 
kingdom, but not destroyed : his power would suffice to make 
him a bulwark against the restless barbarians of the North. That 
his presence would serve to keep the Greeks quiet, and conscious 
of depending on Rome, was a point probably not overlooked. 
The decisions of the Roman commission in the affairs of Greece 
were announced at the Isthmian festival to the eager assembled 
multitude. When it was understood that those Greeks who had 
been subject to Philip were declared free, while nothing was said 
about the rest (their freedom being assumed), the enthusiasm of 
the meeting was unbounded. But wild demonstrations of joy 
were not enough to give peace and unity to the jealous states of 
Greece. Moreover ' freedom ' in the Roman sense did not include 
the freedom to take any step displeasing to Rome. Henceforth 
there was a distinction, very galling to Greeks, between what they 
had technically a full right to do and what they could in practice 
venture to do without offending Rome. The misunderstandings 
arising from the difference in their respective views of ' freedom ' 
were a large part of Greek history in the next 50 years. 

198. The war was over, but the awards of the commissioners 
did not give universal satisfaction. Some allies, such as the Achaean 
League, received extensions of territory, but it seems clear that 
Rome did not mean to allow another great warlike power to be 
built up in Greece, perhaps to be as troublesome as Macedon 
had lately been. The Aetolians seemed to have some such am- 
bition, and it was therefore thought wise to refuse their extreme 
claims. They were sulky and did not conceal their indignation. 
They had never intended to submit to Roman dictation, nor was 
it as yet clear that this was the inevitable result of Roman inter- 
vention. PhiHp's position was different. After the conclusion of 
peace, acting on Roman advice, he applied to be made an ' ally 
and friend ' of Rome. The request was granted, and he thereby 
became bound not to fight against Rome, remaining free to help 



1 66 Antiochus [ch. 

Rome in her wars or to stand neutral if he preferred to do so. 
Thus Rome bound him over not to help Antiochus. Antiochus 
had left him to be humbled by Rome, and was even turning his 
misfortunes to account by annexing Greek cities in Asia to which 
Philip laid claim. The Roman commissioners were now free to 
deal boldly with Antiochus. Antiochus, ignoring their previous 
warnings, crossed the Hellespont in 196 and began to carry out 
his project of reconquering the parts of Thrace which he claimed 
as having once belonged to the empire of Seleucus. The Roman 
envoys found him in the Thracian Chersonese, busy in restoring 
the fortress of Lysimacheia. This commanded the isthmus, and 
it meant that he was come to stay. The parties could not agree. 
The king would not withdraw from Europe at the order of Rome. 
He asserted his right to recover his ancestral dominions. The 
Romans could not consent to let him establish himself in Europe. 
When they ordered him to give up the Greek cities he had seized, 
formerly subject to the kings of Egypt or Macedon, he replied 
that Rome had no concern in the affairs of Asia. A false report 
of the death of Ptolemy V caused both sides to end the conference 
and find a pretext for hurrying off to Alexandria to watch over 
their several interests. By this futile diversion the development 
of the main quarrel was suspended for a time. 

199. In considering the relations of Rome with Antiochus 
we must bear in mind that neither side knew what we know now. 
The Romans feared Antiochus as a dangerous enemy who must 
at all costs be prevented from coming within reach of Italy. The 
king had no fear of the Romans assailing him in Asia, and little 
doubt that he could, if he chose, face them successfully in Europe. 
So great was their misjudgment of each other's strength. And 
the king's confidence was fatally increased by the flattery of 
courtiers who did not venture to report to him unwelcome facts, 
necessary for judging situations rightly. At Rome there was no 
lack of information, derived chiefly from Pergamum and Rhodes. 
These powers looked to Rome for protection against Antiochus, 
and were concerned to keep alive the fear of the king's designs. 
They made much of the king's strength in order to alarm their 
powerful ally. The Senate saw that it was not Rome's interest to 
allow her eastern allies to be crushed, for Antiochus would then 
be free to employ all his forces in the West. Even more alarming 
was the news that the king had been joined by Hannibal. For 



xv] Hannibal. Sparta 167 

this Rome had to thank her own jealousy. She had encouraged 
Masinissa to watch Carthage, and she had on occasion dealt 
hardly with her beaten enemy. But still Carthage throve, reviving 
under the reforms and good administration introduced by Hanni- 
bal as leader of the popular party. Roman suspicion was aroused, 
and fed by the reports received from the wealthy clique whom 
Hannibal had driven from power. These men were base enough 
to play upon Roman fears in order to get rid of the one great 
Carthaginian. A Roman embassy came to impeach Hannibal 
before the Punic senate; and he, to avoid being sacrificed to 
please Rome, fled to the East. 

200. Meanwhile (195) Flamininus, still in. charge of Greek 
affairs, had to deal with a burning question. Argos, once a 
member of the Achaean League, but of late subject to Philip, 
had been transferred by Philip to Nabis the tyrant of Sparta. 
The Achaeans were eager to recover it, all the more as Nabis, 
though he deserted Philip, had acted with great cruelty at Argos. 
A congress of Greek delegates voted for war with Nabis, in spite 
of the furious opposition of the Aetolians. Nabis was beaten, 
but the proconsul, anxious to have quiet in Greece, and more 
concerned to watch Antiochus than to destroy Nabis, did his best 
for peace. But his terms were severe, and the tyrant did not 
accept them till a second conflict had ended in the assault of 
Sparta, in which the city was only saved by setting it on fire. 
Nabis had now to give up Argos and some other towns, to 
surrender his fleet, to pay war-indemnities, and to submit to 
restriction of his liberty to make alliances and war. But the 
ruffian was still left in being as ruler of Sparta, and the Greeks 
guessed rightly that the Spartan question would still be a source 
of trouble. So far we have no right to charge the Romans with 
a deliberate aim of promoting quarrels and dissensions to keep the 
Greek states weak. Greek jealousy was of home growth. The 
Aetolians denounced the lenient treatment of Nabis, but they 
were far more angry to see Argos restored to their Achaean 
rivals. 

201. Greece for the Greeks. At this stage orders from 
Rome intervened. The Senate was resolved to avoid wars so far 
as possible. But the ambition of leading men, of Scipio in 
particular, pointed to command in war. In order to thwart it, 
the Senate appear to have decided to patch up matters East and 



1 68 'Freedom' in Greece [ch. 

West and to withdraw the armies from Greece and Spain. It was 
premature and unwise, but Flamininus had to go. He did what 
he could to strengthen a Roman interest in Greece by placing 
Roman partisans (generally the wealthier citizens) in power in 
a number of Greek cities. He delighted the assembled delegates 
by announcing the immediate evacuation of the three fetter- 
fortresses, and returned to Rome, where he celebrated a splendid 
triumph. Thus in 194 Greece was left nominally free and at 
peace. Such was the Roman policy. The Senate wished for no 
wars, above all for no annexations likely to provoke wars. Flami- 
ninus and the rest of the new school of statesmen, men inspired by 
admiration of Greek literature and art, fancied that in removing 
the Macedonian yoke, and establishing a balance of power among 
the chief Greek states, they had done enough. Freedom would 
surely be turned to good account by so gifted a race, and Rome 
their benefactress would have no further trouble from the quarrels 
of the Greeks. The sequel proved that this was a mistake. Rome 
could not allow the Greeks a genuine independence, and if she 
meant to guide them peaceably it was needful that she should rule 
them effectively. A policy of leaving them to their own devices, 
and now and then intervening as umpire, could only succeed if 
founded on a thorough understanding of Greek ideas and Greek 
institutions. And this understanding the Romans lacked. In 
particular, they never understood the nature of Federal govern- 
ments. In Italy it had been the Roman policy to break up 
Leagues, and to attach their members separately to Rome. But 
she did rule Italy, and at present she did not and would not rule 
Greece. Yet she was ever seeking to deal separately with the 
several members of the Leagues. At first she seems to have acted 
in ignorance : the time came when she acted with malignant 
purpose. 

202. Roman doings in the West. The experience of the 
Hannibalic war had taught the Roman government that the 
power paramount in Italy must for its own security advance its 
frontier to the Alps. The Cisalpine Gauls in the rich lowlands 
of the Po must not be left free to help invaders. The Ligurians 
of the north-western hills were a troublesome race. Sometimes 
they raided Etruria ; now and then they combined with the Gauls 
to resist the advance of Rome. But the conquest of Liguria 
might wait for a time ; the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul could not. 



Plate III 




Coin of Philip V of IVEacedon (220—178 B.C.). 
obv. Head of Philip. 

rev. Athena Alkis. BASIAEfiS <l>IAinnOT. 
See §§ 140, 187. 




Coin of Aetolian League (? 192 — i B.C.). 

obv. ? Head of Antiochus HI, elected cTTparayos avTOKpdrwp 

of the League. 
rev. Meleager. AITfiAfiN. 

See §§ 204—207. 




Coin of Rhodes, about 200 B.C. 
obv. Head of Sun-god (? after Colossus). 
7-dv. Rose (pddov). PO below. ? Persephone. Name of 
magistrate above. 

See §§ 185, 217, 222, 226. 



xv] The West. Spain 169 

So the years 201 — 194 were years of warfare in northern Italy. 
We have no trustworthy record of these wars, but we know that 
they were aggressive wars, probably mismanaged. No sufificient 
effort at any one time was made. When the Gauls made a feigned 
submission, there was a temporary lull in the operations, then 
a fresh outbreak and more bloodshed. Average Roman magis- 
trates held command, and the armies were such as could be spared 
while other forces were on service in Greece and Spain. No 
doubt the Gaulish tribes were weakened, but at the cost of great 
Roman losses. The colonies on the Po were maintained, but 
with difficulty. In short, a beginning had been made, but as yet 
there was no effective conquest of Cisalpine Gaul. 

203. Spain. In the far West also Rome meant to be 
mistress, and blundered by attempting to solve the Spanish 
problem with insufficient means. The native tribes were glad to 
be rid of Carthage, but unwilling to be controlled by Rome. 
Rome had two ' provinces ' there, known as the Nearer and 
Further Spain. But the frontiers were disturbed and uncertain. 
The governors of these provinces had no easy rask. Each had 
an army, inadequate to carry on a serious war, and composed 
of contingents of Italian Allies, always more or less discontented. 
The service in Spain was most unpopular. In 197 a step was 
taken to provide a regular succession of governors. The number 
of praetors was raised from four to six, and two were intended for 
the Spanish posts. A delimitation of the provincial spheres was 
carried out, and some concessions made to the great trading city 
of Gades. But risings of the native tribes and disasters to the 
Roman arms soon shewed the need of a great effort. In the 
year 195 we find the consul M. Porcius Cato at work in Spain 
with a strong army, including Roman legions. He was a man of 
exceptional energy, and he not only gained victories and pacified 
the country for the time, but took steps to increase its prosperity 
and contentment. In particular, he promoted mining, as Hanni- 
bal had done before him. But political movements at Rome led, 
as we have seen, to his premature recall ; and Spain, quiet for the 
moment, was left under two praetors as before. The peninsula 
had to suffer dreadful things under Roman mismanagement in 
the course of the next 60 years. The policy of Rome may be 
now stated in few words. In the East she made final conquests, 
but shrank from the needful annexations : in the West (for Sardi- 



170 The Aetolians and Antiochus [ch. 

nia and Corsica are further instances) she was ready to annex, 
but cruelly slow to carry out the needful conquests. 

204. The war with Antiochus 192 — 190 B.C. We have 
seen that by the year 195 it was clear that a war was inevitable. 
But it did not break out at once. Antiochus, having gained 
a footing in Europe, was for a time busy asserting his power in 
southern Asia Minor. The Romans were in no hurry. They 
took matters very seriously. In 194 they founded a number of 
colonies in southern Italy, fortresses to protect the coast, and 
prepared to guard Sicily also, fearing an invasion by sea. The 
year 193 was a time of negotiations, each side trying to put the 
other in the wrong, but nothing came of the embassies. It was 
the situation in Greece that brought on actual hostilities. The 
Aetolians stirred up Nabis to try and recover by war the towns of 
which he had been deprived in Laconia. Of the minor Greek 
states several were ready to follow the lead of the Aetolians. But 
Philip of Macedon and the Achaean League were loyal to Rome. 
Nothing could be done against Rome in Greece without the aid 
of a great military power. It is said that the Aetolians tried to 
win the support of Philip, who detested them and refused. But 
they seem to have thought that he was only waiting to see whether 
a strong coalition could be formed against Rome. They turned 
to Antiochus, holding out prospects of a great rising in Greece if 
the king would but come to head it. This he undertook to do, 
relying on the boasted forces of the League and its sympathizers. 
They were in fact trusting to the vast resources of Antiochus. It 
was a partnership in which each partner relied on the other, and 
mutual deception led naturally to common ruin. 

205. Antiochus had indeed no trusty allies, willing to make 
great sacrifices in a common cause. Even in and beyond the 
Aegean Rome was sure of the zealous support of the Rhodian 
republic and some other maritime Greek cities, also of Eumenes II 
king of Pergamum, not to mention Egypt. All these powers 
looked to Rome for protection against the ambition of Antiochus. 
The effective military strength of the Seleucid empire was greatly 
overrated by its opponents. It consisted of contingents drawn 
from eastern peoples owning a lukewarm or forced allegiance to 
the ruler of Antioch, and of mercenaries, Galatian or Cretan, 
ready to serve for hire in any cause. If the weakness of a power 
so lacking in national cohesion was at all clearly understood, it 



xv] Antiochus in Greece 171 

was assumed that the presence of Hannibal would lead to the 
formation of efificient armaments and supply the best of contem- 
porary generalship. Hannibal knew the mettle of the Romans, 
and we hear that in his opinion the only chance of success lay in 
a vigorous invasion of Italy, which he offered to conduct. An 
attempt to gain the support of Carthage was foiled by the party 
in power there. Meanwhile Hannibal lost favour at court through 
insisting on unwelcome truths. The king decided on a campaign 
in Greece. This plan was foredoomed to failure, unless he at 
once placed in the field a large and well-trained army, and sent 
large sums of money to maintain it and his Greek allies as well. 
But he did not do so. In Peloponnesus war broke out in 192. 
The Achaeans defeated Nabis, who was soon after murdered by 
an Aetolian force nominally sent to his aid. These Aetolians 
were massacred by the Spartans, and Sparta was attached to the 
Achaean League by its general Philopoemen. The Aetolians 
were busy occupying positions in readiness for the coming of 
Antiochus, and Flamininus, who was again acting for Rome in 
Greece, could get no satisfaction from them. 

206. In 192 Antiochus came with something over 10,000 
men and insufficient supplies. The Aetolians voted him the 
chief command of their forces. But their enthusiasm was much 
damped by the weakness of the king's army. A far stronger force 
was necessary if Greek states were to be induced to declare for 
him. He promised to furnish immense armaments on land and 
sea, and supplies to match. But he had made a bad beginning. 
A section of the Aetolians mistrusted him, and the Achaean 
League, after hearing the envoys of Antiochus and the Aetolians, 
and Flamininus in reply, decided to cooperate with Rome. At 
this stage he was cheered by a few strokes of luck. Chalcis fell 
into his hands, and became his base of operations. In a short 
time he was master of Euboea and a considerable part of the 
adjoining mainland. The Boeotians joined him, and he won a 
number of Thessalian towns in a short campaign. But the 
adhesion of these petty states was worthless, as Hannibal is said 
to have pointed out. The help of Macedon would be worth 
securing. But Philip held aloof. The Epirotes would not 
commit themselves to a war with Rome. Meanwhile the rein- 
forcements from Asia were delayed, and when they arrived they 
were insufficient for the work in hand. At this time the Romans 



172 Thermopylae [ch. 

had already sent over an army to Epirus, and had declared war. 
Antiochus passed a luxurious winter at Chalcis, apparently uncon- 
scious of his danger. 

207. The Romans were usually slow to take the field, 
and on this occasion their preparations were more than usually 
deliberate and complete. Home defence, the fleet, religious 
precautions, supplies, were carefully attended to. The foreign 
alHes, Masinissa, Carthage, Ptolemy, Philip, all zealously sent 
contingents or money and corn. Eumenes and the Rhodians 
were of course hard at work. In 191 the consul Manius Acilius 
Glabrio crossed the Adriatic with a strong force. The army sent 
to Epirus was already recovering Thessalian cities with the help 
of Philip. The Aetolians, who had invited Antiochus to Greece, 
now failed him, sending only 4000 men to his aid. The king fell 
back upon the famous pass of Thermopylae, where he was defeated 
by Glabrio with the loss of nearly all his army. The pass had 
been turned by a Roman detachment led by the ever-active Cato. 
After his recent victories in Spain, the ex-consul was ready to 
serve as a subordinate against Rome's enemy. Such was the 
spirit against which the misguided Antiochus had to contend. 
The king fled to Chalcis, and so to Ephesus, where he fondly 
imagined himself out of Roman reach. The general submission 
of the Greek states that had joined him was made without delay. 
The Aetolians too were driven to negotiate, and persuaded to 
' entrust themselves to the faith of the Roman people,' not under- 
standing that this was the Roman phrase for unconditional 
surrender, A quarrel arose, and the Assembly of their League, 
encouraged by money and promises from Antiochus, went on 
with the war. 

208. Roman policy. The siege of Naupactus, where the 
Aetolians were making a stand, was a difficult undertaking, 
but it was not the most important part of the Roman pro- 
ceedings in Greece. Rome's allies, Philip and the Achaeans, 
were acting independently. The Achaeans were annexing the 
Peloponnesian states that had belonged to the Aetolian League, 
and were buying the island of Zacynthus from the present oc- 
cupant. The Messenians objected to submit to the Achaeans, 
and put themselves in the hands of Flamininus. The Roman 
agent insisted on the withdrawal of the Achaean force, but 
ordered the Messenians to join the League and to recall their 



xv] Selfish policy of Rome 173 

ovm exiles. Thus an unwilling member was added to the 
League, while Messene itself was exposed to the certainty of 
sedition within, ^lamininus then claimed Zacynthus for Rome, 
warning the Achaeans not to risk their compact sovranty in 
the Peloponnese by seeking extensions abroad. To this the 
League was forced to consent. Philip was making conquests 
in the North with leave of the consul Glabrio. But Flamininus 
pointed out that it was not Rome's interest to let him win and 
keep these territories, or to weaken the Aetolians further. The 
siege of Naupactus was raised, and the decision of policy re- 
ferred to Rome. It seems clear that a change was coming over 
Roman policy in Greece. The philhellene party in the Senate 
might wish to treat the Greeks kindly and interfere with them 
as little as possible. But Antiochus had proved that Greece 
might at any time be made a base of operations against Rome. 
By keeping all the Greek states weak and disunited (and Greek 
jealousy made this easy) the danger might be reduced to a 
minimum, and Rome would thus be spared much trouble and 
expense. As time went on, this policy became cruel and ma- 
lignant. For the present it was simply an attempt to avoid 
future embarrassments. But what to Rome was a saving of 
trouble was a slow torture to the Greek Leagues, particularly 
to a highly-organized federation like that of the Achaeans. The 
Roman claim to deal directly with separate members superseded 
the central authority of the League. Sparta was already giving 
trouble in this respect, and was destined to give more later 
on, under Roman encouragement. So the Achaeans, the loyal 
friends of Rome, had to learn that in their case ' freedom ' 
meant the liability to have their internal relations subjected to 
Roman interference and revision. Philip, their former overlord, 
was for the moment treated with kindness and civility by the 
Romans, who were about to require his further help. The 
Aetolians were let off easily. In short, there was henceforth 
to be only one interest dominating the whole Balkan peninsula, 
and that interest the selfish policy of Rome. 

209. The Aetolians were not willing to accept the terms 
offered by the Senate, so war began again. But to put down 
Antiochus was the chief business in hand. The joint fleets of 
Rome Rhodes and Pergamum defeated his fleet, but it was seen 
that only a crushing defeat on land could force the king to 



174 Magnesia [ch. 

withdraw from Europe and western Asia Minor. Nothing less 
than this would render him harmless. So all preparations were 
carefully made as before, and the consul appointed to command, 
Lucius Cornelius Scipio, had with him his brother, the great 
Africanus, as his adviser. The Scipios, eager to win the glory 
of victory within the year (190), gave the Aetolians another truce 
for a fresh embassy, and set out to deal with Antiochus. They 
had to choose between two risks. If they took their army across 
the Aegean, a single disaster might be fatal. If they took the 
land-route, it was necessary to rely on the friendly cooperation 
of Philip. Inquiry shewed that Philip was both loyal and ready, 
so the latter course was chosen. While they were on their way, 
Pergamum was attacked by the king's forces, but without success. 
The fleets too were at work. A Rhodian squadron was destroyed, 
but the Rhodians equipped another, and prevented Hannibal, 
who was bringing up a fleet from the East, from joining the king's 
other fleet at Ephesus. Soon after this, the allied fleet gained 
a great victory ofl" Myonnesus in Ionia and held command of 
the sea. The Roman army was approaching the Hellespont, 
and Antiochus, who had hoped to be safe in Asia, was now 
thoroughly frightened. He evacuated Lysimacheia, giving up 
his hold on Europe. An attempt to negotiate had failed, and 
he set himself to increase his army by contingents of various 
peoples. But it was not numbers that were needed, and spirit 
and discipline were lacking in his splendid and motley host. 
Again he tried to negotiate, but the Roman terms were too hard. 
The armies met near Magnesia by mount Sipylus. Tactical errors 
on the king's part seem to have rendered even the best part of 
his army, the phalanx drawn up in sections 32 files deep, quite 
ineffective. Rout quickly followed. It is said that out of 70,000 
men 50,000 were killed or taken prisoners. Africanus had been 
sick, and bore no part in the battle. L. Scipio the consul had 
the credit of the victory, but the effective commander was his 
subordinate Cn. Domitius, and Eumenes of Pergamum had dis- 
tinguished himself on the field. 

210. So far as Antiochus was concerned, the war was at an 
end. He had to accept the Taurus range as the north-western 
boundary of his kingdom, to pay a great war-indemnity, to feed 
the Roman army while in Asia, and to deliver up certain dan- 
gerous persons. Among the last was Hannibal, who managed 



xv] The eastern settlement 175 

to escape. All now knew where the real centre of power lay, 
and numerous embassies came to seek favour at Rome. A 
senatorial commission was as usual sent to the East to arrange 
the details of the territorial settlement. A vast area in Asia 
Minor and a small district in Europe, ceded by Antiochus, had 
to be disposed of. The Roman Senate had no desire for an- 
nexation with all its responsibiHties. There were three parties 
anxious to share the pickings of the provinces detached from 
the Seleucid realm ; Philip, Eumenes, and the Rhodian republic. 
To the last, already possessed of a province on the Asiatic main- 
land, were assigned Lycia and southern Caria. To Eumenes 
were granted immense territories, many times larger than his 
present kingdom. His frontier was to touch Bithynia Galatia 
Cappadocia Cilicia and Lycia, and to include northern Caria. 
It seems certain that the generosity of Rome was part of a 
far-sighted policy. If Eumenes could establish himself firmly 
in this great new territory, he would serve to watch Antiochus 
and Philip, while his exertions in securing his sovranty would 
keep him employed. To Philip, beyond a few compliments and 
remission of the outstanding balance of his war-indemnity, no 
reward was given. The three claimants were jealous of each 
other, as plainly appeared in the discussion of the future status 
of the Greek cities in the coast-lands of the Aegean. Eumenes 
wished to have them as tributaries. PhiHp coveted those in 
Thrace. Rhodes was all for having them free. This, said 
Eumenes, would make them in effect dependencies of Rhodes. 
The Senate finally decided to let Eumenes have some that had 
formerly been tributary to Pergamum, and to declare the rest 
free. Thus Rome fostered the jealousy of her 'friends' in her 
own interest, as she had done in Greece, and left herself free to 
intervene as umpire in disputes that were only too likely to arise. 
211. But there were still two quarters in which there was 
some reason for the forcible assertion of Roman power. Of the 
consuls for 189, M. Fulvius Nobilior was sent to humble the 
Aetolians and teach them a lesson, for they were still giving 
trouble. The chief operation of this war was the siege of the 
stubbornly defended city of Ambracia. The terms of peace 
finally imposed on the Aetolians included, beside the usual 
penalties of defeat, two special provisions. The foreign policy 
of the League was to be wholly dependent on that of Rome, 



176 Galatian war [ch. 

and it was to cede the island of Cephallenia. Thus Rome did 
not destroy the League, but kept it as a vassal-state, useful for 
maintaining a balance of power in Greece. She annexed another 
island, according to her usual practice. The other consul, Cn. 
Manlius Vulso, took over the command in Asia. Whether the 
Senate meant him to engage in war or not, there seems to have 
been good ground for a demonstration in force, that the peoples 
annexed to the Pergamene kingdom might understand the ne- 
cessity of submission. Eumenes, in short, was to have a fair 
start; and Manlius thirsted for military glory. In the uplands 
of Asia Minor were the restless Galatian tribes. What with their 
own wars and their mercenary service in foreign armies, they 
had been disturbing the peace and accumulating booty for about 
100 years. With the help of Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, 
Manlius carried out a successful expedition into the interior, and 
ended by two great victories over the Galatians. The effect of 
this long march and the defeat of the brave barbarians was to 
prepare the ground for Eumenes, while making it clear that the 
real overlord of these parts was Rome. 

212. Manlius was continued in command as proconsul, and 
early in 188 Eumenes and the ten commissioners arrived from 
Rome. The detailed settlement now taken in hand shewed 
clearly the intentions of the Senate. Peace was to be secured 
in the East : nearer home, Philip was not to be strengthened 
so as to become once more dangerous. Antiochus was deprived 
of his fleet and elephants, and strictly bound by treaty excluding 
him from all interference in the western countries where Roman 
influence was supreme. The Thracian district with Lysimacheia 
and other cities was assigned to Eumenes, not to Philip. The 
king of Cappadocia, on whom a heavy fine had been laid for 
his support of Antiochus, was excused half the penalty, as a 
further favour to Eumenes, who thus gained a friend on his 
new eastern frontier. In fact Rome acted on a principle of 
lowering the high and raising the low. The latter would be 
dependent on her protection, and thereby bound to loyalty. 
And the arbitration on which she insisted in treaties as a sub- 
stitute for wars meant simply that no movements were to be 
allowed without Roman leave. But, if Rome gained vast prestige 
b y her rapid advance to the first place in the East, the reaction 
of the East on Rome was, if we may trust Roman tradition, not 



xv] Rome and the Greek States 177 

less momentous. It had been shewn that oriental armies were 
no match in battle for the armies of Italy. The enormous booty, 
in particular the hoarded Galatian gold, looted by the troops of 
Manlius, opened the eyes of Roman soldiers. The easy gains 
and glory of eastern wars made a deep impression, and hence- 
forth we find men regarding military service as a source of profit, 
and more than ever loth to serve in the hard and unremunerative 
warfare of the West. 

213. Manlius took back his army by land, perhaps to 
overawe Philip. Waggons laden with spoil made their progress 
slow, but they got through somehow, losing some men and 
booty by the attacks of Thracian tribesmen. They crossed the 
Adriatic early in 187. While he had been in Asia, Fulvius had 
been busy in Greece. Here also the change in Roman policy 
was manifest. In 188 Sparta was giving trouble to the Achaean 
League. The League, lately strengthened by the wise reforms of 
Philopoemen, was well able to coerce Sparta. Sparta appealed 
to Fulvius, who at once forbade the League to coerce its unruly 
member till the Senate gave its decision. The decision was 
ambiguous. Sparta was subdued and restored to the League. 
But the Achaeans were of course greatly annoyed at this inter- 
ference in their federal affairs, while the Romans were more than 
ever jealous of a power possessed of so much vital energy and 
even capable of growth under the eyes of Rome. Rome had 
now risen to a marked predominance in the Mediterranean world, 
and her aim was peace, in other words the retention of this 
predominance without effort. From this point of view there was 
no room for gratitude or grudge. Friend and foe stood on the 
same footing, and to be strong and independent without Roman 
leave was to be suspected. There was also a change coming 
over Roman public life. Contact with the East had brought 
wealth and with it luxury. Roman nobles were losing the simple 
patriotism of their fathers. Old-fashioned politicians were alarmed 
at the signs of the times. We find an Old-Roman party beginning 
to form, in opposition to the new school, stubbornly endeavouring 
to withstand the growth of greed and ambition, and to uphold the 
honesty frugality and scrupulousness to which they attributed the 
success of Rome in the past. The struggle went on for many 
years, and the chief figure among these narrow-minded but well- 
meaning reactionaries was Cato. 

H. 12 



178 Attacks on public men [ch. 

214. For the present this movement resulted in three open 
attacks on men distinguished by recent victories. The details, 
in part obscure, may be omitted. The general line taken was 
to impute to a commander improper ambition, shewn in rash or 
brutal conduct to foreign peoples, contrary to the true interest 
of Rome. Thus great efforts were made to rob Fulvius and 
Manlius of the coveted honour of a triumph. In both cases 
the assailants had the advantage at first, but time and private 
influence were too strong for them, and both the triumphs were 
granted. Suggestions of a corrupt appropriation of state-moneys 
and booty were another form of imputation. In the famous but 
obscure case of the Scipios they seem to have been the staple 
of a formal charge tried before a specially appointed court. It 
was urged that the circumstances of the peace granted to An- 
tiochus were highly suspicious, and pointed to bribery. Africanus 
had made many enemies by his haughty bearing, particularly 
among the jealous nobles, and he is said to have acted in a 
bold defiant manner now. His brother Lucius was condemned 
to a heavy fine. The intervention of a tribune prevented the 
completion of the proceedings, and the great Africanus, disgusted 
with public life, passed the rest of his days in retirement. These 
affairs shew us that the control of commanders abroad was be- 
coming more difficult as Rome advanced. They remind us that 
the responsibility of Roman officials was always difficult to en- 
force, depending as it did on the action of party-spirit, capricious 
and devoid of legal principle. To rise above the ordinary level 
of Roman nobles was a fault less easily condoned than gross 
misconduct. 

215. We shall see below that the years 186 — 173 were not 
barren of important events either in the internal politics of Rome 
or in her dealings with Italy and the West. For the present let 
us trace the course of affairs in Greece down to the war of 171 — 
168, in which the Macedonian kingdom perished. 

Philip, enraged at his treatment by Rome, set himself to 
repair the exhausted resources of Macedon, and to build up a 
fresh army. Roman suspicions were soon roused. A Roman 
commission forbade him to retain his conquests in northern 
Greece. When even the Thracian coast-cities were denied him, 
his fury vented itself in a massacre of the people of Maronea. 
Unable to conceal this deed, he sent his son Demetrius to Rome 



xv] Philopoemen. Hannibal 179 

to pacify the Senate. But he went on with his schemes, and 
bided his time. He was still Rome's ' Friend and ally,' and as 
such was closely watched. He was visited by Roman com- 
missioners, and it was well known that hostile reports from 
other witnesses would find a hearing at Rome. The same 
jealousy appeared in Roman dealings with the Achaeans. That 
the League was eminently loyal and pacific made no difference. 
In 185 they received embassies from the kings of Pergamum 
Syria and Egypt. Great care was taken to accept no offers of 
which Rome might fairly complain. But the mere fact of friendly 
diplomatic intercourse between powers connected with Rome was 
displeasing to the Senate. The Senate wished to keep Rome's 
'Friends and allies' apart from each other, while bound to 
dependence on the paramount power. It was her old policy, 
but it was henceforth carried out with less and less scruple as 
to the means. Chronic interference in Achaean affairs kept the 
League in a constant state of unrest, and the rules of the federal 
constitution were disregarded to suit the convenience of Roman 
commissioners. As in other parts of Greece, men of the baser 
sort were beginning to form a party abjectly subservient to Rome. 
The chief source of trouble arose from the inclusion of unwilling 
members in the League. The friction with Sparta continued, 
and Roman commissions only fomented the evil. Messene se- 
ceded in 183, and in the war that followed old Philopoemen 
was taken prisoner and put to death. It was a bad time for 
Achaean patriots. In Crete too Rome intervened as umpire, 
with the same result of leaving that distracted island more dis- 
united than ever. In this same year Hannibal was at last hunted 
down. He had taken refuge with the meanest of kings, Prusias 
of Bithynia. A Roman embassy with a military escort came to 
demand his extradition, and he took poison to avoid capture. 
All these proceedings must have served to enlighten the Greek 
and half-Greek world as to the meaning of Friendship and Free- 
dom when enjoyed under the overlordship of Rome. 

216. Philip had sought to stave off Roman hostility by 
sending his favourite son Demetrius to plead his cause at Rome. 
We hear that the Senate deferred a final decision, and that 
leading nobles tried, by paying great attention to the young 
prince, to estrange him from his father. Meanwhile another 
son, Perseus, was busy at Pella, undermining the influence of 



i8o Perseus [ck. 

his brother. Perseus hoped to succeed to the throne, posing 
as champion of a national interest against Demetrius favoured 
by Rome. We have no reason to doubt that he was an un- 
scrupulous villain, ambitious, but weak and nerveless in character. 
Philip in his latter days was arbitrary and cruel. Perseus found 
agents at court, and his spies watched Demetrius. The old king 
was led to suspect his favourite son of designs upon his father's 
life. A forged letter from Rome was taken as proof of guilt, and 
Demetrius was put to death in i8i. In 179 Philip learnt that 
he had been foully tricked, but before he could exclude Perseus 
from the succession he died. Perseus now hoped to revive and 
extend the power of Macedon. The first step necessary was to 
get rid of Roman control. With this view he took great pains 
to improve the Macedonian army and to heap up vast stores of 
money. While he sought and procured recognition as king and 
Friend of Rome, it seems that he tried to induce some northern 
barbarians to invade Italy. Nothing came of this, but the Senate 
heard of the design. He surrounded himself at home with a 
gang of men wholly dependent on his favour, and looked abroad 
for allies. By dynastic marriages he connected himself with 
Prusias of Bithynia and Seleucus IV now king of Syria. He 
exchanged civilities with the Rhodian republic. All these moves 
were viewed uneasily by the Senate, particularly the last. 

217. The cities of Lycia, handed over to Rhodes in 189, 
were united in a federal League. They rose against the Rhodians, 
who for the time put down the rebellion. They appealed to 
Rome, and the Senate now held that according to the terms 
of the award the Lycians were friends and allies of Rhodes, 
not subjects. This seems to have been in 177. The Rhodian 
government was too cautious to resent this malign treatment 
openly, but henceforth their relations with Rome were less warm 
and certain ; there was now a party in Rhodes incHned to look 
more kindly on the approaches of Perseus. Perseus went on 
with his intrigues, and grew bolder. In 174 he visited northern 
Greece, winning favour in various quarters. He knew that 
Roman interventions had brought little happiness to the Greek 
states. In particular, he tried to renew friendly relations, long 
broken off, with the Achaean League. The partisans of Rome 
with difficulty prevented this, and the plausible king had sown 
the seeds of dissension in the League. It was a time of un- 



xv] The coming struggle i8i 

easiness. There was trouble in Aetolia, in Crete, in Lycia ; and 
Rome, engaged in wearisome western wars and afflicted with 
plague in the city, was in no mood for another Macedonian 
war. The Senate sent commissioners to keep things quiet, but 
the Greeks remained restless. In 173 the report of envoys was 
alarming. Disorders were spreading, Perseus meant war, and 
was fast gaining popularity in Greece. Temporary quiet was 
restored, but the situation was now serious, and Roman em- 
bassies were sent to watch Roman interests at Pella Alexandria 
and Antioch. In Egypt the old friendship was to be renewed 
with the young Ptolemy (VI or VII) Philometor, who had come 
to the throne in 181. In Syria Antiochus IV Epiphanes had 
succeeded his brother Seleucus in 175. He had in his youth 
lived at Rome for some time as a hostage for his father An- 
tiochus III, and had become an admirer of Roman institutions. 
He was now a crazy autocrat, with a mania for reproducing in 
Antioch the elections, law-courts, even gladiatorial shows, that 
he had seen in Rome. Of course the result was a silly 
travesty. But this madman was destined to make trouble in 
the East. 

218. The Greek East saw that a conflict was inevitable. 
The growing influence of Perseus, and the dallying policy of 
Rome, alarmed Roman partisans. If things followed their present 
course, and Perseus superseded Rome as master of Greece, with 
backers in Asia also, what was the prospect of Rome's allies? 
Embassies flocked to Rome to get light on the situation. Eumenes 
came in person. But the Senate, aware that it would take some 
time to place an army in the field, still refrained from shewing 
its warlike intentions. It was Perseus who made the first move, 
by sending men to assassinate Eumenes on his way home. 
Eumenes was stunned and left for dead, but recovered. The 
report of this outrage was followed by further evidence of the 
murderous plots of Perseus. It appeared that he had tried to 
arrange a regular scheme for poisoning Roman representatives 
on their way to and from Greece. Thus in 1 7 2 the Senate could 
delay no longer. They declared the king of Macedon a public 
enemy and began openly to prepare for war. A commission was 
sent to ascertain the temper of some of Rome's eastern friends. 
On their return they reported that there was general loyalty, in 
spite of the wide-spread intrigues of Perseus : of Rhodes they 



1 82 Preparations [ch. 

spoke with less confidence. But, as the Romans had feared 
Antiochus overmuch, so now they underrated the power of 
Perseus. That one of the consuls for 171 would be equal to 
the task in hand seems to have been assumed. Military and 
naval preparations were made, and religious observances ordered. 
A force was sent over the Adriatic in advance, and corn bought 
abroad. But the most important measures were those directed 
to lessen the strain on Roman resources in the West until Rome 
had settled accounts with Macedon. Spain was just now fairly 
quiet, but Sardinia Corsica and Sicily had to be firmly held. 
Complaints from Carthage as to the aggressions of Masinissa 
had to be shelved, for the help of that king was badly needed. 
The chief saving was effected in the North, where Ligurian wars 
were now chronic. Rome refrained from conquest for a while, 
and the hillmen enjoyed a rest. 

2ig. The total of Roman and Italian troops sent to the 
front is not certain. Great attention was paid to quality. Two 
choice legions were the backbone of the army. Seasoned soldiers, 
Romans and Allies, were drawn from the army in Liguria. Veteran 
centurions were procured, and the military tribunes were to be 
nominated by the consul in command, not elected by the As- 
sembly. The fleet had fighting crews of citizens (freedmen) and 
Allies. Of foreign kings, Rome could rely on Eumenes and 
Masinissa. Antiochus and Ptolemy were preparing to fight for 
possession of the district known as Hollow Syria, and could 
send only their promises. Perseus seems to have had in all about 
43,000 men, of whom some 21,000 were Macedonian phalangites. 
The rest were mercenaries, Gauls, Thracians, with Cretans and 
other Greeks, and the whole formed a well-equipped and efficient 
army. Cotys, a Thracian chief, was on his side, but some Thracian 
tribes favoured Rome. Prusias of Bithynia and Gentius of Illyria 
were at present neutral, but Perseus had hopes of the latter. Of 
the Greek states in general we hear that the poorer citizens mostly 
favoured Perseus, for Roman policy always was to give power to 
the rich. But the wealthier citizens were not all of one mind. 
Some leant to Rome, some to Macedon, as their private interests 
led them. Some patriotic statesmen hoped that neither power 
would crush the other, and so room be left for more free action 
than the Greek states now enjoyed. This is the analysis of the 
Achaean Polybius. We may add that all these smaller powers 



xv] Mismanaged War 183 

were agreed in wishing to be on the winning side, for fear of losing 
what freedom they still had. 

220. War was formally declared, and an embassy from the 
nervous Perseus ordered out of Italy. A Roman commission 
visited the Greek states, calling on them as Friends to get ready 
contingents and declare for Rome. It is to be noted that the 
Achaeans, though offended at recent treatment, were consistently 
and actively loyal to Rome all through the war. Meanwhile 
Perseus was quite ready, the Romans at first not. The king made 
yet another attempt to negotiate through Q. Marcius Philippus, 
the chief Roman commissioner. He met his match. Marcius 
allowed him to send another embassy to Rome, thus gaining time, 
which the Romans wanted. The Rhodians, called upon to sup- 
port Rome, provided a fine naval contingent, and for the present, 
though desiring peace, refused to stand neutral as Perseus asked 
them to do. The war opened feebly on the part of Rome. The 
consul in command, P. Licinius Crassus, was no skilled soldier, 
and competent advisers were sent to guide him. Perseus ad- 
vanced and easily occupied most of northern Thessaly, but, instead 
of pressing on, he then formed a camp and waited to be attacked. 
Crassus did much the same, and his inactivity revived the king's 
courage. In some minor engagements the Romans had the worst 
of it, and the men were losing heart. Things looked badly : the 
Greek contingents were below their expected strength, and, though 
a few Boeotian towns declared for Perseus and were cruelly 
punished, this was not enough to restore confidence. The suc- 
cess of the king was popular in Greece, but for the present the 
fear of the Romans prevented any open rising in his favour. On 
the one hand the arrival of the Numidian contingent shewed the 
wide extent of Roman power. On the other hand a revolution in 
Epirus, provoked by Roman partisans, added the Epirotes to the 
forces of Perseus. It was the king himself who best helped the 
cause of Rome. Evidently he did not understand that the Senate 
were in earnest, and that he had no choice but either to lose his 
kingdom or to fight and win without delay. He made offer of peace 
on the terms granted to his father in 196. The Roman answer was 
a demand for an unconditional surrender. Even so he went on 
bargaining to no purpose, till the moral effect of his successes was 
fooled away. After one or two indecisive combats the war ended 
for the season, leaving the Romans worse off than when it began. 



184 Inefficiency [ch. 

221.' Matters were not mended in the campaign of 170. The 
consul A. Hostilius Mancinus seems to have done something to 
improve the tone of the demoralized army. But he gained no 
ground, and Perseus was able to chastise the Dardani and to 
invade Illyria and Epirus, while the Romans could not enter 
Macedonia. And the impotence of the Roman government was 
to blame for most of these failures. The Senate, loth to employ 
none but competent commanders, for fear of raising up a new 
Africanus, was not able to control bad ones. Barbarity accom- 
panied inefificiency as before. The fleet, engaged in no serious 
naval war, was even a greater terror than the army to loyal or 
peaceful people. The cruel treatment of Coronea in 171 was 
followed by the destruction of Abdera and outrages at Chalcis. 
Redress of these misdeeds was a farce, and the punishment of 
guilty officers generally eluded. For the moment the fear of 
Roman severities kept the Greeks quiet, and drew humble em- 
bassies to Rome. Failures had not made the Senate less domi- 
neering in foreign policy : the Cretans were warned that their 
friendly relations with Rome were in danger. To send a corps 
of bowmen to the Roman army was not enough : they must recall 
those sent to Perseus, or take the consequences. This was not 
a Greek (least of all a Cretan) view. It was an object with both 
sides to gain the support of Gentius the Illyrian chief. His 
warlike people would be a great help to whoever could win their 
support and find money to keep them in the field. He defeated 
a Roman expeditionary force. In the winter of 170 — 169 Perseus 
approached Gentius, but would not give him a subsidy, so for the 
present no bargain was struck. The operations of 170 were un- 
important, but the Senate had cause for uneasiness both at home 
and in Greece. A commission sent to report on the state of things 
at the front brought back alarming news of the army. Its weak- 
ness was lamentable, the allies of Rome were losing heart, and 
Perseus gaining ground. To raise troops for the next campaign 
was not easy. Only after some pressure on feeble magistrates 
was compulsion firmly applied and the levy completed. The 
censors for 169, both strong men, had to begin work by using 
their authority to enforce enrolment and even to send absentees 
on furlough back to Greece. The Senate strove to check the 
harm done to the Roman cause by the exactions of Roman officers. 
They instructed the Greek allies to supply nothing without an 



Plate IV 




9. Coin of Perseus of Macedon (179 — 168 B.C.). 

obv. Head of Perseus. Below, name of mint-officer. 
rev. Eagle on thunderbolt. BASIAE12S IIEPSEOS. 
See §§ 216 — 226. 




Coin of tlie second of the 4 Macedonian republics 167 — 146. 
Struck after the grant of the right to coin in silver, 158 B.C. 
obv. Head of Artemis in a Macedonian shield. 
rev. Club in oak-wreath. MAKEA0Ni2N AETTEPAS. 
See §§ 228, 243. 




Coin struck by Faustus Sulla about 62 B.C. 
obv. Head of Diana, liUius. FAVSTVS. 
rev. Sulla (L., the Dictator) seated, receiving Jugurtha from 
Bocchus, who holds olive-branch. FELIX. 
See § 366. 



xv] Q. Marcius Philippus 185 

order of the House. This step was well received, but the state 
of quarrelling and disorder in many parts of Greece shewed that 
there was good ground for anxiety. 

222. The consul commanding in 169 was the same Marcius 
who had been too wily for Perseus two years before. He was a 
crafty diplomatist : in a former military command he had failed. 
But he boldly advanced into Macedonia. It is true he found 
himself in an awkward fix, unable to move without exposing his 
army to attack in both front and rear. But the nerve of Perseus 
again gave way. He withdrew the detachments that commanded 
the consul's line of retreat, and fell back, thus reUeving the distress 
of the Romans. In his panic he sent orders to have his treasure 
sunk in the sea. When Marcius retired after a futile advance, the 
king recovered his treasure and tried to hide the fact of his fright. 
He once more fortified a strong position and waited to be attacked. 
While this season was passing, still without any decisive result, 
many things were happening, of which we have no satisfactory 
accounts. Antiochus (IV) of Syria had defeat-d Ptolemy's army. 
He invaded Egypt, and the disorder of Egypt interrupted trade. 
The Rhodians, who were the chief sufferers, sent to Rome for 
leave to buy corn in Sicily, which was granted. They protested 
that doubts lately thrown on their loyalty were groundless, and 
this protest was conveyed by other envoys to the consul Marcius 
also. Now Marcius (if Polybius is to be trusted) had lately been 
deaUng with the Achaean s in a very strange manner, discouraging 
them from giving much-needed aid to the Roman force in Epirus. 
Perhaps he mistrusted them ; at any rate Eumenes was trying to 
improve his own connexion with the League, and Eumenes was 
already under some suspicion. It may be that there was reason 
for Roman uneasiness just now; for the mismanagement of the 
war might well shake the faith of allies whose first interest was 
their own safety. Marcius now suggested to the Rhodian envoys 
that Rhodes, a power ever desirous of peace, might come forward 
with proposals for ending the war. Whether this suggestion was a 
base trick to lure the Rhodians into a false move, or was prompted 
by genuine alarm at the growing complications in Egypt, we cannot 
tell. What came of it we shall see below. 

223. It was manifestly high time for a complete change, if 
the position of Rome beyond the Adriatic was to be retained. In 
the Rome of this period it was an unusual step to put a man for- 



1 86 Paullus. Gentius. Eumenes [ch. 

ward for the consulship merely on the ground of his fitness for the 
work in hand. But it had to be done. A good soldier was now 
needed, one who would be master in his own camp, who would 
be incorruptible himself and put an end to corruption and out- 
rages. The choice fell on L. Aemilius Paullus, a noble of old 
Patrician family, son of the consul killed at Cannae, a man of 
60 years. He was noted for his scrupulous attention to matters 
of religion and civic duty. He may be called the representative 
man of this age, in which Old and New were meeting and often 
conflicting. In him old Roman traditions and temper were 
smoothed and molUfied by Greek influences, which do not seem 
to have weakened his character as they did in the case of some 
others. By his first wife he had two sons, to whom he gave the 
best education to be had, partly through Greek teachers. One 
of them was adopted by a Fabius, the other by a Scipio, sons of 
the two heroes of the Hannibalic war : the latter became famous 
afterwards as Scipio Aemilianus. Paullus had been consul in 182 
and had seen a good deal of service. But he had no record of 
great victories. It seems certain that a general trust in his moral 
qualities was the reason why men pressed him to undertake a task 
in which three ordinary nobles had failed. 

224. The winter of 169 — 168 was eventful. While Paullus 
was busy raising troops, he ascertained by inquiry the miserable 
state of things at the front. A complete reorganization was neces- 
sary, both in Macedonia and lUyria. But it was carried out, and 
a praetor, L. Anicius, selected for lUyria. Perseus had at last 
drawn Gentius into the war, at the same time cheating him out 
of nearly all the promised money. But Gentius had now to be 
conquered without delay. Still more alarming was the report 
(recorded and believed by Polybius) that Eumenes also was 
negotiating with Perseus, and willing to abandon the Romans 
for a price. It was said that the transaction only miscarried 
because Eumenes insisted on ready money, while Perseus wanted 
to swindle him as he had swindled Gentius. Moreover the Mace- 
donian fleet, handled no doubt by Greeks, profited by the break- 
down of the Roman naval service. It commanded the Aegean, 
and spared only the merchantmen of Rhodes. The Roman 
partisans in that republic could no longer control the popular 
movement called forth by an embassy from Perseus and Gentius. 
Rhodian envoys were sent to Rome and to the consul in com- 



xv] Pydna. Popilius 187 

mand, charged to insist on the ending of the war, and military 
preparations were begun in order to give effect to intervention. 
When we add that Antiochus was now besieging Alexandria, and 
that a Roman embassy, sent to warn him ofif and save the king- 
dom of the Ptolemies, was at present unable to get further than 
Delos, where the sanctity of the island protected them; and 
further, that Perseus had been in communication with Antiochus ; 
it is clear that Rome had now to face a situation more compli- 
cated and perilous than ever. 

225. But Rome was now in earnest, and had taken the 
proper means to achieve her end. In a month's time Gentius 
was a captive, and firmness combined with lenity put an end to 
the war in Illyria. In Macedonia Paullus speedily brought his 
army to full efficiency, aided by his well-selected staff. He turned 
the king's position and drove him back on Pydna, where he 
defeated him with great slaughter. After all the heaping-up of 
resources, the formation of armies, the subtle diplomacy, the 
doubts and dreams of wavering powers, one hearty stroke brought 
down the whole fabric. The sudden end of a weary drama left 
Rome beyond all doubt supreme, and the revelation of what 
had all along been the truth caused the changed situation to be 
accepted at once. 

226. We need not dwell on the prompt submission of 
Macedonia, or on the flight of Perseus, losing his cherished 
money as he went by the pilfering or swindling of his associates. 
In the island of Samothrace he was blockaded by the Roman 
fleet and forced to surrender. At Rome the Rhodian envoys 
offered congratulations and suppressed their original message. 
But their errand was known, and they were sent back without 
an answer. Rhodes was in terror. The Roman ambassadors, 
now released from Delos, were entreated to hear their defence. 
C. Popilius, head of the embassy, bullied them into a frenzy of 
fear and went on to Egypt, while the unhappy Rhodians sentenced 
Macedonian partisans to death. The story of Popilius in Egypt 
is famous. The Roman handed the king the written order of 
the Senate. Antiochus asked for time to consider it. Popilius 
with his stick drew a circle on the ground and required the king 
to answer Yes or No before he left the circle. Antiochus sub- 
mitted, and was then recognized as being still a Friend of Rome. 
The envoys next ordered a Syrian force out of Cyprus and re- 



i88 



The great Settlement 



[CH. 



united the island to Egypt. Antiochus on his way home vented 
his rage on the Jews, and provoked the famous revolt headed by 
the Maccabees. 

227. The Senate had now to dictate terms to a large part 
of the civilized world, and to appoint commissioners for settlement 
of details. It is well to consider some of the motives that guided 
their policy. First, they wished to secure a lasting peace, that the 



Dyrrachiunjj 
BriJmausium 



1 



Corc^ra 




Cephallenia 

Zacynthus w^ 



?? 



Sketch map of Balkan peninsula about 170 B.C. Roman dominions in black. 
Aetolia a dependent ally of Rome since 189. Greece in 'free' Leagues, 
the Achaean now including the whole Peloponnesus. The 'free Laconian ' 
district dotted. The divisions of Macedonia 167 — 148 B.C. roughly in- 
dicated by dotted lines. 

armies abroad and the reserve forces at home might be disbanded 
without delay. The conquest of Liguria was enough to have on 
hand. Secondly, they meant to teach the Greek East such a lesson 
that it should give no trouble in future. There was to be no more 
trusting to the loyalty of Friends and allies. Doubtful friends or 
conquered foes, all must be paralysed. The guilty would of course 
be punished ; the suspected must not go scot-free for mere defect 
of convincing proof. On the other hand the Senate was still 
resolved to annex no provinces. The ruling nobles, jealous of 



XV] of 167 B.C. 189 

equality among themselves, knew that the governors of civilized 
lands, many of them rich fields for plunder, would be beyond 
control. At home they would rise above their peers, abroad they 
were only too likely to provoke fresh wars. The old-Roman party 
dreaded the influence of the East on Roman character. And the 
abuses that might arise out of the exploitation of mines and other 
resources by companies of Roman capitalists were, it is said, already 
foreseen. Let us now review briefly the chief points of the great 
settlement of 167. 

228. '■Freedom.^ The conquered peoples were to be 'free.' 
That is, they were to have no kings, no central authorities to 
which they might rally and become powerful. In Macedon this 
meant that the one bond of union known to the people, the 
monarchy under which they had become a nation, was taken 
away. The country was to be cut up into districts (three in 
Illyria, four in Macedonia), each with a centre and constitution 
of its own. Each was a self-governing unit, isolated on an old 
Roman plan. Its members could contract legal marriages and 
hold property only within their own district. These new republics 
were an utterly strange system to the peoples of that part of the 
world. And all the men who had any experience of administra- 
tion were ordered to depart for Italy and await the pleasure of 
the Roman government. Thus the inexperienced mass were left 
helpless, deprived of their natural leaders. They were to pay to 
Rome a tribute, half the amount hitherto paid to their kings. 
This reduced taxation seems meant to reconcile the conquered 
to the new system. But the commercial restrictions, such as 
prohibition of the export of Macedonian timber and the import 
of salt, tended to check the growth of trade, and the closing of 
gold and silver mines stopped another industry for the present. 
The people in general were disarmed, but the dwellers in border 
districts were allowed the means of defence against barbarian 
neighbours. It may be that the parcelling-out of a large country 
mattered little in rude Illyria : in Macedonia it was the cutting-up 
of a nation. We must note that Rome, implicitly if not expressly, 
reserved to herself the sovran power over the whole area. She 
was the only possible umpire in any dispute : her leave was needed 
for everything. She declined to be responsible for the admini- 
stration, but the appointment of Roman governors would at any 
time convert the conquered countries into provinces. 



190 Pergamum and Rhodes [ch. 

229. ^Friendship.'' Whatever were the truth as to the sus- 
pected intrigues of Eumenes, the Senate meant to teach him that 
he ruled by Roman leave and must obey orders. An invasion of 
Galatians was probably not undertaken without Roman connivance. 
When he sent Attalus to complain of it, Attalus was privately 
prompted to ask for a part of his brother's kingdom. A message 
from Eumenes caused him to decline this insidious proposal. So 
the Attalid house was not weakened by a dynastic quarrel. It is 
said that leading senators, who had looked for bribes to favour 
his claim, were disgusted at the failure of this dirty intrigue, and 
sent a hint to the Galatians that they might worry Pergamum. 

230. The harsh treatment of Rhodes is remarkable, when 
contrasted with the comparative leniency shewn to Eumenes. 
Perhaps the republic, unable to act with regal secrecy, was thought 
to have offered a more flagrant insult to the majesty of Rome. 
But the fact of Rhodes being primarily a naval power was surely 
one reason for Roman severity. Rome kept no regular fleet in 
commission. Her policy was to annex islands in the seas round 
Italy, and to trust to maritime Greeks for the speedy provision 
of a fleet when needed. Above all she relied on Rhodes to 
hold in check all attempts to create a hostile sea-power in eastern 
waters. Roman confidence was now shaken ; it was even pro- 
posed to declare war against the Rhodians. Cato and others 
managed to prevent this, but the Rhodians were terribly frightened. 
In the settlement, they were deprived of the Lycian and Carian 
territories granted them in 189, thereby losing a considerable 
revenue. Their commerce was injured by the establishment of 
Delos as a free port, to which most of the Aegean trade was 
soon attracted. Even in their old province on the mainland 
there was a rebellion, the suppression of which was a further 
drain on their resources. They learnt that the days of simple 
Friendship with Rome were over, and applied for a treaty. Thus 
they became allies of Rome. They lost all power of independent 
action. This could not be helped ; at least they had a clearly 
defined position stated in official terms. 

231. In Greece the malignant policy of promoting disunion 
and impotence was pursued more thoroughly than ever. In most 
of the states vile men came to the front as Roman partisans, and 
murders of anti-Roman or patriotic leaders were the order of the 
day. Aetolia in particular was a scene of massacres and banish- 



xv] Greece. Rome Supreme 191 

ments. A black-list of the chief men in the northern Greek states 
was published by the Roman commission : they were to go and 
stand their trial in Rome. The steady loyalty of the Achaean 
League did not protect it. Infamous traitors accused the best 
patriots of disloyalty, and 1000 men, the very pick of their citi- 
zens, were deported to Italy. Thus Greek public life was robbed 
of all its soundest and most competent elements. Epirus was 
for the moment the scene of the worst atrocities. Its chief men 
had been removed or murdered. Finally, by an act of cruel 
treachery, the defenceless country was swept by the Roman army. 
It is said that 150,000 people were carried off into slavery. The 
kindly Paullus, deservedly popular in Greece, had to preside over 
the commission and to carry out these abominations ; but he was 
not the man to question the orders of the Senate. 

232. The old-fashioned scruples of Paullus caused him to 
keep for the Roman treasury the rich war-booty that properly 
belonged to it. For himself he took only the royal library of 
Macedon, as a prize for his grown-up sons. In his army he 
had maintained discipline, and the largess given to the soldiers 
at his triumph was on a moderate scale. We hear that the men 
were sulky at the poor returns from the sale of captives, and 
grumbled at the stingy dole. The triumph itself was splendid 
beyond precedent. But it was the state-finances that profited. 
The old war-tax or forced loan {tributum\ formerly one of the 
regular burdens of citizenship, ceased to be levied. It was indeed 
a turning-point in Roman history. The Roman soldier-citizen 
was developing into a greedy mercenary, and an honest com- 
mander like Paullus, thinking only of his duty, was already 
exceptional. And the position of Rome was now one of un- 
challenged supremacy. The virtues of her people and govern- 
ment had been a wondrous growth, stimulated by the actual or 
probable competition of rivals. Now there was no rival power, 
nor the smallest likelihood of one to come. The hand of Rome 
was everywhere, and no fugitive enemy could find a safe refuge 
from her vengeance. Nor could her prisoners in Italy escape. 
The custody of Perseus and Gentius, and also of the suspected 
Greeks, was provided for by placing them out in towns of the 
Italian Allies. No doubt this was a great nuisance and respon- 
sibility laid on the local authorities, but it was a saving of trouble 
to the Roman government. We may see in it an additional proof 



192 The deported Greeks [ch. xv 

of the tendency to treat the AlUes as subjects, ever since the 
second Punic war. And the unhappy Greeks were left to pine 
away in confinement. The Senate would not bring them to trial. 
One by one they died off: what became of the survivors we shall 
see below. Very few had the good luck of the Achaean Polybius, 
who found favour with some cultivated Romans and lived in some 
of the best society in Rome. 

These struggles in which Rome became the paramount power 
in the East were affairs of little fighting and much diplomacy. 
Let us turn to the striking contrast presented by her doings in 
the West. 



CHAPTER XVI 

WARS AND POLICY IN THE WEST, 193—167 B.C. 

233. Spatn^. Our knowledge of Spanish afifairs in this 
period is very fragmentary. We read of obscure wars to put 
down native risings, generally provoked by Roman misdeeds, of 
insincere submissions and renewed rebellions. The Roman forces 
in Spain, mostly Allies, were in a chronic state of discontent. It 
was not only the soldiers that disliked the Spanish service, with 
its hardships and dangers, and small prospec" of rich booty to 
compensate them (in case they survived it) for their long exile 
from Italy. Praetors also shirked the Spanish provinces. In 176 
both the praetors to whom the lot assigned these departments 
contrived to evade the duty. Yet the occasional employment 
of native levies to cooperate with Roman armies suggests that 
better management might have made things work more smoothly. 
In the years 171 — 168, when Rome was busy with Perseus, a single 
praetor was left in charge of both provinces. The previous wars 
had been due to the irritating policy of the Roman governors, 
and this had to cease for a time. The chief war of this period 
was that of 181-^180, when a great rising of the Celtiberians in 
central Spain was suppressed. Roman policy appeared at its best 
in Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who ruled the Hither Spain in 
180 and 179. By kindly and fair treatment he gained the con- 
fidence of the natives and led them to more settled and peaceful 
ways of life. After his return to Rome he watched over their 
interests, and the land had rest for some 25 years. Oppression 
did not wholly cease. In 171 a deputation came from the Spanish 
provinces to complain of recent extortions. Two or three ex- 
governors were brought to trial in the form of civil actions for 

■^ This chapter resumes the narrative from §§ 203, iiS. 
H. 13 



194 Spain. Sardinia [ch. 

recovery of sums wrung by them from the provincials. Senators 
of the old-Roman party, among them Cato and Paullus, conducted 
the several cases on behalf of the Spaniards. Two of the culprits 
went into exile to avoid judgment ; but this merely meant a change 
of residence (probably not permanent) to Latin towns hard by. 
No effective redress was gained. But the Macedonian war was 
on foot, and the Senate did what it could to gratify the Spaniards 
by passing strict orders forbidding certain practices of governors. 
These abuses were connected with the collection of tribute, par- 
ticularly with the valuation of corn. But to get good regulations 
carried out was the really difficult matter, and so it remained. 
And yet it had been wise to resent oppression. The worst abuses 
of provincial government were never established in Spain. Another 
Spanish question was that of the half-breeds, children of Italians 
and Spanish mothers. A number of these were granted a town^ 
on the southern coast, where they formed with the present in- 
habitants a peculiar colony, linked to Rome on special terms. 
It seems that the amalgamation of races and Romanizing of the 
peninsula, which took place much later, might have made great 
strides now. But Roman misgovernment was destined to do 
much more mischief yet in Spain, as we shall see. 

234. Sardinia and Corsica. These islands, necessary to 
Rome as lying near Italy on the way to Spain, had been annexed 
when Carthage was helpless after the first Punic war. But after 
half a century they had still never been really conquered. The 
combined province was ruled by a succession of yearly praetors, 
who often had to fight the natives of the interior. Of the final 
result there could be no doubt, but the reluctance to act boldly 
and firmly led the Romans here as elsewhere into wasteful wars, 
in which much blood was shed needlessly. In 177 Sardinia was 
taken in hand. Gracchus was sent there as consul, and kept on 
as proconsul in 176. He quelled all resistance. The slave-market 
was glutted with his captives, so that ' Sards for sale ' became a 
phrase for anything dirt-cheap. But there was an end of general 
risings, and the conquest of Corsica in 173 left the province 
normally a quiet one; that is, unable to give Rome serious trouble 
or escape the extortions of bad governors. When a spare praetor 
was wanted for some special purpose it was usual to employ the 
man to whom the Sardinian province had fallen. 

^ Carteia. 



xvi] Liguria 195 

235. Liguria. The broken hill-country, cut up by ravines, 
formed by the northwestern Apennine and the southwestern Alps, 
was inhabited by the people known as Ligures. In early times 
they had probably covered a much wider area, and had been 
driven back into the hills by other races. Even now they still held 
the highlands that looked down upon the Arno and the Rhone. 
The Romans in Etruria and the Massaliots in their seaboard 
territories found the Ligurian highlanders troublesome neighbours. 
It was the occupation of the rich lowlands of Cisalpine Gaul that 
shewed the Romans the necessity of conquering Liguria. Until 
this was done there could be no security in the region of the Po. 
It was a case of deliberate conquest, carried on intermittently and 
piecemeal. There was no central power in Liguria, and the sub- 
mission of one tribe did little or nothing to effect the subjugation 
of the rest. So the warfare begun in 193 dragged on for about 
forty years with varying fortune and vast expenditure of human 
lives. The Ligurians were attacked from several quarters, mainly 
from the North, for most of the country slopes that way, and the 
streams are affluents of the Po. From 193 to 173 the war was 
practically continuous. It was the ' province ' of a consul, often 
of both consuls, ordinary Roman yearly magistrates. Some won, 
or claimed to have won, victories, and had triumphs, so cheaply 
earned that Ligurian triumphs became a byword. The defeats 
of others were not disasters of supreme importance : the assertion 
of Roman power was delayed, but Roman dominion in Italy was 
unshaken. And consuls were kept employed in an undertaking 
where there was no prospect of great glory, nothing likely to raise 
a man far above his fellow nobles. 

236. The systematic nature of the Roman advance is shewn 
in the foundation of fortress-colonies. Of those in Cisalpine Gaul 
we will speak below. In northern Etruria we find a Latin colony, 
Luca (Lucca), planted inland in 180, and in 177 a citizen colony, 
Luna, near the partus Veneris (Bay of Spezia). On the Ligurian 
coast the Romans held the port of Genua (Genoa), and the 
operations on this side included the suppression of the local 
piracy, at times troublesome even after the Roman annexation 
of Sardinia and Corsica. But descents on that coast were not 
easy, nor always successful. The stubborn resistance of the 
Ligurians at last caused the Romans to try a new policy. This 
was the transplantation of large bodies of natives to places far 

13—2 



196 Cisalpine Gaul [ch. 

from their home. After a period of great efforts, 40,000 of them 
were taken away (180) and settled in Samnium, where there were 
some vacant state-lands, and 7000 more soon after. Other bodies 
were removed to lands in Cisalpine Gaul about this time. Thus 
the highland population was somewhat thinned out, while the 
settlers in new homes were not likely to be too friendly with their 
neighbours to the embarrassment of Rome. But the Ligurians 
were not subdued yet. The warfare became more ferocious, and 
in 177 a Roman fortress was taken. In 173, just when the Senate 
wanted to have quiet for a time until they had dealt with Perseus, 
a consul provoked the Ligurians by selling into slavery men who 
had surrendered. The Senate tried hard to cancel the transaction 
and make the fullest redress for this barbarous act and others of 
the same kind. But in spite of all their efforts it does not appear 
that the Ligurians were effectively compensated or the offender 
punished. Mutual exasperation was the characteristic feature of 
these wretched wars, and it was only because it suited Roman 
convenience that the years 171 — 168 were an interval of com- 
parative peace. 

237. Cisalpine Gaul. Of the forward movements of Rome 
in this period the most judicious and well-managed was that by 
which she secured the region of the Po and advanced her northern 
frontier to the Alps. We must bear in mind from the first that 
the country known as Cisalpine Gaul did not become a Province, 
with a charter and a governor, for about a century more. It did 
not become technically a part of Italy till after the fall of the 
Roman Republic. But it was virtually attached to Italy, and 
great pains were taken to Romanize the inhabitants. Colonies 
and roads helped to introduce Roman civilization as well as to 
facilitate the movement of Roman armies. In short, we are 
entering on a time in which careful policy, rather than great 
battles, is the chief feature. The Gauls had learnt the power of 
Rome : Rome had learnt the value of the Gauls, and meant to 
control them. 

238. The grouping of population between Alps and Apennine 
was roughly as follows. North- West, in the district about Medio- 
lanum (Milan) dwelt the Insubres, the most independent of the 
Gaulish tribes. Under the middle Alps, about Verona and Brixia 
(Brescia) were the Cenomani, who had long been on friendly 
j-erms with Rome. South of the Po, in the district about Bononia 



xvi] The North-East frontier 197 

(Bologna) were the Boii. These were in the direct line of the 
Roman advance, lying between the frontier-post at Ariminum 
(Rimini) and the colonies of Placentia and Cremona, founded 
in 218. The Boii had already suffered much in wars. In 192 
we hear that they submitted to Rome, on terms which suggest 
that the wealthier tribesmen were as usual favoured and thus 
a Roman party formed among them. The confiscation of half 
their territory provided room for Roman colonies. The Veneti 
in the Po-delta and northeastern lowlands were old friends or 
allies of Rome. They had been very useful in former times, 
and seem to have been ready to fall into the Roman system. 

239. It was clear that the success of a forward movement 
would add a vast area of rich country to the dominions of Rome. 
The undertaking made it necessary to provide for the security 
of the country on two sides where it lay open to attack. The 
Ligurians were troublesome as raiders ; when they sent aid to 
rebellious Gauls, they were a danger. Hence the Ligurian wars 
referred to above. On the North-East there was manifest need 
of a more defensible frontier, if Rome intended to protect the 
low country of the Veneti. Already the northern barbarians 
(Gauls, it is said,) were finding their way over the passes of the 
Carnic Alps. We hear of two parties who came, in 186 and 179, 
professing a desire to settle peaceably at the head of the Adriatic. 
This might be the beginning of a great migration, and could not 
be allowed. The intruders were sent back with no more show of 
force than was necessary. Rome had had quite enough of Trans- 
alpine Gauls in Italy, and it had been rumoured that Philip of 
Macedon designed to promote a barbarian invasion by this route. 
It was therefore a precautionary measure when the peninsula of 
Istria (or Histria) was conquered in 183 — 181, Roman supremacy 
was established there, and the control of the harbours was con- 
venient for checking the pirates of Illyria. 

240. We must now sketch the course of occupation by which 
the Romans took possession of Cisalpine Gaul. In 190 fresh 
colonists were sent to reinforce Placentia and Cremona. In 189 
a Latin colony was founded at Bononia. In 187 two important 
roads were undertaken. One was carried over the Apennine from 
Arretium in Etruria to Bononia. The other, the famous via 
Aemilia, ran parallel with the range, along the low ground, from 
Ariminum to Placentia, taking Bononia on the way. There were 



198 Extension of roads [ch. 

thus two alternative routes from Rome to Bononia, and a good 
military road beyond, connecting Bononia with the fortress com- 
manding the passage of the great river. In 183 the stretch of 
road from Bononia to Placentia was guarded by the foundation 
of two colonies, Mutina (Modena) and Parma. These mark a 
change in Roman policy. They were citizen colonies, but 
organized on the scale of Latin colonies and designed to fulfil 
the same purpose. Each had 2000 colonists ; each was a new 
fortress, holding an important line of inland communications. 
In 181 an outlying fortress was established at the head of the 
Adriatic, to give Rome a firm foothold in the North-East. This 
was a step connected with the frontier-policy of the Istrian war. 
It was Aquileia, a Latin colony of 3000 men, the last of its kind. 
Since the second Punic war, the increased predominance of Rome 
in Italy had caused Roman citizenship to be valued for the 
privileges that went with it, such as the more favourable conditions 
of military service. This feeling was destined . to grow stronger, 
and to have a great influence on the course of Roman history. 
It seems to have been already strong enough to create some 
difficulty in finding colonists willing to settle in new homes on 
no better terms than the ' Latin right.' But the system of roads 
and colonies was not the only means employed to consolidate 
Roman dominion in the Cisalpine. It seems that a real effort 
was made to conciliate the Gauls by friendly treatment. When 
a praetor in 187 disarmed the Cenomani, the Senate took vigorous 
measures to enforce full redress for the wrong, and for once the 
good intention seems to have been carried out. In 171 a self- 
willed consul set out on an unauthorized expedition into Illyria, 
hoping to win glory in the Macedonian war. Recalled by strict 
orders, he turned upon some Alpine tribes, wantonly ravaging the 
lands of peaceful neighbours whom it was folly to provoke. Their 
appeal to the Senate was met with civility and presents, but the 
author of the outrage eluded punishment. In these episodes we 
may find traces of Roman policy in the North during the war of 
conquest in Liguria. 

241 . In speaking of the war with Antiochus, reference was made 
to foundation of colonies as one of the means employed to protect 
southern Italy against invasion by sea. It was in the South that 
Hannibal had found support among the Italian Allies, and the 
experience must not be repeated. So in 194 no less than eight 



xvi] and Colonies 199 

points on the southern coasts were occupied by citizen colonies 
of the old sort, in which a garrison of Roman citizens became 
a kind of local aristocracy in an existing town. Of these eight, 
Puteoli alone was a place of commercial importance. In 193 — 192 
two Latin colonies were added, one of them also on the coast. 
We have seen that the invasion feared did not take place. What 
with colonies of earlier date and the Greek Allies, such as Neapolis 
and Rhegium, the southern seaboard was safe enough. If Samnites 
or other Allies inland were still discontented, they could at least 
receive no new deliverer by sea. Rome was determined that 
neither should a new Hannibal come from the North. It 
is to be noted that the defeat of Antiochus (190) was at once 
followed by the foundation of Bononia (189). To keep out all 
foreign intruders, and to have the undisputed control of the 
resources of the Italian Confederacy, were the first objects of 
the Senate, and each helped to secure the other. As in playing 
off Masinissa against Carthage, as in the policy of balancing and 
weakening followed in Greece and the East, the ultimate aim was 
to maintain peace with the least possible trouble and exertion. 
Therefore, within the ever-widening sphere of Roman influence, 
no movement could be permitted unless authorized by Rome. 
Such was the circular argument of imperial policy. Conquest 
for conquest's sake was not the Roman way. But pax Romana 
was not less costly: it led inevitably to hypocrisies, jealousy, mis- 
understandings, frictions, wars ; and it came to much the same 
thing in the end. 



CHAPTER XVII 

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 167—133 B.C. 

242. We are now come to the period immediately preceding 
that revolutionary century (133 — 31) which ended by establishing 
a disguised but effective monarchy. In that age of seditions and 
civil wars the prominent fact is that the Roman Republic, unable 
to cure its internal maladies, rent itself, while the subject world 
passively looked on. It is the present period, in which all the 
remaining powers that might cause any uneasiness to the governing 
class at Rome were suppressed, that explains the strange sequel. 
The weakness of distracted Rome was not the opportunity of the 
subject peoples, because each unit was too weak to stand alone, 
while combined action was impossible. Nor was there any im- 
perial power other than Rome by submitting to which they might 
in despair of liberty at least better their condition. So they 
waited, not in vain. The same internal corruption that cankered 
and destroyed the Roman Republic was also at the bottom of 
provincial extortion and misgovernment ; and when Augustus 
made an end of corrupt public life in Rome, he at once relieved 
the suffering of the provinces. We have now to give a short 
account of the last steps by which the pax Romana was imposed 
on the Mediterranean world, and Romans set free to work their 
will on the subject peoples. 

243. Macedon and Greece. The suppression of the Mace- 
donian monarchy was a great blow to a population mainly rustic, 
whose national unity had been the work of kings and who were 
quite unaccustomed to self-government. The four republics did 
not work well. After some years of discomfort and discontent, 
in 149 a pretender appeared, one Andriscus, who professed to 
be a natural son of Perseus. He soon drew after him a large 



CH. xvii] Macedonia and Greece 201 

following of men who hoped to restore the kingdom and be a 
nation once more. After some success at first, he was defeated 
and captured by the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus. In 146 
the unsatisfactory arrangements were ended by the annexation 
of Macedonia as a Roman Province. Henceforth it was the 
department of a Roman governor, but no unnecessary changes 
were made in the regulations drawn up by Paullus and the 
commission of 167, 

244. In Greece the Achaean League was by far the most 
powerful state remaining. As such, it incurred Roman jealousy. 
We have seen how the chief Achaean patriots were deported to 
Italy, and the Roman partisans were left in power. But patriotism 
was not extinct, and Achaean embassies pleaded for the restora- 
tion, or at least the trial, of the lost leaders. The Senate refused 
this, and addressed its answers not to the League but to the 
several members, thus ignoring the federal union and seeking to 
sow discord in its ranks. And, when Sparta once more began 
to give trouble, an appeal to Roman arbitration was used as an 
opportunity of making further mischief. But the League still 
held together. In 150 the survivors of the exiled 1000, about 
300 in all, were allowed to return, mostly embittered by their 
dreary captivity. Among them was Polybius, who soon felt 
out of place and returned to Rome. Roman malignity at last 
produced a violent reaction in the League. The anti-Roman 
party came into power, and a conflict became inevitable. An 
obscure quarrel in which Athens was concerned set going other 
causes of friction in Greece. In 149 an ambiguous decision from 
Rome left Sparta and the League at war. Rome had just then 
enough to do in Macedonia Africa and Spain. So the party 
ruling the League went on their way, heedless of warnings. 

245. The defeat of the Spartans did not restore harmony 
in the League. By 147 the Macedonian rising was put down, 
and Rome could act freely. A Roman commission arrived, and 
announced the Senate's orders. The rules and constitution of 
the League were disregarded, and certain cities, among them 
Corinth, were no longer to be members of it. At this there 
was a riot, and the Romans withdrew. A second commission 
came with a milder message, which was taken to shew that 
Rome had her hands full in Africa and Spain, and might safely 
be defied. Meanwhile Metellus drew near with his army from 



202 End of Greek freedom [ch, 

the North. He tried hard to preserve peace, and continued to 
do so, even when his envoys were insulted and war declared, 
nominally against Sparta. The frantic leaders of the League 
set to work releasing debtors, liberating slaves, and giving over 
the cities to mob-rule. Their army entered central Greece and 
was joined by some local allies. Metellus now had to act, and 
routed them at Scarphea in Locris. While they were raising 
more troops and reforming their army, Metellus was superseded 
by L. Mummius, under instructions to make an end of the busi- 
ness. This he speedily did. He utterly defeated the Achaean 
force at Leucopetra on the Isthmus. Corinth at once fell. The 
inhabitants were slain or sold for slaves ; the city, plundered of 
its artistic and other treasures, was burnt ; the site, long famed 
as a centre of commerce, was laid under a solemn curse and left 
desolate. 

246. So at last in 146 b.c. the vain pretence of Greek 
freedom came to an end. It was well it did so, for Greek and 
Roman notions of freedom could never have been reconciled, 
and one or other had to go. Ever since Rome became mixed up 
with the affairs of Greece things had been going from bad to 
worse. A true Greek nation had never existed, and the growth 
of great powers had made it impossible for the small to enjoy 
a real independence. Little republics were unable to stand alone, 
and the Greek federations were on too small a scale to solve the 
problem. Roman interference was perhaps well-meaning at first. 
But it was unintelligent. Selfish motives soon guided it : for 
many years it had been hypocritical and malignant : to a gifted 
and sensitive race like the Greeks it was a slow and cruel torture. 
Compared with this abominable system, the work of Mummius 
was mercy. 

247. The settlement proceeded under a commission in 
the usual way and on the usual principles. All Leagues were 
dissolved, and the several communities effectually isolated by 
allowing no reciprocity of property-rights (commercium) between 
them. The growth of common interests was further checked by 
differential treatment. While the territory of Corinth Chalcis and 
Thebes became domain-land of Rome, Athens and Sparta were 
declared Free States. Athens kept her old island-dependencies 
of Lemnos Imbros and Scyros, and received also Delos. Treated 
with indulgence and respect, the famous city was no more in- 



xvii] The settlement 203 

dependent than others ; hence she was made in form mistress 
of the Delian free port, Rome wishing to be spared the trouble of 
administering what in effect was a Roman possession. The mass 
of the Greek cities were on various footings between these ex- 
tremes, and the work of the commission was largely concerned 
with details. Roman precedent was followed in regulating the 
constitutions under which the cities were still to carry on their 
local government. Rome would not tolerate democracies swayed 
by men with nothing to lose, so all franchises were confined to 
owners of property. We are told that the Greek communities 
were made subject to a tribute of some sort, but the particulars 
are not given. It seems certain however that the country was 
not made into a Province with a Roman governor. It remained 
a bunch of separate states free or ' autonomous ' in the sense that 
they had local governments and might not meddle with each 
other. Any questions arising between them were referred in the 
first instance to the governor of Macedonia, who was thus a kind 
of standing commissioner for Greek affairs. Rome was the sovran 
power, and we may describe Greece as a Roman protectorate. 

248. The settlement was not in itself harsh. The oppressions 
of which we sometimes hear later on were the doing of Roman 
officials insufficiently controlled by the home government. In- 
deed we learn that after a time the revival of federal Leagues 
was allowed (of course as mere shadows), and the restrictions on 
reciprocal property-rights withdrawn. Nevertheless the Greeks 
of old Hellas were neither prosperous nor happy. Freedom of 
action, wise or unwise, was to their little states the very breath 
of life. Decay had already gone far before federation took a 
practical form : federation was only partial, and it came too late. 
Rome freed them from Macedonian control, but was driven to 
substitute her own. And under control of any kind they could 
not thrive. Trade had long been declining, and its revival was 
now more impossible than ever. Economic and political dead- 
ness only hastened the decay of literature and art. The Greeks 
of whose influence Roman life was destined to feel the power 
were the Greeks or half-Greeks chiefly drawn from the cities 
of the East. The transition to the new system was somewhat 
smoothed by the services of Polybius the Achaean. He did his 
best to explain things to his countrymen and reconcile them to 
the inevitable. Perhaps no man ever understood the necessities 



204 Delos. Pergamum [ch. 

of his own time better than this worthy and experienced man. 
But he could do nothing to arrest the withering effects of poverty 
helplessness and dulness. Athens herself, still the seat of philo- 
sophic schools claiming descent from the great leaders of thought, 
more and more was driven to draw her professors from abroad. 
As the resort of Roman tourists and students she was able to 
profit by a steady patronage, the fruit of a glorious past. 

249. Among the islands, the great fact is the rise of Delos 
since it had been made a free port. Merchants flocked there, and 
the dealings, particularly in the slave-market, became immense. 
The little island was a centre of Roman financial and trading 
companies, and the influence of capitalists in Rome, interested 
in these operations, probably had something to do with the 
destruction of Corinth. But, while Delos was the scene of an 
unwholesome ' boom,' the commerce of Rhodes declined. The 
time was now near at hand when Rhodes would be more famous 
as a centre of culture and rhetoric than as a naval power. This 
had one very serious consequence. The Rhodian fleets had been 
the most effective protectors of sea-borne trade, and Rome made 
no provision for the performance of this duty. Hence came the 
monstrous growth of piracy, of which we shall speak below. 

250. Of the kingdoms, Pergamum was ruled by Eumenes 
till his death in 159. His brother Attalus H, who succeeded 
him, was more in favour with the Senate, and ruled prosperously 
till 138. He sent a contingent to the Achaean war, and was 
rewarded with a dole of the spoils of Corinth. After him his 
nephew Attalus III, a poor creature, reigned till 133. We may 
look forward so far as to note that, having no successor, he 
bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people. Whether his 
will was made under Roman influences is not certain. But the 
Province (called Asia) made out of the Attalid kingdom at once 
became the sphere of extortions and iniquities even beyond the 
ordinary standard of Roman misrule. For the present Perga- 
mum was a centre where art, and in some degree literature also, 
flourished under royal patronage. 

251. The Bithynian kings, a dynasty of doubtful inclinations, 
were watched by Rome. They were a factor in the balance of 
power. To the East of Bithynia was the growing kingdom of 
Pontus. The reigning king Mithradates HI (169 — 121 B.C.) was 
on friendly terms with Rome, and he too had a place in the 



xvn] Eastern Greeks. Syria 205 

balance-scheme. The king of Cappadocia, Ariarathes V (163 — 
130), was also a 'friend.' It was his misfortune to become in- 
volved in the wars of succession now chronic in the neighbour- 
kingdom of Syria, and to suffer losses thereby. Of the Galatian 
tribes we hear little in this period. It was in wars that they 
chiefly made their mark as mercenaries, and wars in Asia Minor 
were less frequent, owing to the policy of Rome. It should be 
observed that in the kingdoms of this part of the world Hellenism 
was gaining ground. Both on the coast and inland, cities with 
Greek institutions and populations partly Greek were prospering 
greatly under the favour of the kings. Greeks were in demand, 
for it was seen that no other race could match them in the 
intellectual gifts necessary for success in peace or war. These 
cities, whether old colonies from the free-states of Hellas or royal 
foundations of Alexander's Successors, were nearly all merged in 
this or that kingdom. But they generally enjoyed a good deal of 
freedom in local government, seldom interfered with so long as 
their allegiance was secure. 

252. The importance of the Greek cities in Syria (including 
eastern or 'level' Cilicia) has been referred to above. Their 
loyalty was now the mainstay of the failing Seleucid dynasty. 
We need not follow out the wearisome tale of disorders and the 
succession of kings unfortunate illegitimate or incapable. Suffice 
it to note that the average length of reigns, which between 312 
and 187 B.C. had been nearly 21 years, between 187 and 129 was 
just over 7 years. The Senate watched this kingdom carefully, 
and for a good many years required a prince of the royal house 
to reside in Rome as a hostage for the good behaviour of the 
ruler of Antioch. On the death of Antiochus IV (Epiphanes) 
in 165 a significant incident occurred. The Senate would not 
let the hostage-prince Demetrius go to claim the throne, but 
recognized a child, son of Epiphanes, as Antiochus V. Thus 
they claimed to determine the succession, meaning no doubt 
to weaken the Seleucid kingdom. But this made the Syrian 
minister Lysias the real ruler, and he began to raise forces 
beyond the scale fixed in the treaty of 189. Commissioners 
were then sent to upset these arrangements in the interests of 
Rome. They went without an armed escort, and the majesty 
of Rome proved to be no sufficient protection. One of them 
was killed in a riot. An embassy of apology was disregarded. 



2o6 Parthia. Judaea. Egypt [ch. 

To avenge the outrage by war was out of the question, owing 
to the distance, so the Senate waited. But in 162 Demetrius 
escaped from Rome and seized the crown, which he held till 
ejected in 150 by a pretender encouraged by Rome. The story 
is a good illustration of the Senate's policy. Whoso dared to 
defy the sovran power must be punished, but patience and 
diplomacy were less costly and embarrassing, while generally 
not less effective, than a resort to arms. 

253. It may be well to refer here to the growth of another 
power in the further East, destined to give Rome much trouble 
in later times. This was the Parthian kingdom. In the middle 
of the third century B.C., when the empire of Seleucus was losing 
provinces in central Asia, this monarchy was founded in the 
rebellion of Arsaces. Under Mithradates I, the present Arsacid, 
the Parthians had been working westwards, occupying the pro- 
vinces temporarily^ reannexed by Antiochus III. The Seleucid 
kingdom in this period was thus a mere remnant. In Judaea 
its authority was being extinguished by degrees. The High 
Priests of Jerusalem took advantage of the disputed successions 
at Antioch, and of the wars between Syria and Egypt for the 
possession of the ' hollow ' Syria. At last the Jewish tribute 
was redeemed by payment of a capital sum to a needy king, 
and in 141 the expulsion of the Syrian garrison from the 
citadel left Jerusalem free. Antiochus VII reconquered it for 
a moment, but the Jews remained practically independent after 
129, on friendly terms with Rome, for more than 50 years. So 
this small people, nerved by their religion, made a stout resistance 
to the hellenizing influences promoted by Seleucid kings. 

254. In Egypt under the degenerate Lagids Greek influence 
was declining. The contests of two brothers, Ptolemy VII Philo- 
metor and Ptolemy VIII (or IX) Euergetes II compose the story 
of the royal house. The latter, best known by his nickname 
Physcon (fat-belly), was an unscrupulous and cruel monster. The 
kingdom was virtually protected by Rome, as we saw above. To 
Rome the brothers in turn appealed, and the Senate decided in 
accordance with what were held to be Roman interests. The 
old game was played again. A partition was made by restoring 
Philometor to Alexandria, and giving the outlying provinces of 
Cyrene and Cyprus to Physcon. In 146 Philometor perished in 

1 See § 188. 



xvii] Africa 207 

a Syrian war, and Physcon reigned over the whole kingdom till 
117, countenanced by Rome. He knew how to keep the favour 
of greedy Roman nobles, and quenched in blood the hatred of 
the Alexandrines. To support his tyranny he relied mainly on the 
native Egyptians, whose priests he conciliated, and on mixed 
foreign mercenaries. Such, under Roman protection, was the 
kingdom of the Lagids. 

255. Africa. Let us now turn to Africa, that is the middle 
part of the northern coast-lands of the great southern continent, 
the part once dominated by Carthage. The present Punic territory 
was now only the block of land about 300 x 200 miles in extent, 
the old Home-province of Carthage, and a long strip of seaboard 
to the East. But the loss of empire had not ruined Punic com- 
merce, and rumours of Carthaginian wealth kept alive the jealousy 
of Rome. The Senate might dally with other dangers ; the vitality 
of Rome's old rival was sleeplessly watched. The merchant princes 
had sacrificed Hannibal, and their subservience to Roman dicta- 
tion would go almost any lengths, if they could but be suffered 
to enjoy their wealth in peace. But we have seen how Rome 
connived at the constant encroachments of Masinissa. Com- 
missions came in answer to Carthaginian appeals, but the word 
that would have restrained the Numidian was never spoken, and 
so the persecution was not abated. The commission of 157 
included the vigorous and prejudiced Cato. Himself a close- 
fisted man of business, he came home deeply impressed with 
the evidence of the vast resources of Carthage, and convinced 
that the safety of Rome was thereby directly menaced. So he 
ceased not to clamour for the destruction of Carthage. Less 
narrow-minded opponents delayed open action for a time. The 
old methods were still employed. The pressure of Masinissa grew 
worse and worse. In 152 the Punic government began arming to 
resist him. The report of this soon reached Rome, and Cato, 
backed no doubt by greedy capitalists, eager to exploit a rich 
country and to rid themselves of commercial rivals, insisted on 
war. On the return of a commission sent to verify the report, 
orders were sent to Carthage that they must disband their army 
and burn their fleet. Meanwhile Rome still waited. 

256. In 151 the Carthaginians, perhaps emboldened by 
Roman dallying, began war with Masinissa. In 150 Rome de- 
clared war. Utica, the oldest of the Phoenician cities in Africa, 



2o8 Third Punic war [ch. 

now went over to Rome. It was hopeless to fight against both 
Masinissa and Rome, so Carthage sued for peace on any terms. 
In 149 all the Punic war-material, arms etc., a vast store, was 
handed over to the consuls of the year when they reached Utica. 
By thus complying with orders Carthage was left helpless, for to 
raise great mercenary forces was no longer possible as of old. 
Then came the final order : the city must be destroyed, and the 
population removed not less than ten miles inland. It is said 
that they numbered 700,000. Only the trade of Carthage could 
support such a number, and the trade depended on the advantages 
of the present site. The cruel order was a mere pretext for the 
destruction of Carthage. Our information as to the so-called 
third Punic war all comes from the Roman side, and it seems 
certain that the Roman government had from the first resolved 
to shew neither scruple nor mercy. 

257. Semitic peoples driven to bay have more than once 
made a surprising stand against fearful odds. About 200 years 
earlier Alexander tasted their mettle at the siege of Tyre, as 
Titus was to do about 200 years later at Jerusalem. We need 
not follow in detail the story of over-confident and bungling 
consuls. The Carthaginians by supreme efforts made shift to 
forge new weapons and build new engines and a new fleet. They 
even raised a new field army in place of that lately defeated by 
Masinissa. Their cavalry scoured the country and kept open a 
route for the entrance of supplies by land. No impression could 
be made on the great city walls, and the Roman operations con- 
sisted chiefly in blunders retrieved by a military tribune, in whom 
alone the army found a competent leader. This was P. Cornelius 
Scipio Aemilianus, son of Aemilius Paullus, adopted by the son of 
Scipio Africanus. It was not only as a soldier that his presence 
was important ; from Africanus he inherited the connexion of the 
Scipios with the royal house of Numidia. His young brother-in- 
law Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus distinguished himself greatly 
in the later course of the siege. 

258. Old Cato did not live to hear of the fall of Carthage. 
In 149 he died; also Masinissa, in extreme old age. The king 
left to Scipio the charge of apportioning his kingdom among his 
three sons. This Scipio did, not by dividing the territory, but 
by a separation of functions. One was to have Cirta the capital 
and the dignity of a general presidency, another the administra- 



XVIl] 



Scipio Aemilianus 



209 



tion of justice. But the command of the army was assigned to 
Gulussa, the prince who had already sh^wn marked attachment 
to the cause of Rome. Thus the award of Scipio was guided 
by Roman interests. In the conduct of the war too he performed 
many services. The new consul commanding in 148 was as in- 
effective as his predecessors. Hope revived in Carthage, while 
Rome was now preoccupied with the troubles in Macedonia and 
Greece, and with the rising in Spain. Punic envoys were sent 
to stir up disaffection in Numidia and elsewhere. The situation 
was getting worse, and some practical step was clearly needed. 
So when Scipio returned to Rome men looked to him as the 
natural commander against Carthage. He stood for the aedile- 
ship, being under the existing rules not of age for the consulship. 
But in this emergency means were found to suspend the rules, to 
elect him consul for 147, and to entrust him with the charge of the 
Punic war. 




Outline of Carthage. 

259. Under Scipio the siege of Carthage began in earnest. 
The first thing was to clear the Roman camp of non-combatants 
and restore the discipline of the army. After this, the quarters 
of the city were to be attacked and captured one by one. The 
taking of Megara, the great garden-suburb, drove the defenders 
back into the old city, but they still had plenty of room. Has- 
drubal the Punic general, by torturing his Roman prisoners to 
death in view of both armies, confessed that nothing remained 
to them but a resistance of despair. Scipio cut off the supply 

H. 14 



2IO The end of Carthage [ch. 

of food by land, and by sea blockade-running was difficult and 
uncertain. So the besieged began to suffer famine. The next 
move was to close the harbour mouth by an artificial dam. 
This was met by cutting a new entrance, opening into the sea 
at a different point. But when the Punic fleet came out (no 
doubt at a great disadvantage from want of training) it suffered 
defeat. Meanwhile Scipio won and kept a footing on the sea 
front, commanding the harbour. In the winter 147 — 146 he 
destroyed the remains of the Carthaginian field army. The 
starving multitude in the city was all that was left of the once 
imperial Carthage. 

260. In 146 Scipio was kept on as proconsul to finish his 
task. After the old commercial quarter of the city was seized, 
the Romans fought their way up to the Byrsa or citadel, taking 
houses one by one in a slow progress of looting burning and 
awful^ carnage. A remnant (50,000, it is said) now surrendered, 
and the Byrsa was occupied. In the temple of the healing god 
Eshmun, on the summit of the hill, a body of Roman deserters 
(probably not Roman citizens), aware that they could expect no 
mercy, made a last stand. Hasdrubal left them and went to beg 
his own life. So they set the temple afire and perished. Scipio 
had done what he was sent to do. As he looked out on the ruins 
of the famous city, Polybius heard him quote some lines of the 
Iliad, foretelUng the fall of Troy. This was not the expression 
of triumph or remorse : it was that his mind misgave him as to 
the future of Rome. 

261. In dealing with the booty, the sale of captives was 
held as usual, and the proper share of spoils reserved for the 
Roman state. But there were found in Carthage a number of 
marble statues, carried away from Sicily in old wars. These 
Scipio restored to the cities that had formerly owned them, thus 
winning the hearts of the island Greeks, and proving that the 
Greek culture of his youth had not been in vain. And now the 
usual commissioners arrived from Rome, and the settlement of 
the conquered territory began. It became a Province, under the 
name of Africa. The various towns were rewarded or punished 
by gain or loss of lands, according to the parts they had taken in 
the war. Utica received special privileges, and became the chief 
city of the province, a centre frequented by Roman financiers and 
merchants. The site of Carthage was cleared and left desolate 



xvii] The Romans in Spain 211 

under a solemn curse. The restrictions on reciprocal property- 
rights were probably of the same character as in Sicily, favouring 
the gradual transfer of landed property to Romans. The great 
estates of Roman landowners were a marked feature of this pro- 
vince in later times. Tillage by slave-gangs on the Carthaginian 
model was the normal form of agriculture. The governorship of 
Africa was one of the prizes of Roman public life. The provin- 
cial tribute took the form of a fixed impost {stipendium), which at 
all events relieved the subjects of the irregular extortion practised 
under a system of tithes. 

262. Spain. As in the last period, the Spanish difficulties 
of Rome illustrate most forcibly the differences of East and West. 
In Spain the tribal units were warlike, but numerous and small. 
Each one could only answer for itself, and Roman supremacy, 
implied in the creation of Provinces, rested on the power of the 
sword. Romanization had as yet not gone far, and the difficulty 
of providing armies for a hated service stood in the way of a bold 
and thorough conquest. So Roman policy, temporizing and hesi- 
tating elsewhere, was naturally not less so in Spain. In the present 
period the results were disastrous. The great Celtiberian and 
Lusitanian wars were sheer waste of energy, provoked and pro- 
tracted by the misdeeds and incapacity of Roman officers, con- 
ducted with shameless treachery and barbarity, and ended without 
glory. The occasional successes of better commanders were again 
and again cancelled by the utter failures of commonplace nobles 
to whom the cause of Rome was entrusted. Exhaustion and 
tardy alarm at last compelled resort to the services of a picked 
man. After his horrible victory the bulk of the peninsula recog- 
nized that the disunited tribes were no match for the power of 
Rome firmly applied. Rome too had learnt a lesson, and the 
abuses of provincial administration were nowhere more effectively 
checked than in pacified Spain. 

263. The wise and conciliatory policy of Gracchus in 179 
kept the country generally quiet for some 24 years. But then 
fighting, and Roman defeats, began on the Lusitanian border. 
In 153 the great Celtiberian rebellion broke out in central Spain. 
Thus both the Further and the Hither province were involved. 
In the latter case the right to fortify towns was in question. The 
views of natives and Romans as to the treaty of Gracchus differed, 
and war followed. That the matter was taken seriously at Rome 

14—2 



212 



Viriathus [<^h. 



appears from the appointment of a consul to command, of course 
with a full consular army, and from the recorded fact that the 
change, by which the consular year was made to begin on the first 
of January, belongs to this date and was connected with the Spanish 
rising. The consul of 153 failed; his successor did better, but the 
Senate rejected Spanish overtures for peace. In 151 the consul 
L. Licinius LucuUus was sent with more troops. But these had 
been raised with great difficulty, and there were grave collisions 
between consuls and tribunes over the levy in Rome. We are told 
that the patriotic offer of Scipio Aemilianus to serve as military 
tribune overcame the reluctance of men of position to volunteer 
as officers, and so the trouble ended : but this story is doubtful. 
In the field LucuUus was no bad specimen of a consul of the 
period, wantonly attacking natives, granting them terms, and 
butchering them in defiance of his pledge. After a fruitless 
campaign he had to withdraw his suffering army to winter 
quarters further south. Galba the praetor in Further Spain had 
also fared badly. In 150 the two, now proconsul and propraetor, 
joined in attacking the Lusitanians, on whom they avenged their 
previous failures. Both acted with brutal cruelty. Galba made 
a treaty with the barbarians under promise of finding lands for 
them, divided them into three bodies, disarmed them, and cut 
them to pieces. Such was Roman faith in these days; as in 
Liguria, so in Spain. And these two ruffians escaped punish- 
ment. LucuUus was not even impeached. Galba was brought 
to trial, but by bribery and appealing to the pity of the court he 
escaped, and was consul five years later. 

264. Viriathus, a Lusitanian shepherd, had escaped the 
massacre, and in 149 we find him heading the great rising of 
his people which taxed the utmost energies of Rome for nearly 
ten years. For some four years his success was unbroken. He 
kept to guerrilla warfare, avoiding sieges and pitched battles, and 
ranging with his mobile forces over a great part of Spain. But 
to effect a concerted war of liberation was beyond his power. 
The Spanish tribes were too divided, and some even furnished 
contingents to Roman armies. After 146 the Senate, having 
settled matters in Greece and Africa, resolved to deal more 
thoroughly with the problem of Spain. Henceforth we find 
consuls or proconsuls employed with fuU consular armies, and 
Viriathus was somewhat checked. Yet he was able to raise a 



xvii] Numantia 213 

rebellion among some Celtiberian tribes. Thus began the ten- 
years Celtiberian war (143 — 133), to which we will return in 
speaking of Numantia. Still the noble generals could not beat 
the shepherd-chief. Failure barbarity and breaches of faith con- 
tinued to be the Roman record. But to keep his guerrilla bands 
together was not easy for Viriathus, and the consul Q. Servilius 
Caepio was more successful. But treachery was more effective 
than arms. Under cover of sham negotiations, he found a traitor 
in the patriot camp, and procured the murder of Viriathus. This 
exploit soon led to the submission of the Lusitanians. And now 
the plan tried in the later stages of the Ligurian wars was tried in 
Spain : a number of the surrendered enemy were transplanted to a 
district on the east coast. This more humane policy was carried 
out and continued by the consul D. Junius Brutus, who came in 
138 and ruled the Further province for several years. By putting 
down resistance in Lusitania, and by defeating the Callaici of the 
far North- West, he taught the natives that they must bow to the 
yoke of Rome. By treating them with mercy and good faith he 
laid the foundations of a better state of things, so that Roman 
civilization could spread in peace. 

265. Meanwhile the Celtiberian war dragged on. Some 
years were more disastrous than others. If the Roman com- 
manders were maligned, the slanders come to us on Roman 
authority. At all events from 143 to 135 we have a story of 
utter failure. As early as 140 the war, fruitless elsewhere, had 
centred on the siege of Numantia, a fortified stronghold the 
capture of which was expected to break down the resistance of 
the rebel tribes. Not only was the siege raised in consequence 
of Roman losses : a treaty was made with the Numantines (and 
carried out by them), only to be repudiated by the proconsul who 
made it, and ignored at Rome. A hypocritical proposal to hand 
him over to the enemy was foiled. Again in 138 we hear of the 
difficulty of raising troops for this miserable war, and a renewal 
of quarrels between consuls and tribunes. In 137 the consul 
C. Hostilius Mancinus did even worse than his predecessors, 
being routed by a Numantine force less than y of his own. He 
only escaped utter destruction by a treaty guaranteeing the inde- 
pendence of Numantia. Even this was only granted on the faith 
of his quaestor, young Tiberius Gracchus, son of the good governor 
of 179, for the consul was not trusted. The treaty was of course 



214 Scipio and the settlement of Spain [ch. 

repudiated, and this time Mancinus was actually exposed half- 
stripped between the opposing lines, and left for the enemy to 
take. But they would not have him, and after a day of suspense 
he was fetched back. It was a shameful business, but strictly in 
order from the legal point of view. What interested later genera- 
tions of Romans was the question whether he had or had not lost 
his rights as a Roman citizen. For the present a law passed in his 
favour served to cut the knot. 

266. In 136 and 135 no progress was made: indeed the 
state of the army made progress impossible. The camp was full 
of disorderly non-combatants, and a strong hand was needed to 
restore discipline. Yet the country in general was quieting down, 
thanks to the work of Brutus in the West. In Rome there was 
indignation at the gross mismanagement of the war, so the Senate 
had to give way and employ a man chosen for his efficiency. 
Once more Scipio was called upon to retrieve the failures of 
others. Once more a constitutional rule (against reelections) was 
suspended, and he was elected consul a second time for 134. His 
charge was to destroy Numantia, and by this object-lesson to clear 
the ground for a permanent settlement of Spain. The first busi- 
ness was to purge and reform the army. This he did thoroughly. 
In his unpopular duty he found it well to have a bodyguard, which 
was furnished by a corps of volunteer friends and dependants, 
about 500 men, personally attached to him. He had also some 
contingents sent by allied states and kings. Some Spanish levies 
were employed later, when discipline had been restored. After 
training his soldiers in a short campaign, he sat down to reduce 
Numantia by famine. A complete circuit of works blockaded 
the town, and its fall was only a question of time. His forces 
seem to have outnumbered the enemy by about eight to one. 
As Rome was resolved to be mistress in Spain, this great clumsy 
effort was in truth less cruel than the vacillations of the past, 
certainly not unwise. 

267. Scipio had with him several remarkable men. Two 
of his military tribunes, P. Sempronius Asellio and P. Rutilius 
Rufus, afterwards wrote histories of the war. Of the latter we 
shall hear again. In the cavalry was C. Marius of Arpinum, 
famous as a soldier in later days. C Gracchus, younger brother 
of Tiberius, served with credit ; Tiberius was in Rome. Polybius 
too may have visited his patron's headquarters. In command of 



xvii] Northern Italy 215 

the Numidian contingent was the vigorous young prince Jugurtha, 
who distinguished himself greatly. In the company of young 
Roman nobles this ambitious man listened to the scandalous 
gossip of Roman corruption, and learnt to fancy that it was 
possible, purse in hand, to defy the whole power of Rome. 
This was so nearly true that it was a dangerous delusion. For 
fifteen months the weary siege dragged on : inside the town it 
was a time of horrors, ending in cannibalism. But the thing 
was done at last. The Spanish tribes bowed to their fate, and 
there were no more great rebellions in Spain. A regular settle- 
ment followed in the usual form. The tribute was a fixed impost. 
Roads opened up the country, Roman civilization effected the real 
conquest so long and wastefuUy delayed. Roman capital developed 
mines and other resources. Spanish soldiers served in Roman 
armies. In short, from the time of Brutus and Scipio Spain was 
on its way to become one of the most Romanized and prosperous 
parts of the Roman empire. 

268. In northern Italy things were a stage further advanced 
than in Spain. Only small local outbreaks interrupted the pro- 
gress of Romanization now and then. Roman supremacy was no 
longer in question, though the Ligurians had still to be watched. 
In the years 156 — 154 we find Roman forces engaged beyond the 
frontiers both East and West. The necessity of controlling the 
Adriatic led to a Dalmatian expedition, and the chastisement of 
these barbarians checked their raids for a time. On the other 
side, Rome's old ally Massalia was troubled by Ligurians, who 
descended on the Massaliot territory along the coast and did 
much damage. A campaign conducted by Q. Opimius, consul 
154, put an end to this annoyance. This little war is worth notice 
as the first step in the Roman advance towards Transalpine Gaul. 
But Rome annexed no territory. In 148 a practical measure was 
undertaken by the consul Sp. Postumius Albinus. This was the 
via Postumia, a road connecting Genua on the coast with Placentia 
on the Po, by way of an Apennine pass. For facilitating military 
movements this connexion was most important. The real trouble 
remaining in these parts arose from the presence of consuls with 
armies in the Cisalpine. They had no regular war to occupy them, 
and were tempted to seek cheap glory and triumphs by getting up 
quarrels with Alpine tribes. The case of a Claudius, consul 143, 
who attacked the Salassi in the North-West on a pretext connected 



2i6 pax Romana [ch. xvn 

with a watercourse and some gold-washings, was thought a scandal. 
But, so long as the Senate could not effectively control com- 
manders of armies, such misconduct was liable to happen. And 
northern Italy was not under an ordinary provincial governor. 
It was an appendage to Italy proper, and as such it naturally 
came under a consul. With the consulship a man reached the 
goal of his ambition, and it became no easy matter to control him. 
So ineffective, under the Roman constitution, were the means at 
the disposal of the government. 

269. We have now reviewed the last steps by which the 
Roman nobiUty and capitalists cleared the ground for a career 
of monstrous tyranny and extortion. That Roman society and 
Roman government were inwardly rotten, we shall presently see. 
But conquest went on nevertheless. We have seen, and shall 
see, the peoples used to effect each other's subjection, or even 
their own. As in Italy, so on a larger scale abroad, to isolate 
and so to rule was ever the guiding principle of the policy of 
Rome. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

INTERNAL HISTORY 201 — 133 B.C. 

270. In the foregoing chapters we have often met with signs 
of a change for the worse in the Roman commonwealth, and it 
has now and then been necessary to call particular attention 
thereto. In the story of the next period we shall find Roman 
public life carried on under conditions widely differing from those 
under which Rome bore the strain of the second Punic war. 
From the peace with Carthage in 201 to the destruction of 
Numantia in 133 we have traced the development of Roman 
policy abroad. Looking back over this period, we have seen 
the Roman system prove itself superior to opposing systems of 
two clearly-marked types. Where local independence was the 
rule, neither barbarian tribes nor small Greek unions could stand 
against the force of the centralized Italian confederacy. That 
force was too great, if used in earnest by the great Head of Italy. 
In the case of great kingdoms, Rome's easy victories were largely 
due to the exercise of intelligence and sound appreciation of facts. 
The truth of things seldom reached the ears of autocrats, unpalat- 
able advice was scorned, and the personal bias of a king generally 
corrupted his own judgment. In the Roman Senate there was 
a store of experience, such as no king could acquire on any terms. 
There was a continuity of policy, such as no dynasty of hereditary 
rulers could long maintain. Lastly, in an age when it was hardly 
possible for states to live side by side on an equal footing, when 
' eat or be eaten ' was the unconfessed rule of international practiccj 
the fears of the weaker powers exercised a marked influence. The 
warnings and information that poured into Rome kept the Senate 
well supplied with the materials for forming a judgment, and 
enabled it to employ the resources of diplomacy with effect. Yet 



2i8 The wealthy classes [ch. 

with all these advantages the imperial progress of Rome was far 
slower than it might conceivably have been. Truth is, the obstacles 
abroad were trifling compared with those at home. The Roman 
government, though better adapted than others to face the struggles 
of an age of conflict, was already suffering from diseases both 
political and social. Let us review briefly the inner history of 
Rome from 200 to 133 B.C. We shall see enough to explain how 
it was that the great republic could neither conquer with a wise 
economy of effort nor rule her subjects with justice and decency. 

271. The working of the constitution. Rome had no system 
of written constitutional laws. Certain changes had in the past 
been made by statute, chiefly under popular pressure acting in 
Assemblies led by tribunes. But for more than a century this 
pressure had been becoming weaker and more fitful, and had 
now practically ceased. The tribunate survived mainly as an 
organ of the Senate. The Senate, once a council of picked men 
chosen by the censors on the ground of official position or merit 
otherwise attested, was fast becoming a close body of nobles ; for 
those members who were not magistrates past or present nearly 
all belonged to noble families. And the Senate was now virtually 
the Government. Aristocratic bodies always tend to close their 
ranks against intruders and to aim (more or less imperfectly) at 
equality within their own circle. The distinction of Patrician and 
Plebeian had now no political importance. In 172 both consuls 
were Plebeians, and the same was often the case later on. The 
line of division in the community was more nearly that between 
Rich and Poor. But the Rich were now forming two distinct 
classes. Senators, debarred from openly taking a part in com- 
merce, were in the main a landholding aristocracy. Beside them 
were a number of non-noble capitalists. This class, long existing 
in Rome, carried on banking, money-lending, and speculation in 
various enterprises of a financial kind, particularly in state-contracts. 
In this period these men became more numerous. The growth of 
empire added to their opportunities. Wars found employment 
for army-contractors and slave-dealers, and in newly-annexed 
countries land-speculators and moneylenders reaped a golden 
harvest. In Rome their influence was on the rise, largely owing 
to the increase of the companies or syndicates {societaies) referred 
to above. Through these a host of smaller capitalists were able 
to share in the profits of exploiting enterprises that would other- 



xviiij Capitalism and Slavery 219 

wise have been beyond their reach, without being obliged to travel 
in search of investments. And these men had votes. 

272. In speaking of the rapid growth and organization of 
a capitalist class, who in the next period became a recognized 
Order, we are touching on a great economic and social change 
that passed over Rome and a large part of Italy. Whence came 
the funds that enabled men to start as investors in a small way of 
business? Once started, most Romans, keen in money-matters, 
were well able to make their capital grow. Two sources may be 
suggested, from which original small nest-eggs were probably 
derived. First, the profits of military service. There is good 
reason to think that even in the field the soldiers of this period 
often amassed considerable sums, and there were generally some 
pickings on the occasion of a triumph. We even hear of money 
carried on foreign service to be used in loans at interest. Second, 
the sale of small holdings of land. We know that the formation 
of large landed estates was going on in several parts of Italy, and 
that this process consisted partly in the big landlords buying out 
the small. The wide estates {latifundia) of the new style were 
tilled by gangs of slaves ; the grazing business employed slave- 
herdsmen. The free small farmer was in large districts (such as 
most of Etruria Lucania and Apulia) unable to compete with 
large-scale husbandry. But there was a growing market for slaves, 
and the soldier who received a slave or two as a reward after 
victory could always get cash from the dealers who followed the 
army. The dealers in slaves would themselves usually be old 
soldiers, or ex-farmers, or both, and would be either speculating 
on their own account or agents for a syndicate in Rome. In any 
case the dealers' profit was doubtless great. To many men these 
openings for acquiring a competence would be irresistible, com- 
pared with a farmer's life, always hard and now unremunerative. 
So the old principle, that the citizen was a soldier who served for 
duty's sake and then returned to rural life, was now an obsolete 
theory. We have seen that the attempt to enforce an old-fashioned 
military levy was at times attended with serious difficulties. Italian 
Allies could be employed in the less attractive campaigns. When 
a better prospect offered itself, the Roman citizen was ready to 
come forward as a mercenary volunteer. 

273. Another great change, silent and continuous, not 
effected by any one deliberate act, was upsetting the balance of 



220 Beginnings of a city mob [ch. 

the constitution. The Assemblies were becoming less and less 
the genuine mouthpiece of the Roman people. Roman citizens 
were in this period more scattered than of old. Numbers went 
off to the new citizen colonies founded in northern and southern 
Italy at great distances from Rome. These would probably be 
men rather above the average in energy. But they could seldom 
attend an Assembly in Rome. Nor should we forget that a large 
number of citizens were at any time absent on service or on their 
own occasions abroad. Meanwhile the mass of those at any time 
within reach was becoming less and less fit to represent the views 
of the whole citizen body. The lazy and thriftless tended to drift 
into Rome and stay there, enjoying privileges and perquisites 
denied to the rustic folk. The more their numbers grew, the 
more it was the interest of the ruling class to keep them in good 
humour, for they at least were always able to use their votes at 
elections. After the second Punic war it had not been easy to 
induce refugees to return to rural life, and the effect of changes 
in agriculture was to send a steady stream of rustics into the city, 
the less capable of whom remained. As these immigrants were 
still registered in their original Tribes, it was not merely the four 
city Tribes in which these city residents voted. Thus the formation 
of an urban mob, ignorant and fickle, went on apace, and this mob 
tended to become more and more corrupt. But the mob was 
further recruited from sources not Roman. The great rise of 
Rome had made the full Roman franchise an object of desire to 
the Latin communities, hitherto content with their local freedom. 
They now saw Romans gradually monopolizing imperial privileges, 
and leaving to them the greater share of the burdens. Hence 
enterprising Latins often migrated^ to Rome, and sometimes 
succeeded in passing themselves off for Roman citizens. More- 
over there were a number of freedmen, and they were increasing 
with the increase of slaves. 

274. Neither the Latin immigrants nor the citizens of servile 
extraction were necessarily paupers. It seems probable that the 
pauper element was in this period mainly Roman by birth. But 
the two non-Roman elements were themselves very different in 
their political character. The Latins represented the claim of 
the Italian Allies (the mainstay of Roman power) to be placed 
on an equality with Romans. The freedmen were aliens. They 
1 See §§ 82, 283. 



xvin] Importance of the censorship 221 

had no Italian traditions, and their connexion with Rome was 
a purely personal one. Their former owners, to whom they 
owed their emancipation, would all be men of property, and to 
them they owed allegiance according to all-powerful custom, to 
some extent even by law. Now we must bear in mind that the 
rule of the Senate was a fact, not a right. It was the effect of 
causes that we have considered above, not of a statute. The 
Assembly alone could legislate; indeed to its power there was 
no limit, for there was no means of challenging its decisions other 
than the discovery of some religious flaw in the proceedings. 
Therefore the nobles who controlled the Senate had to manage 
the Assembly, or lose the direction of affairs. In general, their 
control of the tribunate was enough for the purpose, but this could 
not always be relied on. From their point of view it was most 
important to see that the Assembly was amenable to their influence. 
This could only be done by watching the composition and organi- 
zation of that body. There were two questions, {a) to whom 
should the Roman franchise be granted {b) in what Tribes should 
new citizens be enrolled. 

275. Now the attempts made to answer these questions were 
the chief constitutional m^ovements of this period. It is charac- 
teristic of the Roman system that these attempts were not made 
in a series of laws but in the action of various censors. Very little 
legislation took place on such matters. Every five years the 
censors had to decide whom they would recognize as citizens 
and in what voting groups they would place them. This then 
was the period in which the censorship reached the height of its 
importance. It was the organ of the senatorial nobles, by which 
they (or the party at any time dominant among them) strove to 
model the citizen body in accordance with their own interest. 
Therefore we find none of the old irregularity in the periodical 
revision. From 199 to 154 the succession of censors is perfectly 
regular at intervals of five years, and even then it was only inter- 
rupted for a moment. The policy of various censors differed 
widely, but the general tendency continued, corresponding to 
the general course of the influences prevailing at different times 
in public life. There was ebbing and flowing, but the ebbing 
of old-Roman principles was on the whole stronger than the flow. 
In the long run the practice of the new school prevailed. Perhaps 
nothing could have prevented the formation of a Roman mob. 



2 22 The old and new schools [ch. 

such as we find it in the next period. At all events the censors 
did not prevent it, nor was their policy, so far as we can trace it, 
likely to do so. In dealing with the freedmen, the new school 
were lax. Their bent was to put these easily-influenced voters 
into any of the 35 Tribes, that the Assembly might be more easy 
to control. The reformers, starting from old Roman ^ principles, 
strove to confine citizens of servile extraction to the four city 
Tribes, that their votes might have less weight. But on the 
question of the Latins both schools agreed. To the new school 
the intruders were unwelcome, as being men on the average more 
independent than suited the nobles bent on monopolizing power. 
The reformers, led by Cato, took a narrowly legal view. The 
relations between Rome and the various Italian Allies were 
defined by treaties. A bargain was a bargain, and to make any 
allowance for change of circumstances was no doubt too statesman- 
like a policy for these well-meaning men. So both parties watched 
the Latin intruders and did their best to exclude them. 

276. It is not possible in the space at disposal to discuss 
the proceedings of the several pairs of censors, so far as we know 
them from our fragmentary record. But we can hardly omit 
altogether the two notable censorships of leading reformers. The 
failure of the attacks on Vulso and Nobilior in 187, and the dis- 
grace of L. Scipio, shew^ the discontent then prevailing and how 
it was thwarted. The old-Roman party gained strength for the 
moment, and in 185 they were able to get Cato and his friend 
L. Valerius Flaccus elected censors for the next year. The result 
was a census carried out with a severity long unknown. The 
Senate was purged of its unworthy members. The interests of 
the state were firmly guarded in the letting of contracts. In 
valuing citizens' property, liable to taxation in the event of war, 
luxuries were assessed at ten times their market price. It is most 
probable that they admitted freedmen to the four city Tribes only, 
and excluded Latins — of course when detected. It is clear that 
a reform-movement undertaken in so unbending a spirit was likely 
to provoke a reaction. And the work of one census was only in 
force till the next. So the censorship of Cato, a byword for 
priggish self-righteousness, was productive of no permanent effect. 
Things slipped back into their former groove, and a spell of slack- 
ness at home was accompanied by grave scandals in the wars 
^ See § III. ^ See § 214. 



xviii] The Freedmen and the Latins 223 

abroad. It was during the war with Perseus that the old- Roman 
reformers once more came to the front. In 169 C. Claudius 
Pulcher and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus were censors. The 
latter was the man who had done good service in Spain and else- 
where. Both were strong men: we have seen' how they used 
their censorial powers to overcome the difficulties connected with 
the military levy. In the work of revision they were severe. But 
an attempt to get rid of jobbery in letting the state contracts soon 
brought them into violent collision with the now powerful class 
of capitalists, backed by a tribune. After a bitter quarrel, the 
censors were accused of high treason {perduellio) before the 
Assembly of Centuries, and only the exertions of leading nobles 
and the personal popularity of Gracchus procured their acquittal. 

277. Here we get a glimpse of the political situation in 
Rome at this time. Senate and censors defeated capitalists and 
tribune, but with great difficulty. The mass of poor citizens had 
to decide the issue, though the voting was by Centuries, not by 
Tribes. For the moment they decided in favour of the nobles. 
But it was clear that their support could not be relied on, and the 
need of care in controlling the composition and organization of 
the citizen body was unmistakeable. Accordingly the censors 
made a distinction between the wealthier and poorer freedmen. 
The former they admitted to any of the 35 Tribes, the latter to 
only one of the four city Tribes. Detected Latin claimants they 
excluded altogether. But their work was short-lived. After the 
victory of Pydna Rome seemed so secure that reformers could 
not get a sympathetic hearing. In the race for wealth and luxury 
men disregarded the principles and practice of old Rome, and 
censorial vigour died away. There were those who saw and 
lamented the demoralization of the age, and confessed that 
corrupt and unpatriotic Assemblies were a grave danger. Such 
was Scipio Aemilianus, censor in 142. It is said that in closing 
the purification {lustrum) he prayed the gods to keep Rome safe, 
not (as in the usual form) to make her greater. Nor was this 
a groundless pessimism. The Roman constitution had hitherto 
only been made to work through the high moral qualities of the 
people. Wise concessions made in time had brought good new 
blood into the citizen body and bound all together in a common 
patriotism. Now, in the full flush of Roman greatness, a jealous 

^ See § 321. 



2 24 ^^^ Villia annalis [ch. 

exclusiveness prevailed. The ruling nobles wanted to share public 
offices among themselves, and to shut out the lower orders. The 
mass of citizens, loth to share their advantages with others, were 
less and less willing to see the franchise granted to the ItaHan 
Allies. 

278. To begin with the nobles. It was their aim to prevent 
young men of their own order from rising too fast and so over- 
topping their peers, and to shut out ' new men ' from office (at 
least from the consulship) altogether. The latter object had to 
be achieved mainly by the steady pressure of influence, but it 
would no doubt be helped on by attaining the former. Existing 
custom enjoined the leaving of an interval between the tenure of 
one office and the next. The ordinary course of honours {honores 
= offices) was quaestor aedile praetor consul. But there had been 
cases, such as those of Scipio Africanus and Flamininus, in which 
the steps of office had been partly skipped by men of mark in 
special circumstances. To stop this it was at length found 
necessary to resort to legislation. In 180 the 'law of years' 
{lex annalis) was carried by the tribune L. Villius. It enacted 
a regular statutory scale of eligibility. After ten years of liability 
to military service (17 — 27 ), a man could hold the quaestorship 
at 28, the praetorship at 31, and the consulship at 34. If after 
the quaestorship he became aedile, he might hold it at 31. Then 
he might be praetor at 34, and consul at 37. Thus between any 
two offices there was to be a minimum interval of two years. The 
aedileship was an optional step in the course, for there were only 
four aediles, not enough to supply candidates for the six praetor- 
ships. But the office of aedile was becoming more and more 
identified with the duty of providing for the games or shows (ludi) 
in which the idle populace delighted. The state allotted funds for 
the purpose, but more and more was expected, and ambitious men 
found it worth their while to win popular favour by lavish outlay 
from their own purses. Thus the road to the consulship was 
generally a costly one, and the extravagance of those who meant 
to compete later for the highest honour was a chief cause of 
Roman iniquities abroad. For empty purses were to be refilled 
at the expense of the subject world. 

279. The lex Villia long remained in force, suiting as it did 
the convenience of the great majority of the class interested. To 
hold each office in a man's ' own year ' {a7i7io sua), that is at the 



xviii] The Senate 225 

earliest lawful date, became an object of ambition. But there 
was the further question of reelections. An old law required an 
interval of ten years between two consulships. In order to prevent 
reelections from lessening average men's chances of holding the 
chief ofifice, it was thought desirable to forbid reelection altogether. 
This seems to have been done by a law passed in 151. Scipio 
Aemilianus had to receive a special exemption from it, that he 
might be consul a second time in 134. But under the strain of 
events this rule was broken to pieces in the following period. 
It is to be noted that the strictly Plebeian office of tribune was 
not touched by these laws, which only applied to the regular 
magistracies. At some date ' continuation ' (immediate reelection) 
seems to have been forbidden ; when, is uncertain. And the 
tribunate was not greatly sought after in an age of great wars, for 
it did not lead to military command. We find tribunes taking 
part in public affairs, generally as tools of the Senate, but now 
and then apparently acting on behalf of some personal interest 
in opposition to consuls. In 151 C. Laelius, friend of Aemilianus, 
is said to have made agrarian proposals, meant to get the people 
back to the land. But he could effect nothing, and dropped his 
scheme. The revival of the active tribunate had to wait. 

280. We have seen that the degradation of the Assembly 
was in full progress, and that more and more care was taken to 
govern the official career by rigid rules, under which a regular 
succession of commonplace magistrates was secured, and only 
departed from under pressure of some great emergency. Yet a 
Republic can hardly thrive under a system of suppressing ambi- 
tions, a truth which appears most clearly in connexion with the 
Senate. That body had now to guide the policy of Rome, but 
in the last resort it was the Assembly with which the sovran power 
rested. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the in- 
ternal relations of the Senate should be harmonious. There is 
reason to think that they were not so. Jealousies prevailed, and 
found open expression on such occasions as the discussion of 
claims to triumphs, approval of acts of provincial governors, and 
so forth. The efforts of the old-Roman party were reinforced by 
personal animosities. Proconsuls returned with all the glories of 
victory followed by a great settlement fresh upon them, and after 
a triumph had to become once more the peers of a number. For 
men who had been in an almost regal position this was hard at 

H. 15 



226 Rome and the Allies [ch. 

first. Nor did time make it easier, for there was a succession of 
men returning with more or less claims to distinction, and former 
achievements were passing out of notice. There would also be 
men rightly or wrongly regarded as failures, and some who had 
attempted nothing remarkable, from lack of enterprise or oppor- 
tunity. The younger members, bent on climbing the ladder of 
office, would look at things chiefly from the point of view of their 
own interests. Enough has been said to shew that the elements 
of discomfort were already rife. No wonder there were cliques 
and factions in the Senate, and that the House was often too 
divided to enforce its will. 

281. The Allies. On one all-important matter of policy 
there was unhappily no real difference between Senate Magis- 
trates and Assembly. The old system of half-citizenship, a stage 
through which a number of Italians had passed to the full Roman 
franchise, was no longer in use. In 188 the citizens of Fundi 
Formiae and Arpinum were thus promoted. Even the Cam- 
panians punished for the misdeeds of Capua in the Hannibalic 
war received an instalment of forgiveness. They were on the way 
to the full citizenship. It seems certain that they and any other 
half-citizens now remaining received the full civitas in this period 
or very soon after. Thus there were in Italy only the two classes 
of cives and socii, and the new growth of Rome as an imperial 
power had completely changed the relations between them. In 
the distant wars of the age, ever extending Roman power, the 
Allies as such had no concern. Provinces were annexed to 
Rome : to Rome, not to united Italy, tributes were paid : Roman, 
not Italian, officers were at the head of provinces and armies, and 
Roman purses were filled by exploiting the results of war. Yet it 
was on the Allies that the most irksome burdens of warfare fell. 
Thousands and thousands of their youth perished in Spain alone. 
Still, when Romans and Allies had fought side by side, it was 
the old custom to give them equal largess at the triumph. At 
a triumph in 177 and on several later occasions the Allies received 
only half. It had formerly been a privilege to be made a member 
of a Latin colony founded by Rome, where the colonist was given 
an allotment of land. But in this period Latin colonies were 
giving place to citizen colonies, to which very few Allies could 
gain admission. As early as 194, some 'Latins' had tried to 
gain the Roman franchise in this way, but the Senate decided 



xvni] Overbearing Nobles 227 

that their admission would not make them Romans. A very 
few AlUes, such as Ennius, were granted the franchise by this 
means as a favour. And all the while the value of the franchise 
went on rising. 

282. For not only did the privileges of Romans automatic- 
ally grow by the growth of the opportunities offered by empire. 
Legislation directly conferred privileges denied to the Ally. The 
three leges Porciae belong to this period. Their exact dates and 
scope are uncertain, but we know that in some form or other they 
protected the citizen's back. That is, the Roman was no longer 
exposed to be cruelly scourged at the will of a magistrate holding 
the military imperium. He could claim the right of appeal, at all 
events in some circumstances. The Ally, even the favoured Latin, 
could not. Here was a galling distinction, felt whenever an army 
was raised. If we may believe a passage from a speech of Cato, 
even the chief men of an allied town were not safe from the 
brutality of a Roman magistrate who took offence at some act 
on their part. The overbearing pride of some Roman nobles 
found various ways of displaying itself. In 174 a censor, wishing 
to adorn a new temple that he was building in Rome, stripped 
the famous Greek temple of Hera Lacinia (near Croton) of its 
marble tiles. It was an outrage on Greek feeling, and the Senate 
ordered him to restore the tiles. But they were only shot down 
in the temple court, not restored to their proper place. In 173 
a consul was instructed to see to some boundary-questions in 
Campania. He had a grudge against the people of Praeneste, 
an old Latin city, a Roman Ally of the first rank, long faithful 
and useful to Rome. He chose to travel by way of Praeneste, 
and wrote requiring a public reception and entertainment, and 
conveyance on the next stage of his journey at the cost of the 
town. He had no right to do this. But the Praenestine autho- 
rities thought it better to submit to an illegal exaction than to risk 
the ill turns that the consul and his friends might do them. They 
did as he ordered, and an evil precedent was made. There was 
in fact no protection for the Allies against the insolence of a 
Roman noble. 

283. It is not wonderful that 'Latins' often migrated to 
Rome and tried to register themselves as Roman citizens. The 
old rules relative to migration from Latin communities no doubt 
offered facilities for removal, and it was not easy to detect evasion 

15—2 



228 The Allies and the franchise [ch. 

of the conditions. But there were also some new devices. A 
Latin sold his son to a Roman, who agreed to emancipate the 
young man, and so make him a citizen. It seems to have been 
understood that a freedman of this sort was on a different social 
footing from the ordinary manumitted slave. The process was 
very like adoption, and Romans were found to carry it out, 
probably for a consideration. But the movement of Latins to 
Rome set going a movement of ordinary Allies to Latin towns. 
This attempt of Allies to better themselves might suit the indi- 
vidual migrants. But it bore hardly on those left behind in their 
proper homes, for the depleted communities had still to furnish 
their military contingents. We are told that both Latins and. 
other Allies complained of these migrations, and the Senate had 
to deal with the matter. In 187 we hear of a commission of 
inquiry, followed by the expulsion from Rome of 12,000 Latins. In 
177 the lex Claudia de sociis was passed to check migrations, 
ordering the Latins back to their homes, and providing against 
certain evasions. It had now come to actual legislation, and the 
Assembly endorsed the pohcy of the Senate. In 174 a consul 
issued a stringent edict, to put the law in force. But there was 
no regular machinery in the Roman system for continuous en- 
forcement of such regulations. The attractions remained, and it 
seems certain that no prohibition of migrations was permanently 
successful in stopping them. 

284. It is quite clear that the Allies were in a far worse 
position than before the Second Punic war. Their various grades 
of privilege and divergent interests hindered combination for 
common ends. Meanwhile the Romans scattered over Italy 
were more united and more exclusive, and the military services 
of the Allies only extended the empire of Rome. Yet they had 
not lost all hope of bettering their condition, and the insults 
referred to above were no doubt exceptional. The situation was 
perhaps not easily understood at the time. By incorporating her 
early conquests in the Roman state, Rome had built up a power 
stronger than any Italian rival, had overcome the disunited Italian 
powers in detail, and had organized the whole in a confederacy 
of which she was the Head. She was now dealing with powers 
abroad, and overcoming them in detail by Italian strength. But 
her success only made the Allies wish for incorporation and a 
share of imperial privileges. This Rome refused. But they still 



xviii] Provincial government 229 

had their local self-government. They were not under the rule of 
a Roman governor, and they paid no tribute. 

285. The Provinces. It was in her transmarine possessions 
that the sovranty of Rome appeared at its worst. We have already 
spoken of the way in which the provincial system grew up, of the 
charter {lex, organic statute) regulating each province, of the suc- 
cession of governors holding civil and military power, and of the 
graduated variety of privileges by which the interests of the several 
communities within the province were kept apart. In the hands 
of virtuous governors, with honest and competent subordinates, 
the system might have worked well. The Senate did not inten- 
tionally encourage ill treatment of Rome's tributary subjects, but 
there was no effective machinery for training or controlling either 
the governors or their staff. They were amateurs, whom yearly 
change prevented from learning their duties and becoming experts. 
They were ordinary Roman nobles, generally in want of money, 
and exposed to temptations which they were quite unable to resist. 
The best of them were liable to err from igiorance; the worse 
were certain to oppress the provincials from greed. 

286. The staff of a provincial governor was arranged on a 
military model. First came the quaestor, in charge of the finances, 
but often employed as deputy in other work. Next the legati or 
attaches appointed by the Senate to act as subordinates, and a 
number of clerks orderlies and men skilled in some special 
function or other. There were also a number of unofficial 
companions {comites) whom a governor was allowed to take out 
with him. One characteristic was common to all : they went 
abroad with an eye to their own advancement. Some meant to 
rise in public life, others were seeking a competence to live in 
comfort. All looked to Rome, and all wanted money. The 
governor, usually a praetor or propraetor, wanted to be consul. 
He therefore wanted the support of his staff later on, and money 
too. He could not afford to offend these people. But there 
were others whom it was necessary to please. There were Roman 
traders (mercatores). always pushing to the front, even beyond the 
frontier of the province. These had to be protected when (as 
happened) they got into trouble. Then there were the financiers 
(negotiatores), principals or agents of syndicates, who did the 
banking and money-lending. These men swarmed in the Pro- 
vinces, where they operated at a great advantage ; for by putting 



230 publicani [ch. 

pressure on governors they were able to influence the courts of 
law, composed of Roman residents, with the governor as supreme 
judge. Thus backed by official favour, they got all financial 
business into their hands, and made immense profits by usury. 
Lastly there were the publicani, the farmers of tolls and dues of 
various kinds, not officials, but persons acting under licence from 
the Roman state in virtue of a definite contract for a certain pur- 
pose, valid for a certain term. 

287. We have already seen that the system of farming out 
the collection of revenues was of old standing, and had been first 
applied in Italy and then extended to the provinces. The syndi- 
cates each paid a lump sum to the state for the right to collect a 
particular set of dues. Of course the shareholders expected to 
make a good profit : the state, having no regular civil service, 
was glad to be relieved of the task of collection : the governor, 
representing the state, was bound to facilitate the work of the 
actual collectors. It was in this connexion that the evils of the 
system most readily developed. For the agents of the publicani 
had only to report that a too scrupulous governor was hindering 
collection ; investors, furious at the prospect of a poor dividend, 
would make themselves felt in Rome. The provincials had no 
voice in the matter, and, as the growth of luxury and corruption 
in Rome created a growing demand for money, the pressure on 
governors grew also. The causes of provincial extortion were in 
Rome, and the working of Roman politics in this period offered 
no prospect of their abatement or removal. While the farming 
of customs rents royalties and other dues of a simple kind was 
probably a source of some grumbling, the chief trouble arose in 
connexion with the provincial tributes. Where the tribute took 
the form of a fixed impost (stipendium) there was little difficulty. 
This was the system to which the Romans inclined. In Spain 
the subjects even won the right to collect it themselves. The 
amount was not excessive, and this tribute-system was applied 
later to Africa and Macedonia. When part of the tribute was 
levied in corn, abuses might occur, as we saw^ above. But on 
the whole this system worked well. 

288. Things were very different in provinces where Roman 
statesmen, ever loth to change existing institutions, had adopted 
a system of exacting yearly percentages of crops. These varied 

M233. 



xviii] Extortion 231 

with the crop from year to year, and to farm the collection of 
such dues was in any case a venture of the most speculative kind. 
The work came with a rush at the time of harvest. To prevent 
fraud, the growers of corn or other crops had to be watched. To 
avoid loss, it was almost necessary to have a small margin beyond 
the strict amount. Here was a rich field for progressive extortion. 
There were also further opportunities. The most notorious was 
this. A grower was required to deliver the corn due, not at the 
place of growth, but at some distant centre. The cost of transport 
was used to force him to commute his liability for a cash payment 
far greater than the market value of the corn. By ringing changes 
on this iniquity a vast scheme of extortion was built up. Such was 
the working of the system of tithes {decuniae) \ prevailing in Sicily, 
applied together with the other system in Sardinia, and carried to 
infamous perfection in Asia, after that province was formed out of 
the kingdom of Pergamum. Against the tithe-farmers {decumani) 
the best of governors was powerless : too many people's incomes 
in Rome depended on their squeezing of the provincials, and no 
laws availed to stop the abuses. Ordinary governors were con- 
cerned to enrich themselves. They had no official salaries, and 
the absolute nature of their power made their favours a market- 
able commodity. Presents were offered and received, for hastening 
or delaying judicial proceedings, to avert burdens such as an official 
visit or the quartering of soldiers in a town, the last a contingency 
peculiarly dreaded. And when precedents were created, these and 
other voluntary gifts quickly became normal exactions. Moreover 
the governor's staff looked for some pickings on their own account, 
and for his own sake he had to connive at their doings. 

289. These horrible abuses were in full play during the next 
period, but they began in the present. How inevitable they were, 
and how unable the Roman government was to check them, appears 
from the vain attempts made to punish governors. Any court be- 
fore which an ex-governor could be brought must sit in Rome, and 
the cause of provincials could only be pleaded by Romans. Com- 
petent and willing advocates were hardly ever to be had, unless 
they had some personal or party grudge against the culprit, or 
were seeking notoriety to forward their own ambition. There 
were men who pitied the provincials, or at least thought that it 
was Rome's interest to keep them prosperous. Such was Cato. 

1 See § 103. 



232 lex Calpurnia de repetundis [ch. 

But Cato died in 149. It was in this very year that a notable 
law was carried, honestly meant to reform the iniquities of pro- 
vincial administration. Its author was a highly respected tribune, 
L. Calpurnius Piso. Public trials before the Assembly were known 
to be in these days a mischievous farce. Special judicial commis- 
sions to try particular cases were generally ineffective, probably 
owing to the selection of the court being made a party affair. 
The attempt to enforce restitution of extorted moneys by means 
of a civil action in a Recovery court had, as we saw^ above, been 
made and failed. The lex Calpurnia took a new line, a develop- 
ment of previous methods. It created a standing court for the 
recovery of ' reclaimable moneys ' (^pecuniae repetundae). A list 
of senators was to be prepared each year, out of whom a court 
was to be formed for the trial of particular cases as they arose. 
The parties each staked a deposit {sacrame?ihim), which the loser 
forfeited. Beside this, the accused, if he lost his cause, had to 
restore the sum wrongfully exacted. And it seems that this 
was all. 

290. Apart from its actual enactments, this law had an ex- 
ceptional importance from the precedent created by it. The new 
courts were real juries, deciding issues by a majority of votes, 
under the chairmanship of a praetor. The decision was theirs, 
not the praetor's on their advice, and it was final. For the passing 
of the law by the Tribe-Assembly made these juries the delegates 
of the Assembly for a special purpose, and therefore there could 
be no appeal from them to the Assembly itself The Assembly 
had abdicated a function. That the Tribes, having no power to 
impose the capital penalty, could not give that power to the juries, 
was a minor point. Even in the treason-jurisdiction of the Cen- 
turies, the capital penalty had practically ceased to mean death, 
and treason trials were very rare. On the other hand, the new 
courts, being for the present merely a development of old civil 
procedure, were not subject to the 'intercession' of a tribune. 
The index in civil suits was not a magistrate. His verdict was 
on the point of fact, and final. The new jurors were izidices, and 
were so called. Thus the effect of the Calpurnian law was to set 
up a permanent commission for providing civil courts as required, 
competent to deal with imperial questions in virtue of statutory 
powers. 

' § 233. 



xviii] The new courts. Corruption 233 

291. That such a law could be passed is a notable fact. 
It only applied to senators, that is to ex-governors of provinces. 
But the juries were to be composed of senators. This probably 
was the reason why we hear of no great conflict over the passing 
of the measure. Distance and delays made it very hard to get 
up a case and produce the provincial evidence of extortion. 
Good Roman pleaders were seldom to be had for the purpose, 
and senators would not be too eager to condemn a man of their 
own Order. So the law, while it affirmed a principle, could not 
create a practice. We shall see that the ' public courts ' {iudicia 
publico) became in course of time one of the most corrupt insti- 
tutions of the Republic. To capture the privilege of supplying 
jurors became a prize competed for by the partisans of the 
governing and capitalist classes in the next age, and these courts 
(for the system was soon extended to other offences) were the 
centre of some of the gravest scandals of Rome. The court of 
repetundae established in 149 was the most important and the 
most scandalous. Justice was generally foiled, and its miscar- 
riage was one of the many ways in v^hich the government of the 
provinces reacted as a corrupting influence on Roman public life. 
Personal and party feuds might now and then lead to the success- 
ful accusation of some evildoer. As a rule it was the shameful 
truth that to submit in silence to wrong was both cheaper and 
safer than to seek redress at Rome. 

292. Roman life. The inner corruption of Rome was both 
an effect and a cause of the race for wealth. Many were enriched 
by the great wars between 200 and 168 B.C. The standard of 
living became higher, and contact with the East brought in new 
tastes, sometimes more refined, always more expensive. As the 
great wars ceased, the plunder of armed enemies gave place to 
the fleecing of peaceful subjects. As affecting Roman character, 
it was not a change for the better. This robbery did not end, 
like wars, but tended to perpetuate itself. The increase of extra- 
vagance at home increased the drain on the sources of supply 
abroad. The vast expenses of the Roman nobles in this period 
(in the next even greater) were chiefly incurred in luxury and the 
support of pride, and in political corruption. Luxury took many 
forms. Houses were becoming grand mansions. Great house- 
holds of slaves, mainly oriental, were kept up for ostentation. 
The service of the toilet employed some, the kitchen others. 



234 Slavery. Legislative reforms [ch. 

Gluttony and other vices were spreading; gout, common later, 
began to appear. The only hope of the slave lay in currying 
favour with his (or her) owner, and the means employed were 
generally degrading. Children were spoilt by the indulgence and 
connivance of the slave-tutor or nurse. A few sturdy fellows 
were kept to act as porters or escort their master in the jostling 
streets. As a rule the domestic slaves were pampered menials, 
the young and handsome bought as pets at scandalous prices. 
There were some few of a better kind, valued for their special 
attainments, literary medical and so forth. Artisans of all kinds 
were numerous, but they were not a part of the household. 

293. Of the great landed estates and country mansions, in 
which the senatorial landlords took pride, we shall speak below. 
Of the extravagant outlay on public shows to please the city 
populace we have spoken above. Vast sums were already being 
wasted thus, and even direct bribery was beginning. All men 
knew that corruption, political and social, was undermining the 
health of the state, and the old-Roman reformers tried hard to 
cure the disease by legislative remedies. In 181 a lex Baebia 
punished corrupt practices {ambitus) at elections by excluding 
the offender from office for ten years. In 159 another law raised 
the penalty to death, that is exile. To check bribery, voting by 
ballot was introduced, in 139 for elections, in 137 for popular 
trials before the Tribes. Looking forward, we find that in 131 
it was extended to legislative Assemblies ; and in 107 even to 
treason-trials before the Centuries. But these long-continued 
efforts were vain. Bribery increased, and votes were sold so 
long as they were worth buying. Sumptuary laws in 181, 161, 
143, passed to check extravagant entertainments and gluttony, 
were ineffective. In the matter of inheritances also new and lax 
practices were coming in, subversive of old-Roman notions. The 
permanence of families was threatened by large bequests to persons 
other than the heir, who then took over the burdens of the family 
succession with reduced means. That testators under undue 
influence should thus break up estates and weaken families, dis- 
regarding family religion and the custom of their ancestors, was a 
serious matter. With it was connected another symptom of the 
new notions now prevailing, in the growing emancipation of women. 

294. Of the traditional position of women under Roman 
law we have spoken above. The wife in the ' hand ' of her 



xviii] Successions and bequests 235 

husband, the widow or maid controlled by her guardian {tutor), 
are the female figures of the upper classes, to which Roman 
tradition refers. But new and less complete forms of marriage, 
of Plebeian origin, had long been superseding the old Patrician 
one. Wives were now seldom their husbands' property in the 
old sense. And other women, aided by ingenious lawyers, were 
making the restraints of wardship a dead letter. They were 
gaining the power of appointing their own guardians. They 
influenced testators, and took large bequests. But they could 
not be heads of families. To make a woman heir was therefore 
to break the family succession : to impoverish a male heir, by 
leaving large bequests to women, came to much the same in 
the end. And Roman ladies of the new school gave occasion 
to several scandals in this period, so that things were unsatis- 
factory from that point of view also. Attempts to revive the old 
customs of inheritance and the old order of family government 
were made by a law of wills {testamentaria) passed in 183, 
restricting the freedom of bequest. In 169 it was followed by 
the famous law {lex Voconia) forbidding a testator to make a 
woman his heir or to bequeath to any legatee more than was 
left to the heir. Even so the male succession could be made 
not worth accepting, if many legacies were bequeathed. Some- 
thing was effected by these statutes, but evasions took place, and 
there is no reason to think that the wealthy classes were led to 
reform their ways. 

295. It has been remarked that the only check upon the 
sovran power of Assemblies lay in the necessity of avoiding all 
flaws in the reUgious part of the proceedings. Here was an 
opening for the governing nobles to exert some control over 
the popular body. Nothing could be done without favour of 
the gods, and the interpretation of signs was in the hands 
of noble augurs. The lore of the augural college had long 
been used on these occasions in good faith. If a strange in- 
genuity had at times been shewn in evading a difficulty, this 
was but a phase of the same temperament that clung to the 
formalities and quibbles of the law. But now, when religious 
beliefs were losing their hold upon educated men, while the 
masses were intensely superstitious, political convenience gave 
a new importance to reUgious rules. Accordingly we find that 
in this period the management of signs from heaven was regu- 



236 Religion. Rationalism [ch- 

lated by statute. The Aelian and Fufian laws, in some way or 
other not clearly recorded, dealt with the matter, probably by 
giving legal force to existing custom. The magistrate saw a sign, 
or had it reported to him ; the augur pronounced on its meaning, 
good or bad. The magistrate had also the right to watch for 
signs, and nothing could be done while he was so engaged. From 
the point of view of the governing class, these powers furnished 
a twofold remedy against the mischievous action of Assemblies 
which were becoming more and more unfit to exercise popular 
sovranty, yet could not be deprived of it. They were meant to 
be obstructive, and in course of time they came to be so employed 
as a party weapon. Not only could action be impeded thereby : 
if a popular leader disregarded these hindrances, he would now 
be breaking laws of the state. His laws, carried in defiance of 
religion, would not be binding on the people. We shall see that 
the Senate, whenever it felt strong enough, assumed the right 
of annulling unwelcome laws on this very ground. 

296. The state religion, with all its punctilious formality 
and scruples, was indeed still a potent force in Roman public 
life. The great conquests of the period might well seem a 
sufficient proof of the power and goodwill of the Roman gods, 
and of the skill of religious experts in bargaining for divine aid. 
Some of the nobles still had a genuine belief in the traditional 
religion : such were Paullus and Cato. In a system the spirit 
of which was little more than legality, it was enough to conform. 
Anything like enthusiasm was only possible in moments of sus- 
pense and fear. Such moments were becoming rare. Conformity 
was tending to become indifference. Meanwhile Roman gods 
were being more and more identified with foreign gods, chiefly 
Greek, and Greek works of art helped on the change. But 
contact with Greeks brought in Greek rationalism, and was fast 
sapping the beliefs of educated men. The superstitious fears 
of the ignorant remained, and could be turned to account in 
politics. And they were thus utilized by the governing class, 
whether they themselves shared them or not. So the observances 
of the state religion were in no danger of disuse : destructive 
criticism of this useful political engine was a private matter. 

297. Greek thinkers had long questioned the truth of the 
popular mythology, and the educated Greeks of this age had as 
a rule no belief in it. Many no doubt, such as Polybius, had a 



xviii] The Bacchanalia 237 

general faith in the moral government of the world, without 
a definite theological system. For the plainer and more prac- 
tical Romans such a position was too intellectual and refined. 
At least their society was not yet educated up to this point, and 
the removal of superstitious fear tended to destroy in them all 
self-restraint. A notable event in the first half of this period was 
the appearance of Euhemerism in a Latin dress. About 315 B.C. 
Euhemerus wrote a book in which he accepted the view that 
the gods were only great men of the past, deified by human 
admiration. Ennius now translated this into Latin, and applied 
its principles in passages of his own works. The simplicity of 
the theory fitted it for reception in Roman minds : that Ennius 
dared to propound it in Rome shews that some were prepared 
to receive it. But these would be more or less thoughtful people ; 
not the choicest natures, who were attracted by Stoicism, nor the 
emotional and weak, whose dissatisfaction with the old religion 
expressed itself differently. The craving for excitement is best 
illustrated by the affair of the Bacchanalia in 186. The old 
worship of the wine-god had been developed into a system of 
mysteries on a Graeco-oriental model. Nightly orgies, immo- 
ralities, murders, were imputed to its votaries. The movement, 
in which women took the chief part, was especially strong in 
the Greek districts of the South and in Etruria, but it was 
widespread in Italy, and found its way into Rome. On receipt 
of sure information the Senate, alive to the danger of secret 
societies, commissioned the consuls to hold an inquiry in Rome 
and through Italy, and to stamp out the evil. But in spite of 
great severities (for numbers were executed) it took some five 
years to put it down. Soon after, the detected forgery of the 
so-called 'Books of Numa,' probably an attempt to smuggle 
foreign notions into Rome, caused further uneasiness. 

298. But it was impossible to shut out Greek influences. 
The Senate instinctively felt that the upsetting of reverence for 
old Roman tradition and custom was dangerous, in fact a 
cutting-adrift from principles that had made Rome what she 
was. In 173 two Epicurean philosophers were ordered to leave 
Rome. In 155 came the famous embassy of the three philo- 
sophers from Athens. In intervals of their business they gave 
lectures, which were well attended by a number of young Romans 
who understood Greek. In these discourses, those of Carneades 



238 Education. Hellenism [ch. 

in particular, there was much to unsettle young minds, for the 
clever statement of arguments for and against current principles 
undermined respect for authority, and left the hearers in doubt 
whether there were such a thing as truth at all. The Senate, 
urged by Cato, settled their business quickly and got rid of them. 
But religion and speculative thought were not the only spheres in 
which Greek influence was felt. Works of Greek art came and 
began to arouse interest. In literature the irresistible Greek was 
dominant. The plays of the freedman Terence, translated or 
adapted from the New Comedy of Athens, belong to the middle 
of this period, and conveyed in pure Latin the naughty morals 
of their originals. In the best society Greek education was the 
mode. A few parents, such as Paullus, Cato, and Cornelia 
mother of the Gracchi, took pains to see that their children 
imbibed culture without corruption. But they were no doubt 
exceptions. Generally speaking, all special studies, such as 
astronomy, were Greek. Cato warned his son against Greek 
physicians and Greek literature, but he had to learn Greek 
himself. 

299. Nothing however was so effective in propagating 
Hellenism as the conversation in private houses. For nearly 
200 years Greek freedom had been precarious or unreal. 
Talented Greeks still abounded, but the public men among 
them were very different from the bold and intense m.en of 
thought and action produced in their golden age. The philo- 
sophers were occupied with questions bearing on practical conduct 
of life, the statesmen with diplomatic expedients and with the 
study of the changes in policy at home and abroad since the days 
of Alexander. The fierce energy and stimulating life of little 
republics was a thing of the past, and the typical Greeks of the 
present age were supple and cosmopolitan. To cultivated Romans 
the company of such men, with their store of new ideas and their 
rich fund of observation and experience, was an intellectual treat. 
Of the social coteries in which able Greeks were welcomed, the 
most famous was the so-called 'Scipionic circle,' the centre of 
which was the genial and accomplished Aemilianus. It included 
orators lawyers poets historians soldiers and men noted for high 
principles and practice. As the elder Africanus had an inse- 
parable friend in the elder C. Laelius, so the younger Laelius 
represented personal attachment in this brilliant company. Two 



xviii] Rural Slavery 239 

distinguished Greeks enjoyed a favoured position among these 
eminent Romans. Panaetius of Rhodes was a Stoic philosopher, 
who had the skill to adapt the stiff principles of his school to the 
practical needs of Roman life. Polybius the Achaean statesman 
was a man of unrivalled experience, to whom the study of politics, 
and not least of Roman politics, was the most absorbing interest 
of his life. Conversation often turned on ethical and political 
subjects. Greek inquirers, these two in particular, had many 
thoughts to offer and problems to suggest. New ideas were 
developed in friendly discussion, and spread beyond the im- 
mediate circle. The effect could not be confined to Scipio 
and his intimates. And there was always the danger that new 
ideas, working in eager minds, might lead hasty men into 
political ventures without sufficient allowance for the practical 
difficulties created by the Roman constitution and past history. 
The reality of this danger was soon to be proved by the careers 
of Scipio's near connexions, the two Gracchi. 

300. Rural economy. There was no lack of great and 
growing evils to tempt a patriot into projects of reform. Of 
domestic slavery as tainting the home life of the rich we have 
spoken. That the use of slaves as gladiators was a horrible evil, 
can hardly be denied. It is on the social and economic evils 
of industrial slavery that it is most necessary to dwell. The 
employment of slave-gangs by contractors for works in Rome 
or elsewhere tended to degrade labour and to drive free labour 
out of the market. Even in skilled work, it was not easy for 
the poor Roman freeman to compete with slaves imported from 
countries of old civilization, trained in arts and trades which 
they practised for the profit of their owners. Such was the 
deadly fruit of empire won in successful wars, and of ancient 
views on the subject of human bondage. But it was on the 
latifundia, the great landed estates in the country, that slavery 
appeared in its worst form. The plantation-system of agriculture 
was spreading fast in Italy, particularly in Etruria and parts of 
the South. It made possible the cultivation of great blocks 
of land by slave-gangs working under slave-overseers. The 
rustic slaves were treated as brute beasts. Some worked in 
chains during the day : all were locked up in foul pens or 
barracoons {ergastula) at night. An overseer was forced to 
exact from them the utmost labour, for to save his own skin 



240 The new agriculture [ch. 

he dared not be merciful. The owner wanted money to spend 
in Rome. Orders must be obeyed, for there was no limit to the 
power of the lord over his human chattels. 

301. The system was not Italian in origin. In Africa it 
had been long normal under Punic rule. The Roman conquest 
made no difference there, unless perhaps by extending it. Its 
prevalence in Sicily we shall see fully proved below. But in 
subject lands its evils did not, at least directly, injure the 
Roman state. In Italy they did, by reducing the number of 
freeholders in large districts. The citizen-soldier who went back 
to his little farm after service in the field of war was becoming 
a rare type. Yet such men had formerly been the mainstay of 
Rome. Nor was it tillage alone that was passing into servile 
hands and being organized on a large scale. There was a ten- 
dency to give up tillage for grazing, and the employment of 
slaves in charge of flocks and herds had a disastrous effect on 
the country side. It was not merely that slaves displaced free- 
men, in winter on the lowland meadows or in summer on the 
hills ; nor that the great herds of the rich monopolized the public 
pastures, driving out the few cattle of the poor. The slave 
herdsman had to carry weapons in order to guard his lord's 
property from wolves and robbers. He became familiar with 
vast stretches of country. Peaceful travellers at times went by, 
and the armed slave was tempted to rob them. Thus the new 
system was a school of brigandage, the curse of rural Italy for 
centuries. Rural police there was none, and neither the owner 
of the slave-brigand nor his bailiff were concerned to protect 
travellers. There were districts not affected by these changes 
in rural economy. The upland peoples of central Italy for the 
most part remained farmer-dalesmen, and in the North, beyond 
the official border, a great and prosperous population, favoured by 
peace, was now growing up in Cisalpine Gaul. 

302. But it seems certain that another change was in 
progress. The growth of corn for market, if ever remunerative 
in Italy, could now, in the face of provincial competition, only 
be made to pay in a few favourably-situated districts. It was a 
better speculation to cultivate the olive and vine. This required 
much skill and patience, and the grower had to be a man of 
capital, able to wait for slow but good returns. Agriculture 
of this sort called for close personal attention, and was best 



xviii] Cato. latifundia 241 

suited to an estate of moderate size. That no small interest 
was being taken in this form of enterprise is clear from Cato's 
treatise on Agriculture, which has come down to us more or 
less complete. This remarkable work tells us many things. In 
particular it leaves no doubt that such estates as Cato had in 
view were worked by slave labour, and that the aim of cultivation 
was simply profit. It would seem that already some landlords 
were building country houses too fine and large for the scale 
of their estates. Cato insists on the wisdom of keeping the 
estate {fundus) [and the country house {villa) in due proportion. 
The owner must visit the farm often, for only the master's eye 
can check mismanagement and waste. The responsibility of the 
bailiff is very great, and he must be kept up to the mark. The 
live and dead stock under his charge makes a long list. What- 
ever is worn out is to be sold off. Cleanliness and forethought 
are most necessary. Household medicine (including incantations), 
instructions for making oil and wine, kitchen receipts, and rules 
for certain religious formalities, find a place in the book. 

303. We do not know whether there were many estates of 
this kind, but we may be pretty sure that few landlords came up 
to Cato's standard in respect of knowledge and energy. Another 
proof of the consciousness that there was something lacking in 
the agriculture of the day is seen in the action of the Senate after 
Cato's death. The Punic libraries found in Africa were given to 
the Numidian princes, but one book, the treatise of Mago on 
agriculture, was kept and translated into Latin. Its technical 
value was recognized later by Greeks. But the Punic system was 
based on slave labour, and Mago's precepts could do nothing to 
arrest the disease that was weakening Italy. The farmer-class of 
the older type continued to decay, and the slave-worked estates 
to grow. That the latifundia were the ruin of Italy, was remarked 
afterwards by Roman writers. The phrase was perhaps too 
sweeping, but in the main true. Rome had now an empire to 
rule, won by the sword. In the past the backbone of her strength 
had been the small farmers, serving in wars at the call of duty, 
men with something to lose, not paupers or mercenaries. This 
period saw a grievous change. The soldier-yeomen were disap- 
pearing, the city-rabble was increasing, and the growing slave- 
population, so far from adding recruits to the armies, was fast 
becoming in itself a source of the gravest danger. 

H. 16 



242 The city mob and its food [ch- 

304. Turning to the city of Rome, we have first of all to 
lament our want of statistics. We have no record of births and 
deaths, of the number of manumissions of slaves, or details of the 
numbers of claimants admitted to the Tribes or excluded by the 
various censors. If the figures of the census are to be trusted, 
there was a fall in the number of citizens registered on several 
occasions in this period. This decrease is probably a fact. Of 
course this gives us no clue to the total (free or slave) 
population resident in Rome. It is clear that the free element 
was not all Roman, and that the Roman element consisted largely 
of persons drawn to the city by the great facilities for idleness 
offered by urban life. A chief attraction was the regular supply 
of cheap corn. We have seen that the government was forced 
to take this matter in hand after the second Punic war. The 
aediles had to provide the people with corn at half the market 
price or less. The system became normal, and the state was 
burdened with an ever-increasing charge. The mob of state- 
paupers grew, and demagogues could always win cheap popularity 
by proposing to reduce the price further. Whatever industrial 
life there was among the poorer citizens was fatally discouraged, 
and later, when the distribution of corn became gratuitous, rich 
men were not loth to manumit slaves whose maintenance as 
freedmen was borne by the state. In this period it is a fair 
guess that the citizens (if any) who left Rome to join the citizen 
colonies were the pick of the poor, and that the worthless in 
general remained. 

305. For keeping these idle and indigent voters in a good 
humour, amusements on a grand scale had to be found. The 
established shows or games of Rome were some of them very 
ancient. All were connected with religious festivals. The new 
tendency was to increase their duration and splendour. The 
cost was becoming enormous, and we have seen how they were 
being used by ambitious men for political purposes, and the 
provincial extortions to which they indirectly led. But there 
were exactions of a direct kind. Provincials, dependent kings, 
even Italian Allies, were pressed to contribute to the cost of 
shows provided by influential men, and no orders of the Senate 
availed to stop the practice. The victims were ' free ' to refuse — 
and to take the consequences of a noble Roman's enmity. The 
splendid triumphal processions after the wars of this period, and 



xviii] Shows. Buildings 243 

the special games held by generals in fulfilment of vows made in 
the field, all contributed to raise the standard of popular expec- 
tations, and so to promote extravagance in the regular official 
festivals also. Horse and chariot races were old traditional events. 
Dramatic shows followed, and were regular since 240, when Livius 
Andronicus began to exhibit. The novelties added later were 
mostly importations from eastern lands, such as performances of 
Greek athletes, singers, dancers, and so forth : also the wild beast 
fight {venatio), the animals for which were procured from abroad. 
The military show {decursio) of special evolutions by picked men 
was another of these varieties. Some of the shows were demoral- 
izing, but the actresses were slaves, indecent to order. Worst of 
all were the gladiatorial shows in which trained slaves killed each 
other. These were private affairs, part of funeral ceremonies, held 
according to very ancient notions in honour of the dead. But the 
public were freely admitted, and these entertainments became the 
most popular of all. In this period they became common and 
lavish. In 174 we hear of one lasting three days, in which 
37 pairs of swordsmen fought. There were no permanent theatres 
or amphitheatres ; seats or stands were temporary structures of 
wood. The regular place for shows was the Circus, but gladiators 
fought in the Forum. The only serious objection to any of these 
exhibitions was that felt by the Senate on the score of expense, 
and this referred only to the public shows, the cost of which was 
partly borne by the state. 

306. The outward aspect of the city in this period was 
probably still very homely, though a good deal had been done 
since the great Punic wars. The chief streets were paved with 
blocks of lava {silex). The piers of a new bridge over the Tiber 
were built in 179, and the arches added in 142. A quay at which 
vessels could discharge cargoes was built in 193, and paved in 174. 
In 179 an attempt to construct a third aqueduct failed through the 
opposition of a landlord whose estate was in the way, but in 144 
the aqua Marcia was built. Public Halls (basilicae) were a public 
convenience, serving as Exchanges and as places for the courts 
of law. We find three erected (184, 179, 169) in this period. 
The number of temples was increasing, and we begin to hear of 
arches and a public colonnade. But splendour was not the mark 
of the buildings of the age, nor were Roman works up to Greek 
artistic standards. The Greek statues, spoils of war, were probably 

1 6 — 2 



244 Habits. Literature [ch. 

a great contrast to their surroundings. Private dwellings of course 
made up the bulk of the city, and these must have increased con- 
siderably with the increase of the city population. But, so far as 
we know, the domestic architecture did not add to the dignity or 
brightness of the streets. Even the houses of the rich presented 
a dull front. Any improvement in comfort or elegance within 
was hidden by the plain and solid wall facing the street, pierced 
by a single door. The dwellings of the poor, mostly on the low 
ground, were surely mean enough. The age of high buildings 
was not yet come, but there is reason to think that upper storeys 
of wood were now commonly added to the ground-floors of 
unbaked brick. The latter gave way in floods, the former 
suffered from fires. We have recorded instances of both these 
dangers. Fire-risks indeed tended to become greater, for the 
quantity of wood in benches and stalls, or brought into the city 
for temporary erections, was ever on the increase. 

307. We have a few details to indicate the change in the 
habits of the people, chiefly among the upper classes. Scipio 
Aemilianus set the fashion of a daily shave. The practice of 
washing the whole body daily was coming in. It may be that 
public baths were started in this period, but certainly not yet as 

free luxury for the masses, and in any case they were very 
simple affairs. Baking, formerly a household duty of women, 
was becoming a specialized trade. Only the rich had the room 
and the domestic staff to do such things comfortably at home. 
A doubtful story suggests that the corrupting example of rich 
men's banquets led to drunkenness among the poor. This may 
be only an exaggerated account, due to some fervid reformer. 
But that gluttony and wine-bibbing were now established in Roman 
society is doubtless true. 

308. The literary movement of the age was very important 
in many ways. It was still inspired by Greek models, and trans- 
lations and adaptations went on. Plautus did most of his work 
in this period, and he was followed by others, such as Terence. 
Pacuvius and Ennius did the same in tragedies, and Accius 
somewhat later. There was however a beginning made of an 
independent kind. Titinius Pacuvius and Accius produced plays 
the scene of which was laid in Italy, or the plots drawn from 
Roman history or legend. But these efforts did not result in 
the creation of a true Roman drama. Of Ennius and his great 



xviii] Cato. Lucilius 245 

historical poem I have spoken above. Latin in fact was becoming 
a literary language, the verse-writers leading the way. But the 
great step in advance was the foundation of a Latin prose. The 
use of Greek for historical narratives was still in fashion, but Cato 
wrote in Latin. His work Ortgines, treating of the early history 
of the Romans and other peoples of Italy, set an example soon 
followed by others, among them Piso the author of the Calpurnian 
law. A number of great lawyers too lived in this period and 
promoted the progress of jurisprudence, beyond all others a 
Roman study. But nothing was more flourishing, or more 
important in the history of Roman literature, than oratory. 
Only a very few fragments remain, quoted by later writers, but 
many of the speeches of this time were preserved, and we have 
the testimony of Cicero. Public men in Rome had to deliver 
their opinions in the Senate, to address mass meetings now and 
then, not to mention pleading for clients in the courts. So oratory 
began to be cultivated. The next period was its golden age, from 
the Gracchi to Cicero. At present it was the ornament of a dis- 
tinguished man, not a gift by which a man could rise to distinction. 
In this department too Cato made his mark, but he was only one 
of a considerable number. 

309. It was surely a great stimulus to literature when it 
began to concern itself with public questions and public characters. 
Intensity of feeling gave it warmth and vigour. And this not only 
in the form of speeches preserved as party pamphlets. We know 
next to nothing of the occasional pieces {saiurae) produced by 
Ennius. But in the latter part of this period there flourished 
a man whom Roman tradition regards as the true father of Satire, 
the one branch of literature claimed by Romans as their very own. 
C. Lucilius was a native of Suessa Aurunca, a Latin colony, but 
he may have been a Roman citizen. He was a friend of Scipio 
Aemilianus, and a member of the Scipionic circle. He served 
in Scipio's bodyguard at Numantia, and his chief had no more 
devoted admirer. Though his writings belong to the next genera- 
tion, he was in spirit a contemporary of Aemilianus (185 — 129) 
whom he outlived by some 27 years. From that eminent but 
politically ineffective man he perhaps caught the combination of 
hating corruption and shrinking from reform. In his satires 
{sermones, talks) he dealt out praise and blame, especially blame, 
with a free hand. The form of his poems varied greatly ; also the 



246 The new Rome [ch. xviii 

metres, but he ended by preferring the hexameter. He boldly 
lashed the vices follies and affectations of private life, and referred 
to persons by name with a freedom envied by his literary successors. 
He was wealthy, and himself apparently a very free liver. While 
keenly alive to the defects of the world around him, he seems to 
have distrusted change. At least in public affairs he wrote as a 
warm partisan, and his leader Scipio was opposed to the Gracchan 
movement. It is a pity that we have nothing but fragments of 
his satires, for it is certain that they presented a lively picture of 
Roman life in the middle of the second century B.C., drawn from 
the inside. He wrote as a Roman of Romans, and it is interesting 
to note that he, like some others of the day, was concerned to 
maintain the purity of the Latin tongue. 

310. We have now passed in review the influences, political 
social intellectual moral and economic, that were working in the 
Roman state and empire, changing the character of the govern- 
ment and people. Outwardly and nominally all things remained 
the same as before 200 B.C. Inwardly and vitally the Rome of 
133 B.C. was a new Rome, and the relation of the central power 
to Allies and subjects was so changed as to be full of difficult 
problems. Men of the time, in Rome as in other states and other 
ages, were not prophets. Yet there were some who saw that all 
was not well, though they could not guess what a long and terrible 
period of revolution was coming. Thorough reform was urgently 
needed, but to succeed in reformation a power was needed, not 
only irresistible but continuous. And the constitution in its 
present working was in this respect weaker than it had been two 
centuries before, during the struggle for the Licinian laws. The 
power needed could not be got peaceably. So we must not 
wonder that Laelius in 151 dropped his project of land-reform, 
the thorniest question of all. Men feared to attempt reforms, 
and the majority, for their own present comfort, were only too 
ready to let things drift from bad to worse. How strong the 
constitution of the Republic still was, had now to be proved by 
the length of time that it took to overthrow it. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE SICILIAN SLAVE-WAR 134—132 B.C. 

311. The arbitrary division of periods at the years 134 — 3 
is a mere matter of convenience. In 134 a war broke out in Sicily 
the horrors of which were an awful illustration of the evils now at 
work in the Roman world. Local slave-risings had occurred in 
Italy in 198 and 185. They had been suppressed, and the danger 
was well known. In recent years there had been trouble in Sicily 
also, not to mention small outbreaks or conspiracies elsewhere. 
But the Roman government, slack and dilatory as usual, took no 
proper precautions. In the end they had to employ consuls with 
consular armies, and the Sicilian rebellion was only put down in 
132, after vast destruction of property and shedding of blood. 
But the causes of evil were not removed; this event registers 
the effect of misgovernment in the past, and prepares, us for 
that which was to come. 

312. The war brings to our notice several classes of people 
in Sicily. Roman capitalists, favoured by their right {commerdum) 
of acquiring property in any part of the Roman dominions, now 
held much of the land. Some of these would be non-resident. 
Sicilians of a few privileged communities enjoyed the same right 
within the province, others only within the territories of their own 
communities. These Sicilian landlords would be all or mostly 
Greeks or half-Greeks. The above had one thing in common ; 
they were slave-owners, and needed protection, surrounded as 
they were by an immense population of hardy and discontented 
slaves. There seem to have been also a number of poorer 
Sicilians, of whom some still farmed small holdings. The spread 
of great slave-worked estates would surely tell against these men, 
as the same system had been ruining small farmers in Italy 



248 Sicily and the slave-war [ch. xix 

They had no reason to be content with the present state of 
things. It is probable that there were also a good many landless 
poor, though the numbers of the free population can hardly have 
been as great as they had been in better days. For the Cartha- 
ginian plantation-system of agriculture was now extended all over 
the island. Money was drained away. The great cities had never 
recovered their old prosperity. Some had been destroyed utterly; 
others were shrunken, as Syracuse and Agrigentum. 

313. It was at Enna, a strong hill-town in the middle of 
Sicily, that the first outbreak occurred. Some slaves rose, mas- 
sacred wealthy masters, and seized the town. They were mostly 
patient orientals from Syria, only roused to vengeance by great 
brutality. Eunus their ringleader was a Syrian, skilled in divina- 
tion and jugglery. Him they made their king, and he set up a 
court of the oriental pattern. The rustic slaves rose in thousands. 
Small Roman forces were routed, and the arms captured were 
added to those seized or made at Enna. A second rising took 
place in the West, and the two chiefs did not fall out, but com- 
bined. In a short time a great army was formed, which is said 
to have reached a total of 200,000 able-bodied men. The leaders 
checked devastation, with a view to supplies. In 134 the consul 
C. Fulvius Flaccus seems to have been unable to retrieve the pre- 
ceding defeats. The rebels held most of the island. In 133 Piso 
(the author of the Calpurnian law) made some progress, and left 
to his successor an army in better heart. In 132 P. Rupilius was 
able to capture the strongholds of the slave-power. Enna fell, 
rebel bands were hunted down. Those taken alive were tortured 
or crucified. A commission under Rupilius reorganized the pro- 
vince by a fresh charter {lex Rupilid). New slaves took the places 
of the old, and things went on as before. 



CHAPTER XX 

TIBERIUS GRACCHUS 133 B.C. 

314. While Scipio was engaged in destroying Numantia, and 
the Sicilian slave-war was causing grave uneasiness nearer home, 
the city itself was the centre of a disturbance the momentous 
consequences of which none could then foresee. Among the ten 
tribunes for 133, who entered on ofi&ce loth December 134, was 
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the elder son of the consul and 
censor of the same name by his wife Cornelia, daughter of Scipio 
the conqueror of Hannibal. He was a man of 30, and had served 
abroad with distinction. He belonged to the best society in Rome, 
and was closely connected with Scipio Aemilianus. In tempera- 
ment he was quite unlike that eminent man. His education, 
guided by his noble mother, had been mainly conducted by Greek 
tutors from whom he learnt high principles, and doubtless imbibed 
an admiration for the Reformers famous in the history of ancient 
Greece. But the circumstances of political life in the little Greek 
republics were widely different from those with which a Roman 
statesman of this age would have to deal. The problems to be 
faced were now far more complicated and vast. Most of the 
leading men were interested in the continuance of present abuses, 
or timidly averse to change. Therefore a reformer must not 
reckon on the support of the Senate. The Assemblies were 
already so far degenerate that no steady and loyal backing could 
be relied on from them. The whole tendency of law and custom 
had long been to weaken the yearly magistracy and make it more 
and more into a succession of average men, cramped by the Senate 
at home and insufficiently controlled abroad. Thus there was no 
means of dealing with problems the solution of which would in 
any case require the work of years. Even a tribune could not 



250 Tiberius Gracchus [ch. 

hold office two years running, and of a succession of tribunes to 
keep up a continuous movement for reform there was no prospect 
whatever. 

315. Yet Gracchus, either not fully conscious of dangers 
ahead, or too hopeful of overcoming them, boldly proceeded to 
grapple with the most difficult and complex problem of the day, 
the land-question. To get any notion of this we must look back 
into the past, and bear in mind that we are not speaking of private 
property but of land owned by the state. The ager pub lieu s of the 
Roman people had been won in the conquest of Italy or forfeited 
to Rome in the Hannibalic war. Out of it a good deal had in 
course, of time been granted to colonists on the foundation of 
colonies, or to individual citizens when a district was settled with- 
out founding a colony. These allotments were private property, 
which the state could not resume. But to the rest, probably the 
larger part, the state had never resigned its claim as owner. Some 
of this state property was regularly leased out by the censors, and 
yielded yearly rents. Some arable land, and a great deal of grazing 
runs {saltus) woodlands etc, were dealt with thus, and to disturb 
so safe a financial resource was out of the question. The land on 
which Gracchus had his eye was that part (probably very large) of 
which the state retained the property {dominium) while individuals 
or communes held it in effective occupation {possessio). It is said 
that such lands had been originally granted on condition of pay- 
ment (according to the kinds of land) of a tithe or quit-rent. But 
in course of time the collection of these dues had been allowed to 
fall into arrear, and they had by this ceased or become nominal. 

316. No doubt the original grants had been matters of favour. 
In some cases a community of Allies had been rewarded by as- 
signing to them a block of land in ' possession,' adjoining their 
own territory. But most of the original grantees had been in- 
fluential Romans, for we hear of this sort of land-grabbing very 
early in the history of the Republic. Centuries had gone by, and 
the neglect of the state to assert its rights had caused the rights to 
be forgotten. Rearrangements of estates had led to the oblitera- 
tion of boundaries, and it was often impossible to tell where the 
private freehold ended and possession began. Money had been 
invested in land, or lent on mortgage, without inquiry into the 
varieties of tenure under which the various parts of an estate were 
held. Such distinctions had come to be ignored as obsolete, and 



xx] and the land-problem 251 

the evidence to justify them had mostly disappeared. Any attempt 
to disturb the present state of things, by investigating titles and 
resuming rights that had been allowed to lapse, was certain to 
arouse fierce opposition, not only from the present possessors 
but from many others also, whose interests would be indirectly 
touched. On the other hand it was true that this appropriation 
of state lands had been carried out in defiance of the Licinian 
land-law of 367 B.C. By that law the amount of land that an 
individual might hold in possession (500 iugerd) was strictly 
limited, and the maintenance of boundaries was necessary to 
prevent evasion. The existing abuse was illegal, but it was in 
nearly all (perhaps all) cases the work of the earlier ^ possessors,' 
to whom the present holders had succeeded by inheritance or 
purchase. Was it wise in the interest of Rome to endeavour to 
upset a system the growth of centuries? The advantages of a 
radical reform could only be guessed : the dangers were sure. 

317. But Gracchus feared no danger, and he traced the 
failure of the Licinian law to the lack of machinery for enforcing 
it. He intended not only to reenact it but to provide a standing 
land-commission, empowered to resume for the state all lands 
illegally held, and to allot the same in parcels to poor citizens. 
Thus he would put the people back on the land, to the lasting 
benefit of Rome. By the time of his entry on office he had 
prepared his famous land-bill, with the help of some of the first 
lawyers of the day. Indeed he did not lack influential support 
at this stage, and with the common folk he was popular enough. 
The question now was, could he peaceably and constitutionally 
carry the law, and on what support could he reckon in case he 
were driven to resort to unconstitutional means ? Further, if he 
carried it by whatever means, could he insure the continuance of 
his policy after he himself ceased to be tribune ? 

318. Of the law we know a few main points. It reenacted 
the limit of the Licinian, but allowed a possessor to hold also half 
the amount (250 iugerd) for each of two sons. It seems that the 
smaller possessors (below 500 iugerd) were not touched, but this 
is not clear. Some compensation to present possessors for unex- 
hausted improvements is mentioned. But whether this was in the 
form of a cash payment is very doubtful. The land still left to 
possessors, after the resumption of excess-amounts, was to be 
guaranteed to them in future free of all dues and claims for 



252 Support and opposition [ch. 

arrears. The law also set up a standing land-commission, with 
power to inquire into cases and to distribute allotments out of 
land resumed on behalf of the state. Power of jurisdiction in 
disputed cases was included either now or at a later stage. The 
publication of the bill at once raised a storm, for the possessors 
were not to be soothed by the concessions offered. Gracchus 
was giving them what in their view was already their own. But 
the tradition of the discontent expressed, and of the harangues 
in which the tribune stirred up the multitude to insist on a share 
of the state land, is so sensationally dressed up that it can hardly 
be accepted as a trustworthy picture of what actually happened. 
We do not know how many of the poorer citizens addressed by 
Gracchus were influenced by genuine land-hunger rather than by 
a general discontent the effect of indigence. 

319. Our authorities speak of a great influx of country folk 
into Rome to support Gracchus. This seems to imply that many 
at least of those who desired allotments of land were rustic citizens 
who hoped to better their present position. Nor is this ■ unlikely. 
Such men would be the first to feel and resent the pressure of the 
great landlords who were squeezing out the small holders, and 
most of them would have sons. Voters of this class would be 
steady supporters of the new policy, and they might well deter- 
mine the votes of a majority of the Tribes, whenever they flocked 
to Rome. But at seasons of urgent farm work they could not well 
leave their farms. It is not clear that there was any other class of 
citizens on whose loyal support Gracchus could safely rely ; for the 
city mob was easily corrupted by various influences, and a leader 
who trusted them was likely to be left in the lurch. In the absence 
of statistics we are driven to guess-work. The above considera- 
tions are at least consistent with the sequel. The opponents of 
the bill were not merely the great landlords and those under their 
influence. The communities of Allies to whom Roman state-land 
had been granted in possession raised an outcry against the harsh- 
ness of disturbing their tenure after all their long and faithful 
service. This was not without effect on the more moderate of 
the nobles, who were conscious that to provoke the already ill- 
treated Allies still further was both inexpedient and unjust. But 
Gracchus had no time to lose, if he meant to get anything done, 
so he prepared to carry the bill. The opposition now induced 
another tribune, M. Octavius, to block it. Gracchus tried in vain 



xxj Gracchus in difficulties 253 

to buy off his ' intercession.' Much debate followed. Gracchus 
used his official powers to stop all public business, and even sealed 
up the treasury. But rioting prevented the voting on the bill, and 
the Senate would do nothing to help him. At last he was driven 
to take an unconstitutional course. He declared that Octavius, 
by thwarting the people's will, had betrayed his trust. He called 
upon the Tribes to depose their unfaithful servant. The Tribes 
voted for deposition. The first step in the Roman revolution was 
thus taken ; it remained to abide the consequences. 

320. The bill now quickly became law. A new tribune was 
put into the place of Octavius. A commission of three was ap- 
pointed. The three were Gracchus himself, his brother Gaius, 
and his father-in-law Appius Claudius. The rural voters went 
home, and the tribune was left to face a storm of calumny and 
spite. And now came the news that Attalus IH king of Per- 
gamum was dead, and had left his kingdom and treasure to the 
Roman people. Gracchus at once prepared to take the matter 
out of the hands of the Senate, by a bill for appropriating the 
treasure to meet the expenses of stocking the new land-allotments. 
The encroachments of the popular tribune were beginning to 
alienate many supporters. Romans were hardly ripe as yet for 
the methods of Greek demagogues. His enemies worried him 
fiercely, most of all on the matter of Octavius. He was driven 
into the weak position of justifying his action in a public speech. 
By slanders and heckling he was made to appear as aiming at 
unconstitutional power, and in this charge there was only too 
much truth. But he had gone too far to stop. Immediate re- 
election was his only chance of effecting reform, and this meant 
breaking another rule of the constitution. The summer elections 
were coming on, and the rural voters were busy. Gracchus was 
in a fix. He strove to win the support of the resident voters by 
a number of proposals of a demagogic kind. He seems by such 
despairing efforts to have regained some popularity, but not to 
have aroused enough enthusiasm to overawe his bitter enemies. 

321. At the election, voting for Gracchus was stopped by 
the squabble that took place over an objection to his eligibility. 
An adjournment followed. The tribunes were evidently unwilling 
or afraid to back up their leader. A party-fight was now in 
prospect. The next morning Gracchan partisans occupied the 
Capitoline temple. The Senate met conveniently near, and the 



254 The end of Gracchus [en. xx 

great majority of the members, headed by P. Cornelius Scipio 
Nasica the chief pontiff, only waited for a chance of intervening 
with effect. They had armed their slaves and dependants, 
meaning to use force. The voting was again stopped by a riot; 
the tribunes fled. Then Nasica and his band of furious senators 
led their followers into the Capitol yard and fell upon the ill-pre- 
pared Gracchans, of whom with clubs and stones they slew 300 or 
more, among them Tiberius Gracchus. Nor did religious senti- 
ment respect the corpses of the dead. They were cast into the 
river. Roman politics had come to this pass, that a precedent 
had been set for massacre as a means of party-strife. And it was 
the rich landlords that had set this precedent, in defence of their 
privileges against a movement for reform. 

322. The massacre was followed up by the appointment of 
a judicial commission to inquire into the complicity of survivors 
in the designs of Gracchus. Some are said to have been outlawed 
by this court. His Greek tutor Blossius had friends on the com- 
mission, and escaped. But he left Rome and went to "join the 
rebellion in Asia. It is clear that the nobles did not feel strong 
enough to defy public feeling. Men mourned for Gracchus^ and 
shewed such hatred for Nasica, that a pretext was found for send- 
ing him on a mission to Asia, where he soon after died. Nor were 
the new laws directly attacked. The vacant place on the land- 
commission was filled by the election of a friend of Gracchus, 
P. Licinius Crassus. In 132 Scipio Aemilianus returned from 
Spain. An opportunity was found to draw from him an opinion 
on the Gracchan affair. He plainly disapproved his brother-in- 
law's projects and condoned his murder. We are told that the 
common people were disgusted with him. This seems to indicate 
that the Sempronian land-law was really a popular measure, and 
the Roman mob perhaps still capable of some genuine land-hunger. 
Anyhow Scipio's attitude made him the associate of the violent 
and selfish nobles, the tool of a clique with which he could have 
little or no sympathy. 

Such in brief is the story of Tiberius Gracchus the Reformer, 
the record of which leaves only too many points open to serious 
doubt. 



CHAPTER XXI 

THE INTERVAL 132—123 B.C. 

323. After the death of Tiberius Gracchus in 133, more 
than nine years passed before Gaius Gracchus could take up 
and extend his brother's projects. In this interval things were 
moving on both at home and abroad, not for the better. A 
short narrative will shew that the situation in 123, as compared 
with 133, was less favourable to any peaceable and effective 
reform. 

324. In the East, the bequest of the Pergamene kingdom 
seemed to promise new and profitable spheres of activity both 
for noble governors and for enterprising capitalists. A Province 
called Asia was to be formed out of countries notoriously rich. 
No resistance was expected. The people were to be ' free ' ; 
that is, to have no more kings, but to be dominated by Roman 
interests. But a certain Aristonicus appeared as pretender to the 
throne of Pergamum, and drew away many after him. Repelled 
by the Greek cities of the coast, he raised an army of slaves and 
barbarians inland, and withstood the forces of Rome for about 
two years. A large part of these forces consisted of contingents 
furnished by the kings of Bithynia Paphlagonia Pontus and 
Cappadocia, for Rome drew upon her own resources as little 
as possible. There was serious fighting. P. Licinius Crassus, 
consul in 131, was defeated and fell in battle : Ariarathes of 
Cappadocia also died fighting for Rome. In 130 M. Perperna 
brought the war to an end, but it was Manius Aquilius (consul 
129) who presided over the following settlement. The after- 
effects of the Gracchan affair are visible in this war. The 
Greek Blossius killed himself in despair after the defeat of 
Aristonicus. Crassus, though chief pontiff after Nasica's death, 



256 Province Asia. Advance into Gaul [ch. 

was appointed to command in Asia, though Scipio wished for 
the post. The matter was decided by the Assembly, and the 
influence of the Gracchan party surely contributed to the result. 

325. The boundaries of the new province Asia had no 
doubt been fixed by the Senate in general terms, leaving dis- 
cretion to the commissioners in dealing with the further districts. 
Not to annex too much, but to reward client-kings with territories 
of doubtful present value, was a practice well established. So a 
wide region was added to Cappadocia. The district known as 
the Greater Phrygia was important from its position and wealth. 
Nicomedes of Bithynia and Mithradates IV of Pontus both 
wanted it. The latter got it, having it was said bribed Aquilius. 
But he did not keep it long. The award was challenged in 
Rome as the needless sacrifice of a valuable property. It seems 
that before this king's death in 120 the concession was with- 
drawn, and another safe outlet found for Roman capital. For 
the present Asia included Mysia Lydia and Caria, with most of 
the adjacent islands. 

326. In the North and West there were a few movements 
worth noting. In 129 the consul C Sempronius Tuditanus made 
a campaign in northern Illyria, probably to keep the peace of the 
Adriatic and secure the route to the East. In Sardinia a rebellion 
in 126 was not put down till 124. Gaius Gracchus served there 
as quaestor. He did as his brother had done in Spain, winning 
the confidence of the natives and being otherwise helpful. So the 
Senate, in order to keep him away from poHtics, continued the 
consul L. Aurelius Orestes in command. This meant by custom 
the detention of his quaestor, but Gracchus saw through the trick 
and returned to Rome in 124. In the South of Transalpine Gaul 
the Romans again intervened to protect their old ally Massalia. 
This time also the enemy were a Ligurian tribe, the Salluvii or 
Salyes, in the country north of Massalia and east of the Rhone. 
In 125 the consul M. Fulvius Flaccus defeated them, and by 123 
they were no longer a menace to the Massaliots. The land-route 
to Spain was now safer, and a step was taken which indicates that 
the possibility of a forward policy was now in view. In 122, at a 
spot behind the Massaliot territory, where there were some hot 
springs, the proconsul C. Sextius founded a military station called 
Aquae Sextiae (Aix en Provence). In 123 the consul Q. Caecilius 
Metellus conquered and occupied the Balearic isles. Thus the 



xxi] The land- commission 257 

sea-passage to Spain was better secured, and Balearic slingers 
were some of the most useful among the auxiliaries now com- 
monly employed in Roman armies. 

327. To return to Italy. The land-commission was at work 
settling boundary questions, perhaps granting allotments. After 
the deaths of Crassus and Appius Claudius two new colleagues 
were found for C. Gracchus. These were M. Fulvius Flaccus 
and C. Papirius Carbo, both at present hot reformers. Of course 
they, like the Gracchi, belonged to the noble class. In the pre- 
ceding period the nobles had been splitting up into two factions, 
which now became regularly labelled with party-names. The 
genuine aristocrats or ' best men ' {optimates) had a majority in 
the Senate, and were stubborn upholders of senatorial govern- 
ment. The other section, the 'people's men' {popidares), included 
some patriotic reformers, but consisted mainly of men who saw a 
better prospect of pushing themselves forward by courting the 
multitude than by trusting to a share of the patronage of their 
own Order. The revived activity of the Assembly encouraged 
these men, of whom Flaccus and Carbo were specimens. Such 
politicians could not be relied on for consistency, for their 
patriotism rested on no principle strong enough to overcome 
personal interests. We shall often come across these two 
factions, and find them equally selfish and mischievous. 

328. The arbitrary powers of the commission were in 
practice clogged by the delay of possessors to make returns of 
their holdings. To quicken matters, informations were invited. 
A mass of litigation was the result. Many awkward questions 
arose, for in the lax management of former times the evidences 
of previous transactions had often disappeared, and the proof of 
titles was impossible. So the outcry against the commission grew 
stronger, and the AUies who feared to be dispossessed added 
their protests to those of the citizen possessors. Scipio, who 
owed much to the Allies, and disliked the Gracchan policy, now 
interposed. He procured the transference of the judicial powers 
of the commission to a consul. This was in 129. The consul 
soon wearied of the tiresome work ; he went off to the lUyrian 
campaign. The commission were now powerless, and their work 
came to a standstill. Scipio was in fact now a leader of obstruction 
in the interest of the great landlords. In 131 a bill was brought 
forward to revive the old right of reelecting tribunes continuously 

H. 17 



258 Death of Aemilianus [ch. 

Scipio and Laelius got it rejected, but some measure of the kind 
seems to have passed a few years later. 

329. It is clear that in these years there was much friction 
and unpleasantness in Roman public life. The 'best men/ or 
conservative aristocrats, were glad to use Scipio against the still 
vigorous Gracchan party, but they did not share his scruples. It 
was not he, but Metellus^ Macedonicus, that had the ear of the 
Senate or the senatorial juries. At this time the Metelli were 
the most powerful family in Rome. But the Gracchan revival 
of the tribunate was a fact. In 131, when Macedonicus was 
censor, he came into collision with a tribune, and a scandalous 
squabble followed. The position of Scipio and his clique as 
moderate men in a factious society was a difificult one, and the 
great man was now both unpopular and ineffective. One morning 
in the year 129 he was found dead in his bed. There were 
rumours of foul play, but no proof, nor even an inquiry. His 
health had never been strong. So the first Roman of the day 
passed from the scene under mysterious circumstances at a 
critical mom^ent. Neither the selfish rich nor the fanatical re- 
formers seem to have mourned one who was too scrupulous to 
please either. Tradition did homage to his nobility of character, 
but as a statesman he was out of place in a turbulent and self- 
seeking age. 

330. The death of Aemilianus made the treatment of the 
Allies a practical issue in Roman politics. True, they had no 
votes, but their importance to the Roman state was not to be 
ignored. The Gracchan reformers, checked in their agrarian 
scheme, began to try and quicken matters by a proposal to 
make the Allies Roman citizens. It is said that this was meant 
to buy off their opposition to the resumption of state domains 
by the state, and that they were willing to accept the offer on 
those terms. The matter is most obscure : anyhow the Senate 
thwarted the design. In 126 a strong measure was taken to 
prevent anything of the kind. The tribune M. lunius Pennus 
brought forward a bill for the expulsion of aliens {peregrini) from 
Rome. Gaius Gracchus led the opposition, but it passed into 
law. We see that the 'popular' party could not rely on the 
Assembly, at least in such a question as this. Too many citizens 
were jealous of the Allies, and the ' best men ' probably appealed 

I See § 245. 



xxi] The Allies. Fregellae 259 

to this feeling with success. The cause of the Allies was being 
made the plaything of Roman factions. The optimates would 
not grant them the Roman franchise ; the populares would not 
guarantee them perpetual possession of Roman domain-land. 
And now the Allies were further irritated by an insulting law. 
They knew that the strength of Rome depended on their support. 
To some of them the land-question was the most important point. 
All no doubt wished to be no longer exposed to the tyrannical 
insolence of Roman nobles. In using their claims as a party 
weapon, the Roman politicians were playing with fire. 

331. Gracchus went off to duty in Sardinia. Party-spirit 
was very bitter in Rome, and the acquittal of M'. Aquilius by 
a senatorial jury on a charge of extortion in Asia was scandal 
enough to make things worse. Flaccus and Carbo were leading 
the 'popular' reform-party, and the former was elected consul 
for 125. He began office by a bill for granting the Roman 
franchise to the Allies, apparently reserving to those who might 
prefer it the choice of receiving the right of appeal {provocatio) 
instead. This would give them a certain personal protection, 
while leaving them local autonomy. But Flaccus seems to have 
found the opposition too strong. He dropped the proposal, and 
went off to Gaul. The consequences of raising and dashing hopes 
were shewn at once. The Latin colony of Fregellae, founded 
328 B.C., had served the cause of Rome with conspicuous loyalty 
for 200 years. The people were ' Latins,' Roman Allies of the 
most favoured class. They rose in revolt, declaring their secession 
from the Italian confederacy. If they hoped for support from 
other Allies, they were mistaken. The rising was ill-timed, for 
the Allies had not yet fully learnt that they must stand or fall 
together, and that their wrongs could only be righted by the 
sword. The praetor L. Opimius was promptly sent with a force 
to quell the revolt, and he soon took the town by the aid of 
treachery within. Fregellae was dismantled. A citizen colony, 
Fabrateria, was founded near, and took its place as a centre. 
But the shameful story did not end there. The ' best men ' in 
Rome declared that the secession had only been brought about 
through the encouragement of Gracchan sympathizers. Thus 
they hoped to discredit their opponents. A judicial inquiry 
was held, and no effort spared to attach the guilt of treason 
to the popular leaders. 

17 — 2 



26o C. Gracchus tribune [ch. xxi 

332. Among those accused of complicity in the revolt of 
Fregellae was Gaius Gracchus himself, on his return from Sardinia. 
He defended himself with success. But his services in the island, 
particularly his wide influence, shewn in procuring a gift of corn 
for the army from the Numidian king, had only alarmed the 
Senate. The censors of 125 — 4, before quitting office, called 
him to account for coming home before his commander. Again 
he justified himself, by shewing that his conduct had been above 
the ordinary standards of the day. In the summer of 124 he 
stood for the tribunate, and was elected, but only fourth in 
order. We hear of great enthusiasm and crowds of country 
voters, perhaps attracted by the wish to set the land-reform 
going again. But events had strengthened the influence of the 
' best men,' and Gaius was not able to secure the unanimous 
vote of the Tribes. 



CHAPTER XXII 

GAIUS GRACCHUS 124—121 B.C. 

333. The two tribunates of Gaius Gracchus lasted from 
10 December 124 to 9 December 122. The details of his acts 
and the order of events are in many points far from certain, for 
our record is incomplete and comes almost wholly from prejudiced 
sources, hostile to the hero of the story. It is most important to 
bear in mind that the work of a tribune's official year was almost 
unavoidably done in the first half. Contemplated measures could 
be (and were) prepared beforehand in the form of bills, which he 
introduced in the regular way as soon as he entered on office. 
In the course of the summer the tribunes for the next year were 
elected, and their presence could not but weaken the hands of 
men whose successors were already known. The power of im- 
mediate reelection, even if only for a second year, greatly extended 
the range of a tribune's activity ; for the second half of his first 
year, and the first half of his second, were both made effective. 
Therefore the work of Gracchus is better understood if we treat 
it as carried on in three divisions. 

(a) Summer 124 to summer 123, including election, pre- 
paration, popular legislation, and reelection. 

(d) Summer 123 to summer 122, including legislation of a 
more contentious kind, ending in defeat at the election for 121. 

(c) Summer 122 to winter 122, when the end of his office 
was in sight. The attack on his measures, and his death, bring 
us to the early days of 121. 

334. Gaius was as well-meaning as his brother, but more 
eager and impatient, and embittered by the murder of Tiberius. 
That murder had shewn that, to effect anything, he must put an 
end to the usurped supremacy of the Senate. He seems to have 



262 The Sempronian corn-law [ch. 

believed that the Assembly could be trusted to give a hearty and 
consistent support to a popular leader who could and would shew 
it the way to recover and assert its sovran power. The sequel 
proved his error. Selfishness indifference and corruption had 
already destroyed the once solid patriotism of Roman Assemblies : 
the non-attendance of rural voters generally made them unfit to 
express public opinion : even those present did not decide by a 
total majority, but by the majorities, however small, in not less 
than 18 of the 35 Tribes. Thus the power at which Gracchus, 
consciously or unconsciously, aimed was that of a popular leader 
in a Greek Demos ; and there was nothing like a Greek Demos 
in Rome. But the rule of the Senate was to him unbearable, 
and he set to work at once. The judicial commission that sat 
after the murder of Tiberius, and put to death or outlawed his 
adherents, was appointed by the Senate. The Senate itself could 
not act as a court of justice. Therefore this act was one more 
encroachment on the Assembly's sovran power, and must not be 
passed over. The act of the court was strictly the act of its 
president. Gracchus then carried a law declaring illegal any 
sentence affecting the bodily or civil life {caput) of any citizen, 
passed without the leave of the Assembly, and he made it 
retrospective. Under this law P. Popilius Laenas, who had 
presided in the special court, was clearly guilty. Gracchus then 
denounced Popilius before the Assembly, and got him outlawed 
in the regular form. This Sempronian law in fact revived the 
old popular jurisdiction, chiefly in order to ruin an obnoxious 
individual. 

335- It was plain that the leading tribune had the complete 
mastery of his nine colleagues, and that he was for the present 
the ruler of the Assembly, controlling the legislative power. The 
only thing to be done was to let him alone and to wait. But he, 
with great and growing designs, could not have too much popular 
support, and therefore it was probably now that he produced and 
carried his famous corn-law. The state was to buy corn, and to 
retail it to citizens in Rome at half the cost-price. That is, an 
expedient hitherto used for temporary relief in time of dearth 
was to be henceforth a regular system of poor-relief That the 
treasury would be sadly crippled by such a burden was obvious. 
We are told that Gracchus posed as a guardian of the treasury. 
By what sophistry he justified the corn-law on economic grounds 



xxii] The province Asia 263 

we do not know. But it is certain that the direct financial drain 
was but a small part of the evils created or fostered by the law. 
Its pauperizing bounty drew more immigrants into Rome. The 
demand for corn grew, and the state had to buy it in the cheapest 
markets. This encouraged the large-scale agriculture of such 
lands as Sicily and Africa, whence slave-grown corn was easily 
transported by sea. Further, it discouraged most of all the 
remaining small farmers of Italy. In some districts men con- 
tinued to exist as true country-folk, living mainly on the produce 
of their labour. To many, edged out by the pressure of great 
landlords, the increased attractions of the city were more irre- 
sistible than ever. Thus the policy of Gaius Gracchus, in quest 
of sufficient power to eifect reforms, directly tended to nullify the 
agrarian revival, which he well knew to be the first necessity, and 
which had been the first object of his brother. We can see now 
that politics were travelling in a vicious circle, from which there 
was no escape. But at the time this would not be evident to a 
hopeful mind. 

336. The corn-law was followed by other measures the 
order of which is uncertain. The land-law of Tiberius was 
reenacted and the judicial powers probably restored to the 
commissioners. Another law improved the conditions of mili- 
tary service, removing certain grievances. It may be that the 
law dealing with the province of Asia belongs to this stage. 
Evidently this new province was not as yet satisfying the ex- 
pectations of Roman financiers, and they put pressure on the 
tribune, who could not do without their support. The law 
provided that the dues of the province (tithes in kind, customs, 
etc.) were henceforth to be farmed out for collection to Roman 
contractors. The imposts in the several departments would be 
put up to auction : this auction was to be held in Rome. Thus 
a peaceful and very rich country was handed over to be exploited 
by unscrupulous and greedy capitalists. We have seen what this 
meant, and that ordinary governors could not or did not restrain 
the iniquitous exactions of these persons. It was cheaper for a 
governor to risk a prosecution in the court of repetundae, and to 
buy his acquittal, than to face the bitter hostility of the whole 
body of financiers in Rome. Gracchus surely knew that he was 
dooming millions of the human race to utter misery. But we 
must judge him by the standard of his own day. In ages of 



264 Public works. Reelection [ch. 

civilization based on slavery, the voice of humanity could seldom 
find a hearing. Even to the best of Romans the claims of the 
human race seldom meant more than the claims of Roman 
citizens. We have also an obscure reference to some measure 
for insuring that public trials should not be used as a means 
of ruining men, Romans of course. This probably refers to some 
clause or law to check judicial commissions, such as that which 
condemned the followers of his brother. 

337. By the summer of 123 Gracchus had a number of 
enterprises in full swing. Among these we hear particularly 
of the granaries {horrea Sempronia) built for the storage of 
corn. But his best work was done in improving communica- 
tions. New roads were made for economic rather than strategic 
purposes. Old ones were better levelled and constructed, and 
provided with better milestones and bridges. Over a host of 
engineers contractors and other subordinates the tribune exercised 
a general supervision. The amount of business transacted by 
him caused general wonder. The tribunate had never been 
meant for an office to undertake the direction of public affairs ; 
but Gracchus, by his power over the Assembly, could procure 
any extension of his own authority as need arose. He was the 
first man in Rome for the moment^ and his enemies did not omit 
to suggest that he was a tyrant-demagogue aiming at monarchy. 
What happened was that he procured the election of his nominee 
C. Fannius Strabo to the consulship, defeating Opimius who 
destroyed Fregellae. He was himself again elected tribune, and 
with him his friend Flaccus the consul of 125, now home from 
Gaul. 

338. The next important measure was most likely the law 
dealing with the jury-courts. Gracchus needed the support of 
an influence that he could play off against the irreconcileable 
hostihty of the Senate. This could only be found in the wealthy 
non-noble class, the so-called ' knights ' [equites). They were now 
simply a class of capitalist speculators, the younger men of whom 
still furnished officers to the army : the old corps of Roman 
citizen cavalry was no longer employed in the field. We have 
seen how powerful this class, numerous and used to cooperation 
in companies, was in public life. Gracchus had already handed 
over Asia to their mercies. He now gave them the means of 
preventing any interference with their extortions. The new law 



xxii] The jury-law. Colonies 265 

took away from the senators the right of sitting on juries, and 
gave it to the 'knights.' Henceforth a governor, who from what- 
ever motive checked the iniquities of the revenue-farmers abroad, 
was liable to be put on his trial before a jury of men whose first 
object was to screw an income out of enterprises of this very kind. 
Gracchus is said to have denounced the scandalous acquittals of 
guilty governors by senatorial juries. But the equestrian juries 
were no better. What he did effect was to weaken the Senate. 
The law was only carried with great difficulty, so strong was the 
opposition. But there were henceforth two privileged Orders 
recognized by statute, for the Knights were now a regular Order 
or rank. And the struggle of these two Orders for the control 
of the public courts, in order to use the privilege of judgment 
as a means of party vengeance or private gain, became a leading 
political issue in the revolutionary age. To win a momentary 
advantage Gracchus had done lasting harm. But he was for 
the moment supreme. Even the preparation of the first list 
of the new indices was not left to a praetor, but entrusted to 
the tribune. Yet there was no guarantee that, having carried 
so much legislation, and disturbed so many interests, he would 
remain in power long enough to bring his reforms into practical 
working. 

339. After this open defiance there could be no accom- 
modation between the tribune and the Senate. Even the known 
supporters of Gracchus in the House began to draw back. To 
keep up his popularity he seems now to have taken up colonial 
projects. We hear nothing of the doings of the land-commission, 
and the foundation of citizen colonies (if places could be found) 
may well have been a more attractive proposal than the offer of 
isolated farms. Capua and Tarentum were suggested, and there 
was public land round both of them. The design on Capua was 
dropped, perhaps because of the objections to it on financial 
grounds. To turn out the present tenants of the ager Campanus 
meant the sacrifice of their rents, one of the safest revenues of 
the Roman state. To Tarentum colonists were actually sent, 
and the city officially named Neptunia. Little is known of this 
matter. But the Greek character of Tarentum was at all events 
not materially altered. The scheme for a transmarine colony at 
Carthage was perhaps somewhat later. Meanwhile the year 123 
wore out, and in December Gracchus began his second tribunate 



266 Competition of Drusus [ch. 

with new colleagues. Among these was M. Livius Drusus, a 
much-respected noble, in whom the Senate found an instrument 
for offering an artful indirect opposition to the policy of Gracchus. 
The plan was to outbid the reforming demagogue by showy pro- 
posals, not meant to be seriously carried out. His popularity 
once undermined, Gracchus must either submit or take the 
consequences. 

340. The chief points of the Livian laws are best seen by 
placing them alongside the Sempronian laws with which they were 
meant to compete. 

Gracchus. Drusus. 

2 colonies of respectable citizens. 12 colonies of indigent citizens. 

Holders of allotments under the The quit-rent of the allotments to 

land-law to pay a quit-rent to the be remitted, 
state. 

Beside these, Gracchus was preparing a bill for granting the 
Roman franchise to the Latins. Drusus met this by a bill to 
grant the Latin soldier the same protection against cruel military 
punishment that the citizen enjoyed. Thus he would remove a 
notorious grievance, while the present Roman citizens would 
retain their exclusive right to the perquisites of citizenship. 
The programme of Drusus was more attractive to the Roman 
populace. Bit by bit the sham demagogue weakened the 
position of the real one. Gracchus could not block the pro- 
posals of his colleague without further loss of popularity. 

341. A law for founding a colony on the site of Carthage 
was followed by one^ for reorganizing the court of repetimdae 
and improving its procedure. Conviction was to be followed 
by restitution of twice the amount extorted. Senators were 
expressly excluded from the juries ; and some hold that this 
law, and no other, was that by which the change of jurors was 
effected. By another law (lex Sempronia de provinciis consula- 
ribus) Gracchus deprived the Senate of a means of putting 
pressure on consuls year after year. The Senate assigned the 
departments to the magistrates after each election. Some of 
these provinciae were far more desirable than others. By naming 
undesirable posts as reserved for the consuls of the coming year 
the Senate could keep the best things out of the reach of a 

^ lex Acilia repetundarum. See § 443 below. 



xxii] Provinces. The Allies 267 

consul whom they wished to punish for contumacy. The new 
law wisely left the selection of ' consular ' posts in the hands 
of the Senate, but required it to be made in each year before 
the elections for next year were held, while it was still uncertain 
for whom the posts were being selected. The Senate was still 
able to leave a man in command as proconsul, by not assigning 
his province to a successor. Surely this moderate measure shews 
us the tribune at his very best : it was not mere playing to the 
mob, but a practical reform. It is said that he designed to give 
the Assemblies a more democratic character. The plan was to 
do away with the privileges of the property-classes altogether in 
the Centuriate Assembly. The first-voting Century {praerogativd) 
was still chosen by lot from the First Class. Henceforth it was 
to be chosen from any Class, and the whole order determined by 
lot. Whether Gracchus actually carried a law to this effect is not 
known. 

342. It was the competition between Gracchus and Drusus 
in the early months of the year 122 that decided the fate of the 
former. To be in earnest was a fatal disadvantage. The most 
awkward question was that of the Allies, how to conciliate them 
without offending the Roman mob. Gracchus had a bill for 
granting the Roman franchise to the Latins, and perhaps the 
' Latin right ' to the other Allies. The Latin communities might, 
if they preferred it, receive the right of appeal instead of the 
citizenship, thus gaining personal protection while keeping their 
local autonomy. The grievances of the Allies were by this time 
notorious, but we have seen that neither Senate nor Assembly 
wished to remedy them by an extension of the franchise. It 
was very difficult for a sincere reformer to get steady support 
for an honest treatment of this question in the teeth of jealous 
prejudices easily roused. Opponents of Gracchus had a fair 
ground for objecting to an influx of Latins at the time of 
voting, and for taking steps to prevent a riot. The absence 
of Gracchus caused delay. He had gone to mark out the 
colony at Carthage. This scheme too was violently denounced. 
Evil omens were eagerly reported. Roman citizens did not 
come forward in sufficient numbers, so the commissioners in- 
vited other Italians. It seems that Roman voters took little 
interest in the colony. The nobles naturally objected to having 
a Gracchan outpost set up in Africa, and the capitalists owning 



268 Failure of Gracchus [ch. 

land in the province can hardly have welcomed the scheme. 
Meanwhile the situation had become worse in the absence of 
Gracchus. Flaccus was alarming people by real or suspected 
intrigues with the Allies. Fannius had joined the opposition. 
Opimius was standing for next year's (121) consulship. A great 
effort was being organized for repealing the law establishing the 
colony at Carthage. Thus in the middle of 122 things already 
looked bad for Gracchus. 

343. A project for planting a large number of citizen 
colonies in Italy was sure to annoy the Allies. But to Drusus 
this mattered not : he was acting for the Senate, not for the 
Allies, and the project was a sham. The proposal to enfranchise 
the Latins was no doubt seriously meant, but it was most difficult 
for Gracchus to commend it to the Roman mob, who now, having 
secured cheap corn, wanted more favours, not for the Latins but 
for themselves. He addressed meetings, and pleaded the cause 
of the Latins bravely. But all his eloquent exposure of their 
wrongs fell flat on the ears of men used to selfishness and un- 
used to philanthropy. When Fannius said ' don't let yourselves 
be crowded out by a mass of new citizens,' this was something 
that spectators of shows could understand. The Senate induced 
Fannius as consul to issue an edict forbidding Allies to come 
within five miles of Rome during the voting on the bill, and the 
tribune found that he had not moral force behind him strong 
enough to enable him to defy the consul. So the hope of putting 
pressure on the Assembly by a great concourse of Latins was 
frustrated, and the bill did not pass. A last vain attempt to 
recover the favour of resident voters, by pulling down the stands 
erected for a gladiatorial show, and so clearing the space for the 
poorer spectators, was made by Gracchus. But he irritated the 
other tribunes, and gained nothing. The elections soon followed. 
Gracchus was not reelected tribune. His enemy Opimius was 
elected consul. The power of Gracchus was virtually ended. His 
opponents made ready to attack his policy, first and foremost 
the law for the colony lunonia on the site of Carthage. On the 
loth December the new tribunes came into office. Notice of a 
bill for repealing the law was promptly given. On the first of 
January Opimius entered office, and an early date was fixed for 
voting on the bill. 

344. We have a very confused and imperfect record of the 



xxii] His death 269 

events that followed. Gracchus, now a mere commissioner under 
certain laws, was sure to have to face a public trial very shortly, 
and it seems that he was prepared for this risk but averse to 
violence. Flaccus and others were for a fight. So the Gracchans 
went to the Assembly with hidden daggers, and a quarrel led to 
the murder of an attendant of the consul. The Assembly broke 
up. Next day the corpse was exposed, and no pains spared to 
rouse public indignation against the Gracchans. Gracchus tried 
to express his horror at the crime : his enemies raised the cry 
that he was interrupting a tribune, traditionally a grave offence. 
The senatorial majority now saw their way to making an end of 
him. The Senate met and passed its 'last order' or 'decree,' 
calling upon the consuls to ' see that the commonwealth took no 
hurt.' When this famous form of words was first used we do 
not know. Its effect was to strengthen the executive power by 
declaring a state of siege. It was supposed to remove for the 
moment the restrictions on the imperium within the city {domi) 
so as to make it equal to that in the field ytnilitiae). It rested 
on no statutory enactment. But some such power was needed in 
great emergencies, and it seems to have been thought constitu- 
tional by all parties. Whatever was done under such authority 
was the act of the acting magistrate, not of the Senate. Could 
he be afterwards called to account ? To this question we must 
recur in a later chapter. 

345. A fight to the death was now inevitable. Men passed 
the night under arms, and next morning Flaccus and the more 
desperate section of the reform-party occupied the Aventine hill. 
Gracchus did not desert them, though he still hoped for peace. 
Negotiations were futile, for the Gracchans would not surrender, 
and the government-party would grant no other terms. So the 
consul led his forces to the assault. We must remember that 
Roman nobles were themselves as a rule fighting men, and that 
each one would be escorted by sturdy slaves, not to mention other 
retainers. Opimius had also some mercenary bowmen from Crete; 
for mercenaries were already a part of the military forces of Rome. 
The mass of the population seem to have looked on at the rout 
and massacre of the ill-prepared Gracchans. We need not relate 
the deaths of the leaders. They died : so did many more ; in the 
battle about 250 fell, and a number were put to death later. 
Mourning was forbidden, the estates of Gracchus and Flaccus 



270 General results of [ch. 

were confiscated, the city was religiously purified. In honour of 
the victory, a temple of Concord was restored by order of the 
Senate. Plutarch tells us that it was regarded as an insolent 
record of civil bloodshed, and that the populace honoured the 
memory of the lost Gracchi. But the Gracchi were gone, and 
their careers had at least proved that it was a fatal error to rely 
on the support of the Roman People. 

346. Did the Roman commonwealth as a whole find itself 
the better for the reform-movement headed by the Gracchi? 
I think not. The tribunate had once more become active, but 
it had never been a good office for governing purposes. In the 
present period its activity was almost an unmixed evil, for the 
tide of tendency was steadily running towards the supremacy of 
military power. The tribunate conferred no imperiuni. Its later 
history is that of fitful and often violent demagogy, and we shall 
see it become the tool and satellite of military leaders. The con- 
sulate, now that the succession of consuls to important provinces 
was made more regular, tended to become a home-magistracy, 
with a provincial government to follow : that is, eventually pro- 
consulship would be more valued than consulship. And the rise 
of great proconsuls was a main cause of the fall of the Republic. 
That the Senate had lost ground as a power in the state is clear 
enough. The nobles seemed to have recovered their dominating 
position, but only by a shameful and clumsy resort to civil warfare. 
The prestige and moral force of the Senate was weakened, yet no 
new and better organ of state policy was found to take its place. 
This, as things now stood, was a sheer calamity. The Assemblies 
were going from bad to worse. The open endowment of the mob 
by the corn-law perpetuated disorder, for the state-paupers became 
more numerous and more worthless, and their votes enabled them 
to insist on their own corruption. That the attempt to recreate 
a race of small citizen-farmers was a failure, the sequel will shew. 
One class alone emerged from the shock of the Gracchan disturb- 
ances with a clear gain. The capitalist Knights, now recognized 
as an Order and armed with the control of the public courts, were 
henceforth well able to make their power felt. But their interest 
seldom coincided with the true interest of the state, and neither 
their present opposition to the senatorial nobles, nor their later 
combination with them, contributed to the health and permanence 
of the Republic. 



xxii] the Gracchan movement 271 

347. If we look beyond the citizen body, to raise hopes 
in the Italian Allies, and then to disappoint them, was surely a 
disastrous result of agitation. The edict of Fannius and the 
fall of Gaius Gracchus proved that neither Senate nor Assembly 
would do justice to those on whose loyal support the Roman state 
depended more than ever. But as yet the Allies had no common 
organization, so the revolt of Fregellae found no imitators. The 
day of reckoning came thirty years later. As to the provincials 
there can be no doubt. The new jury-law changed their position 
for the worse. The class that supplied governors might be de- 
generating, but an honest and kindly governor was not unheard 
of. I know of no suggestion that a Roman money-lender or 
revenue-farmer ever regarded Roman subjects abroad from any 
other point of view than his own immediate profit. Not to shear 
the sheep close was only to leave wool for the next shearer. This 
policy filled private purses, not the Roman treasury, and it reached 
its full perfection under the system of Gaius Gracchus. 

348. It would be unfair to blame the Gracchi for the sad 
result of their exertions. They miscalculated the means at their 
disposal, and paid for the error with their lives. All parts of the 
state were corrupt. In the face of senatorial opposition, a magis- 
trate could only depend on the Assembly, and the Assembly could 
only be managed by continuous and progressive bribery. The 
short tenure of office paralysed a reformer. The unofficial Greek 
demagogue had no place in Rome. Yet the Gracchi both acted 
as if the Rome of their day had been the Athens of Pericles. 
In truth there remained but one possible means of gaining the 
continuous power necessary for effecting reforms. This was armed 
force. This force could not be made effective in mere faction- 
fights. Only the army could overawe opposition, and an army 
must have a leader. With the appearance of such a leader 
republican government would become utterly unreal. It is easy 
enough to see these things now. But to the republican aristocrats 
of the revolutionary period the one thing clear was that they had 
to fight for their privileges. Fight they did, and they were not 
finally beaten till about 80 years after the death of Gaius Gracchus. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

FROM THE DEATH OF C. GRACCHUS TO THE END 
OF THE JUGURTHINE WAR. 121— 105 B.C. 

349. The years included in this chapter form a period of 
great interest. The first part, say 121 — 112, contains the reaction 
against the Gracchan movement, and the wars connected with 
the advance of the Roman frontier in the North. The second 
contains the war with a cHent-prince, and the scandals connected 
therewith, the rise of Marius, and the appearance of Sulla. All 
through the connexion of internal and external policy is close. 
It is a time of transition, in which we see the gradual revelation 
of a dissembled truth, that the real power in the state could no 
longer be grasped by civilians. Marius begins the inevitable 
predominance of military men. 

350. The anti-Gracchan reaction is chiefly remarkable for 
its significant limits. The senatorial leaders did not dare to 
tamper with those parts of the Gracchan policy in which the 
mob or the capitalist equites were seriously interested. A modi- 
fication of the corn-law, carried by the tribune M. Octavius, was 
certainly no reversal of the law, whatever it may have been in 
detail. But the law for a colony at Carthage was repealed. The 
Gracchan land-laws were indirectly set aside by piecemeal legis- 
lation ; not openly attacked, but insidiously undermined. In 1 2 1 
or 120 the clause forbidding the sale of allotments was repealed. 
In 119 or 118 a law forbade further allotments, thus aboHshing 
the commission. It had probably done nothing since the death 
of C. Gracchus and Flaccus. Carbo, the survivor, had come to 
terms with the reactionary nobles, and safe do-nothing men were 
most likely put into the vacant places. Now the state was made 
to guarantee present possessors against future disturbance ; the 



CH. xxiii] The anti-Gracchan reaction 273 

reseived quit-rents were to form a fund towards the provision of 
cheap corn under the corn-law. In n i the final step was taken : 
the quit-rents were abolished, and the ' possessions ' made private 
property. Thus the wealthy could resume their old game of 
absorbing small holdings by purchase, and even hasten the pro- 
cess by annoying their poorer neighbours. They became owners 
of a vast area of what had been ager publicus. The old name 
possessiones remained in general use, attesting the origin of 
numerous large estates, but they were practically freeholds. So 
the result of all the efforts to repeople Italy with free farmers was 
to legalize admitted evils, removing all checks on latifundia and 
slave-gangs. Meanwhile the state lost most of its domains, and 
had to pay for corn-doles to the Roman mob. 

351. So far the optimates had the upper hand of the 
populares, and their victory was illustrated by the treatment of 
some persons concerned in the events of recent years. Opimius 
had put citizens to death without trial, acting under the authority 
of the Senate's 'last decree.' He was brought to trial, defended 
by the Gracchan renegade Carbo, and acquitted. Possibly the 
whole affair was got up with a view to give a public recognition 
to the Senate's assumption of sovran power in emergencies ; such 
certainly was its effect. Popilius, exiled in 123, was now recalled: 
a tribune proposed a bill for the purpose, and the Assembly passed 
it. On the other hand the rising orator, L. Licinius Crassus, 
impeached Carbo for treason, and the ' best men ' could not 
save him. Probably they did not try. He thought it best to 
commit suicide. The death of the hated turncoat was a relief 
to the 'popular' party, but they had no leaders, and for the 
present were helpless. Such was the state of things in 120 — 119, 
but in the latter year the appearance of Gaius Marius in politics 
was a sign of their revival. 

352. Marius belonged to the municipal town of Arpinum, 
the citizens of which had received the full Roman franchise in 1 88. 
His family were farmers of the old sort, thrifty folk, certainly not 
paupers. When Marius went with Scipio to Numantia, he served 
as an eques, and was received with favour at headquarters. But 
he was not rich, and to the last he retained the simple and even 
boorish ways of his youth. He was ambitious, but it was not 
easy for him to rise. He was not at his ease among poHshed 
Roman aristocrats, and they looked down on him. On his return 

H. 18 



274 Marius. External policy [ch. 

from Spain he seems to have given up the land and taken to the 
life of a publicatius, sharing state-contracts. Thus he made money 
and became known to the numerous small capitalists, a connexion 
very important in his later career. He became a hanger-on of the 
Caecilii Metelli, no doubt intending to use the influence of the 
most powerful Roman family of the day for his own advancement. 
With their support he was elected in 120 tribune for the next 
year. It may fairly be assumed that he had some sympathy with 
the Gracchan movements, but he had evidently not compromised 
himself by hasty action. As tribune he was bold enough to force 
through a law to hinder the nobles from putting pressure on their 
dependants. Access to voters while voting was forbidden. He 
had to defy Senate and consuls (one of them a Metellus), and he 
did so. But he opposed a bill for further lowering the price of 
corn in Rome. His independent attitude seems to have lost him 
support, for he could not win the aedileship in 117. In 116 he 
won the praetorship for 115 with difficulty. He was accused of 
bribery, and it was said that his acquittal through equal division 
of votes was only gained by bribing some of the court. In 114 
he governed the Further Spain as propraetor, and is said to have 
done good service in suppressing brigandage. But in the chief 
military operations of these years 120 — no he had no part. 

353. The attention of the Roman government was directed 
to three spheres of activity abroad, (i) the advance into Trans- 
alpine Gaul (2) the Macedonian frontier (3) the secure control of 
the Cisalpine country, not yet incorporated in Italy. The first 
of these was a continuation of the movement already begun in 
defence of Massalia, Rome's old and useful Ally. One object 
was to gain a land-route to the Spanish frontier under Roman 
control. It would also be convenient to hold the seaboard of 
southern Gaul where not already held by Massalia, and so to 
prevent molestation of the sea-route by the growth of local piracy. 
And there was no lack of influences in Rome to promote a forward 
policy. Consuls hoped to win triumphs in wars. Capitalists 
hoped that a Roman advance would lead to the annexation of 
new territories as a field for financial enterprise. So leading men 
of both parties were ready to move on. Roman diplomacy had 
prepared the w^ay in the traditional Roman manner. Rome was 
already allied with the Aedui, a powerful Gaulish tribe. The 
Aedui wanted to get the better of their enemies the Allobroges, 



XXIIl] 



Advance into Gaul 



275 



and could not, the latter tribe being protected by their alliance 
with the Arverni, who dominated a number of smaller tribes, and 
were the leading power of south-central Gaul. The Romans were 
well informed as to the relations of the Gaulish tribes, for Massaliot 
traders knew the country. Through them the Gauls had long 



AEDVI 






LugudunuTnt 



1^ 



.V 



V 



o^' 



,^' 



•,^^ 



,cr'' 



Tolo, 



Traiectus - 
Arelate. 



.vi^ 



^■ 



Forum ItLJiL 



ilcaea 
^AnlipoUs 



\OMASSALIA. 



Southern Transalpine Gaul, shewing the probable line of the road from Italy 
to Spain, avoiding the strip of coast belonging to Massalia. 



been introduced to various appliances of civilized life : Greek 
coins were rudely copied in Gaulish mints. 

354. Rome therefore acted deliberately and with effect. 
In 122 the consul Cn, Domitius Ahenobarbus entered Gaul with 
an army. In 121 he met the advancing AUobroges in the Rhone 
country, and defeated them with heavy loss. The Arverni came 



276 Macedonia. Northern Italy [ch. 

to their aid, but the new consul Q. Fabius Maximus and the 
proconsul Domitius joined forces and gained a crushing victory 
over the combined Gauls. Submission followed, but Rome 
annexed no territory. What she needed was a free hand further 
to the South. The Arvernian king was decoyed into Roman 
power and detained in Italy. We hear of his great wealth and 
of the abundance of gold hoarded in Gaul. This would not tend 
to dull the Roman appetite for annexation. The real aims of 
Roman policy were shewn in the next steps. A road was built 
{via Domiiia), running by way of Aquae Sextiae (Aix) to the 
Rhone. A strip of land, enclosing the Massaliot territory, and 
reaching from the Alps to the border of Spain, was annexed and 
made a Province. In 118 a colony of Roman citizens was 
founded in the West of the new province. It was at Narbo 
(Narbonne), and served as a military and trading centre. Its 
official name was Narbo Martius, and the province was afterwards 
commonly called Narbonese Gaul. The foundation of Narbo 
was a triumph for the ' popular ' party in Rome ; that is, for the 
great financial interest, who overcame the opposition of the 
Senate. 

355. In the years 119— 115 there were small wars, out of 
which Roman nobles contrived to win triumphal honours, in 
Dalmatia and against the tribes of the north-eastern Alps. The 
pretext was of course the pacification of the northern and eastern 
frontier. The defence of Macedonia was a more serious matter. 
There was generally some trouble with the warlike barbarians 
pressing down from the North. In 114 a Roman army was 
defeated with very heavy loss. Later governors recovered the 
lost ground, and pushed back the invaders beyond the Danube. 
After no there was peace for a time, but it was never safe to 
neglect this part of the Roman borders. To return to Italy, the 
recent advance of Rome made it desirable to improve communi- 
cations by land along the Ligurian seaboard, and also between 
that difficult coast and the region of the Po. The road from 
Rome {via Aurelia) led as far as Pisae (or perhaps Luna). Since 
148 the Postumian road had given access from Genua to Cisalpine 
Gaul by a difficult pass. Now in 109 the censor M. AemiHus 
Scaurus undertook a great piece of work. His via Aemilia ran 
from Pisae or Luna through the rocky district to Genua, then on 
to vada Sabata (Vado) on the coast some 30 miles beyond. After 



XXIIl] 



Politics in Rome 



277 



this it turned back northwards, joined the via Postumia at Dertona 
(Tortona) by an easier pass, and thus opened up an alternative 
route to Placentia on the Po. Dertona became a colony. The 
strategic importance of the new road was of course the motive 
for making it. Before ten years had passed, its value was strikingly 
proved in a way perhaps hardly foreseen. But that northern bar- 
barians were on the move, and might become dangerous, was 
already known. 

356. In Rome, where politics were now a struggle between 
two selfish and worthless factions, things were not going well. 







Cisalpine Gaul with Liguria about 100 B.C. Only the river Po and the chief 
roads are shewn. The advance of the boundary of Italy from the Aesis to 
the Rubicon [? 82 B.C.] is indicated. See § 



The rise of Scaurus was a sign of the times. He was a Patrician, 
of a family that had come down in the world. He set himself to 
raise it again by recovering wealth and position. As one of the 
' best men ' he had borne a leading part against C. Gracchus. He 
lost no chance of coming to the front, posing as a virtuous patriot 
of conservative views. Whether he was quite so great a rogue as 
the ' popular ' party thought him, is hard to say. It is certain 
that he made solemn respectability a very paying game in a very 



278 Numidia [ch. 

corrupt age. He was consul in 115, and the censors of that year 
made him 'first man' of the Senate {princeps senatus). This 
place he kept for over 25 years. We have seen that he was 
censor in 109. Though a time-server, he was masterful when 
in office. In 114 there was a grave scandal. Three Vestal 
virgins were said to have misconducted themselves with Roman 
Knights, and the pontifical court was thought to have shewn 
culpable laxity in acquitting two of them. This alarmed the 
superstitious masses. In 113 a special court was appointed to 
deal with the matter, and punishments and public purifications 
followed. In in, the year of the reactionary land-law, a new 
law^ against extortion, the lex Servilia repetimdarum, was carried 
by the tribune C. Servilius Glaucia. That a new law was already 
wanted, was not a good sign, and this law, like its predecessors, 
was ineffective. These few details are enough to shew that we 
need not be surprised to find much evidence of corruption in 
Rome. Let us now turn to the story of the Jugurthine war. 

357. Numidia. To the West of the Roman province of 
Africa lay the kingdoms of Numidia and Mauretania. Both were 
independent, W^ith the latter Rome had as yet no regular re- 
lations. In Numidia, since the days of Masinissa, Roman over- 
lordship was so far recognized that changes in the royal succession 
took place under the approval and guarantee of Rome. But the 
practical freedom of this client-kingdom was not seriously impaired 
by Roman interference. Numidian contingents, by request or 
voluntary offer, served Rome in foreign wars. Roman traders 
and financiers settled and carried on business in Numidia. There 
was no design of annexing the country : that things should go on 
as they were was enough for Roman interests. But Rome as an 
imperial power could not afford to let herself be openly defied. 
Nor would the capitalists now powerful in Rome allow Roman 
business-men to be left helpless at the mercy of a foreign potentate. 
Therefore the Senate would have no easy task in case trouble 
arose in Numidia. To assert the power and prestige of Rome by 
armed intervention would be necessary, and to do this effectively 
grave difficulties had to be overcome. That Rome had no 
standing army was an old difficulty, in fact a part of the Roman 

^ Supposed to have restored to the Knights the complete control of the 
public courts, interrupted by a previous lex Servilia carried by Caepio after- 
wards consul in 106. But this matter is very obscure. 



xxiii] Jugurtha 279 

constitution. A new army had to be created for each war. More- 
over, no sooner had one ordinary consul got his army into trim 
and learnt something of the conditions of campaigning in a strange 
land, than he was superseded by another consul, generally of the 
same ordinary type. Time had not lessened these obstacles to 
efficiency. Meanwhile the Senate itself had deteriorated. Many 
noble members needed money to support their extravagance, and 
could not be trusted to refuse a bribe. No wonder the House 
acted weakly, and sought every pretext for shirking a necessary war. 
358. The relationships in the Numidian royal house are 
best shewn in a table 

Masinissa (died 149) 
L_^ I 

Micipsa Gulussa Mastanabal 
. Ll . I , \ , 



Adherbal Hiempsal Massiva (Jugurtha) Cauda 

Micipsa had outlived his brothers, and was sole king till his death 
in 118. He left the kingdom to his two sons and his bastard 
nephew Jugurtha as joint rulers, hoping that the last would be 
satisfied with a share and that the succession of his own sons 
would be secured. Of course the plan failed. Hiempsal soon 
fell out with Jugurtha, and was murdered. War between the two 
survivors then followed : Adherbal, beaten in the field, fled to 
Rome. The Senate heard his appeal for restoration, but many 
members were bribed by agents of Jugurtha. A commission was 
sent out, probably in 116, instructed to divide the kingdom 
between the two princes. The commissioners gave Jugurtha 
the richer western part. Adherbal received the eastern part with 
Cirta (Constantine) the capital. It was said that this award also 
was the result of bribery. So Jugurtha, confirmed in the view of 
Roman corruption learnt from camp-gossip at Numantia, felt free 
to work his will. He went on provoking Adherbal till war was 
renewed. In 113 Adherbal was again defeated and besieged in 
Cirta. He awaited a reply to an embassy sent for succour to 
Rome. Meanwhile, with the help of resident Romans and others, 
the strong city was stoutly defended. An incompetent embassy 
from Rome, sent to stop hostilities, was coolly dismissed by 
Jugurtha, and the siege went on. Adherbal contrived to send 
another message to Rome, imploring aid and pointing out that 
it must come quickly or Cirta would fall. 



28o Corrupt mismanagement [ch. 

359- At this time (112) the Roman government was nervous 
on account of recent disasters on the northern frontier. The 
Senate's reluctance to engage in a Numidian war was natural, 
and we are told that corrupt members were acting in the interest 
of Jugurtha. Another embassy, headed by Scaurus, was sent to 
warn the king. But he managed to get rid of them somehow. 
Cirta was starved out : terms of surrender were disregarded : 
Adherbal and his garrison, Romans and all, were massacred. 
Jugurtha was master of all Numidia, and he had demonstrated 
the futility of trusting in the protection of Rome. At last some- 
thing practical had to be done. A tribune-elect took up the 
matter and forced the Senate to act. Africa was named as a 
consular province for the next year (iii), and in due course the 
lot assigned it to L. Calpurnius Bestia, consul-elect. He raised 
an army, and in in war began. Bestia had on his staff the 
respectable Scaurus and other nobles. After some successes, 
Bestia consented to negotiate. Soon peace was concluded be^ 
tween the parties, on terms strangely favourable to the king. 
We are told that in this affair also corruption was the true 
explanation of what happened, and we have no good ground 
for doubting it. But Jugurtha had gone too far. The scandal 
roused great indignation in Rome, and in moments of excitement 
the influence of a few corrupt nobles could not check the popular 
wrath. The tribune Memmius carried a motion for an inquiry, 
and for fetching Jugurtha to Rome under safe-conduct. The 
king's evidence was needed to prove the guilt of the culprits. 

360. To understand the position in Rome we must bear in 
mind certain points. The common people and their leaders were 
not sharing the bribes of Jugurtha. The non-noble capitalists 
were angry that men of their own class had been left to their fate 
at Cirta. And it was not Jugurtha's interest to ruin such men as 
Scaurus and Bestia, and thus spoil his own game. How then was 
he to come to Rome and yet not betray his associates ? Roman 
institutions supplied an answer. He came, and he bought a 
tribune. When brought before a mass-meeting and urged to 
make a full confession, this tribune forbade him to speak. The 
activity of the tribunate had not been revived for nothing, and 
popular rage was foiled. Of the consuls for no, Sp. Postumius 
Albinus was to succeed Bestia in command. He wanted a triumph, 
and is said to have prompted Massiva, then a refugee in Rome, 



xxiii] Metellus 281 

to claim the Numidian throne. Jugurtha at once procured his 
cousin's murder. His agent Bomilcar, who had engaged the 
assassin, was brought to trial, and bolted, leaving fifty of the 
king's friends to forfeit the bail. The Senate at last ordered 
Jugurtha out of Italy. War began again, but Albinus could 
effect nothing. He soon had to return to Rome to hold elections 
for next year, and a deadlock in politics kept him there for some 
time. Meanwhile his brother Aulus was left in charge of the 
army. A mismanaged campaign ended with a crushing disaster. 
The survivors were made to pass under the yoke, and Roman 
prestige in Africa was for the present at an end. Rightly or 
wrongly, the consul and his brother were supposed to have been 
corrupted by Jugurtha. 

361. Rome was now full of suspicion and alarm, and the 
popular indignation at last found vent. C. Mamilius, tribune 
in 109, carried a law appointing a special commission to inquire 
into recent scandals and punish the guilty. The leading nobles 
were in a fright, but we are told that one of ihem at least coolly 
provided for his own safety. Scaurus contrived to get himself 
elected one of the three commissioners. Nevertheless the inquiry 
was carried on with much bitterness. Bestia and Sp. Albinus 
were among the victims. But the chief result was that henceforth 
some regard was paid to efficiency in the conduct of the Numidian 
war. The consul Q. Caecilius Metellus, who took over the com- 
mand in 109, was a noble of the best type, honest and devoted 
to duty. In reconstructing the army he had the help of two 
practical soldiers on his staff. P. Rutilius Rufus, a man of Stoic 
principles, distinguished as a lawyer and noted for virtue, reformed 
the drill and swordsmanship of the men. Marius, jealous and 
ambitious, but a masterly handler of troops, returned to military 
life resolved to raise himself by success in war. Under these 
men discipline and efficiency were restored. 

362. Jugurtha had now to learn that there were Romans 
who would neither be deceived nor bribed. Metellus advanced 
cautiously into Numidia, gaining ground and at the same time 
pretending to negotiate. He tried to seduce the king's envoys. 
In a battle by the river Muthul Jugurtha could not break up the 
Roman army, and his own, though not defeated, melted away. 
Metellus went on, occupying posts and devastating the country. 
Jugurtha with new and inferior forces waged a guerrilla warfare. 



282 Marius consul [ch. 

Such campaigning was wearing out the Roman army. Metellus 
tried to bring on a pitched battle by attacking the city of Zama. 
But he was thwarted by a defect of the Roman military system. 
Deserters, probably Allies or auxiliaries, seem to have gone over 
in some numbers, and the king learnt the design from them and 
added some of them to the garrison of Zama. The siege was 
a failure, and Metellus retired into winter quarters. Plotting 
was resumed, and Bomilcar, in fear for himself, turned traitor. 
He frightened Jugurtha into a surrender, but at the last the king 
would not put his person in the consul's power. War was renewed, 
and the conquest of Numidia was yet far off. Still the success of 
Metellus had been welcomed at Rome, and he was left in command 
for the next year (108) as proconsul. 

363. But there was trouble at headquarters. Marius had 
done remarkably good service, and now wanted to stand for 
the consulship. Metellus would not grant him leave to visit 
Rome for the purpose of a canvass. The ambition of the ' new 
man' seemed to the great noble a grotesque presumption. Marius 
set to work in his own way. He could canvass indirectly by con- 
triving that letters and messages from Africa should carry his fame 
to Rome as the efficient man of the hour. So he indulged the 
rank and file, and took particular care to win the favour of the 
financiers gathered at Utica, weary of waiting for the opportunities 
depending on the victory of Rome. While the campaign of 108 
was proceeding in Numidia, the people at home were being pre- 
pared for the candidature of Marius. The discomfort of Metellus 
grew worse, as the stories of this time shew. Jugurtha was again 
strong in the field, and he discovered the plot against him. 
Bomilcar and others were put to death, but henceforth the faith- 
less king knew not whom to trust. So much Metellus had gained. 
He now pushed on the war vigorously, and at last gave Marius 
leave of absence. In the summer of 108 Marius reached Rome, 
just in time for the election. The 'popular' party carried all 
before them. He not only became consul-elect for 107, but was 
appointed to command in Numidia by a vote of the Assembly 
taken in defiance of the Senate. A recent defeat (109) in Gaul 
no doubt tended to discredit the management of wars by the 
senatorial nobles. 

364. The soldier-demagogue now had a free hand, for the 
Senate voted all he asked. But he did not, as they hoped, wear 



xxiii] The new army. Sulla 283 

out his popularity by levying troops. Old soldiers volunteered 
for service. Paupers 'rated by the head' {capite censi) had 
hitherto not been accepted for legionary service, at least not 
openly and wholesale. The tradition that the infantry of the 
line consisted of owners of property was not extinct, but Marius 
made an end of it. He enlisted men solely on the ground of 
fitness for service. He meant to have a fighting force devoted 
to himself, and the formation of this army was one of the most 
decisive steps in the Roman revolution. Military efficiency was 
gained, but from this time forth Roman politics were never free 
from the power of the sword, as we shall see. Contingents of 
Allies and foreign auxiliaries were raised as usual. It remained 
to appoint a quaestor. The office was of great importance, for 
the quaestor with a field-army was the consul's right-hand man. 
The choice of L. Cornelius Sulla was a momentous one. He was 
a Patrician, a man of education, cool and unscrupulous, who had 
passed a somewhat dissipated youth. His adaptability and force 
of character were destined to be a surprise to his contemporaries, 
and his relations with Marius to be the cause of some of the worst 
horrors in the whole history of Rome. 

365. Before Marius reached the seat of war, probably in the 
spring of 107, Metellus had gained various successes, but was 
Httle if at all nearer to capturing Jugurtha. And a victorious 
peace was impossible so long as the king remained at large. 
Moreover Bocchus, king of Mauretania, was now induced to 
intervene. It is said that he had offered to join Rome at the 
beginning of the war, and that Jugurtha's friends in the Senate 
had procured the refusal of the offer. He now joined Jugurtha. 
Metellus, hearing that Marius was coming to supersede him, 
ceased his active campaigning, and soon set out for Rome, where 
he had a great reception, a triumph, and the nickname of honour 
Nufnidicus. Marius took over the proconsul's army from Rutilius, 
and set to work. It seems clear that his operations were suc- 
cessful, but the chronology and the details are most obscure. 
The important point to notice is that successful campaigning 
was not productive of the decisive result aimed at. But the 
army of Marius was good, and Bocchus became alarmed when 
he found that no impression could be made on it, even when 
attacked on the march at every disadvantage of circumstance. 
Some time in 106 he shewed a willingness to treat for peace 



284 Marius and Sulla [ch. 

and Marius sent Sulla to negotiate. For the present nothing 
came of the conference, but further successes of Marius brought 
an embassy from Bocchus. The envoys, referred to Rome by 
Marius, brought back the answer that the king could only earn 
Roman friendship and alliance by doing something to deserve it. 
Bocchus asked for a second conference with Sulla. So Sulla was 
sent again. 

366. The Mauretanian king had now to choose between 
surrendering Sulla to Jugurtha or Jugurtha to Sulla. His 
wavering was a dramatic episode, famous in later literature. At 
length the nerve of the barbarian gave way under the cool insist- 
ence of the Roman. Sulla brought back Jugurtha a prisoner, 
and the war was at an end. Bocchus became an ally of Rome, 
and received a part of western Numidia. The eastern part was 
assigned to Jugurtha's half-brother Gauda. The overlordship of 
Rome was now firmly established in these regions. Near the end 
of the year 105 the proconsul Marius returned to Rome and held 
his well-earned triumph. Jugurtha was put to death in the old 
style. The recent news of a terrible disaster in the Rhone country 
had revived previous alarms. The fear of an invasion by the 
warlike northern barbarians was a Roman nightmare. There 
was no time to be lost, so constitutional scruples about reelection 
were set aside. Marius found himself already elected consul for 
104 and appointed to the chief command in the North. But the 
beginnings of the troubles in which his career was destined to 
involve the Roman state were soon apparent. He had humbled 
the great noble houses, and they took their revenge by magnifying 
the exploit of Sulla. To Sulla, they urged, the triumph was really 
due : as Marius had unfairly stolen the glory of Metellus, it served 
him right to be robbed of his own. Henceforth there was a deadly 
rivalry between Marius and Sulla, for the moment not openly 
expressed, but the jealousy of the elder man and the ambition 
of the younger never slept. 

367. The story of the Jugurthine war has revealed to us 
more clearly than ever the internal decay of Rome. The one 
class in the state consistent and able to make themselves felt 
whenever they chose were the keen and selfish capitalists. In 
backing the 'popular' leaders and insisting on having the war 
vigorously fought to a finish, they were surely right. Rome could 
not afford to abdicate her position of suzerainty in Numidia. Nor 



xxiii] Lessons of the war 285 

would Sulla have been able to overawe Bocchus, had it not been 
for the victories of Marius. In one department of state the war 
led to an increase of efficiency. Numidian campaigning was not 
a series of pitched battles. To deal with the mobility of the 
enemy it was necessary to give more attention to the light troops 
and cavalry, and even our imperfect record contains traces of an 
improvement in this respect. But we must not forget that these 
arms were made up of Allies and auxiliaries. The Roman citizens 
serving in the legions were on the way to become a force of pauper 
volunteers, attached to their own generals, not simple patriots 
fighting for their country. This change was no sudden one, but 
the new model developed by Marius organized a tendency that 
had long been at work, and conducted it to a logical result. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE INVASION FROM THE NORTH. 109-101 B.C. 

368. The history of Rome in the years 104 — loi B.C. in- 
cludes two wars, that against the northern barbarians, and the 
second slave-war in Sicily. The contemporary movements and 
influences at work in Rome are of great interest. The end of 
an old state of things is announced by the predominance of an 
individual. After the events of these years, government by an 
aristocratic clique has lost its vigour, and we enter on a new stage 
in the Roman revolution, a scene in which leading figures compete 
for unconstitutional power, and rival claims are in the last resort 
settled by the sword. 

369. For some years the northern countries had been trou- 
bled by a great migration, such as often took place in ancient times 
when uncivilized peoples were driven by increase of numbers to 
overflow into new lands. At this time the wanderers were drawn 
from Germany and Switzerland. Some were certainly of Teutonic 
stock, some probably Celtic. We hear of them under the names 
of Cimbri, Teutoni, Tigurini, Ambrones. They were not raiders, 
but swarms 'trekking' in search of new homes, slowly moving 
with wives and children in long caravans of covered waggons. 
They changed their direction from time to time according to 
circumstances. When they started is uncertain. The Tigurini 
and Ambrones appear to have joined the first body after they 
entered Gaul. In 113 we hear of them further eastward, where 
they routed the army of Carbo in Noricum. After this we find 
them, about in and no, on the move in Gaul, masters of the 
open country in their line of march, but unable to capture the 
Gaulish strongholds or to settle down. In 109 the consul M. 
lunius Silanus received from them a request for lands, which was 
sent on to the Senate and refused. A battle in the Rhone country 
ended in the defeat of the Romans with great loss. The main 



CH. XX rv] The northern migration 287 

body of the invaders seem to have been still content to seek con- 
quests in central Gaul : at least Roman territory was not directly 
menaced till 107, when the Tigurini appeared in the West. The 
consul L. Cassius Longinus advanced to meet them and guard 
the Roman province. But he perished with a great part of his 
army, and the remnant only escaped by agreeing to degrading 
terms. In 106 the consul Q. Servilius Caepio, one of the regular 
nobles, did not improve matters. He recovered the city of Tolosa 
(Toulouse), lately lost. In it he captured a great treasure, for the 
holy places there contained vast hoards of gold. This gold, seized 
for Rome as prize of war, mysteriously disappeared, and never 
reached the Roman treasury. Rumour accused the consul of 
having organized the robbery, but for the present he escaped an 
inquiry and remained as proconsul in 105. To relieve public 
anxiety, a second army was sent to Gaul under Cn. Manlius 
Maximus. He was a 'new man,' put forward by the 'popular' 
party. As consul he ranked above a proconsul, and it was 
Caepio's duty to cooperate with him loyally. This Caepio did 
not do. The neglect of mutual support led up to the bloody 
defeat of Arausio (Orange), in which two Roman armies were 
practically destroyed. Rome and Italy were now clearly in im- 
minent danger. There was nothing to be done but to send Gaius 
Marius to command in Gaul. It was fortunate for Rome that the 
barbarians did not at once push on into Italy. True to their first 
design, they turned aside to Spain, hoping there at last to find a 
dwelling-place. 

370. Before we speak of the effect of this series of disasters 
on public life in Rome, let us see what the one trusted man did 
in the way of military reform during the respite afforded by the 
departure of the barbarians to Spain. Many points are somewhat 
obscure, especially as to the order and date of the various changes. 
The improvement in swordsmanship was due to Rutilius, and con- 
sisted in training the legionaries to fence by thrusting rather than 
cutting, a practice copied from gladiatorial schools. But the new 
organization was the work of Marius, probably begun in Numidia, 
and now completed in Gaul. Hitherto the third line {triarii) had 
borne spears. They were now armed like the rest with javelins 
{pila), so that the equipment of the whole legion was uniform. 
The old divisions of maniple and century were not abolished, but 
the cohort, a larger division long used in the contingents of the 



288 Marius and the new model [ch. 

Allies, became the effective tactical unit. A legion at full strength 
was to be ten cohorts of 600 men each. Each cohort had a 
standard, and Marius added the famous silver eagle as a standard 
for the whole legion. Romans and Allies were now organized 
alike : we may note that the galling political difference still re- 
mained. The cavalry were not neglected, but we should bear in 
mind that Roman equites no longer served as a corps. The 
troopers were either Allies, or foreigners from certain provinces 
or client kingdoms, and the latter were becoming more numerous. 
Light troops were drawn from Liguria, slingers from the Balearic 
isles, mercenary bowmen from independent Crete. 

371. To bring so composite a force into a state of cohesion 
and efficiency was a work of time. Yet the employment of 
foreigners was more than ever necessary, owing to the terrible 
losses of recent years, which had drained so much of the best 
blood of Italy. Abroad too all was not well. It is said that 
Nicomedes of Bithynia, when called upon to furnish a contingent, 
replied that more than half his men were slaves on the plantations 
of Roman capitalists, and therefore he had none to send. True 
or not as an excuse, it is certain that piracy and kidnapping sup- 
plied most of the slaves at this time imported from the East. But 
the formation of the army went on, and the army of the new model 
put on a decisively professional character. Circumstances had 
long compelled the enlistment of men for campaigns of more 
than a year. This necessity was now accepted as normal; soldiers 
took the oath once for all, and served, if wanted, continuously for 
16 years. Marius also took great pains to increase the mobility 
of the infantry, by reducing the baggage-train and inventing ap- 
pliances by which the soldier could carry his kit with ease and yet 
lay it aside quickly when attacked on the march. Among the 
officers who served under the consul were Sulla and Q. Sertorius, 
a good soldier who had added to his usefulness by learning the 
Gaulish tongue. 

372. In Rome, the years of disaster followed by prepara- 
tion for defence were naturally a time of unrest. Commanders, 
whether unlucky or blameworthy, were brought to trial as having 
imperilled the state by their conduct. Most notable was the case 
of Caepio. In 105 a vote of the Assembly took avvay^ his im- 

^ He was not consul but proconsul, but in any case the proceeding was 
exceptional. 



xxiv] Movements in Rome 289 

perium. In 104 a law disqualified a person so deprived from 
sitting in the Senate. Then a commission was appointed to 
inquire into the disappearance of the Tolosan treasure. The 
nobles were not able to prevent this measure. Caepio went into 
exile to escape condemnation, and ended his days in shame. 
The 'gold of Tolosa' became a byword for ill-gotten gain bringing 
bad luck. Silanus, the man defeated in 109, was tried before the 
Tribe-Assembly in 104, but was acquitted. In 104 a notable law 
changed the method of appointing members of the great religious 
colleges. These close corporations had hitherto coopted new 
members to fill vacancies. Only the choice of one member of 
the pontifical college to be Chief Pontiff was determined by the 
votes of 17 Tribes (a minority of 35) selected by lot. This 
method was now introduced for all appointments of pontiffs, 
augurs, and decemviri sacrorum. The mover was the tribune 
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and it appears that he was induced 
to agitate for this change by irritation at being passed over in 
favour of others when vacancies occurred. We have seen above 
how important in Roman politics the religious colleges were. 
This lex Domitia, like the trials just referred to, shews the acti- 
vity of the ' popular ' party in Rome. They were busy assailing 
the noble 'best men' at home, while their champion Marius 
represented them in the field. If the reelection of Marius as 
consul year after year violated constitutional rules, the interference 
with the religious colleges deprived the nobles of much of their 
power to check the hasty action of Assemblies. Hence Sulla 
23 years later, when he had overthrown the Marians, repealed 
the Domitian law. 

373. In the years 104 — 103 Marius was forging the weapon 
to strike the enemy when the time came. He formed a military 
base at the mouth of the Rhone and secured his communications 
with Italy by sea. He made his men cut a new channel to im- 
prove an outfall of the river. No great campaign was undertaken, 
but the army was kept in fine condition and discipline, and the 
Gaulish tribes carefully watched. Late in 103 the barbarian host 
came back from Spain, having failed in their enterprise and doubt- 
less suffered some loss. Marius was reelected consul for the fourth 
time. The popular leaders, in particular the noisy tribune L. Ap- 
puleius Saturninus, insisted on it, and Marius was nothing loth. 
The other consul for 102 was Q. Lutatius Catulus, a noble of high 

H. 19 



290 Destruction of the barbarians [ch. xxiv 

character, but more of a literary than a military man. The work 
for the coming year was determined by the movements of the 
enemy, who, having found no homes for permanent settlement in 
Gaul or Spain, now resolved to force their way into Italy. Their 
plan was to advance in two bodies by separate routes. Teutoni 
and Ambrones were to pass through the Roman province and 
enter the Po-country by way of Liguria. Cimbri and Tigurini 
were to pass round the great Alpine range and descend upon Italy 
from the North-East. The result may be briefly told. Marius 
let the Teuton caravan trek slowly by, and followed at leisure, 
refusing to fight till his own good time. Near Aquae Sextiae 
his chance came. In two battles he defeated them utterly. Some 
prisoners were taken, but most of the brave barbarians perished 
by the sword. The western column had ceased to exist. Mean- 
while the Cimbric column, after their long march, broke into Italy. 
Catulus, though helped by Sulla, who had now parted from Marius, 
could not stop them. They forced the passage of the Athesis 
(Adige) and he had to fall back. The armies wintered in the 
Cisalpine. Marius was elected consul for the fifth time, and 
Catulus was continued in command as proconsul. 

374. In the spring of loi Marius brought his army to share 
the defence of Italy. The great battle of Vercellae (about half 
way between Milan and Turin) was not fought till the summer, 
when the heat told against the northern invaders. Our autho- 
rities, writing from sources hostile to Marius, give the chief glory 
of victory to Catulus, but popular opinion seems to have regarded 
Marius with good reason as the hero of the day. The carnage 
was again frightful ; the prisoners many, but fewer than the slain. 
The presence of the women and children with the barbarian war- 
riors explains this result. The women drove back their routed 
men-folk on the Roman swords, and slew themselves in despair 
when all was over. The military resources of a civilized power, 
when wielded by competent hands, were as yet far too strong for 
barbarian hosts, however brave. For about 500 years Italy re- 
mained secure from northern invaders, and Italy did not soon 
forget the services of Marius. But for the present the most serious 
question was, how Rome's great military workman would bear 
himself in political life. He had overshadowed others : would 
he now use his preeminent position for the lasting benefit of the 
Roman state? 



CHAPTER XXV 

THE SECOND SICILIAN SLAVE-WAR, AND EXTERNAL 

AFFAIRS 105—92 B.C. 

375' A. grave internal danger, by which the evils at work 
in the Roman system were again rudely exposed, was contem- 
porary with the life-and-death struggle in the No'-th. The partisans 
of Marius were strengthened by the horrors of a second slave-war 
in Sicily, which gave a further shock to the nerves of the Roman 
public. This war was preceded, and in its first stages accom- 
panied, by smaller outbreaks in Italy itself, all symptoms of the 
morbid state of rural economy, worse than ever since the failure 
of the Gracchan land-reform. They were put down, in one case 
with some difficulty, but the evil of the plantation-system remained. 
Discontent was not extinct. In 104 or 103 the tribune L. Marcius 
Philippus proposed some land-bill of a radical nature. Evidently 
the landlord interest was too strong for him : he could not carry 
the bill, and the matter dropped. 

376. The spark that set Sicily aflame was an order of the 
Senate in the year 104. The excuse^ offered by Nicomedes for 
not sending men to serve in the northern war led the House to 
vote that the enslavement of free allies of Rome was illegal, and 
to instruct provincial governors to redress the grievance. C. Lici- 
nius Nerva, governor of Sicily, promptly acted on this order. The 
ferment produced among the slaves called forth a protest from the 
slaveowners, and Nerva ceased the work of liberation. Disappoint- 
ment of hopes soon produced a rising, with which the governor, 
having no sufficient force at his disposal, was unable to cope. We 

1 See § 371. 

19 — 2 



292 Second Sicilian slave-war [ch. 

need not follow the war in detail. It followed very closely the 
lines of the great insurrection thirty years before. A Syrian slave- 
king, professing to be a prophet, joined by a warrior leader from 
the West of the island, the combination of the two slave-armies, 
the defeat of Roman detachments, the capture of Roman arms, 
the bands of the poorer freemen engaged in brigandage, all re- 
peated the phenomena of the former war. But the forces employed 
by Rome were now more miscellaneous. Beside the troops from 
Italy (not the pick, of course,) there were auxiliaries from Greece 
and Bithynia, and a Mauretanian contingent sent by Bocchus. 
The praetors who commanded in 103 and 102 were not able to 
suppress the rising. Both were tried and punished on their return 
to Rome. Meanwhile the state of the province was deplorable. 
In 10 1, after the destruction of the Teutoni, the affair of Sicily 
was more seriously taken in hand. The consul M'. Aquilius, an 
ofificer trained under Marius, was sent to restore order in the oldest 
province of Rome. 

377. Aquilius had no easy task. Devastation had gone so 
far in this granary-province that in some parts it was necessary to 
import corn and advance it to the people as a loan. But the new 
consul ended the war. He remained as proconsul to see things 
through, and returned to Rome in 99. A typical Roman of his 
time, his better qualities were marred by greed. In 98 he was 
tried on a charge of extortion, but escaped, mainly through 
appealing to evidence of his bravery in the field. And now Sicily 
settled down once more into hopeless acquiescence in the abomi- 
nations of the plantation-system. It is said that the war had cost 
100,000 lives. The dead would be mostly slaves, and the captives 
in other wars of this time would find a ready market. How Sicily 
was henceforth kept quiet may be gathered from the story of what 
once happened under the administration of the next governor. 
A fine wild boar was sent to grace the governor's table. Inquiry 
shewed that it had been killed by a slave-herdsman with a spear. 
It was a strict regulation of the province that no slave might go 
armed. So the governor stifled his compassionate feelings (if any), 
and at once had the fellow crucified. 

378. In outlying parts of the Roman dominions there was 
also trouble, but from other causes. Rome had no standmg army, 
and the forces at the disposal of provincial governors were seldom 
adequate to deal with any serious rising or invasion. Spain had 



xxv] Troubles abroad. Piracy 293 

been lately invaded by the Citnbri, and the tribesmen had been 
left unprotected to make their own defence. A doubt of the 
power of Rome either to defend or to coerce her subjects prob- 
ably contributed to produce Spanish rebellions. Between 102 and 
94 there were risings in Lusitania and in central (Celtiberian) 
Spain. After fierce and brutal warfare peace was at length re- 
stored, but it seems certain that the whole miserable business was 
the outcome of Roman neglect. To look forward a few years, we 
may remark that the old frontier troubles still harassed the Mace- 
donian province. It was indeed in these days a department full 
of worry and danger, and a governor had hard work to make head 
against raids and invasions. A little later, when the hands of the 
Roman government were tied by the troubles in Italy, we find 
C. Sentius left in charge year after year. That he held the pro- 
vince for Rome under great difficulties was probably due to his 
good government : for, when the people of Macedonia were con- 
tented, good local forces could be raised for defence. But one 
of the most serious questions abroad was the horrible state of 
things created by the rapid development of piracy in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 

379. Of the immense demand for slaves we have seen proof 
enough. The supply was partly met by prisoners taken in wars, 
but its most regular source was the slave-trade, the chief centre 
of which was at Delos. Sea-rovers soon found it profitable to 
capture men by sea or land and sell them in the Delian slave- 
market, and this form of enterprise put free voyagers and residents 
on the seacoasts in constant danger of enslavement. Rhodes, 
now the humble dependant of Rome, could no longer protect 
sea-borne commerce as of old. Rome kept up no navy in time of 
peace, and did nothing to put down the growing evil of piracy. 
No doubt many Roman capitalists were profiting directly or in- 
directly by the transactions at Delos, and in no hurry to raise a 
clamour against iniquities on which they throve. At last however 
things became so bad that something had to be done. In 103, 
with Cimbric and Sicilian wars still on hand, the praetor M. An- 
tonius (the famous orator) was sent out with a fleet, doubtless 
chiefly Greek. He did something to check piracy for the time, 
by taking some pirate strongholds in the western or rocky Cilicia, 
one of their favourite haunts. But he did not conquer the hill- 
country inland ; indeed he had no army for that purpose. It may 



294 Eastern affairs [ch. 

be that a large part of Asia Minor was nominally annexed as a 
province Cilicia. No real occupation took place, and piracy was 
soon as active as ever. 

380. The Syrian and Egyptian kingdoms were now in decay. 
Since the death of Ptolemy Physcon in 117, the Cyrenaic province 
had been under a prince independent of Alexandria. He died in 
96, and bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. The Senate, loth to 
accept fresh responsibilities, would not annex the country as a 
Roman province, but took over the royal domains for the sake 
of the rents. The five Greek cities were declared free states, 
a shirking policy doomed to failure. In short, the slackness of 
Roman policy was of itself enough to weaken the position of Rome 
as the leading power in the East. But there was also a great 
external change in that part of the world. The place of the 
Successors of Alexander had been taken by new monarchies, 
one of which, in the hands of an able and ambitious king, had 
already reached a degree of strength unsuspected by Rome. This 
was the kingdom of Pontus, in the northern part of Asia Minor. 
Bithynia, dependent on Rome, had not a free hand. Between 
it and Pontus lay the weak principalities of Paphlagonia, and the 
power further from Rome was better placed for a policy of absorp- 
tion even here. Galatia, still tribally divided, was weak as a poli- 
tical unit, and its mercenary warriors would serve any master in 
war. Cappadocia was next to Pontus, and the peoples of the two 
were connected by affinity of race. In the further East were two 
great kingdoms. Of Parthia, built upon the ruin of the Seleucid 
empire, we have spoken above. It represented the reaction of 
East against West. For the present it did not count in the im- 
perial calculations of Rome. Nor in truth did Armenia, a wide 
stretch of lands chiefly mountainous, from which the Euphrates 
and Tigris flow to the South-East. The relations between these 
two oriental monarchies were not always friendly, so the Armenian 
king was not likely to provoke a quarrel with the king of Pontus, 
his neighbour to the West. In all these countries, though the 
Hellenism spread by the conquests of Alexander was no longer 
politically a ruling force, the value of Greek talent and the 
superiority of Greek civilization were recognized, and the events 
that followed could hardly have occurred without the cooperation 
of the Greeks. 

381. Mithradates (Vor VI) Eupator succeeded his murdered 



xxv] Mithradates 295 

father on the Pontic throne in 121 as a boy of 11 or 12 years. 
After escaping perils at home he fled abroad. Hardened by years 
of wandering, he returned about 113 and assumed the government. 
His bodily strength and mental vigour were remarkable, and under 
him the kingdom, lately mismanaged, soon began to revive. The 
Greek colonies of northern Asia Minor were already many of them 
dependent on the Pontic kings : his father had made Sinope the 
royal capital. But there were other Greek colonies scattered 
around the shores of the Euxine sea, old trading centres, mostly 
pressed by the barbarous peoples at their back, and willing to 
welcome a powerful protector. The young king saw the advan- 
tages to be gained by undertaking their defence and converting 
them into loyal dependencies of his crown. Success would give 
him the control of the Euxine and the mouths of navigable rivers, 
and enable him not only to draw a revenue from the Greek com- 
merce but to create a powerful navy with the aid of Greek seamen. 
He raised an efficient fleet and army of his own under competent 
Greek officers. When the Greeks of the Bosporan (Crimean) 
kingdom, which comprised several cities about the Cimmerian 
Bosporus (strait of Kertch), sent to beg his help, he was ready to 
appear as the saviour of Greek civilization in barbarous lands. 
By about 106 he had established himself as sovran protector of 
these and other Greek cities, and added their resources to those 
of his ancestral realm. The conquest of the south-eastern sea- 
board from Colchis to the Pontic frontier soon followed, and also 
that of the mountain district known as Lesser Armenia. Mithra- 
dates was now strong enough to move more boldly, in fact to make 
trial of the temper of Rome. 

382. In 105 he drew Nicomedes of Bithynia into a partition 
of Paphlagonia, then into a joint intervention in Galatia. Soon 
the two fell out over the affairs of Cappadocia. Till then they 
had disregarded protests from Rome. Time went by, and the 
troubles in Cappadocia at last led the Senate to send orders for 
the evacuation of that country, about 96 B.C. Mithradates then 
induced Tigranes of Armenia (in 94 or 93) to invade Cappadocia 
and drive out the new king recognized by Rome, Ariobarzanes. 
In 92 Sulla was sent as propraetor to the so-called Cilician pro- 
vince, with orders to restore the ejected king, and did so, supple- 
menting his weak force with auxiliary levies. He even pushed on 



296 Sulla [cH. XXV 

to the Euphrates, where he met an ambassador from the Parthian 
king, sent with friendly intentions. Sulla, it is said, did not lose 
the chance of asserting the primacy of Rome. Mithradates thought 
it wise not to resent openly the thwarting of his designs. He 
waited for an opportunity, perhaps aware of the coming struggle 
in Italy. Sulla returned to Rome in 91. We must now see what 
had been going on in Roman public life during several m.omentous 
years. 



Plate V 




Coin of Mithradates VI Eupator, 75 B.C. 
obv. Head of Mithradates. 

rev. Stag, feeding, and sun and crescent moon, in ivy wreath. 
BASIAEfiS MiePAAATOT ETHATOPOS. 
See §§ 381—2. 





13. Coins of Italian confederates, 90 B.C. 

[a) obv. Head of Mars. VITELIV { = Italia), 
rev. Four soldiers taking oath of alliance. 

[b) obv. Head of Bacchante. 

rev. Samnite bull goring Roman wolf. 

Both coins bear Oscan inscriptions and the name of Papius. 
See § 402. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

INTERNAL HISTORY 104—91 B.C. 

383. While there was so much trouble abroad^ things were 
not going well in Rome. The struggle of factions continued. The 
populares, thanks to military necessities, overcame the optimates, 
but neither side had any consistent policy likely to remedy exist- 
ing evils. Of the men who came to the front in the years 104 — 
100 as popular leaders connected with Marius, the most notorious 
were Saturninus and C Servilius Glaucia. Roman tradition (from 
hostile sources) gives them both bad characters. Saturninus in 
truth seems to have been a hasty demagogue at best, to some 
extent an imitator of the Gracchi, and a violent opponent of the 
Senate. Glaucia, a man of lower type, had won the favour of the 
Equestrian Order by a law^ on extortion in which he had restored 
to them the control of the jury-courts, taken away from them by 
a previous law. Both were unscrupulous mob-orators, detested 
by the nobles. Among the ' best men ' none was more respected 
than Metellus, now known as Numidicus. He was one of the 
censors of 102, and would have turned both Saturninus and 
Glaucia out of the Senate, had not his colleague refused his 
consent. Metellus, already hated by Marius, had now all three 
leaders of the 'popular' faction eager to do him an ill turn. 
And Rome was seething with intrigues. The various stories 
shew that men did not agree as to the credit due to Marius and 
Catulus respectively for the victory over the Cimbri in loi, or as 
to the motives of the former in sharing a joint triumph with the 
proconsul in whose province the battle was fought. 

384. Marius had held five consulships. The great emer- 
gency, by which the disregard of constitutional rules might be 

1 See § 356, 



298 Position of Marius [ch. 

excused, was at an end. He now desired a sixths thus openly 
violating republican principles for the sake of personal ambition. 
This desire led him to join forces with Saturninus and Glaucia. 
Saturninus had lately embroiled himself with the Senate more 
than ever, by insulting an embassy from Mithradates. But the 
coalition triumphed. Marius was elected consul for the year 
100, Glaucia praetor, Saturninus tribune. But the elections were 
stormy. Blood was shed in riots, and it is said that Marius owed 
his success partly to bribery. In the obscurity of our record we 
can detect that his popularity was waning. At the back of all 
movements of the time there was always something likely to 
remind citizens of the claims and discontent of the Allies. They 
were apt to appear in Rome and bear a hand in disturbances. 
And the jealousy of citizens had lately been revived by an act 
of Marius. Some Allies had distinguished themselves in the 
battle with the Cimbri, and the consul had promised them the 
Roman franchise as a reward. He defended his action on the 
ground of necessity at a critical moment. But there seem to 
have been about 1000 of these men, and Roman jealousy was 
easily led to think that he had gone too far. What with this 
affair and his association with two noisy demagogues, who only 
agreed with the great soldier and with each other for their own 
immediate ends, the position of Marius was hardly a comfortable 
one, and the political situation complicated, not to say dangerous. 
385. Our authorities are very onesided, for Roman history 
was chiefly written by nobles, or based on their memoirs : and 
men of the noble class generally hated both Marius and Saturni- 
nus. It is however clear that Marius was now, thanks to his own 
services, no longer indispensable ; and further, that he was a failure 
in political life. A consul in Rome depended much on the Senate, 
and the Senate disliked Marius, both as a ' new man ' who over- 
shadowed nobles of old family, and for clumsy breaches of etiquette. 
Moreover he made but a poor figure in addressing the mob, being 
no orator, and at a loss among the humours of mass-meetings. 
Nor had he any clear scheme of policy. He wanted to be popular, 
but by submitting to be dragged along by his associates he made 
himself ridiculous. Yet he could only assert his own dignity by 
suppressing them, and Saturninus at least had some sort of policy, 
and was not likely to take suppression tamely. Before we proceed 
to speak of the measures in which the three leaders jointly were 



xxvi] The Appuleian laws 299 

concerned, we must again note that no leader could carry out 
any considerable policy without an unconstitutional continuation 
of power. 

386. Saturninus was the active legislator, and the bunch of 
measures now carried were named leges Appuleiae after him. An 
agrarian law dealt with certain lands in the North, occupied by 
the Cimbri, and recovered through their defeat. This land was 
regarded as having fallen to the Roman state by conquest (not to 
the disturbed Cisalpine Gauls), and it was now to be distributed 
in allotments to Roman citizens. The law passed. What steps 
were taken to carry it out, we do not learn. As a party move it 
was turned to account. In order to prevent the Senate from 
getting it annulled like the Gracchan land-laws, a clause required 
all senators to take an oath to observe it, on pain of losing their 
seats in the House and being fined. But this clause had also 
a personal aim. The story is that Marius, by declaring that he 
would not swear, led Metellus Numidicus to say the same. 
Marius then got out of his promise by equivocating, which Me- 
tellus was too honourable to do. Saturninus prepared a bill to 
outlaw the recusant, and Metellus would not let his sympathizers 
resist the bill by rioting. He went into exile, and the bill passed. 
Thus a great and good noble was got rid of for the time. We 
have no Marian version of this affair. Next came a corn-law, 
reducing the price of corn in Rome to a merely nominal figure. 
Already the sale of corn below cost-price was a heavy burden on 
the treasury. The city quaestor declared that it was impossible 
to bear the cost of the new scheme, and the Senate found tribunes 
to block it. Neither this opposition nor a riot availed to stop its 
passing. Another law provided for the foundation of some colonies 
outside Italy, and empowered Marius to grant the Roman franchise 
to three Allies for each colony founded. The colonial designs 
were not fulfilled, but Marius used his powers, — a good specimen 
of the doings of this period, and probably a fair indication of the 
sympathies of Marius. 

387. It is unfortunate that we have no clear and certain 
record as to whether Saturninus did or did not carry a lex Appu- 
leia de maiestate establishing a standing court {guaestio perpetud) 
for the trial of persons charged with lessening the inherent great- 
ness {maiestas) of the state. Trials for this offence were common 
enough later, and under the Empire they were a principal means 



300 Marlus destroys his partners [ch. 

of repressing the freedom of literature. The term maiestas populi 
Romani, an undefined something which inferior confederates of 
Rome were by treaty bound to uphold, had been in use for cen- 
turies. To assume that a citizen had by his own act impaired this 
'majesty' was in effect to declare him a public enemy {perdtiellis). 
The penalty was death, the court was the Assembly by Centuries. 
Now the death-penalty was out of fashion, and convictions, in all 
but the most flagrant cases, very hard to secure. We have seen 
that the plan of appointing special commissions for the trial of 
particular cases was resorted to. If the Assembly by Tribes, the 
old court for the procedure by fine-process, could so delegate its 
powers to temporary courts, why should it not do so once for all 
to a standing court ? There was no need to abolish the old juris- 
diction of either Assembly, and certainly no such course was taken. 
But it seems on the whole probable that a standing court was set 
up by Saturninus, and that the charges to be brought before it 
were expressed in general terms; while the definition of the various 
acts to which those terms properly applied was left to grow up 
gradually, the result of the decisions of the court from time to 
time. This was an improvement, in so far as it was a speedier 
and more convenient method of dealing with cases of gross mis- 
conduct on the part of public men at home or abroad. But it 
was also a handy weapon to enable those in power at any moment 
to ruin their adversaries. 

388. Whatever was the scope of the Appuleian laws, the 
means of carrying them was force. The capitalist class, and 
Marius with them, began to be uneasy. Saturninus and Glaucia 
could no longer rely on the consul. They resolved to fight for 
their own continuance in office, and to go on without him. 
Saturninus was to have a third tribunate ; Glaucia, though now 
praetor and so not yet eligible, was to be consul. But the 
senatorial leaders saw their chance in the reaction of opinion. 
The demagogues had lost even rioting-power by estranging old 
soldiers who followed the lead of Marius. The elections for 99 
were interrupted by grave disorders. A competitor of Glaucia 
was murdered. Expecting an open attack, the two ringleaders 
got together a band of ruffians and seized the Capitol. The 
Senate now passed the 'last order,' calling on the consuls to save 
the state, and Marius sulkily complied. He had to embody an 
armed force and crush his own associates. With the help of a 



xxvi] Weak government in Rome 301 

general rally- of the rich and their slaves he drove the rebels back 
to the Capitol, and compelled them to surrender by cutting off 
their water-supply. He is said to have guaranteed their lives, 
but the victorious party massacred them. So revolution went 
forward another step. A democrat consul had become the tool 
of the aristocrats, and made it easy for them to destroy their 
opponents. 

389. The senatorial nobility were for the third time restored 
to power. But each revolutionary shock left the government 
weaker. Marius was the first man in Rome. He had acted so 
that neither political faction could trust him, and reduced himself 
to political nullity. He only served to block the way for other 
leaders, and without leaders Senate and Assembly were alike in- 
effective. Great questions called for settlement, and there was no 
strong man to deal with them. The nobles could only drift along, 
and make arrangements for their own convenience. It remained 
the sad truth that popular leaders, so long as they retained office, 
could defy the Senate ; and that force, the only means of putting 
them down, was more and more taking the character of civil war. 
The power of law was in fact giving way to the power of the 
sword. For the present the factions were concerned to see how 
much of the results of recent movements they could severally 
destroy or preserve. The Senate declared all or most of the 
Appuleian laws invalid, as having been passed in disregard of 
formalities and omens. But a colony was founded in Corsica, 
apparently to silence and get rid of some of the troublesome 
disbanded soldiers of Marius. This was the first of the regular 
military settlements, afterwards a common form of pensions. 
The recall of Metellus was blocked for the present, but he was 
restored in 98. At this time we hear of various trials, party 
moves, the outcome of the doings of Saturninus and the reaction 
that followed. One of them seems to have been a case of 
maiestas. If this were so, surely Saturninus had legislated on 
the subject, and the law had not been annulled. 

390. In 98 the aristocrats made an effort to revive some 
of the checks on the hasty action of Assemblies. The revived 
activity of the tribunate had indeed created a real danger. Two 
of the checks already existing were ( i ) the prohibition of ' tack- 
ing,' that is the combination of matters unconnected with each 
other in a single bill, (2) the requirement of 24 days notice of 



302 Question of the Allies [ch. 

public business. The consuls of the year now carried a law 
{lex Caecilia Didia) stringently reenacting both these rules. 
With this law, and the usual religious hindrances, the Senate 
hoped to regain much of its former power. For the time it 
might seem that this object was attained; Saturninus had alarmed 
the non-noble capitalists, and the two wealthy classes could pull 
together. But there was no real improvement in the administra- 
tion of the empire. The constitution was out of date, and there 
were no means of reforming it. With great perils fast maturing 
in Italy and the East, a dead unsatisfactory time followed for a 
few years. Marius left Rome in 98, glad to escape from his own 
blunders. He found an excuse for going to Asia Minor. His 
enemies said that he wanted to recover his importance by stirring 
up a new war, and that for this purpose he provoked Mithradates 
by insulting remarks. This may be a slander. But his absence 
from Rome is significant, and not less so is the fact that just now 
we hear nothing of the doings of Sulla. Sulla's ambition was cer- 
tainly not in abeyance, but we have no reason to think that he 
had much taste for politics. He was probably biding his time, 
while richer and weaker men led the Senate. In 93 he was praetor. 
Of his mission to the East in 92 and his return in 91 we have 
spoken above. 

391. How far the feeling of present security had blinded 
the Roman nobles to the dangerous disaffection of the Allies, 
was proved by an act of the consuls of the year 95. They were 
no ordinary pair ; L. Licinius Crassus the famous orator, and 
Q. Mucins Scaevola, afterwards chief pontiff, the greatest jurist 
of a family famed for producing lawyers. They undertook to 
deal with a trouble of long standing, the interference of Latins 
and other Allies in Roman Assemblies. We have seen that 
some contrived to get enrolled as Roman citizens without legal 
right, and that others bore a hand in rioting. These practices 
were not easily checked. A census was unavoidably a time of 
hurry and some confusion. Once it was over, the censors went 
out of office. And the police of Rome was too inefficient (there 
being no regular force) to act as a firm and impartial preventive 
of disorder. What the consuls did, doubtless with the Senate's 
approval, and very likely with the best intentions, was to carry 
a lex Lidtiia Mucia, of which we know few details. It seems to 
have set up a commission to try cases of illegal assumption of 



xxvi] Scandals in Rome 303 

Roman citizenship. It is not quite clear what was the extent 
of their powers. At least they were able to expose unauthorized 
claims and to compel offenders to revert to their proper local 
franchises. It does not follow that they expelled them from 
Rome. Mere roughs, who had come to riot and remained to 
share the perquisites of citizens (old soldiers probably many of 
them), would be sent back to their homes without more ado. 
The law was evidently milder than previous acts of expulsion. 
Yet it caused the most intense irritation throughout Italy. Times 
had changed. The blood of Allies had been freely shed for 
Rome on the great northern battlefields, and after long patience 
this fresh snub was too much. Moreover the rough men sent 
home were centres of discontent and unrest. Their return shewed 
that the selfish mob and nobles of Rome would yield only to 
force^ and the conviction spread that there was nothing for it but 
a war. 

392. It is hardly necessary to dwell on the other stray details 
which shew the unsatisfactory state of Roman public life. Objects 
of vice and luxury were rising in price. We hear of men shirking 
unattractive duties, of squabbles over the repeal of a sumptuary 
law, of trials involving much scandal. The case of C Norbanus 
in 95 is interesting. As tribune in 103 he had brought about the 
ruin of Caepio on the charge of embezzling the 'gold of Tolosa.' 
He was now brought to trial by men acting for the senatorial 
nobles, and the prosecution was strong in influence and talent. 
But the jury were capitalist Knights, who had not forgotten how 
Caepio had tried ^ to deprive them of the control of the courts. 
Therefore they would not punish Norbanus, and acquitted him. 
The charge was pretty certainly one of maiestas {minuta), which 
was becoming a regular political weapon. The consul Crassus, 
after taking part in this prosecution, went off to northern Italy, 
and tried to win the honour of a triumph by worrying some Alpine 
tribes. But his colleague Scaevola prevented the scandal. Among 
all these signs of degeneracy in public men the trial of P. Rutilius 
Rufus stands out as exceptionally scandalous. We have seen this 
man as a trusted military reformer. He was a great lawyer, and 
a Stoic, like many Roman lawyers ; a man of high principles, and 
an honest patriot. In 98, when Scaevola was governor of Asia, 
RutiHus went with him as legatus, and was left in charge of the 

^ See § 356. 



304 Condemnation of Rutilius [ch. 

province for three months after the propraetor returned to Rome. 
These two good men by upright and just administration upset 
the calculations of Roman financiers, who had reckoned on the 
continuance of normal conditions, that is on misgovernment 
favourable to gross extortion. The capitalist class in Rome were 
furious. As the pontiff Scaevola was out of their reach, they 
watched for a chance of vengeance on Rutilius. 

393. In 92 Rutilius was brought to trial on a charge of 
extortion. His innocence was notorious. But the Stoic would 
neither use the services of the leading orators, nor bid for pity 
in the customary way. He proved himself innocent, and was of 
course found guilty by a capitalist jury. The whole of his estate 
proved to be far less than the sum named in the charge of ex- 
tortion. Rutilius passed the rest of his days in exile at Smyrna, 
in the province that he had not robbed. He gave himself to 
study, and wrote on Roman history in Greek. To later genera- 
tions he was a well-known name, a stock example of unquestionable 
merit and public ingratitude, and noble writers eagerly recorded 
the shame of an Equestrian jury. Meanwhile there was a census 
in the year 92, and some bickering between the censors. They 
agreed however in ordering the suppression of some Latin schools 
of rhetoric lately set up in Rome, which they thought inferior to 
those conducted by skilled Greeks. But the Latin schools were 
soon at work again. Far more important was the beginning of a 
movement for a change in the constitution of the public courts. 
This was not in the direction of appointing trained judges to 
preside. Without the help of such guidance a Roman jury, even 
if honest, was ever liable to go wrong ; but no such help had yet 
been devised. The aim was to provide better jurors, if they could 
be found. The Equestrian Order had used their power scandal- 
ously; but they were in possession, and not at all inclined to give 
up a profitable monopoly. A serious struggle was imminent, and 
in the present state of Roman politics there was a danger that the 
jury-question might become complicated with other issues, and 
raise an unexpected storm. 

394. M. Livius Drusus, perhaps son of the opponent of 
C. Gracchus, a young man of good repute, was a tribune for the 
year 91. He took up the question of the juries as an independent 
politician, but from the Senate's point of view. He had the pick 
of the House at his back. But the Knights were against him, and 



xxvij Drusus and his laws 305 

the rabble had no special interest in what did not concern them- 
selves. To conciliate the latter he produced a bill for founding 
some colonies, and another for cheapening corn. But his project 
for jury-reform at once stirred up opposition, not only from the 
capitalist body, but from a part of the nobles. The chief of these 
was the consul L. Marcius Philippus, once a radical of commun- 
istic bent, now an obstructive aristocrat, passionate and ready of 
tongue. It was evidently known that Drusus sympathized with 
the claims of the Allies. His enemies now set going the rumour 
that he meant to enfranchise the Italians, and so to swamp the 
present citizens. Thus they appealed to the selfish populace, 
unwilling to share their perquisites with aliens. Therefore, of 
the two reforms for which Drusus really cared, the jury-reform 
and the enfranchisement of the Allies, each had to win votes on 
its own merits. If the issues got confused by people thinking 
of both schemes at the same time (which was inevitable), the 
unpopularity of the enfranchisement-scheme would tell against 
the chances of carrying the reform of the juries. And Drusus 
had not time enough to meet his difficulties. The helplessness 
of a statesman holding office for a year only was shewn more 
clearly than ever. 

395. The exact scope of the jury-bill is not certain. We are 
told that the proposal was to add 300 picked men of the Eques- 
trian Order to the Senate, and to draw the jurors from the Senate 
thus enlarged. We also hear that this plan pleased neither Order. 
Old senators did not wish to be swamped by a wholesale creation 
of new members. Knights, the rank-and-file majority at least, did 
not wish to lose their present power of safeguarding their provin- 
cial investments by teaching governors to leave Roman capitalists 
a free hand. A further proposal of Drusus, intended to punish 
jurors for taking bribes, only strengthened the opposition. At 
present the Equestrian jurors claimed that the law of C. Gracchus 
against judicial corruption, being aimed at the former senatorial 
juries, did not apply to themselves ; and only too many, whether 
Senators or Knights, preferred to be the keepers of their own 
venal consciences. So the year wore on in a scene of much 
oratory and occasional violence. Drusus was highly respected 
as a man, but losing ground as a politician. His temper was 
at times unequal to the strain of the conflict. His enemies had 
no scruple in charging him with fomenting Italian discontents, 
H. 20 



J 



06 End of Drusus [ch. xxvi 



while his supporters in the Senate were worried and frightened 
by the long and bitter struggle. The consul Philippus denounced 
them in public meetings. Drusus protested in the Senate. Crassus 
the orator backed him up manfully, but died a few days after. 
Drusus did not himself seek reelection, and the tribunes elected 
for the year 90 were men hostile to his policy. His proceedings 
in the two or three months remaining of his own year are obscured 
by the defects of our record. The following account is an abstract 
of statements derived from various sources. 

396. It seems that Drusus, unable to draw back, was driven, 
like other reformers, to extend his programme. We hear of two 
agrarian bills, and of a measure for debasing the currency, in the 
vain hope of meeting some of the deficit caused by the cheapening 
of corn. All this was sheer demagogy, and he was now embarked 
on a course sure to aHenate the Senate, while the financiers were 
against him, and the city mob not to be relied on. He may have 
been supported by some non-resident voters, but it. is probable 
that he now made a regular bargain with the leaders of the Allies. 
Preparations for war, in case of refusal of their claims, were already 
far advanced in Italy, and Drusus in despair seems to have deter- 
mined to carry his laws by force with their help. At this juncture 
a form of oath, said to have been taken by Drusus and the Italian 
leaders, binding both parties to mutual support, was circulated in 
Rome. It was supposed to have been published by Philippus to 
discredit Drusus. Drusus could not stop now. He forced through 
a number of his schemes in a combined statute, disregarding re- 
cent laws and bad auspices. Philippus called a meeting of the 
Senate and the House declared the /ex Livia not binding on the 
people. Drusus did not as tribune block this order of the Senate, 
but prepared to put his franchise-bill to the vote. Before he could 
do so he was struck down by an assassin, probably an agent of 
some of the Roman capitalists. So ended the last of the civilian 
reformers, in pursuit of ends unattainable by peaceful means. 
We hear nothing of any relations between him and Marius, nor 
was any such connexion likely. The problems left unsolved by 
Drusus could not be solved while the Republic lasted. The 
question of the franchise was at once settled by the sword. Dis- 
banded soldiers were scattered over Italy, men trained in recent 
wars, and Rome found herself called upon to fight for her existence 
at a moment's warning. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

THE GREAT ITALIAN OR MARSIC WAR 90—87 B.a 

397. We pass now to a scene the full significance of which 
is not easily to be grasped by minds prepossessed with modern 
political notions. We find a great part of the military peoples 
of Italy in arms against Rome, and that what they really wanted 
was to become Romans. It is certain that the struggle was fierce 
and devastating, and that it left behind it so much smouldering 
discontent that it was continued in the form of a civil war. The 
unceasing discord of Roman factions influenced Roman policy 
during the main struggle, and its events reacted upon Roman 
factions. As to the causes of the war there can be no doubt, 
but the details of the campaigns are utterly obscure. We have 
nothing that can be called a continuous narrative, even of a 
partisan colour. Appian, a Greek writer of the second century 
A.D., is our chief witness, and his account is meagre confused and 
inaccurate. This part of Livy's work is lost. So too is the con- 
temporary history of Sisenna. A few details survive in the stray 
notices of other writers. But we have enough evidence to prove 
that the story of this war was not a topic on which Roman pride 
was tempted to dwell. It is possible therefore that our lack of 
information may be partly due to Roman reticence, and not 
wholly to the accidental ravages of time. As things stand, our 
best help to understanding the strategic position and the course 
of the war is to be found in good maps : for beyond all doubt a 
great deal turned on the situation created by the political and 
physical geography of Italy. 

398. In former chapters we have seen how Rome conquered 
the Italian peoples one by one, and formed them into a confede- 
racy under her own headship on terms varying in the several 

20 — 2 



J 



08 Rome and the Allies [ch. 



cases, but on the whole neither onerous nor unfair. We have 
also seen how in her earlier days, before she acquired an empire, 
Rome incorporated some of the conquered as citizens ; and how 
these half-citizens were in course of time admitted to the full 
Roman franchise. But the Roman Republic had now long been 
an imperial power, and in Italy incorporation had ceased. Within 
the confederacy Roman Citizen and Ally were in painful contrast : 
we have traced the elevation of the one and depression of the 
other. We have remarked the inevitable growth of the demand 
for the Roman franchise, and the resistance to the claim. At 
last, after long patient waiting, great hopes had been raised, and 
then dashed by the murder of Drusus. But even now the most 
favoured class of Allies, the old Latin towns and the Latin 
colonies, stood by Rome. And the Greek cities of the South 
were also loyal. Indeed the services of Rome to Italy in the 
past had been great. Her system had been too strong for 
the Gauls, for Pyrrhus, for Hannibal. Italy had been enabled 
to prevent foreign invaders from ruling her destinies. But then 
followed a time in which a Roman empire was won, largely at 
the cost of Italian lives. The generation living in B.C. 90 might 
know as a tradition the services of Rome to Italy. Those of 
Italy to Rome would be far fresher in their memories, and they 
had a constant reminder in the presence of men who had fought 
with honour in recent wars. In short, they knew their own value, 
and meant to compel Rome to receive them on equal terms. 
Only in one part of Italy can we surely trace a grim desire for 
the destruction of Rome. A shrunken remnant of the once great 
Samnite confederacy still kept the old name, the old Oscan 
dialect, and much of old tradition and habits. The dalesmen, 
little affected by the Romanizing of Italy, were no doubt well 
aware that their valiant forefathers had suffered many things from 
Rome, and brooded over stories of ancestral wrongs. 

399. The change in the Roman attitude towards Allies gave 
them a galling consciousness of their inferiority. The internal 
degeneration of Rome was meanwhile no secret. If Jugurtha 
knew of it, so surely did the Italian AUies. This would not tend 
to make them more contented. They could not like the policy 
of the corn-laws, encouraging the growth of a pauper mob, whose 
votes carried measures without regard to the interests or feelings 
of the Allies. Still rebelUon was not to be lightly undertaken. 



xxvii] Loyal and rebel districts 309 

There must be a reasonable prospect that gains would outweigh 
losses. In particular the wealthier Allies in the various com- 
munities were probably slow to move. Roman policy had always 
favoured well-to-do minorities in states leagued with Rome, and 
the benefit of Roman domain-lands granted to Roman con- 
federates was probably enjoyed mainly by the rich. Now the 
loyalty of these men would be shaken by the land-laws. Re- 
sumption of the lands held in possession by Allies may not have 
gone far in practice : mere uncertainty was enough to create 
irritation. Therefore, when it became clear that careful organiza- 
tion was necessary, if rebels were to avoid the fate of Fregellae, 
leaders were forthcoming to head a combined revolt. At the 
end of the year 91 their preparations were complete. It was 
not the Allies, isolated by Roman statecraft, but Rome, distracted 
and blind to her danger, that had to face the great crisis un- 
prepared. 

400. Want of space forbids a full discussion of the map of 
Italy, but a few important points must be noted. There were 
three large continuous blocks of territory held by Allies, in which 
disaffection was rife. Northern Etruria and Umbria were cut off 
from the more active centres of rebellion by a great block of 
territory reaching from sea to sea, which was either Roman or 
held by Latin colonies loyal to Rome. In it were imbedded a 
few communities of Allies, one of which, Asculum in Picenum, 
was a hotbed of rebellion. The desire of the rebels to open 
communications with Etruria, and so to extend the revolt, and 
the determination of the Romans to prevent it, made Asculum 
a place of strategic importance to both sides. There was at first 
no open rising in Etruria. The districts mainly concerned in the 
rebellion lay East and South-East of Rome. The group of hill 
peoples, Marsi Paeligni Vestini Marrucini, seem to have been 
still as of old loosely-federated cantons. As soldiers, the men 
of these parts were the flower of Italy. Armed and trained on 
the Roman model, they had no superiors in battle. From the 
Marsi this great struggle was commonly called the Marsic war. 
But united action on their part had hitherto been conducted 
under Roman generals for Roman causes : they had now to co- 
operate independently. Further South were the peoples whom 
we may roughly call Samnites. For the Frentani Hirpini and 
Lucani were of Samnite blood and sympathies, though detached 



3IO 



[CH. 




Map of Italy 90 B.C., shewing Roman territory in dark-hatching (Rome is 
marked with a cross), the Latin Colonies of the Roman People in black, 
and the territory of Treaty-states in white. The dotted line AB is the 
official limit of Italy proper, from the Macra (West) to the Aesis (East). 
CD is the line from the Macra to the Rubicon. For the question of the 
advance of the official limit see § 440. The map is adapted from that in 
Beloch's Italische Bund. 



xxvii] Rome holds the harbours 3 1 1 

from the reduced League that still bore the famous name. These 
peoples were spread over a wide area, for the inland parts of 
Lucania were still in their hands. Combination had its diffi- 
culties, for some Latin colonies and a block held by transplanted 
Ligurians formed a territorial bar between the northern and 
southern divisions. Moreover the Latin colony of Aesernia 
watched the northern border, while Venusia stood in the way 
of joint action further South. All the points indicated were of 
great strategic importance in the war. In Apulia there was dis- 
content, but the presence of Samnite forces seems to have been 
needed to kindle serious revolt. 

401. On the other hand, the city of Rome was shielded by 
a large block of friendly territory. Southern Etruria and Umbria 
with Picenum were almost wholly Roman, at least loyal. East 
and South of the city, beside a few loyal old-Latin cities, were 
the districts once Sabine Volscian Auruncan etc., now all Roman; 
the former peoples having either become Romans or disappeared. 
Northern Campania was either Roman domain or held by colonies. 
The southern part was mainly in the hands of Allies, but some 
(as the Greek Neapolis) were loyal. Campania was a chief seat 
of war, for some cities were drawn into revolt by the inroad of 
a Samnite army. But by far the greatest element of strength 
in the strategic position of Rome was the fact of controlling all 
the important maritime centres. With Brundisium, Tarentum, 
Rhegium, and the ports of the bay of Naples, in Roman hands, 
she was able to prevent succours reaching the rebels from abroad, 
while she could and did import foreign auxiliaries herself. The 
Numidian horseman, the mercenary bowman from Crete, probably 
the Balearic slinger also, bore a part in the war for Rome. Gauls 
seem to have served on both sides. Imperial Rome, taken at a 
disadvantage, had to seek help from any quarter. In the earlier 
part of the war it is clear that the confederate rebels were able to 
place in the field better armies. But it must be remembered that 
of officers experienced in handling large bodies of troops Rome 
had probably a far greater number; and in case of need there 
were Marius and Sulla. 

402. Let us now compare the political organizations. The 
outbreak of war found the rebels equipped with a regular con- 
federate constitution. Corfinium in the land of the Paeligni was 
renamed Italia and made the capital. A Senate of 500 delegates 



312 The confederate rebels [ch. 

was the governing body. There was a select inner council for 
practical deliberation. The magistracy was a copy of Roman 
models. Two consuls, each with six praetors under him, were 
to command in the two main theatres of war. Q. Pompaedius 
Silo the Marsian had the northern department, C. Papius Mutilus 
the Samnite had the southern. A common coinage was struck, 
with symbolic figures : the legend was according to the prevailing 
dialect, Latin for the Marsian district, Oscan for the Samnite. In 
short, the new confederacy presented an appearance of remark- 
able unity and imposing strength. Yet at this distance of time it 
should be clear to us that it was more likely to be effective in 
the first rush. All would be eager to win victories in battle. But 
if the war were protracted, and if great sacrifices had to be made 
for the common cause, the interests and aims of its various 
members might diverge. The empire of Rome was a property 
of value. To extort a share in it was no doubt a practical 
aspiration. To destroy Rome was not to win that .empire, but 
to lose it, for the subject peoples obeyed not Italy but Rome. 
If Rome offered to make the Italians Romans, the rage of many, 
having spent its first fury, would be cooled by self-interest. They 
would have gained their object, and the stubborn hatred of the 
Samnite would be left to fail. If the great leaders aimed at 
founding a new Italian compound state, this was surely an 
ambition not likely to rouse an equal enthusiasm in the rank 
and file of their followers. 

403. The first outbreak of the revolt occurred at Asculum. 
A Roman ofificer was murdered and all Romans in the town were 
massacred. In a few days the confederate rebels were in arms. 
This seems to have been at the end of the year 91, immediately 
after the death of Drusus. But even in this hour of panic, with 
a terrible war at their doors, Roman politicians did not cease 
their factious strife. The capitalist influence, hostile to Drusus, 
had got the upper hand, and the magistrates for 90 were all or 
mostly in their interest. The tribune Q. Varius, a half-breed from 
Spain, forced through a law appointing a special commission to 
try all persons suspected of having caused the revolt of the Allies. 
Nobody who had supported Drusus was safe from a charge of 
treason {niaiestas). A few, such as old Scaurus, were acquitted, 
but many were driven into exile. In the Senate too the same 
influences prevailed. The House ordered the suspension of the 



xxvii] lex Varia. First campaign 313 

ordinary law-courts, while the Varian commission went on. Mean- 
while the preparations for war were hastily made. An embassy 
from the rebels, offering to negotiate, was dismissed by the Senate. 
The consuls were assigned to command in the two chief seats of 
war, P. Rutilius Lupus having the northern department, L. lulius 
Caesar Strabo the southern. To each were attached five legati; 
among those of Lupus was Marius, while Sulla was with Caesar. 
The Varian court was still sitting in Rome when the consuls set 
out for the front with their armies. 

404. The southern campaign went badly for Rome. Aesernia 
was lost. A large part of Apulia was won by the rebels, who even 
took the great fortress-colony of Venusia. Mutilus with the main 
Samnite army broke into Campania, and took town after town. 
The failure of the Roman forces may have been exaggerated, but 
it is plain that they could not hold their own. And even the 
imperial connexions of Rome had their disadvantages. A son 
of Jugurtha, removed from Numidia, had been placed in the 
custody of the authorities of Venusia. There he fell into the 
hands of the rebels, and Mutilus, finding that Caesar had under 
him a Numidian contingent, used the prisoner to entice them 
to desert. The consul was soon glad to send the remainder 
home. In the obscurity of our record we can see that in the 
South Rome had lost ground. In the North the Romans fared 
somewhat better, though they suffered grave disasters. Party- 
spirit ran high, and reached the camp. Lupus suspected some 
of his officers of sending news to the enemy, and this was a cause 
of uneasiness. Some of his divisional commanders were badly 
beaten, and in a great battle with the Marsi the consul himself 
fell. The situation was saved by Marius. But Marius, unpopular 
in Rome, and probably suspected of being really in favour of the 
rebels' claims, was not placed in sole command. The Senate 
joined with him Q. Servilius Caepio, one of the chief opponents 
of Drusus. But Caepio was soon outgeneralled and destroyed 
with a large part of his army. Marius, at last in supreme com- 
mand, had once more to retrieve the blunders of others, and 
did so. In some quarters of the northern department the Roman 
generals were more successful, in particular Cn. Pompeius Strabo, 
who seems to have done much fighting, and eventually to have 
begun the siege of Asculum. To punish this town as a warning 
to others was a main object of the Romans. Moreover it was in 



314 ^^^ lulia 90 B.C. [cH. 

itself an important post, commanding as it did the line of com- 
munication between the rebels in arms and the Umbro-Etruscan 
districts. A rising in those parts was likely, and the strategy of 
the belligerents was directed to promote or prevent it. On the 
whole the results in the North were something like a drawn game. 
The Roman losses were great, and the Senate had to take special 
measures to quiet the alarm in Rome. But Silo^ for all his 
victories, had not achieved his aim of piercing the Roman barrier 
to the North. That the services of Marius were not valued as 
they deserved was surely due to party-jealousy. At the end of 
the year he retired from command. 

405. In the winter of 90 — 89 the Umbro-Etruscan Allies 
rose in revolt. The rising seems to have been rather tardy than 
deliberate, prompted by news of the Marsian victories, and neither 
hearty nor well organized. To draw in the Roman armies, and 
stand on the defensive, would have been fatal to the cause of 
Rome. To carry on an offensive war in northern Etruria, when 
so much lost ground had to be recovered in the South, was im- 
possible. The resources of the Roman state were already strained 
to the utmost. Some concession had to be made, in the hope of 
thus detaching some of the more lukewarm rebels from the cause 
of Mutilus and Silo. Late in the year 90 the consul Caesar came 
to Rome to hold elections, and he carried a lex Iidia by which 
the Roman franchise was offered to all communities of Allies that 
either had remained loyal or at once laid down their arms. This 
law, far more than the doubtful victories dimly recorded of Roman 
forces, speedily pacified Etruria. Probably it also made possible 
the raising of recruits there for the Roman legions. But its 
effects were felt all over Italy. It now rested with the several 
communities to accept or decline the concession which most 
of them were in arms to extort. Was it worth while to go on 
shedding blood and laying waste the land of Italy, for the mere 
purpose of destroying Rome? The advantages of becoming 
Romans were known to all, and who could suggest a better 
alternative? So some accepted the offer at once, and the re- 
solution of others was weakened. That Roman ingenuity might 
yet delay complete enfranchisement, by juggling in the matter 
of registration, was a point not likely to attract much attention 
during the continuance of the war. 

406. In the campaign of 89, obscure though the record is. 



xxvii] Second campaign 315 

the turn of the tide is manifest. It was arranged that Sulla 
should command in the South, while both consuls operated in 
the North. Of these two, Cn. Pompeius was an astute and 
competent man. He had the full confidence of the party in 
power at Rome, which Marius had lacked. The great success 
of his campaign was when he caught a rebel army on its way 
to support the Etruscan rising and defeated it with heavy loss. 
Evidently there was at this time a wish to restore peace in these 
parts by judicious treatment as well as by victories in battle. 
Pompeius carried out this policy so adroitly that he gained much 
popularity in the northern districts as the people gradually re- 
turned to their allegiance. His son Gnaeus, afterwards the great 
Pompey, was with his father in camp. To him the goodwill 
earned by his father in Picenum was an inheritance of value at 
a later day. The main struggle in the northern department 
centred in the siege of Asculum. Great efforts were made to 
break up the investment, but in vain. The Romans took it late 
in the year, and dealt severely with their captives. Meanwhile 
the ravages of Roman forces had made the Marsi weary of the 
war. We shall see that a fresh concession on the Roman side 
helped to induce them and the neighbouring rebel peoples to sue 
for peace. Silo withdrew to the South, and joined the Samnites. 
407. In the South great exertions were called for. A large 
part of southern Campania had to be recovered, and it seems 
that it was no easy matter for Sulla to raise sufficient forces and 
maintain discipline. Somehow he managed to hold his ground, 
and to push back the enemy. Then he fell upon the Hirpini 
and compelled them to submit. The southern area of the rebel 
confederacy was thus cut in two, and Sulla now delivered his 
main stroke. While his divisional commanders held or gained 
ground in Lucania and Apulia, he burst into Samnium, routed 
the army of Mutilus with great slaughter, took towns, and stunned 
the rebel power in its central seat. Even allowing for exaggera- 
tions, it is clear that Sulla conducted his campaign with remarkable 
skill and energy. The war was not at an end, but in the South, 
as in the North, the real danger was past. The broken Samnite 
League was no longer a serious menace to Rome. The re- 
maining local conflicts, such as the siege of Nola, would be 
decided in time, and could only end in one way. Meanwhile 
the movements of Mithradates had created an imminent danger 



3i6 Three franchise-laws [ch. 

in the East. Here was a task worthy of an ambitious soldier. 
Sulla therefore returned to Rome, bent upon winning the consul- 
ship and the eastern command. 

408. Let us now consider what was happening in Rome 
during this momentous year 89, chiefly the legislation that went 
on side by side with military operations. And first of the 
franchise-laws. To grant the franchise to loyal Allies actually 
fighting for Rome was an obvious step. A lex Calpurnia con- 
ferred on Roman commanders the necessary powers. To promote 
disunion in the rebel ranks it was desirable to open a way by 
which individuals might become Romans. Thus some would 
come over at once, and whole communities, now wavering, would 
be likely to decide for peace. A period of 60 days of grace was 
allowed for application^ to be made to a Roman praetor. It is 
probable that the lex Plautia Papiria, in which this offer was 
made, had something to do with the final pacification of the more 
accessible peoples, such as the Marsi. We are told that the 
Samnites and Lucanians did not receive the franchise at this 
time. Probably the clauses of the law were so drafted as to 
exclude them : they were still in arms, and had as yet shewn 
no sign of submission. Another question that arose was the 
treatment of Cisalpine Gaul. That district contained (a) citizen- 
colonies, {b) citizen settlers not in colonies, [c) Latin colonies, to 
which the lex lulia of 90 applied, {d) the remnants of earlier 
inhabitants. These last, particularly those South of the Po, were 
now a good deal Romanized. A lex Pompeia of the consul Cn. 
Pompeius recognized two divisions of the country, Cispadane 
and Transpadane, and treated the two differently. South of the 
Po, the non-Roman population received the franchise, and Cispa- 
dane Gaul became virtually a part of Italy. In the Transpadane 
the new policy was to choose or establish urban centres, to which 
batches of Gaulish neighbours were severally attached in sub- 
ordinate relations. Each city had the constitution and privileges 
of a Latin colony, and a Romanizing process under municipal 
conditions was effectively promoted. In point of form the great 
Cisalpine district seems to have remained in an anomalous 
position. It was neither strictly a part of Italy, nor yet a 
province. To this matter we shall have to return in a later 
chapter. 

1 See § 418. 



xxvii] Effect delayed in practice 317 

409. These laws gave to certain persons or classes of persons 
certain rights. But to accept the offer of the Roman civitas did 
not at once place a man in a Roman Tribe, still less in a Century. 
And a citizen could only vote as a member of one of these groups. 
Now the vote was desired, not as a privilege to be often used by 
voters dwelling at a distance from Rome, but as a weapon useful 
in times of agitation, as a means of preventing the passage of 
measures likely to injure the interests of non-residents. Naturally 
the new citizens were wanting to know in what groups they would 
be enrolled as parts of the Roman community. This was a matter 
for censors. But in this time of disturbance, with Italy in dis- 
order, it was no doubt a matter of much delicacy and difficulty, 
not to be easily despatched in a hurry. For the old citizens had 
to be considered, and they feared that the new ones might outvote 
them. Many would be found to deprecate hasty action, and on 
plausible grounds. The course followed was truly Roman. There 
were censors in the year 89, and they did some censorial work. 
Surely they were appointed partly to carry out the urgent regis- 
tration, for it was not five years since the census of 92. But no 
registration took place. At this point our record fails us utterly. 
Some temporary arrangement seems to have been devised now 
or soon after. What it was we can only guess, so obscure and 
conflicting are the notices of our authorities. Two inferences 
may fairly be drawn : the plan adopted was found unsatisfactory, 
and it was not long in force. It is certain that the franchise- 
agitation continued to be a cause of friction and embarrassment 
for several years. Piecemeal concessions, dimly recorded, shew 
that it became a question of party politics within the Roman 
state. That the new citizens were impatient of Roman delays 
we may safely assume. For what really ended the Italian re- 
bellion was the belief that Roman pride had at last stooped to 
a bona fide concession of equal rights. And without a place 
in a Tribe there was no voice in legislation : without a place in 
a Century there was no voice in the elections of consuls and 
praetors, and therefore (for leading men) no real chance of being 
elected. Discontent was inevitable under such conditions. 

410. Party-feelings were running high in Rome. We can 
trace three parties among the wealthier classes, from whom the 
politicians were drawn. These were the capitalist Knights and 
two sections of the nobility, the one favouring the concessions, 



3i8 Troubles and intrigues in Rome [ch. 

and including former supporters of Drusus, the other consisting 
of stiff-necked men, resolved to concede as little and as slowly 
as possible. The first had to bear the odium of the Varian 
commission, the second had lost some of their best members 
through the action of that court. The favourable turn of the 
war strengthened the third party, to which Sulla belonged. A 
law passed in this year (89) is a sign of the change in the balance 
of forces. By it the Knights were for the moment deprived of 
their monopoly of the public jury-courts. A new elective system, 
in which the yearly list {albwn) of qualified jurors was made up 
of 15 members from each Tribe, took its place. This lex Plautia 
iudiciaria marks a reaction, but the capitalist party were strong, 
and the law was only in force for about two years. Another 
troublesome matter was the scarcity of ready money. Public and 
private finances were upset by the war, and a law reducing the 
weight of the copper as to \ ounce {semuncia) can hardly have 
eased things much. Debtors pressed by creditors found a pro- 
tector in the praetor Asellio. Then . the capitalists, enraged at 
official obstruction, murdered the praetor, and nobody was 
punished for it. 

411. The consular election for 88 expressed the situation so 
far as the Centuries were concerned. Sulla and Q. Pompeius 
Rufus were elected. This Pompeius was a man of the same 
political colour. But the Tribes elected among the tribunes 
P. Sulpicius Rufus, a young Patrician who had become a 
Plebeian for the purpose. He was one of the concessionist 
nobles, and meant to push on the enfranchising policy. It 
was necessary for him to coalesce with the capitalist party, and 
for this coalition a figure-head was wanted. The place was 
filled by Marius. Marius was now about 68, and his enemies 
called him worn out. They derided his efforts to display his 
vigour. But he thirsted for a seventh consulship, or at least 
for the command against Mithradates. This he hoped to gain 
by joining Sulpicius. The recall of exiles, arid the complete 
equalization of old and new citizens, were the programme re- 
sulting from this notable bargain, in which Marius certainly had 
the best of it. Sulpicius set to work, and carried his laws by 
sheer force of armed men. Sulla had drawn the lot for the 
eastern command. Sulpicius forced the Tribes to transfer it 
from the consul to Marius, a private citizen. This conduct 



xxvii] Marius Sulpicius and Sulla 319 

was openly revolutionary. Sulla went off to his army before 
Nola. He had the real power, for trained armies now belonged 
to their general, not to the state. Marius, the chief creator of 
such armies, must have been blind to fancy for a moment that 
he could take such an army from such a man by means of a 
forced popular vote in Rome. The other consul, who had fled 
with Sulla, was probably deprived of his command in the northern 
department. There was still work to be done there, and Cn. 
Pompeius was kept in charge as proconsul. 

412. Sulla's army scorned the orders from Rome, and he 
set out for the city with six devoted legions. All attempts to 
stop them were futile. Thus early in 88 B.C. Rome was for the 
first time invaded by a Roman army. Marius Sulpicius and 
others could not even stay the onset of the troops in a street- 
fight, though they invited the help of slaves. They fled for their 
lives, and Sulla at once had them outlawed, with a price set on 
their heads. Sulpicius was murdered ; Marius. after hairbreadth 
escapes and many hardships, managed to reach Africa. For the 
moment Sulla was supreme. But for a permanent tyranny things 
were not ripe ; and to stay at home, and send someone else to 
assert the dominion of Rome in the East, would lead to dangerous 
consequences, whether the substitute succeeded or failed. So he 
resolved to patch up things in Rome, and go. What his temporary 
arrangements were in detail is very uncertain. He seems at least 
to have tried to strengthen the Senate by a law requiring all bills 
to have the sanction of the House before being offered to the 
vote of the Tribes. The Assembly by Centuries was in some 
way modified so as to give more power to the rich, evidently 
as a check upon the election of revolutionary magistrates. The 
Senate was filled up by adding 300 new members, chosen sup- 
porters of the aristocratic party. But all these changes could 
only be lasting if the leading men were strong. When Sulla 
sent off his army to Capua on the way to embark for Greece, 
the sulky resentment of the people revived. At the consular 
election for 87 he carried one aristocrat, Cn. Octavius, as consul; 
L. Cornelius Cinna, a Patrician, but of the opposite faction, gained 
the other place. In repealing the acts of Sulpicius, Sulla had 
restored his own colleague Q. Pompeius to the command in the 
North. But the men of the northern army would not have him. 
He was murdered in a mutiny, and Cn. Pompeius resumed the 



320 The situation as left by Sulla [ch. xxvii 

command. Such was the state of things Sulla was leaving behind 
him. But he went through the farce of binding Cinna by solemn 
oaths not to upset arrangements recently made, and set out for 
the East early in 87. 

413. The civil warfare and revolutionary doings in Rome 
during the year 88 were only possible because the Italian rebellion 
had ceased to be really dangerous. But Italy was still far from 
being at rest. In the North there were uneasy movements among 
the smaller peoples, and an army of observation had to be em- 
ployed. In the South another force was at work recovering 
Apulia. The Samnites and Lucanians were still in arms. Silo 
the Marsian reorganized the Samnite forces and held his ground 
till the Roman armies closed in upon him, and he fell in battle. 
So the war died out, and we cease to hear of Italian armies as 
such holding the field. But we do not hear of any formal sub- 
mission and pacification of the stubborn remnant of the rebels. 
It is said that in their latter days of depression they sent an 
embassy to beg the aid of Mithradates. But the Great King 
now had his hands full, and the ill-matched combination never 
took effect. After the death of Silo, open resistance to Rome 
was at an end, save for a few minor affairs such as the siege 
of Nola. The general situation in several parts of Italy seems 
to have been a sort of uneasy truce, with masses of discontented 
people awaiting developments. Many districts had suffered from 
the wasteful ravages of war. On the side of Rome, a change 
had come over the spirit of her armies. The departure of Sulla 
removed the pick of the Roman troops, doubtless nearly all of 
them old citizens. In the forces left behind, the ranks were 
largely filled with new citizens hastily enrolled, probably far more 
interested in securing their own equal rights as Romans, than 
willing to wait patiently for a suitable moment to assert their 
claims. Rome, torn by faction, needed a little breathing-space 
to settle down and face the difficult problems of the hour. But, 
with things in the state in which Sulla had left them, such a 
respite would have been a miracle. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

MARIUS AND CINNA 87—86 B.C. 

414. Italy, full of dissatisfaction and unrest, sadly needed 
good and firm government under a great leader. Time alone 
could assuage resentments. But there was much to be done at 
once, if things were to settle down peaceably, and there was no 
one to do it. The aristocrats, left by Sulla in precarious posses- 
sion of power, had no strong man to lead them. Their adversary 
Cinna had much ambition and enterprise ; he speedily proved 
that he had neither scruples nor real capacity. His oath of 
course went for nothing. He at once produced bills to recall the 
men outlawed by Sulla, and to distribute new citizens and freed- 
men among all the 35 Tribes. An open conflict with the mass 
of old citizens, headed by his colleague Octavius, ended in his 
having to fly from Rome. The Senate voted him a public 
enemy, no longer consul, and had a harmless man of their own 
colour elected in his stead. Such a step could only have been 
effective if followed up with vigour, but vigour was just what these 
reactionary nobles lacked. 

415. Cinna was not the man to be put down by votes. 
Sulla had taught him the way to deal with Rome. He set out on 
a tour to rally the new citizens. First he gained the support of 
the army in Campania, then of a number of cities, where the 
ex-Allies welcomed him. After picking up other partisans, he 
was able to march on Rome with a numerous army. In the 
absence of Sulla the acting government was weak, but they 
prepared to defend the city. Not being able to raise enough 
troops by their own exertions, they sent for Cn. Pompeius and his 
army. But Pompeius dallied. He was not really in favour with 
either faction, and seems to have been inclined to play a game of 

H. 21 



32 2 Return of the Marians [ch. 

his own. His slow movements gave time for Cinna to organize 
his forces, and for other combatants to appear. Among Cinna's 
supporters were Cn. Papirius Carbo, an active and turbulent 
partisan, and Q. Sertorius, an ofificer who had done good service, 
particularly under Marius. Above all, Marius himself started 
from Africa and landed in Etruria. He had a few ships, and 
quickly raised troops among the new citizens, and some planta- 
tion-slaves also. What followed may be called the Marian 
revolution, for Marius was the chief figure. The advance on 
Rome was made in three divisions. A battle between Sertorius 
and Pompeius was indecisive, and therefore in favour of the 
assailants. The army of Pompeius did not care for the cause of 
the old citizens, and discontent spread in the ranks. Marius 
took Ostia, and cut off the city's supply of corn. Meanwhile the 
Senate was hoping for aid from the South, where there were still 
Italians who had been conquered by force of arms, but had not 
as yet been allowed to benefit by the franchise-laws. They were 
now offered the Roman citizenship. Metellus {Pius, son of 
Numidicus), who commanded an army of observation in those 
parts, was ordered to come to terms with the Samnites and march 
to the relief of Rome. It seems that the Samnites demanded a 
guarantee that enfranchisement should mean perfect equality, and 
that Metellus, in heart opposed to the concession, refused to give 
it. So the Samnites joined the Marian side. Metellus led a 
small force to Rome; but the aid from the South was quite 
insufficient, and expected reinforcements from the North were 
held in check by detachments of Marians. 

416. Within the city there was a lack of cooperation between 
the leaders which soon proved fatal. Pompeius was not in 
earnest, but his death (perhaps murder) removed a bad adviser. 
His men were deserting. Octavius, a refined and scrupulous 
patriot, would not resort to desperate measures, such as arming 
slaves. Metellus would not take command so as to supersede 
the consul. The troops passed over to the enemy, and food was 
scarce. Cinna's terms had to be accepted. He was reinstated 
in the consulship, and allowed to enter Rome on the faith of a 
mere promise to shew all possible mercy. He at once made the 
Assembly repeal the outlawries enacted under Sulla. This done, 
Marius consented to appear in the city. Octavius as consul 
waited for his murderers; Metellus got away safe to Africa. Then 



xxviii] Cinna. Financial crisis 323 

began the massacres in which Marius took revenge for his past 
slights and sufferings. With a gang of slaves he went about 
Rome indicating victims, who were cut down at once. The 
pursuit and murder of marked men, among them old Antonius 
the orator, informations, treacheries, betrayals, were long-remem- 
bered episodes of this horrible time. We hear that there were 
also touching instances of loyalty, even among slaves, and that as 
yet it was not a Roman practice to procure a citizen's death in 
order to get his property. But, after at least five days of murders, 
Cinna and Sertorius found means to destroy the ruffians of 
Marius and stop the slaughter. Sulla was now declared a public 
enemy, his property confiscated, his laws annulled. Marius and 
Cinna were elected consuls for the next year (86), now close at 
hand. The old soldier was worn out, and on the Ides (13th) of 
January he died. Everything the Marians had done had been 
effected by fear and use of the sword. It now remained for 
Cinna to shew whether he could give a practical and lasting turn 
to the revolution. 

417. Cinna took L. Valerius Flaccus as his colleague in 
place of Marius. Among the reversals of recent policy we may 
note the repeal of the Plautian law, and consequently the rein- 
statement of the Knights in control of the public courts. But 
the m.ost serious internal trouble at the moment was the financial 
crisis. Not only had events upset the money-market and destroyed 
credit : the Mithradatic war had stopped remittances from Asia 
and produced a panic in capitalist circles. A law was carried 
enabling debtors to discharge their liabilities by paying 25°/^ 
of the sums owed. So desperate a remedy could not really 
restore credit, and the financial stringency remained. Political 
troubles were aggravated by the fact that money was being with- 
held from circulation. The state chest suffered, and among the 
efforts made to fill it prosecutions for alleged embezzlement found 
a place. The bad state of the currency made matters worse. 
Bad denarii had become common since the foolish act^ of Drusus, 
and of course the bad drove out the good. The money-changers 
alone profited by this state of things. Something had to be done 
to relieve the distress. Tribunes and praetors united to effect a 
reform, by assaying the pieces and withdrawing the bad ones 
from circulation. The cost of this reform seems to have fallen 

^ See § 396. 

21 — 2 



324 The census of 86 B.C. [ch. xxviii 

on the treasury, but it was a good move, and assaying became a 
regular profession. 

418. Another urgent matter was the registration of the new 
citizens. In 86 there were censors, again before the period of 
five years had expired. This time the registration was carried 
out somehow, but very little is known about it. Probably the 
new citizens were distributed over the 35 Tribes. But we are not 
to assume that an equal number were put into each Tribe : that 
is very unlikely. And it was incomplete. One known hindrance 
was the carelessness of the praetors whose duty it had been to 
receive applications^ under the law of 89, and who had not kept 
perfect lists. But the prospects of the present government were 
clouded by the news from abroad. Sulla was gaining wonderful 
victories. Cinna was naturally anxious. He wanted to guard 
against the danger of the bold outlaw's return. The first thing 
to be done was to recover the control of the veteran army, and 
Cinna was so blind to the lessons of experience that he fancied 
himself able to remove Sulla from the command of his devoted 
troops. He sent out a force under the consul Flaccus, a worthless 
fellow, with the rough soldier C Flavius Fimbria to guide him. 
We shall see what came of this absurd project. Meanwhile 
Cinna's chief associate was Carbo. The pair assumed the consul- 
ships for two years (85 and 84) in advance. Constitutional 
government was in abeyance at home. Let us see what Sulla 
was doing in the East. 

1 See § 408. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

SULLA IN THE EAST 87—84 B.C. 

419. We have seen how Mithradates Eupator took advantage 
of the weakness or jealousies of neighbouring powers and of the 
reluctance of Rome to engage in distant wars. He had now a 
large empire, a full treasury, and a strong fleet and army under 
able Greek officers. His opportunity for further aggression came 
in 90, when Rome had her hands full with the Italian war. No 
doubt he was well informed of the wretched state of the province 
Asia, which was being bled to death by Roman extortioners. 
There he could appear as a welcome deliverer, for the small 
Roman force kept in the province to overawe the subjects was 
quite inadequate for its defence. He set a pretender on the 
Bithynian throne and reoccupied Cappadocia. No Roman force 
could be spared to restore the ejected kings, but an embassy was 
sent to insist on their restoration. Mithradates still shrank from 
open war, and obeyed for the moment. But the sequel shewed 
how private greed was apt to spoil the effect of Roman diplomacy. 
M'. Aquilius, the head of the embassy, was avaricious, and his 
colleagues probably men of the same type. Bribes were exacted 
from the restored kings : the kings had to borrow from Roman 
financiers. Nicomedes of Bithynia was hard pressed by his 
creditors, till he was driven to make a raid into Pontic territory 
for booty to satisfy their claims. Mithradates had now what he 
wanted, a good pretext for war. He could gain no redress by 
negotiation, and about the end of 89 B.C. hostilities began. 

420. The foolish miscalculations of the Romans were soon 
exposed. Their inadequate and divided forces, mostly raised in 
Asia Minor, were routed and scattered. The cities of Asia (the 
province) mostly joined the king, who paraded the country with 



326 Mithradates and the Greeks [ch. 

his captive Aquilius, and put the unlucky man to death at 
Pergamum. At sea he was equally successful. The Roman 
fleet at Byzantium was taken or scattered, and many of the 
islands surrendered : the Aegean was commanded by the Pontic 
navy, and communications between Italy and Asia were now 
practically severed. Rome declared war in 88. We have seen 
above the causes that delayed effective action, and left Mithra- 
dates free to extend his designs. A few maritime republics, such 
as Rhodes Byzantium Cyzicus and Heraclea Pontica, stood by 
Rome. But there was no Roman fleet within reach, and they 
were helpless. The king's first move was to procure a general 
massacre of the Romans in Asia. It is said that some 80,000 
thus perished, and the provincials were thereby committed to 
his cause. For the moment he remitted some taxes, and was 
a popular master ; but the people were in fact his slaves. He 
next tried to conquer Rhodes, but was beaten off. Still he was 
supreme at sea. He knew the value of gifted Greeks, and posed 
as patron and champion of Hellenism. So he resolved to make 
himself master of the old Hellas, and chose Athens as the centre 
of his influence. A Professor in one of the philosophic schools 
served as his agent, and the dreamy University town was seduced 
from its alliance with Rome. Hopes of a revival of ancient 
glories were easily aroused. A nominal democracy was restored, 
in effect a tyranny under the Professor Aristion, who raised money 
by the plunder of the rich. Athens was now a dependency of 
the Pontic empire, and her possessions were occupied by the 
Pontic fleet. In Delos and other islands another great massacre 
of Romans took place. The Piraeus and Athens were held by 
Pontic garrisons, and most of the Greek states were induced to 
declare for Mithradates. 

421. But little help was to be got from the Greek states in 
their decay. So a second armament was sent to cooperate with 
the first. This force made descents on the Thessalian coast, 
but was checked by the energy of C. Sentius the long-resident 
governor^ of Macedonia. The two Pontic armies concentrated 
in Boeotia. At this point Sulla appeared with his army (season 
of 87) and the enemy fell back on Athens and the Piraeus. The 
two cities were separate, for there were now no Long WaUs. Sulla 
began the siege of both. But he needed a fleet for the work in 

' See § 378. 



xxix] Chaeronea. Orchomenus 327 

prospect, and sent L. Licinius LucuUus to raise one among the 
friendly naval powers of the eastern Mediterranean. The Great 
King dallied at Pergamum, while Sulla was changing the face of 
things in Greece. After a first repulse from Athens, he renewed 
the siege in the winter of 87 — 86, while the Marians were holding 
Rome, and a new and larger Pontic army was on its way from 
the North. Even the news of his outlawry did not turn him 
from his purpose. He defied both the enemy and the home 
authorities, knowing that his army was all his own. Athens at 
last fell, and after vast efforts the Piraeus also, all but its citadel 
Munychia. This too was abandoned when the Pontic force 
moved away by sea to join the new army in Boeotia. Near 
Chaeronea Sulla brought them to battle. Fighting against great 
odds ( I to 4 or more), the well-handled veterans utterly routed 
the king's motley host. Mithradates was furious at the news 
from Greece, and made ready another large army. To fight the 
Romans at a distance from his base was a costly undertaking. 
But he had good reasons for wishing to keep them busy in Greece. 
By his despotic and barbarous acts he had angered the Galatians, 
and caused much discontent in Asia. Ephesus and some other 
cities even revolted. By his cruelties in those that he reconquered, 
and by a general policy of putting the city governments in the 
hands of a rabble, paupers or aliens or liberated slaves, he 
destroyed all order and ruined the rich. Such a patron of 
Hellenism was the Great King of Pontus. 

422. In the year 86, after the battle of Chaeronea, the 
Roman army under Flaccus and Fimbria appeared in northern 
Greece. Sulla went to meet them, but they did not feel able 
to face him. After some loss by desertions, they went on to 
Asia by way of Macedonia. Sulla turned back to deal with the 
Pontic armies, now once more concentrated in Boeotia. Early 
in 85 he defeated them with great slaughter near Orchomenus. 
Meanwhile the government army reached Asia Minor, and 
LucuUus had at last raised a fleet and returned to the Aegean. 
Mithradates had now to face the attack of two Roman forces 
acting independently. Fimbria, who murdered Flaccus and took 
his place, defeated the king's army in Asia. He called upon 
LucuUus to close in with his fleet and capture the chief enemy. 
LucuUus refused, and the king escaped by sea. In a sea-fight 
off Tenedos the Roman-Greek fleet gained a great victory over 



328 Peace. Sulla in Asia [ch. 

that of Mithradates, mainly due to the skill of the Rhodians. 
Rome now had the upper hand, and Mithradates began to 
negotiate with Sulla. At first he would not accept Sulla's terms, 
though these were moderated by Sulla's anxiety to get back to 
Italy. Sulla marched northwards, and employed the time of 
waiting in chastising frontier tribes and restoring order in Mace- 
donia. Then he went on to Asia Minor. At a meeting with the 
king at Dardanus in the Troad Sulla's terms were accepted. 
Fimbria did not give much trouble. He was isolated, having 
no fleet ; his men deserted to Sulla, and he killed himself. The 
peace of Dardanus was a restoration of the status quo. Mithra- 
dates had to give up all his acquisitions, and be content with his 
kingdom as it stood before the year 90. There were the usual 
surrenders and stipulations in favour of allies. The war-indemnity 
was moderate, for Sulla was in a hurry to return. 

423. It was necessary to resume possession of Asia, evacuated 
by Mithradates. No treaty-clauses could prevent Sulla from 
punishing cities that had been disloyal to Rome. Moreover 
he wanted money for the task still before him. He exacted 
sums so enormous that many communities were forced to mort- 
gage their public property. For the ready money required had 
to be borrowed from Roman capitalists, who flocked to reap the 
rich harvest of usury. The richest of the Roman provinces 
entered on a period of poverty hopelessly encumbered with debt. 
The winter of 85 — 84 was a season of peculiar misery. Sulla's 
army wanted a rest, and he put them into winter quarters in 
provincial cities at the cost of the inhabitants. No burden borne 
by Roman subjects was so dreaded as this. And the present case 
was doubtless an extreme one, for the soldiers, ever prone to 
outrage the households on which they were billeted, knew that 
punishment was intended. Most of Sulla's administrative arrange- 
ments were sound, and long remained in use. But the working 
of them was corrupted as before by the financial interests of 
Roman investors, and a happy time for Asia was far off. Sulla 
was too busy or indifferent to deal with another evil by which 
the coasts and islands of the Aegean were suffering great losses. 
Piracy, encouraged by recent disorders, had increased and was 
increasing. Sulla ignored it. As an army of occupation he left 
in Asia the Fimbrian legions, with L. Licinius Murena in command, 
and crossed the sea to the Piraeus in the season of 84 b.c. 



xxix] Athens. Sulla's return 329 

424. Sulla and his army wintered in Greece. There was 
much to be done at Athens and elsewhere, and the preparations 
for his return to Italy in defiance of the Marians had to be made 
with care. He was interested in Greek arts and letters, and at 
Athens he came upon a literary treasure, which he transferred to 
Rome. This was a collection of the most important works of 
Aristotle, long supposed lost, but lately rediscovered. But Sulla's 
favourite companions were actors and musicians. There were in 
Athens also various Romans, driven out of Italy by disgust at the 
government of Cinna and Carbo. Among them was a young and 
wealthy man of Equestrian rank, T. Pomponius Atticus. This 
man is notable for the part played by him during all the later 
period of revolution and civil wars. He early learnt to take 
neither side in a quarrel, but to help men in their time of trouble 
and earn their goodwill in case they returned to power. Atticus 
gained the favour of Sulla, and used his influence on behalf of 
the Athenians. He helped them over pref^sing difficulties by 
lending money to the state on reasonable terms, but he wisely 
insisted on punctual repayment. He became immensely popular 
in Athens, and lived there more than 20 years. Sulla invited him 
to return to Italy, but his Epicurean temperament made him prefer 
to keep out of the stormy politics of Rome. Early in 83 Sulla 
safely landed his army at Brundisium. He was well received, but 
he had not more than 40,000 men. But the army was a real one, 
and the prestige of his luck — the luck of which he always boasted 
— was a force of incalculable value. His veterans swore to stand 
by him, and they made ready to face great odds. In the last two 
years he had sent despatches to the Senate, ignoring his outlawry. 
He protested against the acts of the Marian party, and gave 
warning of the redress that he would exact on his return. But 
he shewed his insight into the situation of affairs in Italy by 
announcing that he did not intend to reverse the enfranchisement 
of the new citizens. Thus he sought to weaken or remove an 
apprehension, natural enough, and to pave the way for detaching 
new citizens from the Marian cause. 



CHAPTER XXX 

CINNA, CARBO, AND SULLA 85—82 B.C. 

425. In the year 85 the dominant faction, led by Cinna, 
were above all things anxious to retain their power, and we know 
that they had still two years in which to prepare for the impending 
struggle. But they were never able to inspire general confidence 
and organize Italy as a Roman whole. In the Southern parts 
men were still in arms. Romans of rank. were slipping away, 
either to join Sulla or to hide in Africa or Spain. At home the 
Senate was uneasy, distrustful of the ruling Marians, but loth to 
oppose them, for fear of a massacre. All that Cinna and Carbo 
could do was to raise troops, but they could not raise enthusiasm 
for their cause, or provide able and inspiring leaders. If the 
Marians meant to hold their ground, a Man was wanted, and was 
not forthcoming. To drift into civil war for sheer lack of plans 
and rational vigour, was the worst of political crimes. Cinna was 
weak enough to let the Senate negotiate with Sulla, but meanwhile 
he went on forming armies. He contemplated taking the offensive 
against Sulla, and began to send troops over the Adriatic. But 
the men did not like the prospect of a civil war abroad. In a 
mutiny at Ancona Cinna was killed early in the year 84, and 
Carbo was left sole consul. 

426. The Roman government had never been in worse 
hands. Carbo would not provide himself with a colleague. The 
Senate was for the time helpless, under a consul obstinate without 
firmness, and rash without the nerve to meet emergencies. Sulla's 
reply to the Senate's conciliatory offers was alarming. He sneered 
at a guarantee of safety, and made it plain that he meant to effect 
a revolution on his own lines by the aid of his army. He repre- 
sented not only himself, but numbers of exiles and refugees : a 



CH. xxx] Policy and success of Sulla 331 

general restoration of properties and privileges was a part of his 
demand, to be enforced by the sword. Carbo and the Senate no 
longer pulled together. That the importance of the new citizens 
was recognized, is clear from an obscure record of an attempt 
to please them by some concession at this juncture. This was 
probably a countermove to the reassuring message of Sulla, 
referred to above. Whatever it may have effected, in the way 
of attaching the discontented to the Marian cause, was neutralized 
by the blundering of the Marian leaders. The consuls elected 
for 83, L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus and C Junius Norbanus, 
were active men, but unequal to the crisis. Carbo went to the 
Cisalpine as proconsul, to raise another army. Sertorius, the one 
good officer they had, was kept in the background. In short, for 
want of a strong directing head, they were putting their trust in 
numbers. Far-sighted men began to detect signs of their coming 
failure. Such was Carbo's quaestor C. Verres. He robbed the 
military chest and went off to Sulla. 

427. The government could not rely on the unanimous 
support of Italy. For instance, the long-Romanized district of 
Picenum needed watching. Sulla was free from such anxieties, 
and was undoubted master in his own camp. At Brundisium he 
was joined by Metellus with a force from Africa. Stray refugees 
rallied to him as the news of his return spread. Among his 
partisans was M. Licinius Crassus, who had been through many 
adventures. Most cheering was the arrival of young Cn. Pompeius 
with three legions raised in Picenum. And all accessions to his 
numbers meant genuine accessions of strength. With able and 
loyal lieutenants and soldiers devoted to his cause, he pushed on 
boldly. He defeated Norbanus in Apulia, met Scipio in northern 
Campania, and by sham negotiations gained time to corrupt his 
half-hearted troops. The consul's army went over to him in a 
body. Sertorius, disgusted with these failures, went away to his 
province in Spain. So far Sulla had done well. But the Marian 
forces in the field were still far more numerous than his own. 
The fear that he would, if victorious, annul the privileges of the 
new citizens had enabled Carbo to raise immense armies in the 
North. Therefore he employed the winter of 83 — 82 in negotiating 
with various new-citizen communities, probably the Marsi and 
other peoples of that group. It is said that he concluded with 
them a regular treaty, pledging himself not to disturb them in 



33^ Collapse of the Marians [ch. 

their privileges. Of the Samnites we hear nothing at present. 
They were probably watching events ; at least they did not come 
to terms with Sulla. 

428. The real tug of war came in the campaign of 82. On 
the way to Rome Sulla met an army commanded by the younger 
Marius. At a spot called Sacriportus a stubborn fight ended in 
a Sullan victory, partly the result of desertions. Samnites among 
the prisoners were butchered. Marius, who was now consul with 
Carbo, fled with a remnant to Praeneste. He sent orders to 
Rome for the murder of some nobles known to be in favour of 
Sulla, Among those who were thus put to death was the great 
lawyer, the chief pontiff Scaevola. Sulla left a force to besiege 
Praeneste, and pushed on to Rome. The chief Marians fled, so 
he placed partisans of his own in charge, and hastened northwards. 
Metellus Porapey and Crassus were at work in Picenum and 
Umbria, gaining ground. Carbo met Sulla in Etruria, but could 
gain no decisive success. South and North, the Marian cause, 
for all its great armies, was failing. Neap.olis was taken by a 
Sullan force ; the Cisalpine was invaded and won. The efforts 
to relieve Praeneste failed. Treachery began to play a leading 
part in the war. Norbanus escaped to Rhodes, only to commit 
suicide later, in order to avoid extradition. Carbo himself left 
his army and fled to Africa. The main strength of opposition 
to Sulla lay in the desperate valour of a great Samnite and 
Lucanian army, whose hostility was not so much to Sulla as to 
Rome. With the addition of some remaining Marians, they may 
have been 80,000 strong, led by Pontius Telesinus, perhaps a 
descendant of the old hero of the Caudine Forks. Foiled in 
other directions, they suddenly marched on Rome. Sulla was 
only just in time to meet them in battle outside the walls by the 
Colline Gate. This fierce struggle was a fitting close to a bloody 
drama. Sulla's own wing of the army was beaten, but that under 
Crassus was completely victorious. Not till midnight was it certain 
that Rome was saved. 

429. Sulla took a short way with those whom he regarded 
as rebels. Samnites were slaughtered in thousands. The Senate, 
alarmed by their shrieks, were requested to attend to the business 
of the House. After the fall of Praeneste, and the suicide of 
Marius, the same course was followed. With the exception of 
some sparks of local resistance, the civil war had now been 



xxx] Sulla supreme 333 

stamped out. There was still work to be done in some of the 
provinces. But to all appearance the Marian party, the champion 
of the new citizens, the opponent of the senatorial nobility, was 
so crushed that it could never revive. We shall see that this was 
not really so. Taking Rome and Italy together (for Rome had 
practically absorbed Italy) the party crushed by Sulla were a 
majority. We shall see that the non-noble capitalists were in 
general Marian, and this class represented the most united and 
consistent influence in Rome. To suppress them was beyond 
the power even of a Sulla. The present ruin of the Marian cause 
was due to the lack of a sound condition of politics. There was 
no great leader in the state, no one man able to give loyalty and 
cohesion to the armies. On the other side there was a master, 
under whom willing and capable men worked in effective harmony. 
Victory at once made the outlawed Sulla supreme in the Roman 
world. That the Republic as a form of government was helpless, 
and a monarchy inevitable, was probably not yet understood. But 
in viewing the course of events from a distance of many centuries 
v/e can see that this was the truth. 



CHAPTER XXXI 



SULLA 82—78 B.C. 

430. We have seen how the change of circumstances in the 
Roman Republic, political, military, economic, moral, had placed 
one man in an autocratic position. We are now to see how the 
character and temperament of this one extraordinary man reacted 
on circumstances, how he dealt with the problems of the time, 
and what kind of solutions he offered. Whether Sulla saw that 
things were not ripe for the establishment of a monarchy in Rome, 
we do not know, nor does it matter. That he did not want to 
take up such a permanent burden of responsibility, is certain. 
When he had crushed opposition, and restored the Senate to 
something like its old power, adding various practical reforms to 
remove some known abuses, he had done enough. Back he 
went to his pleasures : if his logical machine was doomed to 
break down, owing to the weakness of its chief part, he could not 
help it. His abdication surprised his contemporaries, and in- 
terested later generations. Indeed it is a strange story, but to 
Sulla it was a natural step. He was the same man from first to 
last, and he died in his bed. 

431. Murders following the massacre of prisoners were a 
cause of alarm in Rome. Sulla consented to relieve anxiety by a 
regulated procedure. A notice-board briefly gave a list of names 
of persons doomed to die. Rewards were offered for killing or 
betraying any of those ' posted ' {proscripti) ; to hide or protect 
them was forbidden under severe penalties. But supplementary 
lists were soon posted. The strain of uncertainty was terrible 
enough, but we are told that over 4000 names actually appeared 
on the lists. Under the terror and temptations Roman society 



CH. xxxi] Proscription 335 

for the time broke down. None knew whom to trust, relative or 
friend, free or slave. Old moral principles were no longer a part 
of Roman life, influencing all Romans ; family ties were weaker. 
The best were powerless to save their dearest : the worst could 
pay off old grudges or profit by others' ruin : it was the villain's 
hour. The proscription developed as days went by. Murder 
first, and posting afterwards, was one of the improvements. Next 
it was found convenient to post the name of one murdered before 
the proscription began, so as to insure indemnity for a stale crime. 
Catiline, afterwards notorious, is said to have done this to hush 
up the murder of his own brother. But sheer greed of gain was 
a powerful motive, giving horrid effect to the proscription. Of 
course it fell almost entirely upon men of property ; and the 
sharing of plunder, particularly the chance of buying up con- 
fiscated estates at a fraction of their value, was a great temptation. 
Buyers would be scarce, for to appear possessed of ready money 
was itself a danger. Among the speculators who throve on the 
bargains made at this time was Crassus, the millionaire of Cicero's 
time. As the majority of the Knights had been on the Marian 
side, they furnished a great number of victims. We shall see 
that Sulla tried to get rid of them as an Order, that is, to undo 
the work of C Gracchus. 

432. So murders and confiscations went on without mercy 
or shame. Sulla coolly spoke of the forfeited property as his 
booty {praedd) or prize of war, and presided at sales by auction. 
Among the vile creatures whom he rewarded, the most dreaded 
and hated was his favourite Greek freedman Chrysogonus. Romans 
were indeed slaves when they had to fawn on freedmen. But 
there was small prospect of any reversal of the confiscations. 
Too many influential people were directly or indirectly interested 
in securing their possession of ill-gotten gains. The terror was 
kept up by signal acts of cruelty and revenge. A relative of 
Marius was caught and sacrificed by a slow death at the tomb of 
Catulus, who had been driven to escape the Marian massacres in 
87 by suicide. The ashes of old Marius were cast into the river 
Anio, and his Cimbric trophies pulled down. These are only 
specimens. And the proscriptions spread all over Italy. Fugi- 
tives were hunted down, and men suffered in country towns, 
either as notorious Marians, or merely to enable a Sullan partisan 
to seize a desirable estate. That refugees were not safe abroad 



336 Sulla Felix [ch. 

we have seen^ above. None dared to provoke Sulla. But Sulla 
was a Roman, with a Roman turn for formalities. At what 
precise stage of his proceedings he ceased to act simply as 
conqueror, and began to legalize his position, is not clear. His 
outlawry had doubtless been cancelled, but he was now a pro- 
consul who had entered the city without special leave, and had 
thereby lost his imperium. He soon procured confirmation of 
his past acts as consul and proconsul, and perhaps a law con- 
ferring on him full powers. A more perfect commission was to 
follow. Meanwhile he paraded his claim to be regarded as the 
favoured of fortune by assuming the additional surname of Felix. 
Twins were born to him : he named them both ' lucky ' {Faustus 
and Faustd). He shared the common superstition of the age in 
this matter. 

433. Even in the Provinces there was no strong opposition 
to the fortunate Sulla. He sent a praetor to turn Sertorius out 
of Spain, and for the present Sertorius had to go. Of the corn- 
provinces, important to a ruler of Rome, Sardinia had been 
recovered. Sicily and Africa were held by Marian governors, 
and the resident Roman capitalists seem to have been on the 
Marian side. Among the fugitives in those parts was the consul 
Carbo, who raised a fleet in Africa and proceeded to Sicily. 
Hiarbas king of Numidia was induced to support their cause in 
Africa. Sulla sent young Pompey to remove these obstacles to a 
general peace. No doubt the state of Italy, much devastated by 
years of active or smouldering war, was a special reason for 
prompt attention to the great food-producing countries. Despite 
his age (24), Pompey was invested with imperium and placed in 
full command. He was required to divorce his present wife and 
marry a step-daughter of Sulla. This he did, and so became a 
connexion of the great autocrat. The proceeding would not 
seem so strange to Romans, who generally married off their 
children with view to the best bargain, as it might to us. But 
the case of another young man offered a curious contrast. Gaius 
lulius Caesar, one of the old Patrician lulii, was doubly con- 
nected with the Marian leaders. He was married to Cinna's 
daughter Cornelia. His aunt lulia had been the wife of the 
elder Marius and mother of the younger. He was of course in 
great danger, but, when ordered to put away Cornelia, he refused. 

1 See § 428. 



xxxi] The new dictatorship 337 

Sulla was with difficulty persuaded to spare him. He is said to 
have told the intercessors that the pleasure-loving and attractive 
youth had in him the making of a more dangerous person than 
Marius. Caesar wisely left Rome for the time. 

434. It would seem that Sulla was already bearing the title 
of Dictator. The steps to effect this were probably taken late in 
the year 82. One consul was dead, the other an outlaw. In 
order to strain the constitution as little as possible, the procedure 
by way of interregnum was chosen, and the traditional powers of 
an interrex %\\^\\-^ extended. L. Valerius Flaccus, the 'first man' 
(princeps) of the Senate, was employed to do what was required, 
of course acting under full instructions from Sulla. He carried 
through the Assembly a lex Valeria, which confirmed all Sulla's 
acts in advance, and set him above the law. The title of ' dictator 
for drafting statutes and setting the commonwealth in order' 
{legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae) practically covered 
everything. It was a commission of autocracy, not limited to a 
stated term, but tenable at the will of the holder until such time 
as he might conceive his task to be fulfilled. The office had 
little but the name in common with the old dictatorship ; it 
differed widely, in the mode of appointment, in duration, in the 
imperial scope of its powers. For times had changed since the 
old office had gone out of favour and fallen into disuse. To be 
supreme in Rome carried with it the dominion of the whole 
Roman world. When we find Sulla's position spoken of as a 
Kingdom or Tyranny, the expression is about the truth. Nor 
indeed did he seriously try to dissemble the absolute nature of 
his power. He now set to work establishing the so-called 'Sullan 
Constitution,' a remodelling of institutions in a reactionary spirit, 
the aim being to restore the state of things existing before the 
Gracchan movement. For making such an attempt it was neces- 
sary to ignore the past. What Scipio AemiHanus had been unable 
to maintain, Sulla could not really restore. The sequel shewed 
that the permanent tendency was against the predominance of an 
aristocratic council. The Senate, replaced in the seat of power, 
could only overcome demagogues by coalescing with leaders of 
armies. It could not really stand alone. To undo what the 
Gracchi and Marius had done was impossible. But we need not 
wonder that Sulla, like most men, was no prophet : he could not 
judge the present with knowledge of that which was to come. 
H. 22 



338 The reactionary [ch. 

435. To weaken the tribunate was an obvious step. As 
revived by the Gracchi, the office certainly was liable at any 
moment to upset the balance of the constitution. Sulla meant 
to reduce it to its original function of auxilium, the protection of 
Plebeians from the harsh use of the magistrates' itnperium. His 
law therefore took away from tribunes the right of proposing laws 
or impeaching presumed offenders before the Assembly. The 
power of intercessio was limited in scope, and it was provided that 
no man who had been tribune should be eligible for any curule 
office. Thus the tribunate would no longer serve as a cheap 
means of courting popular favour, and would not attract restless 
and ambitious men. So it was muzzled. The rules governing 
the sequence of magistracies also needed a thorough revision. 
The lex Villia had often been disregarded in recent years, and 
illegal reelections and continuations of office had been very 
common. The separation of civil and military life had already 
gone far, and the old requirement of ten years military service 
was practically obsolete. The details of Sulla's new law are 
uncertain, but a scale of age-limits and compulsory succession of 
offices was arranged. At 30 a man became of age for the quaes- 
torship, at 39 for the praetorship, at 42 for the consulship. For 
the aedileship, if held at all, the age was 36. Sulla was evidently 
bent on raising the minimum ages, and preventing men from 
stepping into higher office without passing through the regular 
stages. He also raised the number of praetors to 8 (why, we 
shall see), and that of quaestors to 20. It seems certain that 
he also made the quaestorship confer membership of the Senate. 
Reelection to an office was only allowed after an interval of ten 
years. All these rules aimed at keeping open the flow of pro- 
motion and fixing a rigid system. They were designed to check 
the rise of prominent leaders, and to distribute power on aristo- 
cratic lines among the members of a ruling caste. 

436. What with massacres and proscriptions, deaths in war 
or in the course of nature, and the flight of Marians, the Senate 
was no doubt reduced in numbers. Sulla wanted the body to be 
numerous, both on general grounds, and because he meant the 
senatorial Order to provide the juries. So once more^ he added 
to it 300 of the * best Knights'; that is, capitalists who had taken 
his side. This addition made the Senate apparently strong. 

^ See § 412. 



xxxi] policy of Sulla 339 

Then by a law he deprived the Equestrian Order of their control 
of the public courts, and gave it to the senators. Coming after 
the proscriptions, these blows left the non-noble capitalists a 
thinned and weakened Order. But their ranks were constantly 
being recruited, as men with small capital began a business 
career, and Rome could not do without them. Sulla had not 
crushed them out of politics, as he perhaps imagined. Another 
law dealt with the great religious colleges. The number of the 
members was raised, and by repeal of the Domitian law of 104 
the old plan of filling up vacancies by cooptation was restored. 
Among the practical needs of the time, it was most desirable to 
bring the civil affairs of life back into their ordinary course. 
This could only be done by closing all proceedings connected 
with the proscriptions. Accordingly the ist June 81 was fixed as 
the date for ending them. Thus confidence would gradually 
revive, and business with it. But two of the results of the pro- 
scriptions remained in force. The sons of the men proscribed 
were still disqualified from holding public office. The slaves 
included in the confiscated estates had been, or now were, 
emancipated in large numbers. It was Sulla's policy to interest 
an active body of new citizens in the permanence of his settle- 
ment. He enfranchised many (10,000 it is said) as freedmen 
of his own, thus becoming the patron of a devoted following. 
They were Cornelii, taking, as was customary, their patron's 
gentile name. 

437. Sulla had found it necessary to remind, not only 
Romans in general, but his own partisans also, that he was master. 
When one presumed so far on his services as to persist in his 
candidature for the consulship of 81 in defiance of orders, the 
dictator had him killed openly in the Forum. It was now time 
to remind the public of his own immense services in the East. 
On the 27th January 81 he held his great triumph for the 
victories over Mithradates. The notable feature of the splendid 
show was the procession of restored exiles. But it was the civil 
war, not the Mithradatic, in which these men's restoration had 
been won. Sulla merely avoided openly triumphing over Roman 
citizens. Meanwhile Pompey had recovered Sicily, and put Carbo 
to death. He went on to Africa, destroyed the Marian force, 
and placed Hiempsal on the throne of Numidia in the room of 
Hiarbas. Later in the year 81 Sulla celebrated a great festival, 

22 — 2 



340 Sulla's land-settlement [ch. 

the ludi Vidoriae, in special commemoration of the battle by the 
CoUine gate. It is recorded that members of noble families, in 
deference to the dictator's wishes, appeared as drivers in chariot- 
races. Probably this outrage on Roman proprieties indicates a 
wish to degrade a few suspected persons : for it was Sulla's policy 
in general to elevate the nobility. The festival also included 
lavish feasting of the whole people. At this time Roman religious 
scruples, and Sulla's own superstition, were illustrated in a way 
worth notice. His wife Metella was very ill. Sulla was a pontiff, 
and his house must not be polluted by the presence of a corpse. 
So, though fond of Metella, he divorced her and sent her to die 
in another house. Her death was a great grief to him. Such is 
the story, preserved by Plutarch. 

438. Of all the works of Sulla, none was more directly 
productive of troublesome consequences than his land-settlement. 
He had an army of 100,000 men to disband and to satisfy. 
Grants of land were the only possible means of pensioning them. 
By planting them here and there in groups he would establish 
garrisons of men whose rights depended on the maintenance of 
the Sullan settlement. To provide allotments he had probably 
some of the land confiscated in the proscriptions. But one form 
of the punishment of communities for their support of the 
Marians was the confiscation of their territories. The blocks of 
land thus set free for distribution were convenient for planting 
settlers in groups, and it was on these blocks that many of the 
'Sullan men' were placed. Wholesale evictions of former holders 
were necessary, and a great deal of land changed hands in 
various parts of Italy. The pity was that the soldiers, long used 
to a life of violence and hardship with intervals of revelling and 
wantonness, seldom could settle down to the monotonous 
drudgery of rural life. A clause in Sulla's colony-laws forbade 
the sale of the allotments. But, as in the case of the Gracchan 
land-laws, the prohibition was evaded or ignored. Most of the 
settlers soon got rid of their plots, which passed into the hands of 
capitalist land-grabbers. The ejected holders had been ruined. 
The new holders were a failure. The two classes might hate each 
other, but in discontent and destitution there was perhaps not 
much to choose between them. Some of Sulla's men seem to have 
been settled in towns on the coast, as at Puteoli and Pompeii, 
where they were soon at loggerheads with the old burgesses. 



xxxi] and its effects 341 

439. The chief groups of Sullan colonists appear to have 
been planted in Etruria and parts of Campania and Samnium. 
In some cases there was resistance, and a few communities were 
punished by Sulla with loss of civic rights as Romans. At Vola- 
terrae a siege was necessary : it only surrendered early in 79. 
No doubt the record of many severities has perished : certainly 
the Samnite dalesmen were not spared. After Sulla the Roman- 
izing of Italy was rapidly completed. Latin drove out Oscan and 
any Etruscan that remained. Greek alone kept its hold in a few 
maritime cities of the South. But the land-settlement was an 
economic disaster, and still more a social one. The new lati- 
fundia might be farmed with more judgment, and in blocks less 
continuous, than those of 50 or 100 years earlier. Rich men 
now commonly owned land in several districts, and kept a slave- 
bailiff and slave-gang on each farm. Land was in fewer hands 
than ever, and the remnant of small farmers was still further 
reduced. Brigandage became a crying evil. To raise a band 
was easy. Ruined and desperate freemen were numerous, and 
slaves, inured to hardship, or even trained as gladiators, were 
always to be had. And the government made no effort to secure 
order by a force of regular police. As for Sulla, his garrisons of 
soldiery lasted his time. His methods of finance seem to have 
been as arbitrary as his policy in the matter of the land. If it be 
true that he stopped the sale of corn below cost price to the city 
populace, it was so far well. But only a strong government could 
have kept such a policy in force, and no such government was 
set up by Sulla. He is said to have wrung money out of the 
subject peoples by direct exactions, and by the sale of exemptions 
from future burdens. He spent lavishly, and enriched his 
favourites, by gifts and remission of debts. Yet it was afterwards 
found better to let many of his arrangements stand, for fear of 
worse confusion in upsetting them. 

440. A most important part of the Sullan system was the 
changes in the regular magistracy. In particular, magistracy and 
pro-magistracy stood side by side. Circumstances, such as the 
need of keeping an efficient man in charge of a province for 
more than a year, led to the frequent employment of proconsuls 
and propraetors abroad. But the normal governors were praetors 
or, in case of a serious foreign war, consuls. Whether a magis- 
trate or a pro-magistrate was in charge, was largely a matter of 



342 Magistracy and pro-magistracy [ch. 

chance. Now there was work for praetors at home, and Sulla 
meant to find them more. Consuls too were wanted in Rome. 
The dictator devised a logical reform by creating a Home service 
and a Provincial service neatly correlated to each other. A man 
was to serve first as magistrate at home, then as pro-magistrate 
abroad. It was a truly momentous step. The unpaid jealously- 
watched office came first : the almost absolute power, with the 
coveted opportunities of enrichment, now the real objects of 
desire, came necessarily later. Pro-magistracy was henceforth 
by law to be the recognized crown of a successful career. It 
would become more and more imperial, while the Home magis- 
tracy tended to become municipal. The numbers corresponded 
exactly. Two consuls and eight praetors had to be provided for. 
There were already nine provincial governorships. Sulla added 
a tenth, Cisalpine Gaul. He moved forward the official boundary 
of Italy from the Aesis to the Rubicon, and perhaps on the 
western side from the Macra to the Varus. The new province 
was a peculiar one. The Cispadane part was already Roman, 
and the Transpadane fast becoming Romanized. But Sulla did 
not choose to extend the franchise as a general boon beyond the 
Po. So the Cisalpine became a Province. It was notable for 
two reasons. To greedy governors it offered no easy field for 
extortion. To an ambitious man it was the best of all bases of 
power, for it was immensely prosperous, and its growing popula- 
tion furnished a plentiful supply of good recruits to Roman 
armies. 

441. On Sulla's plan there would be in each year two posts 
proconsular and eight propraetorian. The Senate was to say 
which were which, and the consuls and praetors apportioned the 
vacancies among themselves by lot or agreement. Smooth work- 
ing of the system was promoted by rules for the transfer of 
command from an outgoing governor to his successor. Other 
provisions were meant to protect the subjects from exactions on 
the part of the governor or his staff. But we must especially 
notice the point that the whole scheme presupposed the unbroken 
continuation of a magistrate's imperium in pro-magistracy. If 
the two should ever be separated by an interval, the separation of 
the services would produce two independent magistracies. We 
shall find that this actually happened about 30 years later. The 
scheme also took no account of the accidents that were Ukely to 



xxxi] The public courts 343 

disturb the regular course of successions, or of a possible increase 
in the number of provinces. This lex Cornelia, rigid and logical, 
needed a strong central authority to work it with due allowance 
for circumstances. And Sulla did not and could not create any 
such authority. In dealing with the Home magistracy, Sulla's 
increased number of quaestors (20) had a double importance. 
These junior officials passed into the Senate, and kept the House 
full without interference of censors. Sulla distrusted censorial 
action. It was capricious, and radical censors might change the 
Senate's character. So he arranged to do without censors. Some 
parts of censorial duty were left to the consuls. As to the com- 
plete registration of citizens in Tribes and Centuries, he was 
probably not loth to let it wait. In fact there was after 86 no 
census until the year 70, when the revived activity in that depart- 
ment was an effect of the movement that broke up the political 
constitution of Sulla. 

442. We now come to the reconstruction and development 
of the public courts, the most perm.anent part of Sulla's work. 
First let us briefly sketch the machinery that had been in use 
hitherto. We have seen that in very early times the magistrate, 
acting on behalf of the community, imposed a penalty on a 
person guilty of an act regarded as an offence against the state. 
Also that it was possible for the offender to appeal to the people 
in Assembly against the sentence of the magistrate. The estab- 
lishment of the right of appeal as an integral part of Roman 
citizenship was one of the most significant and well-attested 
movements in the early Republic. In the older and smaller 
Rome this rude method of making the people the judge of 
offences against itself seems to have sufficed. Side by side with 
the trials for high treason i^perduellid) before the Centuries there 
grew up the fine-processes before the Tribes. But these pro- 
cedures had this in common, that the Assembly was called upon 
to decide whether a particular offender should be punished or 
not. Therefore the people could and did take other circum- 
stances into account in judging his conduct. It was in fact a 
moral judgment, and as such it contained the germ of criminal 
law. But these popular trials were a clumsy affair, and, as Rome 
grew and the citizens were more widely scattered, they were sure 
to become less and less satisfactory. Cases occurred calling for 
secrecy and despatch, and it was found convenient to appoint 



344 Development of the system [ch. 

special judicial commissions {quaestiones extraordtnariae), to hold 
inquiries into the facts of particular cases and pass judgment 
thereon. From the judgment of such a court there was probably 
no appeal, the Assembly having delegated its powers. In this as 
in other matters it seems that the Senate at times assumed the 
right of appointing such commissions on its own authority. 
There was little to tempt the people to resent this encroachment, 
for public offences were seldom committed by the poor. The 
next step was the transition from occasional to permanent courts. 
A beginning was made by the Calpurnian law of 149 B.C. The 
need of a regular means of checking extortion in the Provinces 
had been felt, for the state suffered through rebellions caused by 
the greed of individuals. So the Assembly once for all delegated 
its powers in this class of cases to a standing commission, the 
quaestio repetmidarum. At first it was virtually a civil court, only 
empowered to award simple compensation. But the court was 
not a magistrate, free to accept or reject the advice of assessors 
{consiliu?n). It was a voting jury ; a praetor presided, and 
announced its verdict, from which there was no appeal. 

443. Compensation developed into punishment. The Acilian 
law of 122 required payment of double the amount extorted, and 
the state undertook to exact the money. The Servilian law of 
III extended the liability. Not only the governor of a province, 
but all persons who had shared his plunder, could now be com- 
pelled to make restitution. This was the law in force. It is to 
be noted that the transition from the notion of a wrong or ' tort ' 
to that of a charge or ' crime ' was accompanied by that from 
claimant (Jjetitor) to prosecutor {accusator). The standing courts 
were first set up to protect the provincials, who had to be repre- 
sented by Roman protectors {patroni). Any citizen was allowed 
to act thus as their counsel. As standing courts were created for 
the trial of cases between Roman citizens (some such appear to 
have existed before Sulla), this general right to act was retained, 
and young orators found an opening for winning notoriety by 
conducting cases before the juries. So patronus had put on a 
special meaning as 'counsel.' 

444. Sulla's great work was to consolidate and extend the 
system of quaestiones perpetuae so as to meet the needs of the 
time. A whole group of his Cornelian laws dealt with the public 
courts, reorganizing those already in existence and setting up 



xxxi] The several courts 345 

new ones. Each of these statutes enumerated the offences placed 
under the jurisdiction of a particular court. The time was not 
yet come for a scientific definition of crimes. It sufficed that an 
act was an offence under this or that statute, which treated it as 
criminal and imposed a penalty on the guilty. In public life it 
was often possible to regard an act as criminal from more than 
one point of view. Thus the term * treason against the state ' 
{mates tas) could be strained to cover almost any conduct injurious 
to the common weal. So a simple method was found without 
precise definitions : a prosecutor alleged that a particular person 
had broken a particular law. In course of time the decisions of 
courts would accumulate, and out of them definitions would 
gradually grow. In short, the system contained the germ of a 
regular criminal jurisprudence. That the growth was slow was 
due not to the defects of the system itself, but to the mischievous 
influences of Roman party-politics and corruption on the action 
of the courts. 

445. Of the courts established by the leges Corneliae iudi- 
ciariae seven can be traced with more or less certainty. 

(i) repetundarum. The penalties for extortion were in 
some way increased, perhaps by raising the money-penalty and 
by adding that of outlawry. 

(2) peculatus. Misappropriation of state property made a 
man liable to enforced restitution, probably to some degree of 
infamia, that is disqualification for public positions and acts. 
Conviction of this crime (or of extortion) was followed by assess- 
ment of damages {litis aestimatio), in which juries often leant to 
leniency. 

(3) maiestatis {minutae). Penalty, outlawry {aquae et ignis 
interdictio). 

(4) de ambitu. Corrupt practices at elections. Penalty, 
ten years disqualification from office. 

(5) i?iter sicarios. The law was that de sicariis et veneficis, 
kept in force, and supplemented, for many centuries. The court 
' among the assassins * dealt with murder, arson, and heinous 
cases of judicial corruption. The penalty was capital, that is 
outlawry. Only parricidium, murder of a near relative, was 
punished with death. 

(6) de/alsis. Forgery, coining, etc. Penalty, at least a 
high degree of infamia, perhaps outlawry. 



346 The juries. Young Pompey [ch. 

(7) iniuriamm. Assault, defamation, insult, seem to have 
been brought under a criminal prosecution. This matter is 
obscure. The civil actio iniuriarum for compensation was not 
abolished. 

446. Sulla attempted to form a consistent system, capable 
of amendment and expansion. He succeeded, because he simply 
developed what he found existing, on the lines indicated by 
previous developments : a contrast to the failure of his political 
reforms, guided by reactionary aims. The chairmen of courts 
under his scheme were as follows. Of eight praetors, two 
{urbanus and peregrinus) were required for the civil jurisdiction. 
Six were left for the public or criminal courts. But the number 
required was uncertain, for there might be several cases for trial 
before any of the divisional courts, and cases sometimes dragged 
on to a great length. The precedent was adopted of putting an 
additional chairman {index quaestionis) in charge when a praetor 
was not available. The roll of jurors {albiwi iiidicum) was made 
up in each year from the list of the Senate. The juries for 
particular cases were chosen by lot, with certain rights of chal- 
lenge {reiedio) reserved to the parties concerned. The jurors 
voted by ballot-tickets, on which they scratched letters denoting 
'guilty' or 'not guilty' or 'not proven,' and a majority decided 
the verdict. Beside the laws above referred to, Sulla carried 
others, for instance some futile sumptuary laws. The crime of 
public violence (ijis) was probably dealt with in 7 7 after his death 
by a lex Piautia, as a supplement to his work. 

447. While Sulla was busy in Rome, there had been trouble 
in the East. Murena wilfully provoked Mithradates, and dis- 
obeyed an order to let the king alone. After a defeat he returned 
to Rome in obedience to a more peremptory summons. Peace 
was restored, but Mithradates remained uneasy, and the evil of 
piracy was becoming unendurable. In the same year (81) the 
victorious Pompey claimed a triumph for his success in Numidia. 
It was against all precedent, for he had not been praetor or 
consul ; indeed he was only a young man of Equestrian rank, 
aged 26. After attempts to evade the claim, Sulla consented, 
and Pompey began his long career of precedent-breaking. In 80 
Sulla was not only dictator, but consul with Metellus Pius. 
Metellus had to be sent to Spain, where Sertorius was now at the 
head of a rebellion. Sulla had to restore order in a few places in 



xxxi] The end of Sulla 347 

Italy. The restoration of the Capitoline temple, burnt during 
the civil war, was begun. The new law-courts started work with 
the new juries, and the first case in the murder-court was a 
charge of parricide, connected with events arising from the pro- 
scriptions. In this trial a young man from Arpinum, M. Tullius 
Cicero, made a successful defence against the leader of the 
Roman bar, Q. Hortensius, and the secret influence of Sulla's 
great freedman Chrysogonus. Henceforth Cicero stood in the 
front rank of forensic orators. 

448. Sulla was weary, and longing to retire and enjoy low 
company in private life. His public policy had been such as to 
make retirement (the great difficulty of tyrants) reasonably safe. 
He refused to be elected consul for 79, and laid down the 
dictatorship early in that year. At his Campanian villa near 
Puteoli he gathered round him a congenial crew of parasites. 
He went on writing his memoirs. Though one of the consuls' 
elected for 78 was coming forward as leader of a counter-revolu- 
tion, and Rome was disturbed, Sulla did not hesitate to interfere 
despotically in the affairs of the Puteolan municipality. In a fit 
of rage he broke a blood-vessel and died. His adherents insisted 
on giving him a splendid funeral, at which his body was burned, 
contrary to the custom of the Cornelian clan. By his will he 
made LucuUus (not Pompey) the guardian of his young son. 
Lucullus was his literary executor also. His death left others to 
compete for the first place. He had for the moment restored 
the senatorial nobility to power, but he could not remove their 
selfishness and jealousies, and restore them to harmony and 
vigour. Nothing could prevent the rise of individuals, so an 
autocrat would surely come. But this great change was not to 
come at once, or in any other way than as the result of sheer 
exhaustion. With all the tendencies of the age working against 
them, the Roman aristocrats made a stubborn fight in defence of 
their Republic. It was their form of patriotism, and many of 
them were wholly or partly influenced by high motives. In the 
next period we must bear in mind that Aristocrat and Republican 
are two names for the same thing. 

^ See §451- 



CHAPTER XXXII 

ROME AND ITALY 78—70 B.C. 

449. At the time of Sulla's death the Roman government 
was face to face with a number of troublesome problems. In 
Italy there was much discontent. The normal condition of the 
Italian communities was that of municipia, towns in which each 
burgess enjoyed the local franchise and the Roman franchise 
also. Each borough had its own local senate and magistrates. 
By rights the incorporation of Italy in Rome should have been 
complete, but it was not. In Etruria and Samnium there were 
communities punished by Sulla with exclusion from Roman 
privileges. Moreover, censorial revision being for the present 
in abeyance, it is hardly doubtful that many new citizens were 
as yet unregistered in Roman Tribes. Few can have been placed 
in Centuries; and it was by the Centuriate Assembly that the 
chief magistrates were elected. But what made the existence of 
political discontent a serious matter was the economic disturbance 
caused by Sulla's land-settlement. The dispossessed men, whether 
they remained near their old homes or migrated to Rome, were 
a disaffected element, ready to join in revolutionary movements. 
Many of them would surely be old citizens, suffering for real or 
imputed sympathy with the Marian cause, and hostile to the rule 
of the Sullan nobles. There were in fact strong forces at work, 
tending to promote a counter-reaction against the political institu- 
tions of Sulla. 

450. And even in Rome the Marian party was by no means 
dead. The city populace, accustomed to be fed and courted, 
wished to recover its former importance. The Assemblies were 
still constitutionally the sovran power. The Senate was ruled by 
a Ring of aristocrats, and the jealousies of noble cliques were 



CH. xxxii] Counter-reaction 349 

hardly a secret. Demagogues with a 'popular' policy had a 
prospect of support from the non-noble capitalists. For the 
Equestrian Order speedily revived after the proscriptions, and 
longed to recapture the control of the public courts ; while the 
senatorial juries, whether lax or severe, could not escape incurring 
unpopularity. This situation naturally resulted in a confused 
struggle, the two factions being at issue on the question of up- 
holding or overthrowing the Sullan constitution. In the course 
of some nine years one great truth was fully demonstrated, that 
the real source of power in the Roman state was the sword. So 
long as the leaders of armies worked in harmony with the Senate, 
the Senate could hold its ground fairly well. Once they found 
their interest in coalescing with the popular party, the Senate 
could make no stand. The armies of the new model obeyed 
their own leaders, not the Senate. The work of Marius could 
not be undone, for it expressed the genuine tendencies of the 
age. Sulla himself had carried the process a step further, by 
teaching them that the soldier must look to his master, not to 
the Senate, for the rewards of service. This was the vital fact 
underlying Roman politics, the fact governing the course of the 
revolution in all its later stages. 

451. The troubles abroad, in Spain Macedonia and Asia 
Minor, will be referred to below. It should however be noted 
here that P. Servilius Vatia, consul in 79, had been sent out to 
put down the pirates infesting the eastern seas. He gained suc- 
cesses both by sea and land ; for he marched up into the hill- 
country of Isauria and earned the title Isaiiricus. But he did not 
make an end of piracy, as we shall see. The most urgent danger 
with which the government had to deal was at home in Italy. 
The consuls of 78 were M. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius 
Catulus. The former, a restless vain man, was for some reason 
hostile to Sulla's policy. He had been supported in his candi- 
dature by Pompey, against the express warning of Sulla. Sulla 
died : the two consuls quarrelled over the question of the public 
funeral. After this Lepidus, relying on the general discontent, 
began to assail parts of the Sullan arrangements. He proposed 
to recall exiles, to restore the dispossessed holders to their lands, 
and to renew the supply of cheap corn in Rome, which last pro- 
posal he seems to have carried. His conduct only added to the 
general unrest. He was not a thorough democrat, for he opposed 



350 Lepidus. Pompey L^h. 

a movement for reviving the powers of the tribunate. Catulus 
could not check him, and the Senate only required the colleagues 
to swear not to engage in civil war. Lepidus raised an army, 
having a pretext in his proconsular province for the year 77, 
Transalpine Gaul. A war followed, the record of which is utterly 
confused. The government forces eventually defeated him in 
Etruria, and he sailed with his army to Sardinia, where he made 
another failure. He died in the island, and the best part of his 
army was taken by his lieutenant M, Perperna to join Sertorius 
in Spain. The most important fact in the story of this obscure 
war is that for military skill the Senate had to rely on Pompey. 
What precise part he bore in the operations is not clear. At any 
rate he stamped out the revolt with severity, and found pretexts 
for keeping his army together. By this means, as we shall see, 
he was able to advance his claims to further promotion. Sulla 
had not been dead two years, when a young military man was 
already in a position to bend the Senate to his will. 

452. Lepidus had failed, but the Marian reaction in Rome 
was a real movement, only needing a leader. The news of Sulla's 
death brought Caesar back from the East, where he had been 
serving against the pirates. He had nothing to do with the silly 
venture of Lepidus, but he soon took his natural place in politics 
by conducting public prosecutions, in which he contrived to expose 
the iniquities of the ruling caste. The acquittal of the accused by 
senatorial juries was no proof of their innocence : it only served 
to bring discredit on senatorial juries. Meanwhile the Senate had 
to face the fact that the Spanish rising under Sertorius had not 
yet been put down by Metellus, and that the reinforcement under 
Perperna had given a more Italian character to the war. They 
did not wish to send out Pompey, and thereby to increase his 
consequence. But his intrigues, backed by the presence of his 
army, prevailed. He was given command with proconsular 
imperium, on an equal footing with Metellus. So the Senate 
had to yield to Sulla's pupil, and to violate Sullan principles. 
While the home government was embarrassed by affairs abroad, 
the Marian revival went on. In 76 a tribune openly agitated 
for the restoration of the former tribunician power. And this 
question was of course the critical point in the movements of 
the time. For the present nothing came of it, but in 75 the 
agitation continued, and the populace was irritable, owing to a 



xxxii] New Provinces. The Luculli 351 

scarcity of corn. There was rioting, and C Aurelius Cotta, one 
of the consuls of the year, saw the need of concession. He carried 
a law repealing the disqualification of ex-tribunes from holding 
further office. So an important detail of Sulla's system was 
abolished, and the tribunate once more became a post worthy 
the ambition of enterprising men. 

453. In the year 74 the troubles abroad were worse than 
ever. Spain, the Macedonian frontier warfare, the revival of 
piracy, above all the preparations of Mithradates, were causes 
of great anxiety. At the same time it was necessary to decide 
on a policy in reference to two bequests of territory. The 
Cyrenaica, bequeathed to Rome in 96, had not yet been taken 
over as a province, and now in 75 Bithynia had been left to 
Rome by the will of Nicomedes III. No doubt the financial 
interests in Rome were pressing for formal annexation, and the 
two countries were accordingly made provinces. This step made 
inevitable a double war, for both the king of Pontus and the 
pirates were certain to oppose it. The commaiid against Mithra- 
dates was coveted by one of the consuls, L. Licinius Lucullus, 
who had been trusted by Sulla, and was a military rival of Pompey. 
The lot assigned him Cisalpine Gaul, but an unexpected vacancy 
occurred in Cilicia, and by private influence he got himself trans- 
ferred to that province, and eventually entrusted with the charge 
of the Pontic war by land. His colleague M. Aurelius Cotta had 
Bithynia and the naval part of the war. The praetor M. Antonius, 
a son of the great orator, was appointed to command against the 
pirates. At home the agitation against the senatorial government 
continued, and a grave judicial scandal (the condemnation through 
bribery of a man said to be innocent) was used to inflame popular 
indignation. Thus the capitalist Knights were drawn into sym- 
pathy with the agitators. 

454. The continuance of the troubles abroad will be spoken 
of in the next chapter. We should note here that M. Lucullus, 
consul in 73, succeeded to the province of Macedonia, where he 
commanded for two years' with good results. The great event 
of 73 was the exposure of the ever-present danger in Italy itself, 
arising from the institution of slavery. We have seen what rural 
slavery meant, and have referred to the training of slaves as 
gladiators. Both these employments called for strength and 

^ See § 462. 



352 Spartacus L^h. 

hardihood. The average slave labourer or swordsman would be 
an able-bodied man, more than a match for the average freeman. 
Economic and social changes had reduced the number of freemen 
in many parts of rural Italy. And there was no regular police 
force. At Capua a school of gladiators broke out. Rural slaves 
joined them. The rout of two Roman forces sent to put down 
the rising furnished the rebels with weapons. Their numbers 
rose to 70,000, and southern Italy was at their mercy. Prepara- 
tions had to be made for a serious war conducted by an organized 
army. The rebellion lasted two years, causing great devastation 
in the country, and embarrassment to the government in Rome. 
The Marians, led by the tribune C. Licinius Macer, kept up the 
agitation against the Sullan system. Young Caesar also bore a 
leading part in the movement. He had again been in the East, 
where he went through various adventures, and was now back in 
Rome. Macer and he could not as yet restore the full powers of 
the tribunate, but they carried a law for recall of the. men in exile 
on account of the rising of Lepidus. And under their pressure 
the consuls carried a law (lex Terentia Cassia) providing for the 
yearly purchase of a quantity of corn, to be retailed to the urban 
populace at a cheap rate. It was meant to secure a regular supply, 
and to please the mob by removing the risk of sudden dearth. 
Sicily in particular was the source of supply in view. In this 
year Verres, after his year as city-praetor, began his three years 
of propraetorship in Sicily, where, among other misdeeds, he de- 
monstrated the iniquitous plundering to which the provincials 
could be subjected by a governor licensed to deal in corn. 

455. In 72 things were better abroad, but in Italy defeats of 
several Roman armies by the slave-rebels marked the course of the 
servile war. Yet the rebellion was really failing. Its great leader, 
the Thracian Spartacus, could not control his men, now flushed 
with victory. They would not, as he wished, force their way to 
the North, and try to regain their native homes in Gaul Germany 
or Thrace by passing the Alps. They broke up into separate 
armies, and did not act together. By turning back southwards 
they lost their only chance of escape. The Senate had at last 
to find an efficient man to reconquer a large part of wasted Italy. 
They chose Crassus, Sulla's lieutenant, who had turned to civil 
life since the battle of the Colline gate. By severe discipline 
Crassus restored the tone of the Roman troops. He defeated 



xxxii] Coalition of Pompey and Crassus 353 

the enemy's forces in detail, and penned up the main body in 
the Bruttian peninsula. Spartacus bargained with some pirates 
cruising off the coast to transport their army to Sicily, but they 
exacted payment in advance and sailed away. After this the 
desperate rebels broke away to the northward, but were beaten 
in detail. Crassus did most of the work of the war. But Pompey, 
returning from Spain, had the luck to meet and destroy a detach- 
ment of fugitives on their way to the North. For this he claimed 
a good share of the credit due to Crassus. We need not dwell on 
the ruin caused in Italy by the slave-war, or on the crucifixions and 
other horrors that marked its close. 

456. The year 71 brought four successful commanders to 
Rome, all claiming triumphs, Metellus Pius and Pompey from 
Spain, M. Lucullus from Macedonia and the frontier war, Crassus 
from the war with Spartacus. The coming political crisis involved 
the fate of the Sullan constitution. All turned on the relations 
between Pompey and the Senate. Would the nobles secure the 
attachment of the young general who had risen to be the first 
soldier of Rome, by gratifying his unconstitutional ambitions? 
If not, would he combine with the popular leaders and defy the 
Senate ? He had held no public office, yet he claimed both a 
triumph and the right to stand at once for the consulship. The 
Senate would not by their own act make Pompey their master, 
so they refused what they could not prevent. Pompey had been 
judicious in his references to the Spanish war, ignoring the Marian 
element in the hostile army, and so not seeming to seek a triumph 
over fellow-citizens. He had captured letters from men in Rome 
to Sertorius, and had burnt them. Common folk cared little for 
the rules by which his claim to the consulship was barred, and the 
Knights were eager to oust the senators from the jury-courts. 
The popular leaders saw their chance. Everything favoured the 
designs of Pompey. Crassus joined forces with him, and the two 
came to terms with the popular agitators. Such a coalition was 
irresistible. The programme agreed upon included judicial reform, 
but the revival of the tribunate was the first article. The new 
citizens were probably conciliated by an assurance that a census 
should be held and the registration-question settled at last. The 
whole affair was an attack on Sulla's aristocratic system. It an- 
nounced that the aristocratic caste were no longer free to share 
preferments among themselves on a footing of normal equality. 
H. 23 



354 The measures of jo b.c. [ch- 

If eminent nobles could not gain special promotion from the 
Senate, they could and would get it from the Assembly. To put 
down such men by force was no longer possible : effective eminence 
came by the successful command of armies. The days when the 
Gracchi had been destroyed were a story of the past. 

457. So Pompey got the better of the Senate. We need not 
enlarge upon the various triumphs, the votes of the Assembly by 
which all the formal hindrances were swept aside, or the election 
of Pompey and Crassus as consuls for the year 70. The spirit of 
Pompey was well shewn in the dramatic choice of the last day 
of 71 for his triumph. Next morning he entered on office as 
consul. The man who thus defied precedent and constitutional 
law had been Sulla's pupil. He was now to bear a leading part 
in the destruction of his master's system. The jealousy between 
him and Crassus was smoothed over for the time. The tribunate 
was restored to its former powers. The question of jury-reform 
was taken in hand, but differences of opinion arose, and for the 
present no project became law. Censors were appointed and a 
census seriously carried out. The Senate was purged of 64 un- 
worthy members, perhaps in the hope that the removal of men 
suspected of corruption on juries might avert judicial reform. 
The registration of citizens was more than usually complete. 
The numbers given may not be wholly trustworthy (910,000, 
compared with 463,000 in the year 86), but no doubt there was 
a great increase on those of the last census. What with elections, 
public shows, and the prospect of registration, it appears that the 
summer of 70 drew an immense concourse of citizens to Rome. 
Full details are lacking, but it is clear that this census, the last 
one effectively carried out under the Republic, was of great im- 
portance in consoHdating the union of Italy under the Roman 
franchise. 

458. While the jury-question awaited solution, public interest 
was aroused by the famous trial of Verres. He had been left in 
charge of Sicily for three years, and his oppressions and extortions 
had been extreme, a scandal even in an age teeming with evil 
precedents. Leading residents, natives and Romans too, looked 
for a trusty protector in Rome, to bring the wicked governor to 
justice. They wanted a man who would not be bought off by the 
gold of Verres. They turned to Cicero, whose conduct as quaes- 
tor at Lilybaeum five years before had earned their confidence. 



xxxii] Cicero and Verres 355 

Cicero was a ' new man,' and his policy was to oblige people by 
undertaking the defence of accused persons, not to be notorious 
as a prosecutor. But here was a chance of fame. Senatorial 
juries were themselves just now on their trial, and he might force 
even senators to condemn a fellow-senator whom in ordinary 
circumstances they would certainly acquit. The Marian party, 
including the Equestrian Order, would applaud his efforts ; and 
his own sympathies were with that Order, from which he had 
sprung, and opposed to the unwise and cruel oppression of Roman 
subjects. He took up the case with energy. Every kind of ob 
stacle was put in his way, and time was precious. If the trial were 
protracted into the next year, magistrates friendly to Verres would 
be in power, and official favour would procure an acquittal. But 
Cicero overcame every hindrance. In the trial itself he even 
sacrificed the tempting opportunity of displaying his oratorical 
powers. Hortensius, the leader of the Bar, was for the defence, 
but he could do nothing against the overwhelming evidence on 
which Cicero rested his simple case. Bribery too was tried in 
vain. Verres went into exile. To explain this strange result is 
easy. The jury were afraid of causing a fresh scandal at this 
critical juncture, and Cicero had taken good care to remind them 
of the imperilled interests of their Order. He even threatened 
that any one guilty of corruption in this case would be prosecuted 
by himself without fail. So Cicero won the primacy of the Roman 
Bar. He followed up his success by composing and publishing a 
great pamphlet on the subject. It was in the form of a speech, 
an elaborate pleading such as he would have delivered in court, 
if the case had come to a second hearing after the ordinary 
adjournment. This stage had not been reached, for the case 
of Verres broke down on the first hearing. The great 'second 
pleading ' took a permanent place in Roman literature. For the 
present it carried the fame of Cicero far and wide. That the 
picture of the iniquities of Verres was overdrawn, is more than 
likely. But the trial was over, and to Verres in exile at Massalia 
the invective of Cicero was a matter of small concern. 

459. Late in this year 70 the question of the juries was at 
last dealt with in a law carried by the praetor L. Aurelius Cotta. 
It was a compromise. The senatorial monopoly was doomed. 
A proposal, that the senatorial and equestrian Orders should each 
furnish half of each jury, was made, but fell through. The 

23—2 



356 lex Aurelia iudiciaria [cm. xxxii 

Knights insisted on more than a half share. The lex Aurelia 
made each jury consist of three equal sections or panels {decuriae)^ 
senators, equites, and tribuni aerarii. These last seem to have 
been a class of lesser capitalists, and the name was probably an 
old survival. At any rate the senators could no longer shield 
the criminals of their own Order. But bribery and party-feeling 
remained the canker of the public courts. The political effect 
of the change was great. Following the revival of the tribunate, 
it recorded the fall of the Sullan constitution. The Marian or 
' popular ' party had already regained the upper hand. This did 
not mean that Rome was on the way to be ruled by a Demos of 
the Greek model. Neither Assembly nor Senate could really 
decide anything of vital importance without the leave of the 
army-leaders who from time to time held the power of the sword. 
This was henceforth the main fact of Roman politics, to which 
many good citizens strove to shut their eyes. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

WARS ABROAD. SERTORIUS AND MITHRADATES. 
79 — 67 B.C. 

460. In this period, though Spain was generally quiet, the 
natives were not yet so far tamed and Romanized as to resist 
the temptation to rise in arms on a favourable opportunity. This 
is more especially true of the Lusitanian tribes in the West. But 
Sertorius, who left Italy in 83, was at first unable to revive the 
Marian cause by raising a Spanish rebellion. With a handful of 
Marian comrades he went through a series of adventures by sea 
and land, and it was not till the year 80 that he received and 
accepted an invitation to head a Lusitanian rising. He organized 
the native forces on the model of a Roman army, but turned their 
superior mobility and knowledge of the country to good account. 
He managed the people well, trusting to their generous loyalty 
and humouring their superstitions. Civil order was promoted by 
just administration, and he was soon in high repute over a great 
part of Spain. He even established a Roman school for the sons 
of native chiefs. For Sertorius did not seek to lessen or destroy 
the influence of Rome : it was to overthrow the government of 
Sulla and the aristocratic faction that he fought. As Marian 
fugitives rallied to him, he employed them in military and civil 
posts, and even formed a Roman council or Senate of the leading 
partisans. His victories over the governors of the Spanish pro- 
vinces so much alarmed Sulla, that in 79 the trusted Metellus Pius 
was sent to put down the rising. But the career of Sertorius was 
not checked, and in 77, as we saw above, he was joined by Perperna 
with a considerable army from Italy. This was probably not an 
unmixed gain. The war was henceforth more of a civil war, and 



358 Sertorius. The East [ch. 

the great leader was exposed to the malign influences of Perperna's 
ambition and jealousy. 

461. We have seen how Pompey contrived to get himself 
sent to Spain on the same footing as Metellus. But the campaign 
of 76 was a failure, and that of 75 not much better. Mithradates 
thought it worth his while to come to a friendly arrangement with 
Sertorius. The pirates supplied means of communication and 
some sort of understanding was entered into. The state of things 
was serious. Pompey, at his urgent request, was reinforced, for 
fear the war should spread to Italy. The tide now began to turn, 
not through marked improvement on the Roman side, but rather 
in consequence of the gradual failure of Sertorius. Perhaps the 
Spaniards were tired of the war : his Roman helpers were certainly 
a hindrance. Their conduct alienated the natives, and it is said 
that Sertorius by various severities was making himself hated. In 
the year 72 he was assassinated, and Perperna, who had been the 
chief conspirator, succeeded to the command. Pompey soon after 
defeated and captured Perperna, and put him to death. The re- 
bellion quickly collapsed, order was restored, and the Marian party 
were no longer represented by a force in arms. But it was thought 
wise to encourage those Spaniards who had done good service for 
the Roman government. Pompey, probably at his own suggestion, 
was authorized by a special law to bestow the Roman franchise on 
deserving individuals. One of the recipients, a native of Gades, 
who took the name L. Cornelius Balbus, migrated to Rome, and 
became a very important person. He is best known as the chief 
private agent of Caesar. In 7 1 Pompey and Metellus returned to 
Rome. 

462. When we turn to the East, we find Roman interests in 
danger from several quarters. A weak and fitful policy exposed 
Macedonia to chronic warfare. No practical and effective measures 
had been taken to suppress piracy. And the king of Pontus had 
been busy with preparations which might at any time issue in a 
serious war. The frontier wars in Macedonia employed governor 
after governor, but victories brought no rest. Dardanians and 
Thracians, to the N. and N.E. of the province, were driven to 
invade the Roman territory by the pressure of ruder barbarians 
behind them, and emissaries of Mithradates helped to make the 
Thracian tribes more troublesome than ever. Rome kept no 
strong standing army in the province, and made no further an- 



xxxiii] Piracy 359 

nexations. So the tide of frontier warfare ebbed and flowed 
fitfully and wastefuUy, with little prospect of lasting peace. At 
this time the governors as a rule each held ofifice for two years. 
When war broke out with Mithradates, it was more necessary than 
before to reestablish the supremacy of Rome in these parts. The 
king drew support from both the barbarian tribes and the Greek 
coast-cities. M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (a Lucullus adopted by 
a Varro) commanded there in 73 — 71, and his successes were a 
great help to his brother L. Lucullus in the Pontic war. He made 
no real conquest of Thrace, but he greatly strengthened the posi- 
tion of Rome and weakened Mithradates. 

463. Piracy and kidnapping were again in full swing, and the 
demand for slaves in the Roman dominions was a never-failing 
encouragement to this form of enterprise. Rome shirked the 
duty of maintaining the police of the seas. The expedition of 
Servilius had gained him the title Isauricus, but had no lasting 
effect. He went off to triumph in Rome, and the pirates, scat- 
tered for a moment, quickly rallied. Crete and the mountainous 
western Cilicia were their chief haunts, but they infested the whole 
Mediterranean, and were a nuisance even in the Adriatic. Their 
numbers were recruited by ruined men from Italy, deserters, and 
rough adventurers from all quarters. Acting in independent 
bodies, they felt a common interest and helped each other. At 
last their operations threatened a stoppage of the Roman corn- 
supply, and the government was forced to attempt their complete 
suppression. Half-measures had been proved useless, so in 74 it 
was decided to hunt them down in all parts of the Mediterranean, 
and to give a single commander wide powers for the purpose. 
M. Antonius, a son of the great orator, was chosen. He had 
imperiu?n as a proconsul over the sea and coasts. Governors 
of provinces had to back him up, and he made requisitions 
accordingly. He then set to work, apparently without any suffi- 
cient organization. That the conquest of Crete was a necessary 
part of the work in hand, was doubtless true. But Antonius 
failed miserably in attempting it. A treaty that he was driven 
to make with the Cretan leaders was not ratified in Rome, and 
the proconsul died in the island, having lived long enough to be 
nicknamed Creiicus in derision. This again brings us to the year 
71. The Mithradatic war was by no means at an end, and the 
failure of naval demonstrations had left behind grave causes for 



360 Tigranes [ch. 

anxiety. Was it certain that the islands, the bases of Rome's 
naval power, were now safe? If not, how was it possible to 
secure free communication with her armies and possessions in 
the East? 

464. To understand the relations of Rome and Mithradates 
at the time when the war began in 74, we must turn back to remind 
ourselves that the Armenian and Parthian monarchies were now 
the chief powers in the further East. The Egyptian and Syrian 
dynasties had practically ceased to count. A Scythian invasion 
weakened Parthia for a time. Tigranes of Armenia took the 
opportunity, and in 83 annexed some Parthian provinces, includ- 
ing Syria, which had lately fallen under Parthian influence. Now 
Tigranes and Mithradates were for the present working in harmony. 
But the Pontic king was well aware that he must beat back Rome, 
if he meant to gratify his imperial ambition. The Armenian had 
evidently no notion that he must support Mithradates at once, or 
it would be too late. He went on with his own plans, trying to 
remodel his empire after the fashion of Alexander's Successors. 
He too must have a great capital city, and surround himself with 
Greek civilization. So he made one, which he called Tigrano- 
certa, and to it he transplanted a number of 'Greeks,' drawn from 
Cilician and Cappadocian cities. Rome did not interfere, and 
Tigranes was not likely to learn from his courtiers that interference 
was possible, or that the Pontic kingdom might prove an insuffi- 
cient buffer. The story of Mithradates and Tigranes was very like 
that of Philip and Antiochus more than 100 years earlier. The 
kings were not loyal to each other, and Rome dealt with them 
one by one. 

465. The death of Nicomedes of Bithynia in 75 brought on 
the inevitable conflict. We have seen that Rome accepted the 
bequest of Bithynia, and in 74 annexed it as a province. Mithra- 
dates accepted the challenge. He had a large well-trained army, 
and among his officers were Romans, in exile through the troubles 
of recent years. He had a strong fleet under Greek commanders. 
He knew that most of the peoples of Asia Minor secretly sym- 
pathized with him as leader of a reaction against Rome, though 
the Galatian tribes were not yet so orientalized as to prefer a 
despot. His connexions with the pirates and Sertorius have been 
referred to above; also the appointment of L. Lucullus and M. 
Cotta to conduct the war on behalf of Rome. At first the king 



xxxiii] Mithradatic war 361 

carried all before him. He found Cotta at Chalcedon, and de- 
feated both his fleet and his army. He overran the northern part 
of the province Asia, and sat down to besiege Cyzicus. This city, 
a republic protected by its Roman alliance, he was bent on taking. 
But the place was stoutly defended, and the great numbers of the 
Pontic army were an embarrassment, for food ran short. Lucullus 
came up in time to cut off supplies by land. At last Mithradates 
had to raise the siege and take away the demoralized remnant of 
his host, thinned by pestilence and famine. The want of an 
effective Roman fleet prevented Lucullus from ending the war. 
But Mithradates, though still powerful at sea, had shewn how 
disastrous the miscalculations of a self-willed autocrat might 
easily be. 

466. Lucullus saw that the first necessity was to get the 
upper hand at sea. A new fleet was raised, and the Aegean 
cleared by two naval victories. A squadron under Cotta now 
entered the Euxine. On the Bithynian coast stood the Greek 
city-republic Heraclea Pontica. Into it Mithradates had thrown 
a barbarian garrison, and forced the citizens to resist the Romans. 
A siege of about two years was the consequence, and in the end 
the king's officers betrayed the place to Cotta, who gave it over 
to massacre or slavery at the hands of the Roman troops. The 
scandal was grave, and likely to discourage submission to the 
Roman arms. Efforts were made at Rome to punish Cotta, 
and a law was passed for making all possible amends to the 
Heracleots, but it seems that little could be done to undo the 
past. Lucullus at least was not to blame. In his campaigns 
of 73 and 72 he won most of the cities on the Pontic coast, 
and in a march up the country met and defeated the king. 
Mithradates fled into Armenia, but Tigranes, still busy with his 
own affairs, did not employ his forces to support the refugee. 
Meanwhile the chief Pontic cities were falling into Roman hands, 
and in the year 70 it looked as if the conquest of Pontus were 
assured. Lucullus left his lieutenants to do this work, while he 
was attending to administration further West. It appears that 
he had been granted full power over the province Asia during 
the war. He found it in great misery, the result of the general 
indebtedness incurred in meeting the demands of Sulla. The 
enormous public debts could not be quickly discharged by the 
cities, so they had gone on mounting till in some twelve years 



3^2 Services of Lucullus [ch. 

time they stood at six times the original amount. Public pro- 
perties were sold, private individuals had to sell their children. 
Roman bankers and brokers were making a golden harvest, while 
the province, a chief source of Roman revenue, was drifting to 
bankruptcy. 

467. The proconsul was a just man, and an honest servant 
of Rome. No mild remedy was of any use. He reduced the 
legal rate of interest to i °/^ per month, and arranged a scheme 
of payment by fixed instalments for the discharge of private debts. 
Public debts were to be paid in double, not sixfold. We hear 
that within four years he cleared off the infamous burden, and 
set the province going afresh. Thus he ruined his own pros- 
pects, for it was at this juncture fatal to offend the Roman capi- 
talists, who had recovered from the blows of Sulla, and were now 
eager to humble the nobles and regain their power in the provinces 
by controlling the courts. He was bitterly denounced in Rome, 
and accused of prolonging the war for his own glory. - While the 
capitalists watched for a chance of procuring his recall, Lucullus 
was not without his troubles in the field. The legionaries of this 
age were good fighting men, but hard to keep in hand. They 
were sadly addicted to plunder, and objected to continued hard- 
ship. And Lucullus had not the gift of winning the personal 
devotion of his men. Hence the difficulty of maintaining dis- 
cipline became greater as time went by and the army was com- 
pelled to winter in inhospitable regions after exhausting campaigns. 
And when it was reported from Rome that his recall was imminent, 
even his officers began to lose their loyalty, and the proconsul's 
control was at an end. A general unpopular both in his own 
camp and in Rome could only clear the ground by his victories 
for a more popular man to win the glory. 

468. To kill or capture Mithradates was the only visible 
means of securing Roman supremacy and peace. So in the year 
70 Lucullus sent to demand his extradition. . Tigranes refused, 
the Roman envoy declared war, and Tigranes at length prepared 
for the struggle. Lucullus was now less uneasy as to the safety 
of his rear. His brother had quieted the Thracians, and a son 
of Mithradates had sought the friendship of Rome. This was 
Machares, who had been deputed by his father to rule the 
Bosporan (Crimean) kingdom. The disloyalty of sons was often 
a source of trouble in the oriental dynasties, and Machares no 



xxxiii] Causes of his failure 363 

doubt hoped to become an independent king. LucuUus boldly 
marched up the country to attack the Armenian in his own land. 
He besieged Tigranocerta. Tigranes advanced with an immense 
army to relieve it. This host the Roman routed and scattered 
with great slaughter, though the odds were about one to twenty. 
The new capital city was taken, and the population, forcibly 
collected there to give it a Greek character, once more dispersed. 
LucuUus passed the winter of 69 — 68 in the land of Gordyene 
by the upper Tigris, while Mithradates was allowed by Tigranes 
to organize a new army. Both sides wished to gain the support 
of the Parthians. But the Parthian king stood neutral. LucuUus 
resolved to win his alliance by force, but the plan had to be given 
up owing to the mutinous refusal of his own troops. The cam- 
paign of 68 was directed to the North, in hope to take Artaxata, 
the old capital of Armenia, and conquer the whole kingdom. But 
it was to no purpose that he met and defeated Mithradates. His 
men would not face the mountains and the weather, and he had 
to turn back. In the same winter-quarters as before he passed 
the winter of 68 — 67, troubled by his mutinous legions. They 
were utterly weary, and the two legions left by Fimbria had served 
18 years in the East. The oflScers were unsettled by news from 
Rome, and the intrigues of Roman politics found their way into 
the camp. 

469. By the season of 67 it had become very necessary to 
hurry back into Pontus, where Mithradates was carrying all before 
him. This movement left Tigranes free to invade Cappadocia. 
All the efforts of LucuUus were foiled by the disobedience of his 
troops. And the certain news of his recall practically ended his 
authority. His enemies in Rome had carried their point, and a 
new governor was coming to Bithynia and Pontus. Commissioners 
presently arrived to organize Pontus as a Province. But they 
could do nothing, for meanwhile Mithradates had reconquered 
most of his kingdom, and LucuUus was helpless. Clearly matters 
could not be left in this state. The actual sequel will be described 
below. The story of LucuUus is an instructive one. His personal 
merits and defects had no doubt a powerful influence on the 
fortune of his campaigns. But it was the political movements in 
Rome that were the main cause of his final failure. A man at 
once honest and ambitious had in these days a difficult game 
to play. To be scrupulous and strict abroad was to lose the 



364 Movements in Rome [ch. xxxiii 

favour of greedy soldiers. To be just to provincials was to incur 
the hatred of greedy capitalists. And long absence from Rome 
gave opportunity to the machinations of a rival. Lucullus was 
the Senate's man, and the Senate were no longer able to protect 
him. The events of the year 70 had made the Assembly, under 
the revived power of the tribunes, the effective disposer of patron- 
age. The alliance of a military leader with a tribune was now the 
simplest means of controlling the affairs of Rome. As Marius had 
used Saturninus, so now we shall find that tribunes were the tools 
of Pompey. 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

AFFAIRS IN ROME 69—66 B.C., AND THE 
PREEMINENCE OF POMPEY 67—62 B.C. 

470. The fall of Sulla's political fabric gave Roman public 
life a fresh start under changed conditions. The chief active 
characters require a brief notice. The party of senatorial nobles 
was led by Q. Lutatius Catulus, consul in 78 and now first man 
{princeps) of the Senate, but its chief orator was Hortensius, 
consul in 69 with Q. Caecilius Metellus. Hortensius drew the 
lot for the charge of the inevitable Cretan war, but resigned it to 
his colleague, not wishing to leave Rome. C Calpurnius Piso, 
consul elect for 67, was of the same party. He is said to have 
won his election by bribery, and to have bought off those who 
threatened to prosecute him. The popular or Marian party had 
various champions, but their efficiency was henceforth largely due 
to the growing influence of Caesar. As a Patrician, Caesar could 
not be tribune. But he was in favour with the populace, and 
already on the way to be a great leader of men, through his 
unfaihng nerve, his intellectual vigour, and his personal charm. 
He spent money lavishly, and borrowed with apparent reckless- 
ness ; but there was probably method in it from the first. Money 
well invested was a condition of the rise to power in the Rome of 
this age. Caesar got value for his outlay, and his creditors were 
interested in his welfare. Cicero, the 'new man,' was not yet 
a political orator, but was steadily raising his public position by 
successful pleading in the courts. As quaestor in 75 and aedile 
in 69 he had entered on an official career. His political con- 
nexion was with the Equestrian Order from which he sprang, 
and we shall see that this connexion coloured his whole public 



366 Crassus, Pompey, Caesar [ch. 

life. But the two most important figures of the time were Pompey 
and Crassus. They watched each other jealously. Crassus sought 
popularity by using his vast wealth in bounties and entertainments, 
and by the judicious employment of moderate gifts as an advocate. 
He obliged serviceable people with loans, and tried to win his 
way by affability. But his self-seeking was too transparent, and 
Crassus by himself was never able to capture public confidence. 
Pompey's position was different. In military reputation he stood 
first, and his line was to keep out of common political squabbles. 
He posed as the Indispensable Military Man, ready at a pinch to 
repair the blunders of others, but too self-respecting to cheapen 
his services by quitting his seclusion on ordinary occasions. At 
the recent census he was (as an eques) asked whether he had 
served the campaigns required by law. He replied 'Yes, and 
all under my own command.' That is, he had broken all pre- 
cedents ; a position not easy to reconcile with heavy constitutional 
dignity. These two pupils of Sulla had overcome the opposition 
of the Senate by coalescing with the leaders of the popular party. 
But they were not, like Caesar, true Marians. They gratified 
their immediate ambitions by upsetting their master's system. 
So in party-politics their position was already ambiguous, while 
that of Caesar was clear. 

471. Caesar was elected quaestor for 68, and appointed to 
serve in the Further Spain. Before his departure he had to 
celebrate the funerals of his aunt Julia, widow of Marius, and 
of his own wife Cornelia. At the former he displayed the face- 
mask of old Marius, thus announcing the revival of the memory 
of a popular hero, and defying the SuUan nobility. In Spain he 
did the usual work for the governor, and returned as soon as he 
could in 67. On his way back (by land) he found the people of 
Transpadane Gaul preparing to claim the Roman franchise. He 
encouraged them, but for the present the opposition of the Senate 
blocked the way. But the Transpadanes remained attached to 
him, and he did not forget them. In Rome he found things in 
a ferment. The pirates were bolder than ever. While Metellus 
had his hands full in Crete, and LucuUus was known to be in 
difficulties, the sea-rovers worked their will in the western seas. 
They had even landed in Campania and Latium, and carried off 
travellers on the Appian way. At last they raided Ostia, and did 
great damage, and began to capture corn-ships. The Senate would 



xxxiv] The lex Gabinia 367 

do nothing, for fear of having to entrust Pompey with exceptional 
powers. The prospect of famine roused the hungry mob, and 
'popular' tribunes were ready to lead an attack on the Senate 
and its policy. The two most active were A. Gabinius and 
C. Cornelius. Pompey was privately in league with them. The 
opportunity of receiving a great commission over the heads of 
ordinary nobles was just what he wanted. With his support and 
that of the capitalists, alarmed by the possible loss of investments, 
it was possible to assail the nobility with success. So the year 67 
was marked by important legislation. 

472. First let us take the lex Gabinia for suppressing piracy. 
The proposal was to appoint a single commander. The whole 
Mediterranean was to be his ' province,' and for 50 miles inland 
he was to have equal powers with the local governors. Provision 
was made for a strong fleet, a large staff of lieutenants, and ample 
supplies of money. In short, there were to be no more half- 
measures : Rome was hungry, and in earnest. No name was 
mentioned in the bill, but all knew who was meant. Catulus, 
Hortensius, and the consul Piso led the opposition. Caesar 
supported Gabinius. Two tribunes had undertaken to block 
proceedings, but Gabinius dealt with one of them as Tiberius 
Gracchus had dealt with Octavius, and the obstructor gave way 
rather than be deposed from office by a vote of the Tribes. The 
bill became law, Pompey was then appointed to command, and 
the revival of confidence at once sent down the price of corn. 
Whatever the consequences of this great commission might be, 
the scandalous inefficiency inseparable from the rule of a jealous 
aristocracy had for the moment been overcome. 

473. There were other abuses, dear to those who profited 
thereby, and hateful to those who did not. The nobles were 
no longer in direct possession of power as designed by Sulla. 
Indirectly they were still powerful by reason of their wealthy and 
they lost no chance of enriching themselves in order to cover 
their expenses. One very invidious source of gain was found in 
blackmailing foreign embassies and provincial deputations. The 
envoys had to fee a consul to obtain a prompt hearing in the 
Senate, and then to bribe senators in order to secure a favourable 
answer. These operations implied the borrowing of money at 
high interest from Roman capitalists, for it was in practice not 
possible to evade the bankers in whose transactions all wealthy 



368 Corrupt senators. Piso [ch. 

Roman investors were concerned. So the money went round 
and round, to the profit of the nobles. They got handsome 
returns on their own money, lent through bankers or syndicates 
for the purpose of bribing themselves. No doubt non-noble 
capitalists shared the pickings arising from high interest, though 
not the bribes. The foreigners were driven to burden their 
people at home with debts that could not be repudiated. And 
a favourable order of the Senate, when procured, could be re- 
scinded or ignored. Now the Senate as a body was not likely 
to reform this abuse, however much the better members might 
desire it. The tribunes, backed by popular feeling, offered legis- 
lative remedies. Gabinius proposed to forbid loans to provincials 
in Rome, and to make such debts not recoverable in the provinces. 
Cornelius dealt in the same way with the case of foreign embassies. 
The latter bill was defeated on the pretence that an old order of 
the Senate in reference to Crete had done all that was required. 
But the bill of Gabinius became law. A law to compel the Senate 
to receive deputations in February also passed. But bribery did 
not cease. Cornelius also proposed to increase the penalties for 
bribery at elections, including some punishment for mere agents. 
This bill the Senate contrived to delay, handing it over to the 
consuls for reintroduction in an amended form. The consul 
meant was Piso\ for his colleague M'. Acilius Glabrio was gone 
or going out to Bithynia. 

474. Piso was a troublesome man. While politicians were 
wrangling, Pompey had organized his forces in spite of every 
hindrance, in particular from the obstructive lieutenants of Piso, 
who, though detained in Rome, was governor of Narbonese Gaul. 
A naval campaign of squadrons cooperating from several centres in 
40 days forced the pirates to leave the seas West of Italy and fall 
back on their strongholds in the East. The corn-supply of Rome 
was now safe, and Pompey was warmly welcomed when he paid 
a flying visit to the city. Piso still gave trouble, but Pompey 
wisely discouraged Gabinius from trying to depose him by a 
special law. By an arbitrary decree the Senate enabled Piso 
to do business in the Assemblies unhampered by religious 
hindrances. He managed to hold the consular and praetorian 
elections, but only with great difficulty, by pressing country 
voters to attend. The bribery bill as revised was a milder 
^ Heuce the law was passed as lex Calpurnia. 



xxxiv] Cornelius, concordia ordimmi 369 

measure than the original draft of Cornelius. In all the As- 
semblies there was rioting, and this bill was only carried through 
by force. Cornelius now sought a way to punish the Senate for 
thwarting him. He found it in assailing the claim of the House 
to grant special dispensations from the laws. 

475. In the early days of the Republic such dispensations 
had been granted with a proviso requiring the consent of the 
Assembly. The Senate gradually dropped this, and assumed 
full powers. Now the activity of the Assembly was revived, 
and the right of the Senate challenged. It was strictly speaking 
unconstitutional, and quite unjustifiable when (as sometimes 
happened) the order was passed in a thin House. The bill of 
Cornelius reserved the power to the Assembly. But again the 
senatorial party, headed by Piso, were able by use of force to 
prevent its passing. Eventually a compromise was agreed to, 
and a law carried by which the Senate retained its usurped power, 
provided that 200 members at least were present in the House 
at the passing of the order. So the nobles made the best bargain 
they could. But the efforts to restrict the arbitrary action of the 
governing class were not yet ended. Praetors now and then 
assumed the right of deviating in judicial practice from the 
principles laid down in their notices {edidd) published when they 
entered on office. Cornelius carried a law requiring juridical 
praetors to abide by their edicts. Other bills were also brought 
forward, but did not pass. Among all the strife and disturbances 
of this year 67, an important change was going on in party 
politics. Senators and Knights not only sat together on juries ; 
they had a real common interest, at least in Home affairs, as the 
party of the Rich. They were beginning to draw together. Both 
sections dreaded mob-rule. Already they were so far united that 
the popular tribunes could not carry all before them. So long as 
no military leader was present to dominate Rome, the two wealthy 
Orders in combination could direct the government. And this 
' harmony of the Orders ' did in fact develope, so that it became 
the mainstay of the Republican constitution. In this year the 
Equestrian Order were gratified by a law assigning them the 
honorary privilege of reserved seats in the theatre, 14 rows 
behind those kept for senators. 

476. Meanwhile Pompey was completing the best of his 
many achievements. His squadrons closed in on the pirates, 

H. 24 



370 Pirates crushed, lex Manilla [ch. 

and drove them from most parts of the eastern seas. They 
were brought to bay off their old haunts in PamphyUa and 
western CiUcia, and at length forced to give battle. In fighting 
they were at a disadvantage, for their light vessels were built for 
speed, suited to chase or run. Off Coracesium they were utterly 
defeated by the Roman ships of war. After this Pompey wisely 
offered them honourable terms. Their strongholds surrendered, 
and in 49 days campaign he had restored peace on the waters. 
He destroyed all their war-material, and planted the pirates as 
reformed characters here and there in various parts of the Roman 
world. Thus he broke up their motley bands, while he added 
colonists to cities or districts in need of population. He had in 
short really grappled with a serious problem and had solved it. 
A deputation from Crete begged him to accept their surrender 
and save them from the blood-and-iron methods of Metellus. 
This led to a quarrel between the two proconsuls, but Metellus, 
backed by the Senate, finished his work, made Crete a Province, 
and had a triumph and the title Creticus. 

477. There was joy in Rome at the success of Pompey, and 
men were now ready for a proposal to turn his abilities to account 
in connexion with the Pontic war. Things could not be left in 
their present state. The power of Rome must be reasserted 
in the East, and it was likely that some annexations might be 
necessary. The prospect of extended fields of enterprise was 
attractive to capitalists : even senators, though unwilling to have 
so much power entrusted to one man, were wiUing to see the 
number of provincial governorships increased. C. Manilius, one 
of the tribunes for 66, took the matter up. He carried a law for 
the appointment of Pompey to the eastern command. The 
powers conferred by the lex Manilla were extraordinarily wide. 
The Gabinian law was not repealed, so Pompey was made 
supreme on both land and sea, in fact given a free hand to 
carry out a complete settlement of the East according to his 
own views of the real interest of Rome. The immense patronage 
at his disposal, and the uncertain duration of this great commis- 
sion, placed him in a position to oblige numbers of people. Even 
while absent, he would be able to influence politics in Rome, 
courted and feared as the uncrowned emperor of the East. Yet 
the bill became law. Catulus and Hortensius spoke against it, 
but even the senators were divided on the question. Caesar 



xxxiv] End of Mithradates 371 

supported it, and Cicero, now praetor, made his first political 
speech on the popular side. 

478. Pompey hastened to supersede LucuUus, who had now 
to submit to all the mortifications that his successor chose to 
inflict. Pompey was jealous and ungenerous all through his 
career. Lucullus on his return to Rome was persecuted by the 
' popular ' faction. Only strenuous efforts of the ' best men ' at 
last procured him the honour of a triumph. But he was disgusted 
with political life, and very seldom took part in public affairs. 
He lived in an elegant and luxurious style, a refined and wealthy 
noble, surrounded by literary men, and famed for his splendid 
mansions and his fishponds. But his campaigns in the East had 
broken the power of Mithradates, and he was certainly a man 
of great merit, worthy of a better fate. He had laboured, and 
Pompey entered into his labours. Pompey understood how to 
manage soldiers far better than Lucullus. Even the Fimbrian 
legions were ready to continue their long service under him. 
Mithradates was easily defeated, and in 65 he withdrew with the 
relics of his army to his Bosporan kingdom. There he got rid 
of his son Machares, and began to raise new forces, intending, 
it is said, to renew the struggle with Rome by passing through the 
Danube countries and descending on Italy from the North. For 
about two years he was scheming and raging, beset by disaff"ection 
and treachery. At last his favourite son Pharnaces rebelled 
against him, and seduced the army. The old king found no 
refuge but in death. We have no reason to think that, if he 
had driven Rome out of Asia Minor, civilization would have 
gained by his victory. Reaction of East against West on the 
lines of Mithradates was at bottom a reversion to the ancient 
system of an empire under a Great King or Sultan. He used 
Greeks for his own purposes, as the Romans did, but it is most 
unlikely that under his rule the Greeks would have flourished 
better than they did afterwards under the Romans. In him we 
see both the weakness and the strength of absolute monarchy. 
In the Roman Republic we see the enormous difficulty of setting 
in motion a really irresistible power. The friction caused by the 
Senate's jealousy of exceptional men had always to be overcome. 
In overcoming it, the authority of the Senate suffered, but there 
was no other body able to do the Senate's work. So the Republic 
was shaken by the rise of individuals to unrepublican power. As 

24 — 2 



372 Pompey's progress and [ch, 

Metellus fell and Marius rose through the party-movements con- 
nected with the Jugurthine war, so Lucullus fell and Pompeyrose 
through the intrigues occasioned by the war with Mithradates. 

479. The great proconsul, doubly commissioned to act for 
Rome with ample forces by sea and land, made a victorious 
progress through countries and peoples accustomed from time 
immemorial to bow before overwhelming power. His delight 
in solemn ceremony was congenial to the East. To ensure the 
due publication of his exploits to the literary world, he took with 
him the Greek Theophanes as a court-historiographer. The over- 
throw of Mithradates was quickly followed by the full submission 
of Tigranes. In 65 a successful campaign among the Albanians 
and Iberians taught those restless peoples to respect the power 
of Rome. Pompey made no regular conquest of that region, and 
did not attempt to pass the mountain barrier of the Caucasus. 
Turning southwards again, he came to terms with the Parthian 
king, Phraates. The Euphrates was recognized as the boundary 
of the two empires, so that Mesopotamia was Parthian territory. 
Neither party wished for war, but the relations between the two 
were hardly those of sincere friendship. Armenia was reduced 
to its former extent : the Parthian recovered some provinces 
annexed by Tigranes, and Pompey decided to annex Syria as a 
province to Rome. That country had been cut off from Armenia 
by Lucullus, and a surviving Seleucid prince, Antiochus XIII, was 
at present its nominal ruler. In and around the district properly 
known as Syria were a number of principalities now practically 
independent, though once vassals of Antioch. There were also 
a number of Greek cities, self-governing and desirous of peace 
and order. The Jewish kingdom had grown through profiting 
by the decay of Syria and Egypt. It was now disturbed by the 
competition of two rivals for the office of High Priest. What 
the whole country needed was a strong central power, able to 
keep the peace. What Pompey did was to substitute Rome, 
represented by a governor, for the kings of the house of Seleucus. 

480. In order to settle the Jewish dispute it was necessary 
to reduce the temple of Jerusalem, occupied as a fortress by the 
faction against whose candidate Pompey had decided. The siege 
gave trouble, and the proconsul thought fit to rebuke the rebellious 
spirit of the Jews by a deliberate outrage. He, a Gentile, insisted 
on entering the Holy of Holies. But he did not seize the treasures 



xxxiv] the settlement of the East 



0/3 



of the temple. In his scheme for the Syrian province the Jewish 
kingdom was included with others. In fact the province was an 
aggregate of tributary principalities and cities. The latter were 
mostly 'Greek'; that is, more or less effective centres of the 
Hellenistic civilization fostered by the Seleucid kings. Pompey 
recognized the value of these communities as promoting order 
and prosperity. Both in Syria and elsewhere he encouraged 
them by grants of privileges, by strengthening those that for 
any reason had fallen into decay, and by new foundations. This 
policy, imitated by emperors in later times, served to hellenize 
the East under the protection of Rome, and much of the later 
history of these regions was profoundly affected thereby. Another 
important point in the great Pompeian settlement was the recogni- 
tion of monarchy as a form of government suited to peoples in 
a certain stage of civilization. We do not now hear of the deposi- 
tion of a king as the grant of ' freedom ' so-called. The proconsul 
awards thrones as a matter of course. These kings or chiefs hold 
their places under Rome, as a part of the Roman system, during 
good behaviour. It is their duty and their interest to save Rome 
trouble and expense. This policy also became a regular principle 
of Roman imperial practice. Pompey left Syria in 63, and spent 
the winter in organizing northern Asia Minor. Pharnaces had 
sent him the corpse of Mithradates, which he ordered to be 
buried with honour at Sinope in the sepulchre of the Pontic 
kings. 

481. The details of the eastern settlement were briefly these. 
Of Provinces, Cilicia and Bithynia were both enlarged by the 
inclusion of districts to the East. Syria was new. Of Client 
kingdoms, Ariobarzanes was recognized in Cappadocia, and a 
native prince in inland Paphlagonia. Another minor principality 
was Commagene to the North of Syria. In Galatia the three 
tribes, each under four tetrarchs, were left as before, but the real 
head was Deiotarus, the friend of Rome. He received a grant 
of eastern Pontus, and soon rose to be ruler of Galatia. Two 
monarchs were recognized as Kings allied with Rome, Tigranes 
in his ancestral kingdom of Armenia, and Pharnaces in the 
Cimmerian Bosporus. We should note that the Province Asia 
remained as organized by Sulla. Lycia remained a ' free ' federal 
League allied with Rome. Egypt and its dependency Cyprus 
were not touched. Pompey wisely let the Egyptian question 



374 Pompey's return [ch. xxxiy 

alone. In fixing boundaries of the recognized divisions of territory, 
and in determining the relations between the various communities 
and the sovran power, no doubt many delicate problems had to 
be considered. In general the proconsul seems to have followed 
existing arrangements so far as possible, and the settlement as 
a whole was a reasonable and practical one. That he had under- 
stood how to manage oriental peoples was shewn a few years later, 
when the eastern part of the empire shared his fortunes in the 
great civil war. 

482. In the year 62 Pompey travelled homewards. He was 
in no hurry, and he was bent upon displaying himself in the cities 
of the Aegean and engaging the chief centres of Greek culture to 
spread his fame. At Mitylene, Ephesus, Rhodes, Athens, and 
other places, he appeared as patron, in some as benefactor, 
granting privileges or giving money. Poets and rhetoricians 
performed before him and sang his praises. His army was 
contented with the rewards and profits of service. ■ Rome was 
anxiously awaiting his return, not without reason, as we shall 
see. He did not reach the city till early in 61. During the 
last four years he must have received from time to time news 
of strange doings in Rome, which will form the subject of the 
next chapter. 



CHAPTER XXXV 

CICERO AND CATILINE. 66—63 B.C. 

483. While Pompey was away in the East, the course of 
events in Rome was proving the extreme need of a strong govern- 
ment and the impossibiUty of forming one. His absence on the 
one hand left others free to push their own designs. The prospect 
of his return, on the other hand, weighed on the minds of all 
prudent men, and enjoined caution. What if he chose to play 
the part of a Sulla? Faction, corruption, violence, were the 
staple of Roman politics. Personal interests overrode public 
considerations, and behind all was a peculiarly mischievous 
influence, the pressure of debt on reckless spendthrifts. It was a 
difficult time for patriots, such as Cicero and M. Porcius Cato. 
Both were loyal repubhcans, strongly opposed to any movement 
imperilling the republican constitution. The immediate danger 
lay in the promotion of individuals in defiance of constitutional 
rules. The demand for efficiency was a good cry for the popular 
party. Cicero knew very well that the policy of the senatorial 
nobles meant inefficiency, and he had openly supported the 
Manilian law. But he also knew that such commissions as that 
given to Pompey must, if often repeated, make an end of the 
Republic. He therefore felt drawn to the party of the 'best men,' 
and the endeavour to create a strong government by cooperation 
of the two wealthy Orders became the aim of his political life. 
He was an opportunist, ready to sacrifice some of his principles 
to gain ends that seemed more important. Cato was very 
different. A hard temperament, developed by Stoic training, 
made him more the fighting man of the republican cause. But 
the Republic was an essentially aristocratic institution, and neither 
of these men were typical aristocrats, such as Catulus^ Lucullus, 



2i"]^ The anti-Pompeian intrigues [ch. 

the Metelli, and others. Cato acted on principle, an eccentric 
being. Cicero, whom circumstances were about to thrust into a 
front place, was a ' new man,' with a vast reverence for the great 
houses, and conscious that to them he was no better than an 
upstart. 

484. But it was the movements of the ' popular ' party that 
made the time of Pompey's absence important in the history of 
Rome. And direct proposals and indirect intrigues alike derived 
most of their force from the presence of Crassus and Caesar. It 
is to be borne in mind that these two were wire-pulling behind 
the scenes. Crassus was the elder and a millionaire, creditor of 
many men, of Caesar among them. But it was Caesar's cleverness 
and popularity that supplied the real guidance and driving-power. 
In the year 66 political strife continued in the form of trials 
before the public courts, and rioting. The consuls elected for 
65, P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla, were prosecuted 
for bribery and unseated. Catiline was only prevented from 
being a candidate by a threatened prosecution for extortion in 
Africa, where he had been propraetor in 67. A plot was laid to 
murder the two new consuls, and recover the consulships for 
Paetus and Sulla by force. It failed, and was renewed, and was 
thwarted a second time. Catiline and a turbulent young man, 
Cn. Calpurnius Piso, were probably concerned in it. But later in 
the year (65), when Catiline was on his trial, the very consul who 
had foiled the plot appeared with others to support the accused. 
And the Senate was induced to make a special appointment for 
Piso in Spain. These mysterious affairs need explanation. There 
is no doubt that jealousy of Pompey was at the bottom of both. 
Catiline was likely to be useful to Crassus and Caesar. Piso was 
sent to Spain to raise forces there and form a military base for 
the party opposed to Pompey. In the Senate many were desirous 
to prevent the rise of Pompey to autocratic power. It is to be 
inferred that a common interest had led the two anti-Pompeian 
sections to sink differences and work together. 

485. In the year 65 there were censors. Both were opposed 
to the aggrandisement of Pompey, Catulus as a republican, 
Crassus as a rival. But here their agreement ended. Crassus, 
prompted by Caesar, was for enrolling the Transpadane ' Latins ' 
as citizens, and for declaring Egypt a Province. Catulus was 
against both schemes. So the censors presently resigned without 



xxxv] Caesar and Cato i']'] 

acting, and there was no census. Catulus thus prevailed for the 
moment, and a law {lex Papid) was even carried for expulsion of 
aliens from Rome. So the Transpadanes were repulsed in the 
old style. The annexation of Egypt was desired as a means of 
checking Pompey, for it was to be occupied by Caesar. But 
this plan was too much for the aristocrats, who wanted to lower 
Pompey without raising up a rival claimant to excessive power. 
The trial of Catiline ended in an acquittal in spite of his notorious 
guilt. He secured a corrupt jury by bribing^ his accuser, and 
then bribed a majority of jurors. The trial of C Cornelius, 
deferred from the last year, also ended in acquittal. He was 
attacked, on a charge of maiestas, for having when tribune in 67 
treated a colleague with disrespect in a legislative Assembly, 
The aristocrats wanted to ruin him, but the popular party would 
not let him be sacrificed. Such was the working of the public 
courts. 

486. The state of things is illustrated by the doings of two 
junior magistrates. Caesar was aedile. He made full use of the 
office to win popularity by shows and bounties of unprecedented 
splendour. He borrowed and spent vast sums himself, and 
managed to join forces with his colleague M. Calpurnius Bibulus 
so dexterously that he got all the credit for what both had spent. 
One night he had the old trophies of Marius set up in the places 
whence Sulla had removed them. Thus he reminded the Roman 
commons of their popular hero, with whom he claimed connexion. 
The aristocrats were angry, and Catulus protested ; but none 
dared to remove the trophies. Cato was city quaestor, in charge 
of the treasury, with its store of specie and documents. He set 
about reforming the management, neglected by his slack prede- 
cessors. Subordinates were no longer allowed to control a lazy 
superior. Cato learnt the business, and made good progress with 
getting rid of arrears. While he remained in office he was, both 
as official and as a senator, a check on jobbery. He made an 
effort to recover for the state the sums paid out by Sulla as blood- 
money. In the next year (64) there were several trials, and a few 
convictions. The Marian populares seized the opportunity to 
prosecute some of Sulla's agents for murders in the time of pro- 
scriptions. Caesar was then presiding in the murder-court, and 

1 That is, by procuring his corrupt coUusion in the matter of reiectio 
iudicum. See § 446. 



2,7^ The consular election of 64 b.c. [ch. 

the prosecutions went on briskly : but he was said to have 
managed matters in favour of Catiline, who was acquitted. So 
the incorruptible Cato, a cham.pion of the republican aristocrats, 
gave an opportunity to the other side, which Caesar and his 
' popular ' associates had no scruple in turning to account. 

487. The news of Pompey's successes in the East, and the 
uncertainty as to what would be the effect of his return, weighed 
heavily on Roman party-politics. The senatorial nobles feared 
him as a possible autocrat. They were willing to see a rival 
power created to thwart him, but not to assist that rival power to 
become itself dangerous. The financial interest, and their spokes- 
man Cicero, were loyal to the absent chief whom they had 
supported. Crassus and Caesar were bent upon strengthening 
themselves before it was too late. Their present aim was to 
capture the consulships for 62,, and thus to get control of the 
constitutional machinery. Catiline, already twice prevented from 
being a candidate, was now free to stand. If he were elected 
with a suitable colleague, Caesar and Crassus would be masters of 
Rome. The elections in the summer of 64 were therefore mo- 
mentous. Of seven candidates only three need mention. Cicero 
the 'new man' had at first only the support of his Equestrian 
connexion, of some non-residents from municipal towns, and of 
persons attached to him by his services as orator or by skilful 
canvassing. This was not enough : he must be backed either by 
the ' popular ' party or by the ' best men.' At one time he 
thought of joining forces with Catiline, whom he had been not 
unwilling to defend in court, though convinced of his guilt. But 
other arrangements had been made. The destined partner of 
Catiline was C. Antonius, a son of the great orator and brother 
of the man who failed in Crete. He was a man of bad character, 
deeply in debt, and sure to be a tool of Catiline and his employers. 
Catiline himself was a leading spirit in the corrupt circles of dissi- 
pated society. The ' best men ' were lukewarm or divided, and 
he seemed likely to succeed, and to carry in Antonius. 

488. New men seldom reached the consulship, and the 
tradition was now backed by the influence of Caesar and the 
purse of Crassus. But Catiline and Antonius could not abstain 
from words and acts that betrayed their intention to rule Rome 
by revolutionary violence. Once the aristocrats saw what was in 
prospect, they swallowed their pride, and threw all their strength 



xxxv] Cicero and the situation 379 

into support of Cicero, in order to keep out the dangerous 
Catiline. This gave Cicero the lead. He was returned first, and 
Antonius just secured the second place. The 'best men' had 
very nearly been caught napping. Shortly before the election, 
when they were already alarmed, Cicero had strengthened his 
position by a powerful address to the Senate. This was the 
' speech in the white gown,' the robe of a candidate. He not 
only denounced Antonius and Catiline, but exposed the intrigues 
that were going on. He did not name Crassus and Caesar, but 
he described them, and convinced the House of the reality and 
true source of the danger, By this speech he announced that he 
had broken with the popular party for good. The support of the 
two wealthy Orders made him consul : how to keep the great 
nobles and the Knights in harmony was henceforth his problem. 
His first anxiety was to prevent Antonius from giving trouble as 
his colleague in office. This he did cheaply. The provinces 
selected for the consuls of 63 to hold in 62 were Macedonia and 
Cisalpine Gaul. Antonius drew the latter, where there was little 
prospect of plunder to restore him to solvency. Cicero offered 
him Macedonia in exchange. The bankrupt gladly accepted the 
offer, and agreed to abstain from factious opposition. Cicero did 
not want to be drawn away from Rome by a provincial charge, 
and obliged a friend^ by getting Cisalpine Gaul transferred to 
him. Thus, before he entered on office, he deprived the popular 
leaders of the help of their partisan consul. 

489. Rome was now on the eve of a party strugggle between 
optimates and populares. For the moment there was no great 
army at hand to overawe either side, so the factions were left to 
fight it out with the means at their disposal. The war of prose- 
cutions dragged on for a good part of the year 64, and then died 
down. The wire-pullers of the popular party were not idle. 
They still hoped to find a base of military power in Spain. 
Piso's enterprise had failed, for the Spaniards killed him : a 
certain P. Sittius was now sent out as a private adventurer to 
watch opportunities. The real director of all their movements 
was Caesar, who alone understood how to manage Crassus, and 
most of the tribunes for 63 were at their service. In facing them 
the aristocrats were at some disadvantage. For his year of office, 
Cicero must hold the first place. But he was a very recent 
1 Q. Metellus Celer. 



380 The agrarian law [ch. 

recruit in their ranks. Great nobles did not like being led by a 
New Man. They were willing to make full use of his high 
character and his eloquence. But they did not mean to let him 
lead them into trouble, or, if things went wrong, to make any 
sacrifices in support of an upstart. If the new consul was to 
carry them with him in an emergency, he would need all his 
cleverness and tact. Moreover tribunes, who entered office on 
the loth December, always had the start of consuls. When 
Cicero became consul on the ist January 63, a number of pro- 
posals were already before the people, though the actual text of 
the bills was not in all cases already published. This democratic 
programme included the restoration of the children of Sulla's 
victims to full civic rights, reduction of debts, the relief of the 
two consuls unseated for bribery in 66 by lessening the penalty, 
and a grand scheme for allotments of land. Some of these pro- 
posals were either foiled or withdrawn or deferred. The agrarian 
scheme at once became the battlefield of a struggle in which the 
consul's power as an orator was put to an exceptional strain. 

490. The bill stood in the name of the tribune P. Servilius 
Rullus, but its real author was Caesar. It professed to be a 
beneficent scheme for settling the pauper mob of Rome on allot- 
ments in Italy, which (following earlier precedents) were to pass 
from father to son, but the holders were to have no power of 
sale. But where was the state to find land for the purpose? 
There was very little state-land left in Italy, and hardly any that 
was not already held by state-tenants paying rent. The wild hill- 
pastures were unsuited for allotments. To resume the lands 
assigned by Sulla was impossible : the storm raised would wreck 
the bill. Purchase from private owners was the only possible 
plan. Therefore the real gist of the bill lay in the means pro- 
posed for raising the money. This was in short a power of selling 
(with a few trifling exceptions) all the state-domains in Italy or 
abroad. For instance, all Bithynia, and the new annexations of 
Pompey, were part of the immense area affected. The language 
was so loose that Cicero could declare that the sale-clauses might 
be held to include Egypt, which the last genuine Ptolemy was 
said to have bequeathed to Rome. Of course an actual sale of 
all these lands was out of the question. Power was therefore 
given to lay a rent or tax on what was not sold. From these 
sources, and from the booty lately acquired in the East, a vast 



xxxv] Oratorical triumphs of Cicero 381 

fund would be raised. The purchase-clauses devoted this to the 
purchase of land in Italy for allotment to the poor. 

491. These powers were to be vested in a commission of 
ten, who were authorized to decide what was and was not state 
property. They were to hold the i7?iperium of propraetors in 
order to enforce their orders. They were to decide what to buy 
and what not. Candidates for election had to appear in person, 
and thus Pompey was excluded. Indeed there is little doubt 
that the whole scheme was designed by Caesar to set up an 
authority in opposition to Pompey. If it had become law, Caesar 
would have been master of the commission, and would have used 
it for his own ends. In opposing it Cicero delivered four 
speeches. His line was to shew that the professed object of the 
bill was not the real one, and to expose the infinite openings for 
favouritism and jobbery created by it. This would be heard 
without surprise. Moreover the city mob did not want to leave 
the pleasures and perquisites of city life for hard work on lonely 
farms. And they would not have access to the great fund that it 
was proposed to raise. So the project evoked no popular enthu- 
siasm, and Cicero with great skill reminded them of all they 
stood to lose by accepting the offered boon, if it ever came to a 
real offer. So the bill had to be withdrawn. Cicero had scored 
a point. Caesar was for the time foiled, but there was no lack of 
questions that might be raised to embarrass the party in power. 
Attacks followed thick and fast, and the consul was compelled to 
meet them. But, if worried without mercy, he was at heart not 
sorry for the chance of proving that his oratorical gifts were equal 
to the task. 

492. When the rabble (probably prompted) raised a clamour 
against the reservation of seats in the theatre for the Knights, 
Cicero talked them into good humour. Then the right of the 
Senate to proclaim martial law in emergencies by issuing its ' last 
decree' was called in question under the form of a trial. An 
aged senator, C. Rabirius, was said to have been the actual 
slayer of Saturninus in the affray of the year 100. He was now 
impeached under an obsolete procedure on a charge of high 
treason {perduellio). The Assembly by Centuries had to deal 
with the case on appeal, and the consul addressed a meeting in 
his defence, or rather in defence of the Senate. The formal vote 
of the Centuries was never taken, for the Assembly was broken 



382 Caesar chief pontiff [ch. 

up by a trick as obsolete as the procedure. If further proceedings 
were threatened, nothing came of it. The matter was allowed to 
drop, and the Senate retained their challenged power. So too 
the proposal to rehabilitate the children of Sulla's victims was 
defeated by Cicero on the plea that at the present juncture more 
harm than good would result. It was not a question of much 
interest to the pauper mob. But they grudged the perquisites 
monopolized by the rich, and from this point of view a reform 
attempted by the consul was popular. Senators who wanted to 
travel on their own private business contrived, by favour of the 
House, to do so at the public cost. A man made a titular 
legatus without duties was said to have a legatio libera, and such 
' free deputations ' were a vexatious addition to the burdens of 
Rome's provincial subjects. Cicero tried to abolish the practice 
by law, but all he could carry was a limitation to a duration of 
one year. And this was ineffectual. 

493. The real strength of Caesar as a popular favourite 
appeared in the contest for the place of chief pontiff, vacant by 
the death of Metellus Pius. This post, tenable for life, made the 
holder the head of the state religion, chairman of the pontifical 
college, trustee of sacred property, judge of religious questions 
and scruples, and gave him in these capacities a great political 
power. Pompey was absent. Caesar first procured the abolition 
of the system of selection by the college itself (which Sulla had 
restored), reverting to the election by 17 of the 35 Tribes. He 
then stood against two older men of high rank, and bribed 
heavily. He refused an offer of a large sum if he would retire. 
He won, and the charge of Roman religious affairs passed under 
the presidency of a freethinker. Thus the earlier part of the year 
was a time of much conflict and disturbance. The aristocrats 
had managed to hold their ground fairly well; thanks to the 
efforts of Cicero. And now the elections for 62 were coming on. 
There were four candidates for the consulships. D. lunius 
Silanus and L. Licinius Murena were men of ordinary type, and 
were on the side of the government, as was also Servius Sulpicius 
Rufus, the first jurist of the day. The fourth was Catiline, 
probably supported by Crassus and Caesar, though less warmly 
than before. He was drifting away from party-politics, and his 
most earnest backers were the debauched and embarrassed men 
and women who saw their only hope in a general attack on 



xxxv] The conspiracy of Catiline 383 

property and cancelling of debts. He might, if consul, be a 
thorn in the side of the rich. But men of property were now on 
their guard, and his chances of success doubtful at the best. Nor 
would Caesar and Crassus have allowed him to carry out a policy 
of repudiation. Still he persisted in his candidature. 

494. There were plenty of discontented men in Italy, par- 
ticularly in northern Etruria. A number of impoverished fellows, 
ready for mischief, were gathered at Faesulae under one C. Man- 
lius, an old Sullan, who was in league with Catiline, and was to 
bring up a large gang for the election. Others were busy bribing 
voters. Only Sulpicius refrained. He complained to the Senate, 
and the House not only voted certain practices illegal under the 
existing law, but instructed the consuls to prepare a new one. 
With the help of suspension of religious hindrances, Cicero 
hurried through a severe lex Tullia in time for the election in 
July. Meanwhile Catiline was becoming desperate. He used 
language in the Senate that sounded as a threat of bloody revolu- 
tion. To his supporters he was said to have spoken in plainer 
terms. Cicero called for a denial of the report in the Senate, but 
Catiline replied with insult and defiance. Cicero took pre- 
cautions against open violence, and held the election. Sulpicius 
had spoilt his own chances by relying on bribery-laws instead of 
bribing. So, for fear of letting in Catiline, some voters threw 
over the lawyer and gave their second votes to Murena, who was 
elected together with Silanus. Sulpicius at once announced that 
he would prosecute Murena under the TuUian law, and Cato 
promised to support the charge. The defeat of Catiline threw 
him back upon his own ruined and desperate circle. What had 
been an infamous association at once became an anarchist con- 
spiracy. 

495. How was it that a plot for overthrowing the govern- 
ment could seem to have any prospect of success ? Manlius and 
his band went back to Faesulae, where he raised and armed more 
men. As there was no standing police-force, the only way of 
dispersing his army was by raising troops for the government. 
This the consul had not yet been authorized to do. The Senate, 
shaken by the popular movements of recent years, was timid. 
Men were afraid to commit themselves to a strong policy on the 
faith of rumours that might prove to be exaggerated. Cicero 
might enjoy playing a leading part : noble members must take 



384 Cicero and the conspiracy [ch. 

care that the New Man did not lead them into an untenable 
position. So the insolence of Catiline had been allowed to pass 
without any strong resolution of the House, and the consul could 
not yet take public action against the conspiracy. The forces 
under Manlius were not of themselves enough to overthrow the 
government, but the government had none ready. Italy would 
not of its own accord rise and put down the rebels. All turned 
on the course of events in Rome. Manlius was waiting for orders 
from the city. The city was full of gossip and suspicion, and 
reported prodigies infected the superstitious rabble with alarm. 
There was no lack of desperate ruffians prepared to pillage and 
destroy. What really saved Rome was not the inner strength of 
the government, but the inner weakness of those who plotted to 
overthrow it. Their aims were inconsistent. To raise outside 
Rome a force able to carry all before it, rural slaves must be 
enUsted wholesale. In Rome itself, a mere disorderly outbreak 
of plunder and massacre would give the spoils of the rich to the 
roughest elements of the city mob. This was not what the ruined 
spendthrifts desired. They wanted the spoils of the rich for 
their own use, to enjoy a fresh start in luxury and dissipation. A 
new slave-war was not to their taste, so Catiline forbade the 
arming of slave-gangs in Etruria. Their domestic slaves might 
be useful in the city when the hour came for rising, but infinite 
care would be needed to ensure that the plunder should fall into 
the right hands, their own. This manifestly required organiza- 
tion, and therefore time. And the same waiting that gave time 
to Catiline also gave time to Cicero. 

496. While the conspirators plotted and took oaths in secret 
meetings, the consul watched them through spies as best he 
could. And now the passions of one of the gang led to a 
betrayal. Enamoured of a mercenary Roman lady named Fulvia, 
this man divulged his secret. She reported it to the consul, who 
engaged her as a paid spy. Henceforth he. got regular news of 
their plans and doings, and certain knowledge of the names of 
the leading men. They were a motley company, ranging from 
senators to freedmen. A few Knights were of the number, and 
some came from municipal towns. All were men who had failed, 
all wanted money. No strong leader for the rising in the city 
(for Catiline would command their field-army) had been found. 
The disreputable P. Cornelius Lentulus was a lethargic figure- 



xxxv] Catiline outgeneralled 385 

head. C. Cornelius Cethegus was hasty and unwise. We should 
bear in mind that the two parts of the enterprise needed to be 
carried out in exact combination, and that from Rome to Faesulae 
was about 200 miles journey. A day late in October was fixed 
for the rising, and Cicero knew it. But in order to deal with it 
he needed the authority given by the ' last decree ' of the Senate, 
and the Senate still hung back. One day he produced in the 
House a packet of sealed letters, addressed to various senators, 
mysteriously delivered to Crassus the night before. When opened, 
all were found to contain warnings of the massacre designed by 
Catiline, and a member told the House some news that had 
reached him of the doings at Faesulae. Whether the whole 
affair had been got up by the consul to alarm first Crassus and 
then the Senate, we cannot tell. At all events it had that effect. 
It was the 21st October, and Cicero assured members that the 
day fixed for the outbreak was close at hand. The decree was 
passed. The consul at once took steps for the public safety. 
The date named went by, and no rising occurred. Men began 
to fancy that Cicero's nervousness had made much out of little. 
But at the very end of October news came that Manlius had 
begun the revolt. It was clear that he had acted on orders which 
there had not been enough time to countermand. 

497. The project of Catiline was wrecked. The consul's 
plans had been ready before he was authorized to act, and amid 
the general alarm of all who had anything to lose he acted boldly. 
Troops were raised, important positions were guarded, and a 
force levied in Picenum to protect the North. Rome was patrolled 
by soldiers. Catiline, anxious to join Manlius, and wanting to 
leave Rome in confusion, now formed detailed plans for a simul- 
taneous conflagration in several parts of the city, with a massacre 
of the wealthy. But he dared not start till the consul had been 
got rid of. So it was agreed at a secret meeting that Cicero was 
to be murdered next morning, and the ground thus cleared for 
the city-conspirators. This plan failed, Cicero having timely 
warning. Next day (8th November) the consul gave the Senate 
a full account of the designs of Catiline, who even now appeared 
in the House. Cicero told him to go and join his rebel army. 
It was to no purpose that he posed as a Patrician of the once 
illustrious Sergian house, and sneered at the New Man who 
posed as the saviour of Rome. The members would have no 
H. 25 



386 The Allobrogian envoys [ch. 

more of him, and that night he left for Faesulae. On the 9th 
Cicero addressed a pubUc meeting. It was necessary to calm 
popular excitement, in particular to let dangerous characters know 
that disorder and robbery would be promptly suppressed. But 
he was far from easy in his own mind. The other chief con- 
spirators were still in Rome. He knew that he must do nothing 
to compromise the senatorial aristocrats on whose behalf he was 
holding the post of danger. So he continued to walk warily. 

498, While the actual conflict was still delayed, Murena's 
trial in the bribery-court came on. Cicero with Hortensius and 
Crassus conducted the defence. They had a weak case. It was 
not the innocence of the accused, nor the consul's witty speech, 
in which he made fun of lawyers (Sulpicius) and Stoic precisians 
(Cato), that gained an acquittal. The jury, men of property, felt 
that this was hardly the moment for vindicating purity of election 
regardless of consequences. Cicero pointed out the danger of 
having only one consul in office at the beginning of the new year, 
and this consideration was enough. So the government party 
kept their two official heads for the year 62. Meanwhile the 
precautions taken in Rome and elsewhere served their purpose. 
The only serious rising was that in Etruria. Attempts were made 
to damage Cicero by representing Catiline as an injured innocent, 
but they failed. Towards the end of November the conspirators 
began to get tired of waiting for Catiline, who could not come. 
An army under the consul Antonius lay between him and Rome, 
and other forces menaced him from other sides. At last Cethegus 
moved Lentulus, and the outbreak in the city was fixed for the 
19th December, the day of the festival Saturnalia. This long 
delay was a blunder. Still the consul, though eager to arrest the 
leaders, dared not do so. Nothing short of the most damning 
evidence would make it safe for him to lay hands on Roman 
nobles. Accident solved the difficulty. The AUobroges, a tribe 
in Transalpine Gaul, worried by Roman usurers, sent a deputation 
to seek relief from the Senate. These envoys, approached on 
behalf of the city conspirators, and invited to bear a part in the 
movement by procuring cavalry from home for Catiline's army, 
thought it more to their people's interest to do a service to the 
Roman government. Cicero heard their story, and told them to 
approve the plot and to promise help, but to insist on having 
documentary proofs written and sealed by the chief conspirators. 



xxxv] Arrest of the city conspirators 387 

These they procured, and set out with them for Gaul by way of 
Faesulae on the night of the 2nd December, accompanied by one 
of the men in the plot. Not far from Rome the road crossed the 
Tiber by the Mulvian bridge. Here an ambush had been laid, 
and the whole party were taken. 

499. Early on the 3rd the consul had a search made. A 
store of arms and combustibles was found in the house of 
Cethegus. He laid his evidence before the Senate, the hand- 
writing and seals of the letters were verified, and the guilt of the 
men was perfectly clear. Lentulus, who was a praetor, was called 
upon to resign his office, and did. He and the rest, five in all, 
were placed in the custody of some senators, of whom Caesar 
and Crassus were two. All the proceedings were carefully re- 
ported, and copies sent out to all parts of Italy. The House 
voted their thanks to Cicero, and a public thanksgiving, as though 
for a great victory in war. To calm the multitude, and reconcile 
them to the measures of the government, he addressed a public 
meeting. He claimed to have saved the poor from having their 
dwellings burnt and being left without shelter, and this by men 
who were willing to have brought their old enemies, the Gauls, 
into Italy. He declared their present safety to be the work of 
Divine providence. But he also hinted that he, their human 
protector, might himself yet need their loyal support to defend 
him from the assaults of enemies provoked in the course of his 
patriotic duty. For the present he was popular. What awaited 
him in the sequel we shall see below. On the 4th some futile 
attempts were made to implicate Crassus and Caesar in the plot, 
and a plan for rescuing the prisoners was foiled. But the main 
interest was in the meeting of the Senate on the 5th, when the 
House decided what was to be done with the guilty five. The 
Senate was not a court of justice. If the men were to suffer 
death or banishment, it would be by the act of the consul. In 
the field he could have sent them to execution, for the full 
imperium {militiae) included this power. Could the ' last decree ' 
of the Senate be held to legalize the infliction of the extreme 
penalty by one who only had the imperium (domt) in its lesser 
degree? That was the practical question for the consul, now 
near the end of his year of office, to consider. 

500. Of the famous debate we can only note the main point 
raised in the speeches of Caesar, praetor-elect, and Cato, tribune- 

25 — 2 



388 End of Catiline [ch. 



XXXV 



elect. Caesar deprecated the proposal to put the men to death 
as un-Roman, unwise, and sure to cause a reaction in public 
feeling. Thus he played on the fears of the timid and self- 
regarding majority. But his alternative proposal was no more 
within the Senate's powers than the death-penalty, and it was in 
truth only a complicated and ingenious sham. That he dared to 
make it shews his coo) audacity. After some feeble speeches 
from wavering members, Cicero asked for a prompt decision, and 
(as he could hardly help doing) promised to carry it out, be it 
what it might. The men were public enemies, for the Senate 
had said so, and not citizens, entitled to the protection of the 
laws hinted at by Caesar. It was Cato who nerved the members 
to vote boldly, in logical consistency with their 'last decree.' 
The execution of the guilty as criminals taken in the act would 
ruin the enterprise of Catiline. He carried his point. Cicero, 
Avith the moral support of the Senate, put the five to death in the 
dungeon under the Capitoline hill. 

501. Cicero was now at the height to which he had long and 
eagerly aspired. He had been the successful champion of the 
nobles and men of property in general. Caesar was under a 
cloud. His life was threatened. Till the first of January, when 
he would enter on his praetorship, the chief pontiff avoided the 
sittings of the Senate. Meanwhile a few small outbreaks in Italy 
were easily suppressed, and the government forces were closing in 
on Catiline. The news from Rome thinned his ranks. M. Petreius, 
deputed by the unwilling Antonius, was in command of the army 
that met the desperate remnant, about 3000 men only, near 
Pistoria on the 5th of January. The battle was fierce and bloody. 
Catiline, and all the free Romans with him, died fighting. So 
ended one who may have been not so great a villain as our 
tradition represents him. There were persons to whom his fall 
was a matter of regret. 



CHAPTER XXXVI 



THE YEARS OF UNCERTAINTY 62—60 B.C. 

502. Early in 62 Antonius went off to misgovern the Mace- 
donian province, leaving Cicero, now a private citizen, in Rome. 
The events of the year 63 had shewn that the civil government 
could still assert itself without depending on the master of an army. 
But it had only done so with infinite difificulty, though helped by 
several instances of good luck, and though the master of the one 
great army was far away. No real revival of the Republic had 
taken place, as the circumstances of Pompey's return soon proved. 
His six years in the East had accustomed him to an imperial posi- 
tion, and left him out of touch with Roman politics. His inclination 
to stand aloof in conscious preeminence was stronger than ever, 
and he now required from other men a deference which few, and 
least of all the Roman aristocrats, were wiUing to shew. But his 
preeminence was a fact. His error was in supposing that in Rome 
he could stand on it, and control affairs, without the support of a 
party. Neither optimates nor populares really wanted him. Both 
were willing to turn him to account for party ends. The ruler of 
the East, the patron of kings, was in Rome a sort of half-made 
Emperor. He could not be ignored. Who would capture the 
great man's favour? Would the republican constitution absorb 
him as one of the senatorial aristocrats ? Or would he once more 
strain and weaken the constitution by an alliance with the popular 
leaders ? In any case, would he be a real leader and guide, with 
a policy of his own, or would he fall under the influence of another? 
These were the important questions, awaiting their answers from 
events, when Pompey returned to Rome. 



390 The competition for Pompey [ch. 

503. On his homeward journey in 63 he had heard of the 
conspiracy and hoped to be recalled in haste to deal with the 
crisis. He sent Q. Metellus Nepos to Rome in time to be elected 
tribune for 62. Nepos was elected, but when he entered office 
(10 Dec. 63) it was too late to send for Pompey. He knew that 
the great man would be mortified to find that people at home had 
contrived to do without him, so he set about making trouble for 
Cicero. As tribune-elect he had questioned the legality of some 
of the consul's acts. And now, at the end of the year, when 
Cicero wanted to make a speech on laying down office, he refused 
as tribune to let him do more than take the customary oath. The 
year 62 in short opened badly for the 'Father of his country' as 
Cato called him. Relatives of the men put to death and of those 
afterwards tried and banished were hostile. Nepos continued to 
denounce him, and the displeasure of Pompey could be traced 
in the behaviour of his agent. Now Cicero above all men had 
been loyal to the absent Pompey. He at least was only too ready 
to play a second part to his hero, to be a Laelius to this new Scipio. 
He said so in a letter describing his own exploits, and looked for 
congratulations, which never came. His offence was that he had 
done what Pompey would have been willing to do. Meanwhile 
Caesar had found a cheap and ready means of winning the great 
man's favour. The Capitoline temple had been dedicated by 
Catulus, but was not complete. Caesar proposed that Pompey 
should be appointed to complete it. This was a sly blow at 
Catulus, a great compliment to Pompey, who never had enough 
of compliments, and a way of soothing any annoyance that 
Pompey might feel at not being chief pontiff. The proposal had 
to be dropped owing to the opposition of the nobles, but it served 
Caesar's purpose all the better, by shewing Pompey how jealous 
of him they were. So too with the proposal to recall Pompey in 
the interests of order. Nepos still urged it, and Caesar supported 
him. Much squabbling and rioting took place, Cato heading the 
opposition. Blood was shed, and the Senate had great difficulty 
in getting quiet restored. 

504. The truth is that the government was incurably weak. 
The mob resented attempts to suppress their favourite Caesar, 
and even Cato consented to a further cheapening of corn at the 
state cost, in order to quiet them. Pompey was coming, and no 
politician could tell what his own position would be, till the great 



xxxvi] Clodius 391 

man came and took his place in public life. Cases connected 
with politics were being heard in the public courts. Cicero suc- 
cessfully defended P. Cornelius Sulla and the poet Archias. The 
former was charged with public violence {vis), and the aim was to 
implicate him in the conspiracy of Catiline. The latter was ac- 
cused of improperly assuming the Roman franchise, and the attack 
was really meant to annoy the Greek poet's patron Lucullus. Both 
these pleadings left the orator more deeply committed to the party 
of the ' best men,' and dependent on maintaining the recent har- 
mony of senators and knights. His position was not an easy one. 
Pompey's return was now very near. One of the consuls elected 
for 61 was a nominee of his. At the end of 62 a grave scandal 
became the talk of Rome. The rites of the Good Goddess {Bona 
Deo), celebrated in December, were held this year in Caesar's 
house. Only females were admitted. P. Clodius, a dissolute 
young Patrician enamoured of Caesar's wife Pompeia, managed 
to enter in female dress, and was detected. The festival was 
adjourned, and the pontiffs pronounced his act a sacrilege. Caesar 
took it coolly, but divorced Pompeia. Superstition however was 
still strong among the masses, and the rites violated were a public 
function on behalf of the state. The Senate took the matter up, 
and a bill was proposed for a special court of inquiry with a select 
jury. While this was still under discussion in January 61, Pompey 
arrived in Rome. He had reached Brundisium in December, and 
had surprised everybody by dismissing his army, to reassemble 
later for his triumph. 

505. The Senate had now a great opportunity. But aristo- 
cratic jealousy was too strong to allow the House to grasp it. 
They did not welcome the great man heartily and at once approve 
his settlement of the East. And Pompey's determination not to 
make himself cheap tended to keep him and the nobles apart, 
Cicero was uneasy at finding that he would not commit himself 
to any definite approval of the recent acts of the government. 
Meanwhile the bill for the trial of Clodius was carried through 
after much opposition in a modified form. The jury was to be 
chosen by lot in the usual way. Some thought that an acquittal 
was impossible, but the jury were venal, and were bought by 
Crassus. A plea of alibi set up by Clodius had been disproved 
by Cicero ; but this did not affect the verdict, while it angered 
Clodius. A wrangle between them in the Senate only made 



392 Caesar in Spain [ch. 

Clodius more determined to have his revenge. But Cicero had 
no notion that he had injured his own prospects by this affair. 
True, he had offended Crassus and Caesar, but he fancied that 
he could trust to the protection of Pompey. Before the elections 
this year (6i) a curious bribery-law was carried at the wish of the 
Senate. It is said that a man who paid bribes was to go on paying 
the same sum yearly for the rest of his life. The aristocrats it 
seems were at last finding corruption both burdensome and in- 
effective. The growing practice of employing bands of armed 
men was making it difficult to be sure of polling bought votes. 
Moreover, there were long purses ready to be used in opposition 
to the politics of their party. It was not easy to compete with 
such a man as Crassus. Hence no doubt much of the aversion 
to bribery. A few, like Cato, would object to it on principle. 
But neither they nor fresh laws could prevent it. 

506. Caesar had meanwhile hurried off as propraetor to his 
province, the Further Spain. Crassus quieted his creditors by 
becom.ing security for his debts. In Spain he found the means 
of gaining some military experience. His civil administration 
was successful. In particular he reformed and improved the 
city of Gades, partly to oblige his useful subordinate Balbus, the 
man whom Pompey had made a Roman. Caesar had found out 
the value of this remarkable man, who became his most trusted 
agent. Before the middle of the year 60 he had done all he 
wanted to do in the West, and returned to Rome, having gained 
reputation, and with money in hand. During his absence Pompey 
had mismanaged matters sadly. He was ambitious, but he tried 
to have his way without being either politic or masterful, and this 
would not do in Rome. At the end of September he held his 
great triumph. It was a show of unprecedented splendour. 
Notable captives had been carefully collected during his eastern 
progress. The records of his victories were followed by those 
of provinces annexed and cities founded, and the crowd were 
reminded of strange peoples subdued and new revenues acquired 
for Rome. The great enemy Mithradates was dead, and on this 
occasion none of the captives exhibited were put to death. About 
this time news came from Gaul of a rebellion of the Allobroges, 
whose grievances seem to have gone unredressed. The governor 
managed to quell it, but it is to be noted as a sign of coming 
trouble in the North. 



xxxvi] Important questions in Rome 393 

507. The reassembling of soldiers for Pompey's triumph was 
of necessity a reminder of their claims. Each man had received 
a bounty on discharge, but the money was wasting, and they wanted 
a provision for life. In the republican system there was no stand- 
ing army and no scheme of pensions. Now that the old assump- 
tion, that the farmer-soldier went back to his farm on the return 
of peace, was quite obsolete, veterans needed something to live 
upon. This could only be land : most occupations of a humble 
kind were left to slaves. Therefore they looked to their com- 
mander for allotments. That they were not as a rule likely to 
make good farmers, did not matter. Pompey did not want to turn 
out present holders, and plant colonies of his adherents, as Sulla 
had done. But he did want to provide for his veterans, and there 
was no time to be lost. There was money coming in from the 
new tributes, and he had paid into the treasury large capital sums. 
So he was anxious to get a purchase- scheme to work without delay. 
Then there was the general question of his eastern settlement. 
He claimed that the Senate should approve his acts as a whole. 
But he had now no embodied army, and the jealous nobles were 
not afraid to thwart him. He had made enemies of some, such 
as Lucullus and Metellus^; others were not sorry to humble him; 
Cato was opposed on principle to predominant men. So a majority 
were for discussing the eastern settlement point by point, and the 
matter of allotments was provokingly delayed. 

508. There were just now two awkward questions before the 
House. Both threatened to cause a split between senators and 
knights, and so to overthrow the aristocratic government. One 
was a proposal to make all jurors liable to the penalties for 
judicial corruption. Hitherto the letter of Sulla's Cornelian law 
had been held to apply to senators only. The other was a de- 
mand from the capitalists who had bought the revenues of the 
province Asia. They said they had paid too much, and wanted 
the bargain cancelled. Crassus egged them on. Cicero, fearing 
the result of a quarrel between the two wealthy Orders, opposed 
the first and supported the second, but in vain. Cato was against 
an opportunist policy. Pompey did not seize the chance of putting 
pressure on the Senate for his own purposes. So these matters 
dragged on into the next year, while friction and ill feeling deve- 
loped. The year 60 began badly. A land-bill for allotments was 

^ Creticus. 



394 Caesar and the great Coalition [ch. xxxvi 

proposed by a tribune, containing purchase-clauses, but also others 
upsetting arrangements made in recent times. After much wrang- 
ling, the Senate being against it, Pompey caused his satellite tribune 
to let the matter drop for the time. There was much uneasiness 
at the news from Gaul. Rome's allies the Aedui had suffered a 
disastrous defeat from other tribes, aided by Germans. The Roman 
province was raided by Helvetii. An embassy was sent, and things 
were reported quieter, but we shall see that this was not for long. 
A strange proposal for abolishing the dues levied at Italian ports 
was carried through by Metellus Nepos, probably at the instigation 
of Pompey. The sacrifice of revenue was a very questionable 
policy. The differences between Senate and knights were still 
causing irritation. Clodius was bent on gaining the tribunate, as 
a means of agitation and revenge. But he was a Patrician, and 
he found that he must become a Plebeian by adoption. This 
design, like many other things, was hindered by formal difificulties. 
But a momentous change in public affairs was near. About the 
middle of the year Caesar, propraetor and chief pontiff, returned 
from Spain. 

509. Caesar wanted two things, a triumph and the consulship. 
A personal candidature would mean entering the city and breaking 
the imperium required for the triumph. The Senate would not 
give him leave to be a candidate in absence, so he gave up the 
triumph. He was elected consul, but his colleague was his old 
fellow-aedile Bibulus, brought in by the money of the aristocrats 
as a man likely to hold his own against a restless partner. The 
precaution was futile. Official power in these days could not 
stand against military prestige and great wealth. Caesar was 
not the man to be stopped by shadows. He had come to terms 
with Pompey and Crassus, contributing to the combination his 
popularity, his energy, his wits. They helped him to the consul- 
ship. He was to help them as consul. They were both disgusted 
with the Senate. Their mutual jealousies were overcome, and 
Caesar undertook to gratify their wishes and ambitions. It was 
however Caesar who (as usual) had the best of the bargain. An 
irresistible private coalition was to dominate all the machinery of 
the Republic. This was the triumph of realities over forms. A 
long and bitter struggle was still to come, but its inevitable end 
was already beginning to appear. 



CHAPTER XXXVII 

CAESAR'S FIRST CONSULSHIP AND THE REMOVAL OF 
CICERO AND CATO 59—58 B.C. 

510. When Caesar entered on office in January 59, a time of 
strong government began. The real holders of power, the three 
partners, could control all state authorities. They were an un- 
official coalition, not recognized by the constitution, and so not 
bound by its legal or traditional restraints. Of the two consuls, 
one belonged to the coalition, and was therefore able to reduce 
his stubborn colleague to impotence. A later generation loosely 
applied to the Three the name Triumvirs, properly used of three 
official commissioners, which they were not. The weak points of 
the coalition, such as the inevitable divergence of interests, and 
the insuperable difficulty of filling up a death-vacancy by coopta- 
tion, will appear in the course of the narrative. The point to be 
noted here is that to contemporaries it was not Caesar but Pompey 
who seemed the chief partner. The more people came to un- 
derstand that the partnership was the great fact underlying the 
movement of public affairs, the less important Caesar's official 
position would seem to be. Caesar as consul punctually carried 
out his compacts with Pompey and Crassus. Therefore they 
shared the resentment of those who disliked the common policy 
of the coalition. Caesar's year of office would come to an end, 
and some men evidently imagined that an effective reaction might 
follow. Even Cicero hardly grasped the truth that Caesar, when 
he went out of office, would, under the changed conditions, not 
go out of power. We shall see that it was Caesar who, with his 
clearness of mind and firmness of purpose, gave effectiveness to 
the so-called Triumvirate : also that while consul he laid the 



396 Caesar as consul [ch. 

foundations of the military strength which enabled him a few 
years later to become master of the Roman world, 

511. Caesar began work at once. By some means he pro- 
vided for the daily publication of proceedings (acta) of the Senate 
and Assembly. Hitherto the reporting of acta senatus had been 
very irregular and incomplete. Only the official copies of orders 
actually passed were kept in the treasury. Other matters were 
recorded in the note-books of presiding magistrates, which were 
their private property. The House was in fact henceforth to be 
more under observation. But Caesar, though resolved not to 
sufifer obstruction, would not unnecessarily provoke his senatorial 
adversaries. He made overtures to Bibulus, of course in vain. 
Bibulus and the aristocrats knew that no cooperation with Caesar 
was possible for them. The consul's first measure was a land-law, 
chiefly a scheme for using the great sums of money accruing from 
Pompey's conquests to purchase land for allotments. He laid 
this moderate proposal before the House in the most conciliatory 
manner. He was met with wilful obstruction, in which Cato bore 
a leading part. At last he told the Senate that he would be driven 
to proceed without them. He now began to lay bills before the 
Assembly direct. The aristocrats had thus lost the chance of 
pressing amendments in debate. They tried to prevent the bills 
from passing. But they were weak for want of able leaders. 
Catulus was lately dead, Metellus Celer died early in this year, 
Lucullus hated political brawls, and was getting old, Cicero was 
helpless now that senators and knights had fallen out. Cato and 
Bibulus were not prepared to go to unconstitutional lengths : sup- 
ported by timid and lazy nobles, they were no match for Caesar. 

512. It was in the course of the public discussion of the 
land-bill that the truth in reference to present politics came out. 
Bibulus would concede nothing. Caesar appealed to Pompey and 
Crassus, both private citizens, and both approved the bill. Thus 
he openly set the support of powerful men against that of a magis- 
trate. There was still the risk of armed violence being used to 
defeat it. He turned to Pompey, and asked whether his support 
could in that case be relied on. Pompey replied that he would 
meet force with force. There was no withstanding such a threat 
from the chief to whom his veterans were looking for a lead. 
The bill became law without any more serious disorder than the 
disregard of a tribune's veto, and a few broken heads. What was 



xxxvii] and the coalition policy 397 

new and revolutionary was the method by which Caesar had 
checkmated the senatorial aristocrats. As they had used force 
under cover of their ' last decree ' to thwart political opponents, 
so he used the menace of military power to overawe those who 
would obstruct his measures with gangs of rioters. The consul 
defied his colleague and the Senate. The odium of the menace 
employed fell on Pompey, not on the consul. A clause in the 
law required all senators to swear to maintain it, and after much 
protesting all (even Cato) did so. Of its working we know nothing. 
We shall have to refer to it below. 

513. Some time early in the year Caesar carried a law for 
confirming Pompey's eastern settlement as a whole. Rough means 
had to be used to overcome the opposition of Lucullus ; but 
Lucullus, thoroughly browbeaten, retired into private life and 
gave no more trouble. Pompey was also interested in the 
Egyptian question. The spurious Ptolemy, known as the Piper 
(Auletes), was hated by his subjects, and wanted to strengthen 
himself by procuring from Rome his recognition as king. His 
application was favoured by Pompey. While the usual negotia- 
tions with greedy senators dragged on, Caesar took the matter in 
hand, and carried a law declaring him king, and an ally and friend 
of the Roman people. Of course the Piper had to pay a large 
sum for the favour, and so to borrow from Roman financiers. 
But the Senate had been overridden by the consul, and the 
senators did not get the money. Now came the turn of Crassus. 
Another of Caesar's laws relieved the farmers of the Asiatic re- 
venues of a third of the price according to their contract. This 
scandalous job detached the capitalist class from the aristocrats, 
and strengthened the Triumvirs. Cato's policy had been a failure. 
In all these transactions it was the Senate that suffered. Caesar 
proved to his partners that he was a man who kept his bargains. 
And, if they gained their desires through his bold and revolutionary 
proceedings, they also bore most of the discredit. 

514. Legislation could now go on freely. Even religious 
hindrances gave way before the chief pontiff and his followers. 
A law carried by the praetor Q. Fufius Calenus required the three 
sections of each jury to vote separately. Henceforth the separate 
numbers were known, and this rule may have been some little 
check on the prevailing corruption. A law of the tribune P. Vati- 
nius extended the right of accuser and accused to challenge jurors. 



398 Cicero and the coalition [ch. 

This too was probably an improvement. These measures were 
really Caesar's. He was a genuine reformer, and the obstruction 
of Bibulus and Cato had been overcome. Before these laws 
passed, C. Antonius was brought to trial for his misdeeds as 
governor of Macedonia. Cicero, his old colleague in 63, felt 
bound to defend him ; but the man was not merely guilty. He 
was hated by all parties. He had associated with Catiline, and 
then sold himself to Cicero. His condemnation was celebrated 
as a triumph by some of Catiline's surviving friends. Now Caesar 
had his eye on Cicero, whose talents he admired. In pleading 
for Antonius, Cicero had been driven, for want of a good case, 
to refer to the unhappy state of public affairs. He was in fact an 
incorrigible opponent of the coalition. Caesar was going shortly 
to leave Rome for a considerable time, and he did not mean to 
let the orator undo his work in his absence. So he at once carried 
through the adoption which made Clodius a Plebeian, eligible for 
the tribunate. Pompey was present as augur. But Cicero took 
no heed of this warning, and continued to delude himself with 
the belief that silly little popular demonstrations of discontent 
with the doings of the three ' tyrants ' (as he called them) were 
a serious menace to their power. He gauged their strength by 
the shuffling hesitation of Pompey, who wanted to be both popular 
and powerful. He did not discover that Caesar, who cared nothing 
for the disapproval of opponents, was the managing director of the 
Triumvirate. Yet this was the most important fact of the present 
situation. This coalition was not a temporary union for the 
purposes of a passing moment, but a farsighted attempt to wrest 
the real control of the government from the selfish and in- 
competent nobles. Its policy was more than a mere pooling of 
personal ambitions, for it included a genuine tendency to promote 
practical reform. Now it was Caesar who gave it this character. 
Its permanent nature was shewn in the new marriage arrange- 
ments made about this time. The most significant of these was 
the marriage of Pompey to Caesar's daughter Julia, a happy 
union. The great partners lived in harmony till the domestic 
tie was severed by Julia's death. 

515. A province had to be found for Caesar after his consul- 
ship. Bibulus did not want to quit Rome, and the Senate feebly 
tried to thwart Caesar by naming the most trivial spheres of duty 
as the ' consular ' provinces. A law carried by Vatinius, Caesar's 



xxxvii] Caesar's province. Second land-law 399 

man, assigned him Cisalpine Gaul with Illyricum for a term of 
five years from the first of March (59 B.C.), with three legions. 
To this the Senate, moved by Pompey and Crassus, added the 
Further Gaul (Transalpine), with another legion. This was for 
one year only, but could be renewed. Here was another of 
the great commands, forewarnings of the coming Empire. In 
appearance it was small compared with that of Pompey in the 
East. But it comprised the best recruiting-ground for Roman 
armies, the rich and populous Cisalpine, a district already attached 
to Caesar. And by a second Vatinian law he received powers 
enabling him to shew some favour to his old friends the Trans- 
padanes. The whole plan was cleverly devised. Pompey had 
now given to Caesar the opportunities he sought. Caesar could 
build up a power such as Rome had not yet seen. None could 
guess that in a few years time he would have added the great un- 
conquered mass of northern Gaul to the Roman dominions, and 
be at the critical moment the only leader in possession of a devoted 
veteran army. Nor is it likely that Caesar himself at this stage 
foresaw into what gigantic undertakings his fortune was leading him. 
516. It would seem that Caesar's first land-law, perhaps only 
meant as an instalment, did not suffice to satisfy Pompey's claims 
on behalf of his soldiers. A second Julian land-law was now 
carried, with enough use of force to quell opposition. In it 
provision was made for resumption of the leased state-land in 
Campania, to be distributed in allotments. The policy of this 
measure was very doubtful, but the thing had to be done. The 
law was carried out. Under it Capua, a mere group of houses 
for about 150 years past, became a municipal town with a local 
government of its own. But as to the scope and working of the 
law there is great uncertainty. It is most probable that the 
parcels of land were allotted to a number of Pompey's old 
soldiers, married men with families being preferred. There was 
not enough to provide for them all, and that the allottees included 
some of the ordinary city rabble (as certain writers say) is most 
unlikely. It is even alleged that a great migration took place, so 
that the deserted rural districts of Italy were repopulated. This 
is not borne out by the facts of a few years later, and appears to 
be a mistake of one' who wrote in the third century a.d. At 
any rate the passing of this law marks the complete supremacy 
^ Dion Cassius. 



400 Movements in Rome [ch. 

of the Triumvirate. Bloodshed in Rome for the time ceased, 
for sufficient force was used to make riotous opposition hopeless. 
Cato was simply removed when troublesome. Bibulus shut 
himself up in his house, whence he issued all manner of 
obstructive notices and protests. His aim was to provide the 
Senate with a pretext for declaring Caesar's laws invalid : but this 
the Senate could not do while the coalition ruled Rome. 

517. Still there were signs of discontent manifested on 
public occasions, and the opposition hoped that a political 
reaction might come. The Triumvirs let it be known that 
such demonstrations must cease, and they ceased. Bibulus still 
protested in pungent edicts, for which Caesar cared nothing. 
To Pompey they were a great annoyance, for they censured the 
policy in which he was concerned, and he loved being above 
criticism. Clodius, now a candidate for the tribunate in 58, was 
blustering. Cicero was still not alive to his coming danger. 
Pompey assured him that Clodius meant no harm, and the orator 
fancied that his many friends could and would protect him. But 
he saw that the Roman Republic was a mere name, and turned 
to advocacy and literature in sorrow and disgust. Rome was now 
a very uncomfortable place for republican statesmen. In August 
occurred the obscure affair of the informer Vettius, who pretended 
to reveal a plot for murdering Pompey. The design was probably 
to alarm Pompey and keep him under the influence of Caesar. 
After it had served its purpose, the informer was got rid of The 
matter dropped, but a number of the aristocratic party had been 
made uneasy by the mention of their names. At this time Cicero 
was engaged in the defence of his friend L. Valerius Flaccus on 
a charge of extortion in the province Asia. Flaccus had helped 
Cicero in the affair of Catiline, and the real aim of the prosecution 
was to punish him for the part he took on that occasion. It was 
another of Caesar's moves. Cicero's speech was on lines exactly 
opposite to those followed in his accusation of Verres. His case 
was a bad one, but the jury could not resist his appeal, not to let 
Flaccus be made a victim of Catilinarian reaction. So Flaccus 
was acquitted, and the provincials of Asia got no redress. But 
the matter did not end here. Cicero had shewn that he was not 
to be turned from the policy adopted by him as consul. He was 
devoted to the ' harmony of the Orders,' and all that it implied. 
Caesar could not go off to Gaul, leaving the orator at work in 



xxxvii] Caesar and Clodius 401 

Rome. Cicero must be removed, and he would not accept 
offered posts and withdraw on a decent pretext. One course 
only remained. Caesar signified to Clodius that he would have 
a free hand to deal with Cicero. 

518. Some time before the elections, which Bibulus contrived 
to defer till October, perhaps in July, Caesar carried one of his 
measures of reform, the lex lulia repetundarum. Its aim was to 
improve provincial administration. In particular it restricted 
the right of governors to make war, a power often abused, and 
endeavoured to lessen the burdens laid on the provincials by the 
proceedings of accusers collectii:ig evidence. It guarded against 
the falsification of official accounts by requiring two copies to be 
kept in the province, besides the one sent to Rome. It provided 
for safe custody of documents, and for shortening the procedure 
of a trial, j A good law, no doubt, and one long kept in force. 
But, so long as corruption prevailed in Rome, no laws could 
really put an end to extortion abroad. Caesar did what he could. 
And now the offices for the next year (58) had to be filled. The 
aristocrats must not be allowed to resume power and undo the 
work of the coalition. The Three were unofficial usurpers, and 
to their rule there was no alternative but a return to anarchy. 
They had made their arrangements. L. Calpurnius Piso and 
A. Gabinius were chosen consuls, and among the tribunes was 
Clodius. Opposition was futile. When a young man proposed 
to prosecute Gabinius for bribery, he had a narrow escape from 
being murdered by ruffians acting for the Triumvirs. While 
Caesar's army was being organized, the plans for the next year 
were carefully laid. He evidently guessed that Pompey and 
Crassus would not be able to direct affairs effectively in his 
absence. Clodius was to see that Cicero and Cato were sent 
away from Rome. The consuls were to back up Clodius. 
Clodius was to see that the inferior provinces assigned to these 
consuls by the Senate were exchanged for richer ones by a vote 
of the Assembly. This was to be their reward for subservience. 
All these arrangements bear the stamp of Caesar. He certainly 
used power well, but he never forgot that, to do this, he must get 
power and keep it. And he was coolly indifferent as to the 
means. Still people regarded Pompey as the real chief, and he 
was too vain to undeceive them: indeed, under Caesar's dexterous 
management, he shared the delusion himself. 

H. 26 



402 The proceedings of Clodius [ch. 

519. Thus, when Clodius entered on office (10 Dec. 59), his 
programme was ready. He at once gave notice of four measures, 
the passing of which would make him for the time master of 
Rome. First, the mob were to be won by abolishing the small 
payment still required for the state-corn. Secondly, they were 
to be organized for political action, by reviving the sham gilds 
{collegia) suppressed by order of the Senate in the year 64. 
Thirdly, the use of religious hindrances was to be so restricted 
as to be no check on legislation. Fourthly, the expulsion of 
members from the Senate was to be permitted only after open 
challenge of a member's fitness and the joint condemnation of 
the two censors. This last was to prevent censors, appointed in 
Caesar's absence, from ejecting Caesarian senators. Early in 58, 
with Gabinius and Piso consuls, and Caesar on the watch outside 
with his army, the four bills became law. Rome was at the 
mercy of Clodius with his organized gangs, including all sorts 
of ruffians, even slaves. The next stage was the- introduction 
of three bills forming a consistent scheme. One assigned 
Macedonia to Piso, and Syria to Gabinius, as their provinces for 
57 — 56. Another was aimed at Cicero, to procure his banishment. 
A third provided a means of getting rid of Cato. Perhaps the first 
here named was to be voted on last ; at any rate the consuls 
were bound to support all three in order to benefit by the one. 

520. Cicero had been lulled into security by the assurances 
of Pompey and Caesar. He had expected an attack in the form 
of a trial before a public court, for maiestas no doubt. With a 
jury of well-to-do citizens his eloquence would probably prevail. 
But Clodius named no names. His bill outlawed any person 
who had put to death a Roman citizen without a regular trial and 
sentence. Once it became law, Clodius had only to impeach 
Cicero before the Assembly, and the orator stood no chance. 
The present Assembly was certain to do the bidding of Clodius. 
The Father of his country was in dire straits. Vainly he humbled 
himself in the hope of defeating the bill. Caesar affected to 
desire that the matter should go no further, but he repeated his 
opinion of the illegality of the execution of the conspirators, and 
Clodius knew what this meant. Crassus was hostile. Pompey, 
true to himself, shuffled, and referred Cicero to the consuls in 
office. No comfort was to be got from Gabinius or Piso, who 
had sold themselves (or rather Cicero) for a price. Private friends 
and supporters could do nothing. Only force could avail them 



xxxvii] Cicero and Cato removed 403 

now, and Caesar had managed matters so that force was on the 
other side. Therefore the general conclusion was that Cicero 
must make up his mind to go. Some useless efforts were made 
to induce the consuls to intervene against Clodius. But about 
the middle of March the crisis came. Cicero left Rome just 
before Clodius carried his three laws, and went into exile. 
Clodius quickly procured his outlawry and the confiscation of 
his property. He was not to remain within 400 miles of Italy : 
within that limit, to kill him was no murder. He fled eastwards 
by way of Dyrrachium. At Thessalonica he was still within the 
zone of danger, but Cn. Plancius, quaestor to the governor of 
Macedonia, protected him, so that he was not compelled to move 
on. There the great orator, to whom the life of Rome was every- 
thing, passed weary months in a state of collapse and despair. 

521. The removal of Cato was not less adroitly managed. 
A law was carried by Clodius to annex the island of Cyprus. 
He then urged the appointment of a thoroughly trustworthy 
commissioner with full powers, to see that the Roman state was 
not defrauded of any part of its new property. Cato was the 
very man, and Cato was forced to go, though sorely against his 
will. He could not on his own principles definitely refuse to 
obey the order of the Assembly, even though controlled by 
Clodius. For fear he should do the work speedily and return 
too soon, he was also charged with the duty of settling some 
matters in dispute at Byzantium. Cyprus was taken over without 
a war. The reigning Ptolemy, a brother of the Piper, poisoned 
himself. Cato left his nephew M. Brutus to take possession of 
the royal property, while he dealt with the Byzantine questions. 
Brutus, reared in Cato's high principles, was like other noble 
Romans. He took the opportunity of being first in the field 
to invest capital in the new country. The Cypriotes, no doubt 
called upon for payments in cash, were driven to borrow from 
him at ruinous interest, and he remained some years in the East, 
wringing a fortune out of the subjects of Rome. Cato did all 
his business thoroughly and incorruptibly. Cyprus was made a 
part of the great province Cilicia, Over ^,^1, 500, 000 is said to 
have been collected for the Roman treasury. Cato did not return 
to Rome till the year 56. Meanwhile many things had happened. 
Caesar had only waited to see the three Clodian laws safely passed 
in March 58, and then set out, none too soon, for Gaul. 

26 — 2 



CHAPTER XXXVIII 



CAESAR IN GAUL 58-56 B.C. 

522. It may be well to begin this chapter by distinguishing 
the various countries to which the name Gallia was applied by 
the Romans. First, there was the Cisalpine province, the southern 
or Cispadane part of which had the Roman franchise, while the 
Transpadane enjoyed only the 'Latin right.' It was often spoken 
of as the Hither or Nearer Gaul; also as the 'gown-wearing' 
Gaul {togata) ; the Romanizing of the people being shewn in 
wearing the costume of Rome. Beyond the Alps lay Trans- 
alpine or Further Gaul. Of this the southern part was the Roman 
province of Narbonese Gaul, which in the region of the Rhone 
extended right up to the lake of Geneva, but further to the West 
was a narrow strip of territory reaching inland about 100 miles 
from the sea. It enclosed the territory of Massalia, Rome's old 
and valued ally. The chief Roman city in it was Narbo. In 
that and other cities many Romans were settled, and Roman 
habits were spreading : but the old native garb, the trews {bracae), 
still prevailed, so that Gallia bracata was a name often given to 
the Narbonese province. North and West of this lay the great 
mass of independent Gaul, often called by the general name of 
Gallia comata, from the native fashion of wearing the hair long. 
The free Gauls were grouped in a great number of tribal units of 
very various degrees of strength. The weaker tribes followed the 
lead of the stronger. In every part of the country there was 
some tribe either accepted as leader or engaged in winning a 
dominant position by overcoming a rival. There was thus a 
certain loose confederation in many parts, but no sort of general 



CH. xxxviii] The Gauls 405 

union. The people were not all of one stock. A short dark 
race, probably akin to the Iberians or Ligurians, were still spread 
over a wide area, but were dominant only in the South-West, 
under the general name of Aquitani, between the Garonne and 
the Pyrenees. The ruling race of central Gaul, the Galli proper, 
were known as Celtae, and belonged to the stock now called 
Celtic. In the far North were a number of tribes, known by the 
general name of Belgae, probably in the main Celtic, but said to 
be partly German. The name KeArot or Celtae was sometimes 
used of Germans as well as of Gauls. Caesar distinguished the 
two, but both races are described as fair and tall. 

523. Some tribes were much more civilized than others. 
Roman traders were now doing business beyond their own 
frontier, and the influence of Massalia had been felt for centuries. 
Barges plied on the rivers. The Belgic tribes were in general 
ruder and more warlike than those more to the South. Most of 
the Gaulish tribes were now ruled by an aristocratic caste of 
nobles or ' knights,' and presided over by a yearly magistrate ; 
but a few seem to have been still under chiefs or 'kings.' Wealth 
was generally in few hands, and the rich kept bands of retainers, 
and competed for power. As in x\sia Minor, and as formerly in 
Italy, the typical Gaul was lively impatient fickle boastful and 
fond of display. The golden collar of the Gaulish noble was 
one of the forms in which the precious metal was hoarded. 
A mysterious religion pervaded the country, strengthening the 
resistance to foreign invaders, but apparently unable to create a 
national spirit and promote union. The priestly class, the Druids, 
had considerable power. The rites included human sacrifices, 
the dogmas the belief in the immortality and transmigration of 
souls. As the Gaulish tribes lacked political cohesion, and were 
loth to make sacrifices in a common cause, so their military 
efficiency was greatly impaired by the lack of discipline and 
willingness to obey. The bravery of Gauls was undoubted, and 
Gaulish mercenaries had served for centuries in many lands. 
Hundreds of thousands had perished in the service of Carthage 
alone. But in their own country, under their own institutions, 
though able to place great forces in the field, they could not 
produce an army. Previous victories over the Roman legions 
in the South had been due to the mismanagement of Roman 
generals. 



4o6 Roman or German ? [ch. 

524. For some years past affairs in Gaul had been tending 
to a crisis. Rome had annexed a part of the South, but was 
more concerned to enjoy this possession than to extend it. 
Having secured the land-route to Spain, and destroyed the 
Cimbro-Teuton invaders, she was not desirous of further wars, 
and pursued a pacific policy. As usual, diplomacy looked beyond 
the frontier. We have seen^ her allied with the Aedui, whose 
misfortunes caused great anxiety, and revived Roman interest in 
Gaulish questions. It was not likely that a policy of sitting still 
and sending occasional embassies would long suffice to keep the 
Roman province unmolested. Pressure from another quarter had 
changed the situation in Gaul. As the Romans had come north- 
wards along the Rhone, so Germans were coming southwards 
along the Rhine. Thousands of them were already settled to 
the West of that river, and many more were ready to follow. In 
the recent troubles, those Gauls who called in the aid of Germans 
had utterly defeated those who vainly relied on that of Rome. 
Roman prestige was consequently low. In all Gaulish tribes 
there was a 'national' party, to whom the presence of either 
Roman or German was alike unwelcome. This section was now 
strong even among the Aedui, where a pro-Roman party had till 
lately monopolized power. The Gauls seem to have been quite 
unaware of their own comparative weakness. No one could then 
guess that a mighty struggle was close at hand, in which the real 
issue would be, not Gaulish freedom, but whether Roman or 
German should be master in Gaul for about 400 years. 

525. At this moment there was a further complication. The 
Helvetian Celts, pressed by the Germans behind them, were 
about to migrate in a body, to seek new homes in the West. 
Whether they had in view some particular district, and how far 
it is true that they had great schemes of conquest in Gaul, are 
matters of doubt. At all events the death of Orgetorix, the first 
leader of the movement, who was said to have conspired with 
two chief men in the tribes of the Aedui and Sequani, did not 
stop their migration. The project was known in Rome early in 
the year 60. In 59 Caesar, as consul and prospective governor 
of Roman Gaul, had to deal with the question. He was busy 
in Rome, so he wisely did what he could to avoid having a 
collision with the Germans and with the Helvetii at the same 

1 See § 508. 



xxxviii] The Helvetii. Caesar's work 407 

time. Ariovist the king of the intruding Germans was recognized 
as a Friend of the Roman people, and the compHment served to 
defer the inevitable conflict for a while. In March 58 news came 
that the Helvetii were on the move. There was no time to be 
lost, for to allow all Gaul to be disturbed by the migration of a 
whole people would surely lead to serious consequences. At the 
very least it would create an impression of Roman impotence, for 
the wanderers meant to enter Gaul by way of Roman territory. 
And this was certain to strengthen the anti-Roman partisans in 
the Gaulish tribes. Here was a danger menacing the province. 
Caesar therefore only waited till he had set Clodius to work, and 
set out post-haste for Gaul. He had only one legion at the front 
as yet, but he reached Genava in time to prevent the Helvetii 
crossing the Rhone by the bridge there, which he broke down. 
Debarred from taking the easier route on the left bank of the 
river, they now sent to ask his leave to pass that way. Caesar 
temporized while he built forts to block the fords. Then he 
refused their request, and beat off their attempts to force a 
passage. They had to travel by the bad route on the right bank 
of the river. Caesar left his lieutenant Labienus in charge, and 
hurried back to bring up his main army from the Cisalpine. 

526. We may pause here to note that Caesar was responsible 
for the administration of a province extending from the border of 
Macedonia to the Pyrenees. During the wars in Gaul he had to 
discharge many of his civil duties by deputy; but his practice 
was, at the end of each campaign, to put his legions into winter 
quarters, and return to the Cisalpine, sometimes to Illyricum 
also. There he not only held his assizes (conventus) in person, 
but kept an eye on subordinates. This care for the interests of 
the governed was most important. His popularity enabled him 
to draw from his province a constant supply of willing recruits, 
and he was never more popular there than at the very end of 
his government. Moreover his winters in the Cisalpine brought 
him nearer to Rome, and into closer touch with men and things 
at the centre. Even in the far North he kept up regular com- 
munications with the city by letters and agents, but in the 
Po-country he was able to receive visitors. At the present 
time he had three legions at Aquileia. He raised and equipped 
two more, took the whole five over the Alps, joined Labienus, 
and caught up the Helvetii before they had got far on their 



4o8 Army departments [ch. 

journey. Their vast caravan of rude waggons, conveying the 
women children and stores of a whole people 'trekking,' could 
only crawl along. Caesar could catch them as Marius caught 
the Teutons. At this point Caesar's GaUic war really begins, and 
we may well forestall matters by considering briefly the compo- 
sition and organization of the great army which was still new 
and was only brought to perfection in the campaigns of eight 
momentous years. 

527. Of the legions we need only remark that, as time went 
on, they were losing their strictly Roman character. Transpadane 
' Latins ' were taken into the ranks, and perhaps Illyrians also. 
When he raised a whole legion of Transalpine Gauls is uncertain. 
Cavalry and light troops were drawn from various parts of the 
Roman empire. In the later stages of the war considerable 
auxiliary forces were raised among the Gaulish tribes faithful 
to Rome, but it was never safe to rely much on their loyalty in 
a struggle with their countrymen. Caesar's great military dis- 
covery was the employment of mercenary Germans, who did 
him invaluable service in the last campaigns and afterwards 
in the civil war. In equipment and training the legionaries 
were far superior to their adversaries, and able to face tremendous 
odds. The artillery of the time {ballistae etc.) also gave the 
Roman an advantage against the Gaul. This department, and 
still more that of engineering, had not only a material effect but 
a moral one, even more important. Siege-works, bridges, and 
the building of large fleets of ships, were all calculated both to 
serve some immediate military end and to create an impression 
of irresistible power. Moreover, the work carried out (such as 
ship-building) in the winter camps no doubt prevented the men 
from losing efficiency in dreary idleness. The typical Caesarian 
soldier was beyond all things a 'handy man.' In days before 
maps, scouting exploring and surveying were of extreme import- 
ance, and these services were carried to a high degree of perfection. 
There was also a good staff" of interpreters. But beyond all these 
departmental merits the spirit of the army was the main thing. 
Discipline and enthusiasm went hand in hand under a leader 
who never overlooked good service in others, and whose own 
nerve never failed. Caesar had some experience of war, but it 
was the practical work of the northern wars that made him a 
great general. Whether, in training his army and himself, he 



Plate VI 




14. Gaulish gold coin, imitated from a Macedonian stater. 
obv. Head of Apollo. 
rev. Chariot. ^lAIIIIIOT. 
See § 353. 




15. Gold coin of M. Brutus, coined 43 — 2 B.C. by one of his 



lieutenants. 
obv. Head of Brutus in laurel wreath. 
rev. Trophy, between 1 ships' prows. 
See §§ 625, 635. 



BRVTVS IMP. 
CASCA LONGVS. 




16. Denarius of 41 B.C. 
obv. Head of Antony. 
rev. Head of Octavian. 

The two chiefs are each called IH vir R(ei) P(ublicae) 
C(onstituendae). 

See § 634. 



xxxviii] Caesar and the Germans 409 

was already looking forward to a time when he must either perish 
or dictate terms to the Roman world, is a question to which it 
is hardly possible to give a confident answer. 

528. The Helvetian migration had to be stopped, and 
Caesar did stop it. This much is certain. After much slaughter, 
the rest of the wanderers were sent back to their old homes. 
The details of the pursuit and the fighting are doubtful and 
obscure. The point of most interest is the relations of Caesar 
to the chiefs of parties among the Aedui. The ' nationaUsts ' were 
powerful, and their leader Dumnorix commanded a contingent 
of Aeduan cavalry who misbehaved themselves suspiciously in 
action. Even more serious was the delay in furnishing promised 
supplies of food. The Roman army had to depend on local 
supplies, and indeed commissariat difficulties were the greatest 
obstacle to campaigning in Gaul. Caesar discovered the treachery 
of his Aeduan allies, but after getting the needful corn he 
smoothed matters over for the present. The Helvetii being 
driven back, Caesar (so he says) was urged by envoys from 
a number of Gaulish tribes to turn his victorious army against 
the Germans under Ariovist. New swarms were joining them 
from beyond the Rhine : was he going to let them spread all 
over Gaul ? The truth is, Caesar needed nobody to teach him 
that the Germans must be kept out at all costs. Negotiations 
were no more than a decent preliminary to war. Neither side 
meant to accept the other's terms, so Caesar set out to settle 
matters with the sword. Ariovist held the Alsatian country; 
Caesar marched North-East along the line of the river Doubs. 
The campaign nearly came to a shameful end at Vesontio 
(Besangon), owing to a panic in the army. Stories of German 
strength and ferocity quite unnerved the young gentleman-cadets 
who according to custom were seeing a Uttle service under the 
proconsul. Their fright infected others, till even the centurions 
lost their heads, and the army was utterly demoralized. Caesar 
was not. If the army was necessary to him, so was he to the 
army, and he knew it. By sheer magnetic power and force of 
will he restored their tone, and convinced them that they must 
fight and conquer. Once in presence of the enemy, insincere 
negotiations and manoeuvres caused some delay. But in the 
ensuing battle Roman skill and steadiness prevailed over bar- 
barous valour. After great slaughter the remnant of the Germans 



4IO Belgic campaign 57 B.C. [ch. 

fled, and for the present there was peace along the Rhine. Caesar 
quartered his troops for the winter in the country of the Sequani. 
Now the Sequani were not included in the Roman province. It 
was naturally inferred that a further advance was in contemplation. 

529. While Caesar was busy in the Cisalpine during the 
winter of 58 — 57, he heard that the Belgic tribes were preparing 
for war. He raised two more legions, and sent them to the front. 
When the season opened, he followed himself, and at once set 
out to face the enemy. A number of strong tribes were in arms, 
but as usual there was not unanimity. The Remi, mistrusting 
their neighbours, came to terms with Caesar, and provided him 
with a base of operations. Indeed they remained the steady 
friends of Rome, and contributed, far more than the Aedui, 
to the Roman conquest of Gaul. The first part of the campaign 
resulted in the submission of the Suessiones Bellovaci and 
Ambiani, tribes lying to the West of the Remi. They were 
not really conquered, but Caesar had an object in .granting them 
mild terms. For the moment their pacification isolated the 
tribes to the North, Nervii and others, from the coast-tribes of 
the far West in Aremorica, now Normandy and Brittany. And 
he thereby began a policy to which he steadily adhered, and by 
which he was enabled to justify his aggressions from a Roman 
point of view. By placing an enemy in the position of surrendered 
foes (dediticii) he gained two things. If these people broke the 
peace, they were regarded as rebellious subjects. If any other 
people molested Roman subjects, Rome was bound to protect 
her own. In punishing rebels and defending the loyal the 
proconsul was on the face of it only doing his duty. His rivals 
and enemies in Rome could not attack him for acting in accord- 
ance with Roman traditions. In short, Caesar in his camp never 
lost sight of the party movements and gossip of the Senate-house 
and the Forum. 

530. The campaign in the North was .a hard one. A piece 
of carelessness on Caesar's part allowed the Nervii to take him at 
a disadvantage. The steady legions averted a great disaster, and 
beat off the enemy with immense loss. Again submission was 
accepted. With the Aduatuci (of German origin) the same 
course was followed; but they tried to surprise the Romans 
after surrendering, and Caesar sold the whole captured population 
into slavery. For slave-dealers w^ere, as usual in these days, in 



xxxviii] Caesar in the Cisalpine 411 

attendance on the Roman army. Another result of the successful 
campaign of 57 is seen in the mission of young P. Crassus (son of 
M. Crassus) to the West with a single legion. He was sent to 
require the submission of the Veneti and other Aremorican tribes. 
They thought it best for the moment to acknowledge the sovranty 
of Rome, insincerely no doubt. But this was enough for Caesar's 
purpose. He had by this time resolved to attempt the conquest 
of all Gaul. He quartered seven legions for the winter in 
camps along the river Loire. In this position they cut off the 
Aremorican tribes from those of central Gaul, and lay con- 
veniently for access to the seaboard. Meanwhile the annexation 
of practically unknown lands made a profound impression in 
Rome. The Senate decreed a public thanksgiving of the 
unprecedented length of 15 days. Caesar's agents took care 
to remind the mob of their absent favourite by the usual means. 
The proconsul himself spent a busy winter in the Cisalpine and 
Illyricum. Here he received news of a great Aremorican rising, 
headed by the Veneti. He at once sent full orders for the 
building of a fleet on the Loire and preparations for a naval 
campaign in the following summer. His own return to the 
front was delayed by urgent questions of Roman politics. In 
pausing to consider these we shall see that the war in Gaul was 
not a detached episode of conquest, but closely connected with 
the inner history of Rome. 



CHAPTER XXXIX 

AFFAIRS IN ROME 58—55 B.C. THE CONFERENCE 
OF LUCA 56 B.C. 

531. We have seen that Caesar did not set out for Gaul 
until Clodius was well started on his career, and the removal of 
Cicero and Cato assured. Caesar's departure left Clodius to act 
on his own account. Backed by a gang of ruffians, the tribune 
was for the time master of Rome, and he turned his opportunities 
to his own profit. The consuls could do nothing with him. He 
treated even the great Pompey with contempt, and at length 
drove him to shut himself up at home. Crassus did nothing, 
and probably was in secret encouraging Clodius. The truth was 
that Pompey and Crassus could do nothing without Caesar. The 
republican constitution had been superseded by the power of the 
three partners. That power had become ineffectual in Caesar's 
absence, and the result was confusion, at any moment liable to 
become sheer anarchy. Cicero's friends began to move for his 
recall, but no practical step was possible while Clodius was 
tribune. After the elections for 57 the prospect was brighter, 
for most of the new magistrates were in favour of his restoration. 
The matter was seriously taken up at the beginning of the new 
year. To ignore the proceedings of Clodius as illegal would 
have called in question his other acts, not affecting Cicero, and 
might have caused great inconvenience. Therefore the Senate, 
guided by Pompey, wisely decided that it was necessary to 
proceed by a special law for Cicero's recall. And this necessity 
involved delay, for Clodius, no longer tribune, was still at the 
head of armed bands and able to prevent any such proposal 
becoming law. Rioting and bloodshed, in the absence of Caesar's 



CH. xxxix] Recall of Cicero 413 

army, could only be met by the same use of force. So the men 
opposed to Clodius raised armed bands, chiefly slave-gladiators, 
and fought for the mastery. The most notable leader was the 
tribune T. Annius Milo, a turbulent unscrupulous fellow, well 
suited for the work in hand. 

532. The recall of Cicero was now a sort of test-question in 
politics. Pompey was in favour of it, but had been corresponding 
with Caesar, by way of overcoming his own irresolution. Caesar, 
personally attached to Cicero, only stipulated that the orator, 
when recalled, should not make himself the mouthpiece of 
opposition to the triumviral policy. Crassus at all events was 
not actively hostile, and his son Publius was a devoted admirer 
of Cicero. In the streets the costly warfare went on, but Milo 
began to get the upper hand of Clodius, and it became possible 
to get something done. In June some progress was made. 
Clodius was isolated in the Senate, and the House proceeded 
boldly. Voters were summoned from the country towns to 
support a bill in an Assembly by Centuries, and on the 
4th August the bill became law. The exile had for some time 
been waiting at Dyrrachium, and was well informed of the course 
of events. He ventured to cross the Adriatic, and landed at 
Brundisium on the 5th August. Three days later he heard the 
news of his formal restoration. He had a grand reception as he 
made his way to Rome, and in the city itself. After an absence 
of about a year and a quarter he returned in glory to the scene of 
his former triumphs, and was a Roman public man once more. 
He began life again with speeches of thanks. For the moment 
all seemed well. But he had to learn, and soon did learn, some 
unwelcome truths. He had been restored, not in defiance of the 
three partners, but with their leave. For the present the Three 
held together, and the real power was in their hands. In Rome 
Pompey was the chief figure. Cicero was no longer a public 
man free to plan and act on his own judgment, so far as he could 
induce others to follow him. He had no following of his own. 
He soon discovered that not a few were jealous of his eminence, 
and his constant harping upon his exile and recall was both 
tiresome and unwise. 

533. Meanwhile Rome was as usual hungry, and short 
harvests in 57 made the supply of corn difficult. Clodius 
imputed this to divine anger at the recall of Cicero. A practical 



414 Disorders in Rome [ch. 

remedy was sought by creating another grand commission with 
exceptional powers. Of course Pompey was appointed to this 
charge. For five years he was made supreme in the Mediter- 
ranean, and his power of organization was again equal to the 
task. Corn was procured, and Clodius now declared that the 
scarcity had been artificially produced in order to furnish an 
excuse for making Pompey commissioner. No doubt Pompey 
had welcomed the opportunity. His friends had suggested the 
grant of even wider powers, to make him supreme over all 
provincial governors, in fact an Emperor. But this could not be 
carried, for the republican aristocrats were against it. So Pompey 
was again put to the front, but it was, as Cicero found, not yet 
possible to bring him into eff"ective union with the 'best men.' 
Cicero himself was also making enemies by abusive oratory. His 
position became more and more uncomfortable, for the great nobles 
would not be led by him. He detected in them a want of 
sympathy with his claims, and set it down to their jealousy. He 
had been guaranteed restitution of his property, but the consecra- 
tion of the site of his town house by Clodius caused him much 
trouble. When the pontiffs cleared away this difficulty, the 
question of the compensation due to him for the destruction of 
this and other houses came up, and he thought that the valuers 
appointed to assess the damages treated him meanly. Nor was 
rebuilding accomplished without bloody combats with the gangs 
of Clodius. Rome was in utter disorder. There was no govern- 
ment able and willing to enforce its will. In this state of things 
the aristocrats were able to fill both consulships and most of the 
praetorships for 56 with their own men. But the power of the 
Triumvirs, though weakened, was not really overthrown. Mile 
held Clodius in check, but could not prevent his being elected 
aedile. 

534. Among the intrigues that went on in this time of 
confusion a new Egyptian question deserves notice. The Piper 
king was begging to be restored to the throne from which a 
rebellion had lately driven him. A deputation from Alexandria 
also came to plead against his restoration. Bribery went on 
freely as usual. The restoration was agreed to, in spite of 
opposition. The question then was, to whom should the business 
be entrusted. The real wish of the Senate was to leave it in the 
hands of the present consul Lentulus Spinther, who was to be 



xxxix] Egypt. The Campanlan land 415 

governor of Cilicia (with Cyprus) in the coming year (56). But 
Pompey wished to be employed. Months went by, and no final 
decision was reached. A passage in the Sibylline books was 
cited to prove that the intervention in Egypt must take place 
without an army. The matter dragged on into the spring of 56. 
Lentulus was never fully instructed to act, so he did nothing. 
Pompey did not care to go without a suitable force. This he 
could not have, thanks to the jealousy of the nobles. Crassus 
seems to have joined in thwarting his ambition. Such was the 
pitiful state of Roman politics in the absence of the only man 
who knew what he wanted, and who, if present, would assuredly 
not have allowed the government to become a mere scene of 
deadlock and impotence. In the early months of 56 things were 
worse than ever in Rome. Clodius was again rampant. He and 
his associates, probably encouraged by Crassus, were too much 
for the hesitating Pompey, who was driven by their insults and 
violence to combine with Milo, and to raise armed bands of his 
own. Anarchy could hardly go further. Cicero was helpless, and 
knew not whither to turn. He was disgusted with the aristocrats, 
though he was a loyal republican. So he was gradually drawn 
towards Pompey, whom he regarded as the first man in the state. 
True, Pompey was leagued with Crassus and Caesar. But the 
coalition seemed to be breaking up. Cicero certainly did not 
mean to support the three partners in a policy dangerous to the 
Republic. But he soon learnt that, if he were unwilling to be 
their open enemy, he must be content to obey their orders. 

535. In the joint policy of the Triumvirs no article was more 
important than the land-law by which Pompey had been enabled 
to quiet his veterans with allotments. In Campania, the district 
chiefly affected, there seems to have been some trouble. We do 
not know exactly what had gone wrong, but on the loth Dec. 57 
one of the new tribunes addressed the Senate on the need of 
some change. The matter was adjourned to the 5th April 56, 
that Pompey, who was away on corn- business, might be present. 
Cicero, who was charmed to note the justification of his own 
resistance to the allotment of the ager Campanus, took part in 
advocating a change of policy. To Pompey any proposal to 
disturb his veterans was surely unwelcome, but according to 
Cicero he made no open objection. The matter was again 
adjourned to the 15th May, and Pompey again left Rome on the 



4i6 Conference of Luca [ch, 

business of corn-supply. The 15th May came, and the debate 
on the Campanian land was not resumed. In seeking the reason 
for the abandonment of the proposal we come upon the most 
important event of the year 56, an event by which all the remaining 
history of the Roman Republic was profoundly influenced. 

536. Caesar had despatched his administrative business in 
the winter of 57 — 56, and had sent orders to the army in northern 
Gaul. But he waited for a time in the Cisalpine. It was high 
time to attend directly to Roman affairs, if he meant to guide 
them. Crassus and Pompey could not by themselves work in 
harmony. Both had ambitions, and each was jealous of the 
other. The republican nobles were gaining ground. Cato had 
either returned or was just returning. Cicero had begun to 
tamper with the Julian land-law. Some were already talking of 
recalling Caesar himself from Gaul. Caesar was by no means 
ready to deal with all these troubles single-handed, if indeed he 
at this time contemplated the possibility of his ever having to be 
the master of Rome. His two partners were at present necessary 
to him. Therefore he must at all costs revive the coalition. He 
arranged a meeting at Luca, a town in northern Etruria, on the 
border of his province. Here there were no Senate or Assemblies 
or tiresome magistrates. Under Caesar's dexterous management 
Pompey and Crassus were again united to promote their common 
interest. Their several ambitions were promptly gratified. Pompey 
was to have the two Spains for five years, and was to be free to 
govern by deputies, in case he preferred to remain near Rome. 
Crassus was to have Syria, and to be free to undertake a Parthian 
war, though Rome and Parthia were at peace. Both were to 
have armies. Caesar was to have his command prolonged for 
five years, that is from March 54 to March 49. All this rested 
on the assumption that the constitutional organs of the Republic 
could and would be made to work in compliance with the will of 
the Three. Here we see the hand of Caesar. He knew that 
the government as conducted by the aristocrats was a mass of 
corruption and sham, and was quite prepared to use all needful 
means of coercion for its practical improvement. All the Three 
wanted to gain their own ends : Caesar alone was masterful or 
unscrupulous enough to take the necessary steps. 

537. In order to control the machinery of government, it 
was agreed that Pompey and Crassus should be consuls in 55, 



xxxix] The coalition revived 417 

and that men willing to serve the coalition should so far as 
possible fill the other offices. Thus the bargain about the 
provinces could be made secure. It was said that the names 
of consuls for years to come were also settled at the conference, 
and that Pompey had the list in a private note-book. Stubborn 
opponents, such as L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Cato, were to 
be thwarted by all means. In particular the restless Cicero must 
be brought to book. This Pompey undertook to do. Q. Cicero 
was serving under him in the charge of the corn-supply. He 
warned Quintus that his own prospects would depend on his 
brother's behaviour, and Quintus at once passed on the warning 
to Marcus. Clodius was for the present put under some restraint, 
but the orator did not wish to be left a second time at his mercy. 
It was necessary to submit ; so no more was done in the matter 
of the Campanian land. Nor was this concession enough. Cicero 
could not bear to retire from politics. Though he had much in 
common with the aristocratic republicans, he was now disgusted 
with them. Though he knew that under the control of the 
coalition his beloved Republic was no more than a name, he was 
drawn bit by bit into the position of servant to the three partners. 
Flattering messages from Caesar smoothed the unwelcome transi- 
tion, and as time went on it was a source of gratification to hear 
of the respect paid to his letters of recommendation at head- 
quarters in Gaul. 

538. The conference of Luca had also a notable effect in 
raising the position of Caesar. Knowing men had guessed that 
it would be an important occasion, and numbers (among them 
more than 200 senators) visited the town in hope of forwarding 
their own interests. They were well received. Politicians likely 
to be useful were treated to a share of the gold of Gaul. Con- 
versation with Caesar's staff convinced many that there were 
opportunities of winning glory and profit in the northern war 
under a lucky and generous commander. Not a few young 
nobles were eager to serve a campaign or two in Gaul, and every 
such cadet was a guarantee against the active hostility of his 
relatives in Rome. But the ambition was not confined to 
stripUngs. Quintus Cicero was fired with it, and in 54 we find 
him one of Caesar's trusted lieutenants. So Caesar, while obliging 
his two partners, quietly gained ground, and people in Rome 
learnt to look with more and more interest for exciting news from 
H. 27 



41 8 The consular provinces [ch. 

Gaul. Meanwhile the first half of this year 56 was a busy time 
for Cicero as a pleader. In the earlier speeches, before the 
conference of Luca in April, he was still more or less free to 
speak his mind and to take a line of his own in referring to public 
affairs. After his warning he had to fall in with the general policy 
of those who were now virtually his masters. It was a relief, in 
defending M. Caelius on a criminal charge, to be free to abuse 
Clodia, the notorious sister of his old enemy; but he had Crassus 
for his fellow-counsel. Rome was still a good deal disturbed, 
but popular discontent grew less as time went by, and Pompey's 
organization provided a better supply of corn. 

539. We must bear in mind that the compact made at Luca 
was a private affair. Business went on in the Senate, and votes 
were passed in accordance with the wish of the Triumvirs, but it 
was not known that Pompey and Crassus meant to be consuls in 
the year 55. By the law of C Gracchus the provinces to be held 
by the consuls of 55 after their year of office had to be fixed in 
56 before the election. This matter was debated in June, and it 
was the occasion of a fine speech by Cicero. In ignorance that 
they were discussing what had already been decided at Luca, the 
House treated the matter seriously. The interesting feature of 
the debate was the attempt to provide for superseding Caesar in 
Gaul. To all proposals having this tendency Cicero offered a 
strong opposition. He had to explain his change of front, and 
he ingeniously justified his support of Caesar as the result of 
a reconciliation. But the truth was that he had made submission 
to Caesar, and in letters to friends he confessed that he was 
ashamed of himself. It seems that nothing came of the debate, 
which was from first to last an illustration of the unreality of the 
Republic under present conditions. Yet the republican aristo- 
crats were by no means ready to submit to the permanent control 
of an informal coalition. Cicero had left them, but in the spring 
of 56 Cato returned from the East, and paid into the treasury the 
vast sums of which he had taken possession on behalf of the 
state. In him the Republic recovered an undaunted champion. 
He soon fell out with Cicero, and for some time these two 
sincere patriots were unhappily at variance. The orator remained 
uneasily obedient to his new masters. Later in the year Balbus 
the Spaniard was prosecuted on a charge of illegal assumption 
of the Roman franchise. It was really an attack on the 



xxxix] Triumph of Caesar's policy 419 

Triumvirs, and Cicero had to defend him. An acquittal was 
the result. 

540. The republicans evidently hoped to give a new turn to 
public affairs by success at the elections. But the three partners 
had agreed to prevent an election being held in the current year. 
Means were found to effect their purpose, and the year 55 began 
without consuls or praetors. The consular election was held in 
January by an interrex. L. Domitius was the only rival who 
persisted in his candidature. He was driven off by armed 
violence, and Pompey and Crassus became consuls. In February 
they held the praetorian election, and with their armed gangs and 
Caesar's gold they managed to keep out Cato and bring in their 
man P. Vatinius. Caesar's bold policy had triumphed. Before 
we proceed to consider the momentous events that led up to the 
great civil war, it will be best to finish the story of Caesar's 
doings in Gaul. 



27 — 2 



CHAPTER XL 

CAESAR IN GAUL 56— 50 B.C. 

541. The campaign of the year 56 opened late, owing to the 
important business by which Caesar was detained in Italy. His 
first object now was to conquer the Aremorican tribes in the 
North-West, in particular the rebellious Veneti. To free himself 
for the main operations, he detached forces to the South and 
South- West, and to the East, while another body invaded northern 
Aremorica (Normandy and N.E. Brittany). His fleet was ready, 
commanded by Decimus Junius Brutus, but was for some time 
weather-bound in the mouth of the Loire. He began operations 
by land, but could make little progress. The enemy were sea- 
faring folk, and he could not catch them : when a headland fort 
was no longer defensible, they gave him the slip by water. At 
length the Roman fleet appeared, but it laboured under grave 
disadvantages. The local waters were strange to the Roman 
skippers, and the galleys were of the Mediterranean model, ill 
suited to face Atlantic waves. The skilful seamen of the Veneti 
knew every channel and shoal, and their stout vessels, impervious 
to the beaks of galleys, were specially built for service in rough 
waters and able to take the ground without hurt. But they were 
heavy sailing vessels, while the Roman galleys were propelled by 
oars, and thus able to manoeuvre in a dead calm. Caesar and 
his men ran a great risk by depending on the fleet for safety ; but 
the Veneti staked everything. The battle was a decisive Roman 
victory, partly won by cutting the slings that carried their yards, 
so that they could not sail, and then boarding. The wind too 
died out, and the ships, now helpless, were taken one by one. 
Fortune had favoured a rash venture. The Veneti had to submit, 
and Caesar treated them with great severity as a warning to others. 



CH. xl] Caesar's campaigns 56 and 55 B.C. 421 

542. His lieutenants were also successful. The northern 
Aremoricans were beaten and forced to surrender. The Aquita- 
nian tribes in the South- West, though helped by Spaniards who 
had served under Sertorius, fared no better. There was no firm 
union or discipline, and they easily succumbed to Roman skill. 
An expedition made by Caesar himself late in the season against 
the Morini and Menapii in the far North effected little beyond 
laying the country waste. The eastern operations under Labienus 
seem to have served their purpose, for there was no great rising 
in those parts. But there was reason for some uneasiness, for 
some German tribes were known to be restless. Caesar quartered 
his army for the winter in the region between the Seine and 
Loire, to watch the new conquests, and himself returned to the 
Cisalpine. In the year 55 news from the North brought him 
back to the front earlier than usual. Masses of Germans were 
on the move, and the terror inspired by these hardy warriors left 
no doubt that he would have to fight them. Unless he could 
prove without delay that the Roman was able to drive out the 
German, the Gauls would never acquiesce in subjection to Rome. 
And a sharp lesson was needed. The fertility of the German 
race was prodigious. They were ever wanting more room, and 
were ever ready to win new lands with the sword. The stronger 
tribes, or confederacies of tribes, were ever pushing on the weaker. 
The Suebi, mightiest of all, had lately dislodged the Usipetes and 
Tencteri ; and these tribes, driven to the North, had passed the 
Rhine, seized a large district in the Menapian country, and 
wintered there. Early in 55 they began to spread southwards, 
and were in communication with some of the Gaulish tribes of 
the North-East. 

543. Negotiation was of course vain. The Germans meant 
to stay in Gaul : Caesar could not allow them to remain. At all 
costs they must be driven out. An obscure but effective cam- 
paign followed, marked by misunderstandings, and perhaps 
treachery, on both sides. Caesar found himself in great danger, 
owing to the disloyalty or panic of his Gaulish auxiliaries. From 
his own narrative we may gather that he stooped to gain an 
advantage by treacherous dealing. He seized the German leaders 
who had come to deal with him, and fell upon their main body 
unawares. They were either cut down or driven into the river. 
So he saved his army. In Rome his victory was honoured, but 



422 Expeditions to Britain [ch. 

Cato and others made party-capital out of the affair, urging that 
his barbarity was making enemies for Rome, and ought to be 
stopped. But nothing came of this talk. Caesar resolved to 
produce a moral effect on the Germans by passing the Rhine. 
For this purpose he refused to employ boats, and displayed 
Roman power by building a trestle-bridge. The army did the 
work in ten days, and marched over dryshod. After a short stay 
the demonstration was ended by returning into Gaul and breaking 
down the bridge. A dramatic expedition occupied what was left 
of the season. Caesar ordered his fleet to meet him in the land 
of the Morini, and paid a short visit to Britain. The direct 
result of this venture was practically nothing. In battle he could 
beat the natives, but he could not catch or conquer them. After 
a very brief stay he was glad to return, having lost some of his 
ships. Further operations in northern Gaul were necessary to 
quiet some of the Belgic tribes, among whom the legions were 
quartered for the winter. In Rome the news of the British 
expedition caused no small stir. The far-off island was only 
known by name, and imaginative gossip freely suggested possi- 
bilities of gain and glory to be won in its conquest. So Caesar 
had no lack of applicants for employment. He left orders for 
new and improved transports to be built for a second voyage, 
and went off to his duties in the Cisalpine and lUyricum. 

544. That 600 ships of the new model, with all accessories, 
were turned out under most difificult conditions in the winter of 
55 — 54, may give us some notion of the handiness and industry 
of Caesar's men. But before they could set out for Britain in the 
year 54 some precautions had to be taken in Gaul. The powerful 
Treveri (in the Rhine-Mosel country) were said to be intriguing 
with Germans, and likely to rebel. The proconsul went to them 
himself with an army, and settled a tribal quarrel by placing the 
leader of the Roman party in power. He took hostages for the 
good behaviour of the nationalist leader. But he found that in 
other tribes also nationalist chiefs were active. There was much 
discontent at the restraints caused by Roman overlordship, at the 
service of Gauls in Roman armies, at Roman consumption of 
native-grown corn. He resolved to take the malcontent chiefs 
with him to Britain as hostages. But Dumnorix the Aeduan still 
plotted to arrange a general refusal of these suspected men to 
embark. He was put to death, and the armada sailed. The 



xl] Society at headquarters 423 

second expedition was made with a stronger force (5 legions) and 
several months were spent in Britain. Caesar penetrated some 
way beyond the Thames, and gained victories. A number of 
tribes made a show of submission, but there was no real conquest. 
For form's sake a yearly tribute was imposed, and a Roman 
protectorate declared. But nothing came of it. The expedition 
gave Caesar the opportunity of learning many things of interest 
concerning the country and the people, which he recorded for 
Roman readers. The material profit of this costly enterprise 
consisted in a number of captives carried off into slavery. 

545. We are speaking of the war in the North as a part of 
Roman history. It is therefore important to remember that 
Caesar was in constant communication with Rome, and that his 
career was attentively watched by Roman society. His head- 
quarters were not a mere military centre. Much of the business 
there transacted was directly connected with Roman politics. 
His correspondence required a regular mail-service. The wealth 
gained in Gaul was partly spent on judicious loans and gifts in 
Rome. A few influential men were gratified by the promotion of 
their friends to positions of trust. The case of Cicero illustrates 
this careful 'nursing.' Caesar read the orator's works, wrote him 
flattering letters, lent him money, and in 54 gave his brother 
Quintus the command of a legion. In short, beside the direction 
of his military staff and the deputies engaged in the administration 
of his provinces, Caesar had a private staff of faithful assistants 
who kept him in touch with affairs at the centre, and discharged 
his commissions with intelligence and zeal. Such were Matius, 
who kept up the social life at headquarters ; Oppius, who was his 
resident agent in Rome; above all the Spaniard Balbus, the 
trusty factotum who travelled to and fro on the most delicate 
errands, and enjoyed his master's fullest confidence. Thus the 
proconsul's camp in Gaul was being converted into a political 
centre, of hardly less practical importance than Rome itself. But 
we must note two events by which the coalition revived at Luca 
was severely shaken. Before the end of 55 Crassus had started 
for the East. Some time in the middle of 54 Julia died. Pompey 
remained in Italy, no longer watched by a jealous colleague, and 
no longer attached to Caesar by a beloved wife. No rupture 
took place openly as yet, but the gradual cooling of relations 
between Pompey and Caesar had momentous consequences. 



424 Troubles in the winter 54 — 53 B.C. [ch. 

546. After the British expedition of 54 Caesar had to prepare 
for the winter. A short harvest compelled him to quarter his 
legions in camps more widely scattered than usual. One was in 
the West, watching Aremorica : the rest were spread over the 
Belgic North. It is clear that there was cause for uneasiness at 
this time. A rebellious spirit was abroad. The Carnutes (between 
Seine and Loire) even broke out in revolt, and murdered the 
chief placed over them by Caesar. But when this rising was put 
down, and when all the legions were reported safely settled in 
their winter quarters, the proconsul still did not set out for Italy. 
His delay was soon justified. In the far North-East the Eburones, 
prompted by Indutiomar, the ' nationalist ' leader of the Treveri, 
rose and beset the nearest Roman station. The senior officer in 
command lost his nerve. The whole force were induced to leave 
their camp and march to join another legion. On the march 
they were waylaid, and only a few stragglers escaped the massacre. 
The camp of Q. Cicero in the Nervian country was next attacked, 
but a desperate defence against enormous odds foiled the be- 
siegers. At last a message reached Caesar through a Gaulish 
slave. He arrived with a relieving force just in time. Thus a 
great general rebeUion of the tribes was averted, but Caesar had 
to spend the whole winter at the front. There was unrest in 
various quarters. In particular, Indutiomar raised the Treveri in 
revolt, but was defeated and slain by Labienus. A sort of quiet 
was restored, but Caesar thought it wise to increase his forces. 
He had lost about a legion and a half He sent orders to raise 
two new ones in the Cisalpine, and borrowed a third from 
Pompey, who had more than he needed. By the end of 
the winter of 54 — 53 he seems to have had ten legions under 
arms. 

547. The work of the year 53 may be briefly described as 
the suppression of outbreaks in northern and north-central Gaul. 
As before, the connexion of the north-eastern tribes with Germans 
was a cause of trouble, and it was in this region that the most 
serious difficulties arose. A fresh rebellion of the Treveri was 
quelled by Labienus. Caesar ravaged the land of the Menapii. 
But the arch-rebel, Ambiorix chief of the Eburones, was still at 
large. In the hope of scaring the Germans, Caesar a second 
time bridged the Rhine and made a short stay beyond the river, 
but evidently to Uttle purpose. Then he turned upon the Ebu- 



xl] Changes in Rome. Vercingetorix 425 

rones and destroyed the whole tribe to the best of his power. 
These operations were not conducted without risks and losses, 
and an isolated post narrowly escaped annihilation by a body of 
German raiders. In spite of vigorous pursuit, Ambiorix again 
got away safe, but the North was so far pacified that it was no 
longer the chief seat of rebelHon. After dealing with the dis- 
affection of the Senones and Carnutes in the Seine-Loire country, 
Caesar quartered his ten legions for the winter, and set out for 
the Cisalpine. There, in the winter months of 53 — 52, he had 
no season of rest. The political situation had been changed by 
the death of Crassus. The disorderly broils long chronic in 
Rome at last in January 52 led to the murder of Clodius. To 
relieve the anarchy that followed, Pompey was entrusted with 
exceptional powers, and a levy of troops decreed by the Senate. 
The force of events had once more given to Pompey a pre- 
dominant position in Rome, and Caesar was doubtless well aware 
that to his surviving partner he must now stand in the relation of 
a rival. He did what he could to avert a rupture. And, before 
Pompey's poUcy had time to unfold itself, Caesar was forced to 
start in all haste for the North, to face a danger that threatened 
to destroy all the achievements of six laborious years. 

548. The central or ' Celtic ' Gaul had as yet hardly felt the 
pressure of Roman conquest. It contained several strong tribes, 
and they were at last thoroughly alarmed at the progress of 
Caesar. Their turn would soon come. And at this juncture a 
leader appeared in the tribe of the Arverni. We have seen^ that 
these enjoyed a sort of primacy because of their numbers and 
prowess. Without them, a large union of tribes against Rome 
was hardly possible in the central region, or at least it had little 
prospect of victory. But the Arverni were at peace with Rome, 
of whose power they had had experience long ago, and their 
leading nobles were opposed to a rising. A young noble named 
Vercingetorix, at first thwarted by the party of peace, overcame 
their opposition, and was declared king. He not only carried his 
own tribe with him in a war with Caesar, but quickly formed a 
great confederacy, embracing almost all the tribes of central Gaul, 
pledged to fight for Gaulish freedom. So far his task was easy, 
for GauUsh enthusiasm was easily roused. But to carry on war 
with an army of tribal contingents, led by touchy and self-willed 

^ § 353- 



426 Cenabum. Avaricum. Gergovia [ch. 

chiefs, was an enterprise of great difficulty. That Vercingetorix 
did gain no small measure of success proves him to have been a 
man of exceptional powers. The absence of Caesar, and rumours 
of the troubles that might detain him in Italy, suggested prompt 
action in the hope that he might be cut off from his army. So 
about the beginning of 52 the signal was given by the Carnutes, 
who rose and massacred the Romans among them. Even in the 
Aeduan tribe the anti-Roman faction daily grew stronger. Doubtful 
tribes soon joined the rebels, and there was more unanimity than 
had yet been known in Gaul. The ordinary campaigning season 
had not yet opened, and snow lay upon the hills. 

549. The daring march by which Caesar foiled the plans of 
Vercingetorix was perhaps his strategic masterpiece. With a 
body of young troops he forced his way over the Cevennes range 
into the Arvernian country. Having drawn the Arvernian chief 
southwards to its defence, he gave him the slip and hurried 
northwards with a mounted escort. After reaching the nearest 
legions, he sent orders to the rest, and in a few days had con- 
centrated his whole army in the land of the Senones. It is to be 
noted that we find him already employing a few Germans as 
cavalry. They made excellent troopers, and later in the year he 
hired more of them. It was still quite early in the year, and the 
great hindrance to campaigning was the difficulty of feeding his 
army. Vercingetorix was active in central Gaul, endeavouring to 
draw the Aedui over to the national cause, when Caesar advanced 
on Cenabum (Orleans), the scene of the recent massacre. The 
town was carried with a rush, and a full revenge taken. He next 
entered the country of the Bituriges and made for their chief 
town Avaricum (Bourges). The Gaulish leader had to meet him, 
and hoped to stay his progress by destroying all towns and 
hamlets and laying the country waste. But local pride thwarted 
this plan. It was agreed to' hold Avaricum, a fatal blunder, 
which sacrificed the true general interests of Gaul. After a 
desperate defence the place fell, and few escaped the ensuing 
butchery. A tribal dispute among the Aedui had next to be 
settled for the moment. This done, Caesar advanced along the 
river AUier towards Gergovia, the Arvernian capital. The town 
stood on a hill difficult of access. Caesar could neither blockade 
it nor carry it by storm. The population of the district were 
hostile. There was no prospect of betrayal from within : mean- 



XL] Alesia 427 

while the ferment among the Aedui might at any moment turn 
to open rebellion and cut him off from Labienus, who was 
operating with part of the army in the region of the Seine. And 
Vercingetorix knew better than to come out and face the legions 
in a pitched battle. 

550. Caesar confessed his failure. With great difficulty and 
danger (for the Aedui now openly joined the revolt) he withdrew 
his army, and managed to rejoin Labienus, who had meanwhile 
made a successful campaign. But the failure at Gergovia had 
put new heart into the Gauls, and the revolt was now more 
general and enthusiastic than ever. Some of the northern tribes 
now joined it. Numbers however were not everything. At this 
critical juncture, when unity of command was most necessary, 
Vercingetorix had some difficulty in maintaining his ascendancy, 
but for the present he did. The real tug of war now began. 
The main object of Gaulish strategy was to sever Caesar's com- 
munications with Italy. His army could then be destroyed by 
cutting off supplies. The plan was probably a good one, but it 
was not possible to carry it out effectually. The AUobroges on 
the upper Rhone, perhaps too much Romanized, refused their 
cooperation. The Gaulish cavalry, whose raids embarrassed the 
Roman army, proved no match for the Germans in battle. Caesar 
moved southwards. Vercingetorix attacked him and suffered 
defeat. After this he fell back on Alesia, a town perhaps already 
held as a military base. It was a strong position, but not, like 
Gergovia, incapable of being blockaded. Caesar saw his chance. 
He gave up the march to the South and closed in on Alesia. If 
labour and skill could do it, he resolved to invest this stronghold, 
and to end the war by one dramatic stroke. The siege of Alesia 
was a supreme effort, not only on his part, but on that of the 
Gauls, who raised a vast army to relieve it. The double lines of 
investment, some ten miles long, were a prodigious work. The 
besieged seem to have outnumbered the besiegers by about two 
to one. The relieving host was many times more numerous. Yet 
the Romans just managed to beat off the assaults on both sides : 
Vercingetorix had to surrender, and the multitude outside melted 
away. 

551. The Gaulish hero was reserved for a cruel fate. After 
six years in a Roman dungeon, he was exhibited and put to death 
at Caesar's triumph in the year 46. Caesar had now to set Gaul 



428 Temporary settlement of Gaul [ch. xl 

in order. He acted on the old Roman principle of treating 
subjects unequally, so as to naake combination difficult. Both 
Arverni and Aedui were favoured. Some local risings were sup- 
pressed in the winter of 52 — 51, and severe punishments inflicted 
in some cases. The conquest was now fairly complete. In the 
year 51 Caesar settled the relations of the Gaulish tribes to the 
sovran power of Rome. All were to pay a moderate tribute. All 
were liable to furnish military contingents. All were treated with 
consideration. But faithful allies, such as the Remi, were left 
fuller freedom than others in their internal affairs. In this pro- 
visional arrangement the sovranty of Rome was no doubt repre- 
sented by the governor of the Narbonese province, at present 
Caesar himself. His aim was to leave the new dominion quiet 
and contented. No regulations were discussed in the Roman 
Senate and applied by a commission. Events moved on too fast, 
and it was Augustus who first gave a regular provincial organiza- 
tion to the new Gaul. Ten legions were quartered for the winter 
of 51 — 50 in suitable spots, and the proconsul returned to the 
Cisalpine. Among other occupations he probably wrote out at 
this time his seven books of the Gallic War, to which his friend 
Hirtius added an eighth. This work, written to influence public 
opinion, naturally gives a favourable account of his own achieve- 
ments and motives. But, for a partisan narrative, there is reason 
to believe that it is in the main trustworthy. 

552. Caesar had good reason to feel uneasy as to future 
developments in Rome. It was already clear that the aristocratic 
republicans were bent upon ruining him when his long pro- 
consulship ended, and he became a private citizen. It was 
therefore clear that he must not at once become a private citizen. 
His enemies had now the prestige and military skill of Pompey 
at their back. Was he to be coerced ? Was it coming to a civil 
war? He went back to his legions in the summer of 50, and 
kept them trained in manoeuvres. Meanwhile he used the gold 
of Gaul with effect in Rome, and waited for the next move. 



CHAPTER XLI 

ROMAN AFFAIRS FROM THE CONFERENCE OF LUCA 
TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR. 
55—49 B.C. 

553. We have seen how Pompey and Crassus, prompted by 
Caesar, paralysed constitutional government in the latter part of 
the year 56, and became for the second time consuls in 55. Most 
of the other magistrates were their creatures. They were both 
concerned to have the bargain arranged at Luca carried out, and 
this was done without delay, by laws assigning the Spains to 
Pompey and Syria to Crassus for five years each with very 
extensive powers, and prolonging for the same term Caesar's 
government of Gaul. That Pompey did not mean to leave 
Italy, but to govern through deputies, seems not to have been 
known. He evidently thought it advantageous to remain close 
to the centre of affairs, and did not perceive that the centre of 
real power was gradually shifting to Gaul, as Caesar became 
more and more the famous conqueror, master of a devoted 
army. Nor indeed was the significance of Caesar's exploits clear 
to many : Pompey at any rate was deaf to warnings. Rome 
continued to be a scene of violence and disorder, for the 
aristocrats fought for the Republic as best they could. Gilds 
and clubs were maintained as organs of intimidation and bribery. 
Caesar was away, and it was well to be ready for opportunities 
that might occur. 

554. For the present relations between the consuls and the 
Senate were strained. An attempt to deal with two notorious 
evils, the misconduct of juries and corruption at elections, was 
probably a party move of the consuls. Pompey carried a law 



430 Pompey and Crassus, 55 B.C. [ch. 

enacting that the yearly Hst of jurors {album iudicum) should be 
made up from all the 35 Tribes, so many from each. Thus a jury 
could be chosen at need from members of a few Tribes only. 
As electoral corruption was organized by Tribes, this made it 
possible to get a verdict from men whose Tribes were not of 
the number corrupted. A law of Crassus, aimed at the clubs 
{sodalicid) formed for election-purposes, followed the same lines. 
But it was too late for any legislation to succeed in making 
elections pure or jurors honest. The government, manipulated by 
personal interests at home, was impotent abroad. The Egyptian 
question, which had lately given so much trouble, was settled 
by Gabinius without any public authority. He coolly left his 
province of Syria and restored the Piper king by force of arms. 
It was certain that he had not done this for nothing, or without 
some guarantee for his own protection on his return to Rome. 
An immense bribe, and the collusion of Pompey, were the 
explanation of his reckless conduct. To Cicero it was very 
galling not to be able to denounce his old enemy. His freedom 
of speech was checked by his relation to the Triumvirs. It was 
in this year that he wrote his great book de oratore. Literature 
was a solace in this season of deep depression. In the autumn 
Pompey opened his great stone theatre, the first permanent 
building of the kind in Rome, with great shows and a wild-beast- 
fight on a colossal scale. The latter was too revolting for even 
Roman spectators, used to the exhibition of gladiators. 

555. Crassus, still consul, set out in November for the East. 
A hostile tribune solemnly cursed him as he left the city, but he 
went. Pompey remained, a mysterious and shifty head of affairs, 
cramping others, but himself contributing no light or leading. 
Politics drifted along. The elections for 54 had included some 
republican successes. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Caesar's bitter 
enemy, was chosen consul. His colleague was Appius Claudius 
Pulcher, a brother of P. Clodius, supported by Pompey. And 
Cato was among the praetors. When the new year (54) came, 
Pompey, now proconsul, could not reside in the city, the sphere 
of his imperiiim being Spain. But he remained in Italy, and his 
legati, L. Afranius and M. Petreius, carried on his provincial 
administration. He never went out to his province at all. Thus, 
after having repeatedly broken the rules of the republican con- 
stitution, he paved the way for the coming Empire. The 



xLi] The Parthian expedition 431 

continuous government of provinces by deputy was the most 
characteristic mark of an Emperor. Pompey was far from 
wishing to bear the responsibilities of an autocratic position. 
He loved to be the First Citizen, and to appear indispensable 
in times of trouble; in fact to be imperial without being an 
emperor. But Caesar, by his expeditions to Britain, and his 
passage of the Rhine, kept his name before the Roman public, 
while Pompey's military fame was growing stale. Caesar was 
certainly inferior to Pompey in dignity, and he had held the 
republican offices in the order prescribed by law. But it was 
he, not Pompey, who was building up the military strength 
necessary for asserting himself with effect, if circumstances made 
war inevitable. 

556. It was in 54, the year of the Belgian rising in Gaul, 
that Crassus began his war with Parthia. He underrated the 
military power of the Parthians, and his army was not fitted for 
its work. The mounted bowmen of Parthia were noted for their 
skill, and the solid Roman legions could not come to close 
quarters with an enemy of such remarkable mobility. It was 
before all things needful to conciliate the half-Greek cities still 
existing as protected trade-centres under the Arsacid kings, and 
to avoid campaigning in the drought and dust of the Mesopo- 
tamian plains. Crassus did neither. He passed the Euphrates 
into northern Mesopotamia, where the ' Greek ' cities submitted, 
and some of them he treated badly. He contrived to win the 
hatred of Avgar, prince of Osrhoene. But the Parthians were 
not ready for war. As if to give them time, Crassus retired to 
winter in Antioch, and set about raising money by confiscations. 
Among the treasures seized were those of the temple of Jerusalem. 
A Parthian embassy v/as dismissed with a refusal to discuss terms. 
The blind confidence and pride of Crassus was perhaps exagge- 
rated by moralizing writers in after times, but the main facts are 
not to be doubted. 

557. To return to Rome. The events of the years 54 to 42 
are the story of the great Republic's last illness and death. They 
supplied the final proof that a change of system was inevitable. 
For Rome could neither do without a master, nor find a master 
without civil war, nor submit peaceably to the master set over her 
by conquest, nor revive the republican government after that 
master's death. The first stage (54 to 50) has its scene chiefly 



432 State of things in Rome [ch. 

in Rome, and the gradual change of relations between Pompey 
and the republican aristocrats form a sort of continuous plot. 
For the present these two forces checked each other, and the 
result was confusion and impotence worse than ever. The un- 
happiness of Cicero has left us in his letters a vivid picture of 
the state of things. He found some relief in writing his work 
de re publica, dwelling on the period of Roman history in which 
the state, under the rule of the Senate, passed through what he 
regarded as its golden age. The conditions of public life were 
at present utterly miserable. There was plenty of speaking to be 
done in the public courts, and sometimes in the Senate. But the 
Father of his country had all the while to remember who were his 
protectors, and to deliver speeches to order. Corruption and 
disorder were everywhere. The proceedings of candidates for 
the consulships of 53 were a flagrant scandal. There was even 
talk of making Pompey dictator to ensure the holding of the 
elections. But the Senate ignored the hint, and matters were 
allowed to drift. 

558. Electoral corruption had now gone so far that the 
present consuls made a formal compact with two of the candi- 
dates to promote their election in return for an act of perjury. 
They were to attest on oath falsely that certain formalities, 
necessary for the consuls' succession to their provinces, had been 
completed in their presence. But the bargain was made public, 
and a secret inquiry ordered. The only election held in 54 was 
that of tribunes, and this too was the occasion of pecuHar scandal. 
A sort of pooling of corruption took place, with Cato as umpire 
holding a sum deposited by each candidate, with power to declare 
it forfeited on proof of unfair play. The courts were busy with 
trials. Vatinius, Cicero's enemy, and Plancius, his friend, were 
both accused of corruption through clubs under the law of 
Crassus. Cicero had to plead for both alike. M. Aemilius 
Scaurus was charged with extortion in Sardinia. In his case 
there was an extraordinary union of various interests in support 
of the accused, who was a son of his namesake noted in the last 
generation, and connected with Pompey. We find Cicero and 
Clodius counsel on the same side. Scaurus was acquitted. Later 
in the year Gabinius returned from Syria, and had soon to face 
prosecutions on charges of treason {maiesias) and extortion. 
Cicero thirsted to prosecute his enemy, but Pompey held him 



xLi] Disaster of Carrhae 433 

back, and screened Gabinius. The first trial ended in an acquittal. 
On the second charge Pompey even constrained Cicero to con- 
duct the defence ; but all efforts' were vain. Gabinius was driven 
into exile. Thus it appeared that Pompey, with all his show of 
power, could not protect his associate. Henceforth Gabinius 
looked to Caesar for his restoration. Cicero was heartily ashamed 
of the part he had been forced to take in the affair. 

559. We must bear in mind that it was some time in the 
middle of 54 that Pompey's marriage-connexion with Caesar was 
severed by Julia's death. He felt her loss severely, but had not 
retired from public life, and was interested to make the general 
perplexity and deadlock in politics a means of increasing his own 
importance. The year 53 opened with only tribunes in office, 
and they were in no hurry to have the curule magistracies filled. 
There were no praetors to hold the courts. A series of interregna 
went on for months, and no consuls were elected till July. 
Rioting continued, but none of the proposals for relieving the 
situation could be carried out till the Senate and Pompey came 
to terms. At last, having let things go far enough, the great man 
came near the city, and the Senate had to vote him full powers 
to deal with the deadlock. He held the election of consuls, and 
the consuls had at once to see to the election of the other regular 
magistrates. Before they could get their own successors elected 
for 52, there came the alarming news of the great disaster in the 
East. Crassus, scorning the advice of the Armenian king, had 
taken that of the treacherous Avgar, and entered the Mesopo- 
tamian plain, where the Parthians were now ready to meet him. 
Against their cavalry the legions were helpless. Crassus with his 
son PubUus and a great part of the army perished. Many were 
taken captive and spared only to serve the Parthian king. A 
small remnant were brought off safely by the quaestor C. Cassius, 
and this able soldier was doing what he could with small means 
to provide for the defence of Syria. He did eventually beat oif 
a Parthian invasion. But there could not be any real security on 
the Euphrates frontier. Parthian and Armenian were now at 
peace, and for some time it was the internal troubles of the 
Parthian dynasty, rather than the military superiority of Rome, 
that guaranteed the integrity of Syria. 

^ It is said that the publicani were hostile to Gabinius, and that he did not 
bribe the jury enough. 

H. 28 



434 Pompey and the republicans [ch. 

560. Later generations with reason viewed the death ot 
Crassus at Carrhae as a momentous stage in the story of the 
Roman revolution. Two rivals now stood face to face. Pompey 
would not give way. Caesar, with many enemies waiting to 
destroy him, dared not. Therefore a conflict must ensue. The 
republicans, having to make a choice, naturally preferred Pompey. 
He at least set store by empty dignities, and was not likely to 
turn them out of their iniquitous but profitable privileges with 
the strong hand. So they began to draw to Pompey, and Pompey 
to them. Military prestige and the republican machinery were 
thus combined. Whether these two forces would strengthen 
each other more than they weakened each other was a question 
which only experience could answer. At the present juncture 
the elections for 52 were a pressing question, and the change 
of relations between Pompey and the aristocrats was illustrated 
in the events of the following months. For the consulship 
Milo was the candidate backed by the republican nobles. Two 
others were Pompey's men. Clodius was standing for the praetor- 
ship. Bribery and affrays of armed bands were in full swing. 
The Senate was powerless, and Pompey would do nothing, so 
the year ended before the elections could be held. It appears 
that some time late in the year an attempt was made to check 
this scandal, now becoming chronic. The Senate passed a resolu- 
tion for changing the system of succession to provinces. Consuls 
and praetors were to pass from office into private life, and not to 
receive provinces till after an interval of five years. This, it was 
said, would check the violence and bribery now employed to win, 
not the office, but the province after it. The change required a 
law to effect it, so for the present it had to wait. But we shall 
see^ that the matter came up again, and that its settlement had 
very important consequences. 

561. The year 52 opened in confusion. Even the appoint- 
ment of an interrex was prevented for a time in the interest 
of Pompey, who was wishing to extort some more exceptional 
powers. He had lately married Cornelia, daughter of Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Scipio^, and was thus connected with a great aristocratic 
family, and not with Caesar. The elections were still delayed, 
when news came of the death of Clodius. One day in January 

^563- 

^ A Scipio adopted by a Metellus. See Index under Caecilii, 



xLi] End of Clodius 435 

he and Milo met on the Appian way. Both had armed escorts, 
but Milo's was the stronger, and in the fight that followed Clodius 
was killed. Rome was quickly in an uproar. The mob burnt 
the body in the Forum ; the fire spread and did much damage, 
and violent demonstrations were made against Milo and his 
supporters. The fury died down, but the affair became a question 
of politics. Milo went on canvassing, but the Senate was forced 
to pass its ' last decree,' practically giving Pompey dictatorial 
power. He raised troops for maintaining order, as authorized. 
But he let the elections wait, and went on playing his own game. 
Meanwhile there were two conflicting versions of the late tragedy. 
Some declared that Milo had acted in self-defence, others alleged 
that it was a case of deliberate murder. To deal with the matter 
a regular government was needed. The aristocrats were resolved 
not to have the old dictatorship revived. So Cato and Bibulus 
devised a plan for avoiding this by making Pompey sole consul, 
and this was done. Thus the law and practice of the constitu- 
tion were broken in three ways. First, the consulship implied a 
colleague. Secondly, it was not lawful to be consul and proconsul 
at once. Thirdly, it was not ten years since his last consulship. 
In short, the strongest republicans were destroying the Republic 
in the effort to preserve it. This was the practical alternative to 
the restoration of efficiency and order by the strong hand of 
Caesar. 

562. For Caesar was not forgotten. It had been suggested 
that he should be consul with Pompey, an alarming prospect for 
the noble republicans. While wintering in the Cisalpine, after 
putting down the Belgic rising of 53, he himself sent to decline 
the proposal. His object was rather to provide for the future. 
His governorship ended on the first of March 49. He wanted 
to be consul in 48, and not to return to Rome until he was 
consul-elect. To do this, he must be allowed to become a 
candidate in absence. Tribunes acting for him proposed a bill 
granting him the needful dispensation. Pompey gave his consent, 
and the bill became law. But Caesar was called away to Gaul 
earlier than usual, and was for months unable to attend to Roman 
affairs, owing to the rising under Vercingetorix. Meanwhile his 
enemies were not idle, and Pompey and the aristocrats were 
steadily drawing together. It is not surprising that things took 
a turn unfavourable to Caesar's interests. The matter of Milo 

28—2 



436 Milo's trial. Pompey's laws [ch. 

was urgent, and the first batch of Pompey's new laws bore directly 
upon his case. One provided specially for the trial of the persons 
concerned in the death of Clodius. For this purpose there was 
to be a special court, chosen from jurors selected by the sole 
consul, who thus assumed praetorian functions. In the Senate 
many opposed the new legislation, for Milo was a sort of champion 
of the republicans, who were glad to be rid of Clodius. But 
Pompey persisted, and he had now enough troops under arms to 
overcome all opposition, so the laws passed. 

563. The trial of Milo is famous as a scene in the drama 
of the Roman revolution. Pompey's soldiers held the Forum, 
and repressed the violence of the mob. But he did not mean 
Milo to escape, though Cicero conducted the defence. The 
masses of armed men and the howling of the mob unnerved 
the orator, and he spoke feebly. Milo was found guilty, and 
went into exile at Massalia. So Pompey was relieved of a person 
who was in the way. His removal left the consul and the Senate 
more free to join forces against Caesar, of whom Pompey was 
more and more jealous. Meanwhile Pompey was in practice 
every bit as unrepublican as Caesar. He treated rules laid 
down in his own laws as not binding on himself. But the most 
significant part of his public acts is to be found in the legislation 
in which he proceeded to deal with the magistracies and the 
succession to provinces. He gave effect to the Senate's recent 
vote^ by enacting that a magistrate should only succeed to a 
province after an interval of five years. This rule implied, 
or expressed, some arrangement for providing governors in the 
transition-period, before the new system could work automatically. 
Probably a considerable discretion was left to the Senate. It 
was obvious that some ex-magistrates, who had not governed 
provinces, would now be forced to take their turn. Moreover, 
the old practice had been, when a governor's term ended in 
the middle of a year, to leave him at his post till the end of the 
year, when his successor was ready in the ordinary course. The 
Senate were no longer to be bound by this practice. Accordingly 
Caesar could be superseded on the first of March 49. By another 
law it was enacted that candidates for office must appear in 
person. This took no account of the exemption lately granted 
to Caesar, and so annulled it. Caesar's friends protested, and 

^ See § 560. 



xLi] Caesar's position 437 

it is said that Pompey, to pacify them, put in a clause reserving 
vested interests, thus tampering with the text of a law already 
passed. There could be no mistake as to the spirit and intention 
of these measures. Caesar was to be exposed as a private citizen 
to the attacks of his enemies. He must either return to Rome, 
to stand trial before a court probably selected to ensure his 
condemnation, perhaps watched by Pompey's troops, or go into 
voluntary exile. This was a belated and clumsy device. The 
man in Gaul was not a fool, and he quietly prepared to avoid 
the necessity of accepting either alternative. 

564. The strength of Caesar's position was probably not 
understood. In Rome his agents were employing the gold of 
Gaul in entertainments and in public buildings to adorn the 
capital, not to mention private favours. The mob were reminded 
of their absent leader, and for political purposes this had its 
value. In his province he had from the first been popular. In 
particular, the Transpadane ' Latins ' were devoted to him. He 
had (in 67) encouraged them to claim the Roman franchise. 
He treated them as citizens, enrolling them in his legions, and 
they hoped to gain their wishes when he became consul. In 
the new Gaul he was now supreme, and by judicious management 
he had secured the loyalty, and at need the help, of many leading 
chiefs and tribes. His army was the only existing force of the 
first quality. He took pains to gratify them, and at this time 
probably doubled their pay. We hear that he also found oppor- 
tunities of doing favours to client kings and important cities in 
Italy and the provinces. Such was the man whom Pompey, Cato, 
Bibulus, and the rest, were hoping to overthrow by a little 
legislative trickery. Meanwhile Pompey was still governing Spain 
through lieutenants. He procured an extension of his command 
for five more years, and obliged many in the exercise of his 
vast patronage. He had as consul a force raised in Italy. The 
maintenance of order enabled consuls to be elected in time for 
the year 51. These were, Servius Sulpicius Rufus the great jurist, 
a cautious man, chiefly concerned to avert a serious crisis ; and 
M. Claudius Marcellus, a heavy aristocrat, bitterly hostile to 
Caesar. Cato stood and was defeated. 

565. With the year 51 we reach a new stage on the road to 
civil war. Caesar had protested against the steps taken to his 
disadvantage, requesting the Senate to leave him his provinces to 



438 The succession-question [ch. 

the end of 49, and not to apply the Pompeian law retrospectively 
to his case. But the republicans wanted to ruin him, in order to 
keep themselves in power. Relying more and more on Pompey's 
secret favour, they became a party united on an anti-Caesarian 
basis. The one vital question of policy was the succession- 
question. Marcellus the consul, their official leader, raised it in 
April without immediate result. As a challenge to Caesar, he 
found a pretext for scourging a Transpadane then in Rome. The 
point of this brutality was to assert that the man was not a Roman. 
In July an attempt was made to draw from Pompey an open 
declaration on the matter of Caesar, but he only replied that all 
should obey the Senate. Neither he nor the republicans were 
eager to move : mutual trust grew but slowly. The elections for 
the year 50 were important. The consuls-elect were C. Claudius 
Marcellus, cousin of the present consul, and L. Aemilius PauUus; 
a Caesarian candidate was defeated. Both were apparently anti- 
Caesarian, but Paullus had been acting for Caesar in charge of 
public works. Among the tribunes-elect was a young man as yet 
reckoned a safe anti-Caesarian, C. Scribonius Curio ; the rest 
were all or mostly Caesar's men. Things went on quietly, in 
spite of secret uneasiness, till the very end of September, when 
the succession-question came up again in an acute form. 

566. M. Marcellus moved that on the first of March next (50) 
the then consuls should raise the question of the consular pro- 
vinces for the year 49. This the Senate passed, and agreed to 
various arrangements for securing a full House and adjournments 
of debate to attain a decision. There were other motions, of a 
more significant bearing. One was an attempt to bar the probable 
veto of Caesar's tribunes : another was meant to outbid Caesar's 
bounty, and undermine his soldiers' loyalty. The third was a 
subtle device to ensure that, in discussing provinces, the Gauls 
should be taken into account, and the Senate prevented from 
shirking the one great issue. These motions were recorded as 
informal resolutions, being vetoed by tribunes in Caesar's interest. 
We have seen what Caesar's claim was. This proposal was from 
his point of view iniquitous. He had been appointed long before 
Pompey's new law. If he was to remain to the end of 49 under 
the old system, the time to discuss the succession would be six 
months before the vacancy, that is in June, not in March. It is 
clear that his views and those of the party now dominant in 



xLi] Cicero as provincial governor 439 

Rome could not possibly be reconciled, and that the failure of 
compromise must lead to a civil war. The main body of the 
Senate were divided. The majority desired peace, but the militant 
minority were more resolute, and better able to put pressure on 
others. It was not easy for them to draw back, and they were 
encouraged by the attitude of Pompey. His utterances were 
taken to imply that he saw his way through the perils of the 
situation, and that they might stand firm without serious risk. 
This was a mistake : the blind was leading the blind. The 
general effect was that extreme partisans, Caesarian or anti- 
Caesarian, were committed to going further still : and the coming 
question was, which side would capture the waverers ? 

567. While at Rome the storm was brewing, Pompey's new 
law had sent out as provincial governors two men to whom it was 
a sheer penance to quit the centre of affairs. Syria fell to Bibulus, 
Cilicia to Cicero. Bibulus had chiefly to deal with the Parthian 
alarms that followed the disaster of Carrhae. With the help of 
C. Cassius, and by fomenting dissensions in Parthia, he prospered 
fairly well. Cicero, who had lately published his treatise de 
legibus, was drawn from literature to the administration of an 
immense province for about a year from the end of July 51. 
The duties of the post were necessarily laborious, and the mis- 
deeds of his predecessor Appius Claudius had left the province in 
a wretched state. The poor man, conscientiously striving to do 
justice and ease the burdens of Rome's subjects, was hampered 
by the urgent necessity of doing nothing to offend either Claudius 
or the capitalists powerful in Rome. For he was ever pining for 
the Senate-house and Forum, and afraid of having to face hostile 
influences on his return. Pompey and M. Brutus were among 
the investors whose loans to client kings or cities gave the pro- 
consul trouble. Do what he might, circumstances were too strong 
for him, and in the end he had to compromise with evil and leave 
some flagrant abuses unredressed. Corruption in Rome was the 
root of the sufferings of the provincials. No central power existed 
able and willing to reform the central government. We may add 
that Cicero himself was a strong supporter of that ' harmony of 
the Orders ' which stood in the way of reform. He would not 
himself oppress and plunder the subjects ; but he was the cham- 
pion, and at length the martyr, of a cause which was bound up 
with such iniquities. The one bright spot in his governorship 



440 Curio and the manoeuvres [cm. 

was the chance of winning a triumph for victory in the field. He 
had good officers on his staff, and a Uttle war with some restless 
borderers ended successfully. He was saluted imperator by his 
army, to his great delight. He sold his captives into slavery in 
the usual style. The triumph, it is true, never came. But he 
was able to start for Italy in August 50, full of self-satisfaction. 

568. During Cicero's absence things had been moving, at 
first slowly, without much public sign of the change going on 
secretly in the minds of men. It was becoming clear that on the 
one great question it would be necessary to take a side. Towards 
the end of the year 51 Caesar judiciously bought the services of 
the consul-elect Paullus and the tribune-elect Curio. The latter 
was a very able and quite unprincipled young man^ deeply in 
debt. He had posed as a true republican, and for a time 
operated by embarrassing his former associates without shewing 
his colours. He brought forward various bills which he knew the 
republicans must oppose. What seemed flightiness was calculated 
policy, to afford pretext for a quarrel. The mob, recovering from 
their suppression under the recent maintenance of order, and 
being Caesarian at heart, rallied to Curio when they saw him 
acting to the annoyance of Pompey and the aristocrats. In the 
year 50 none served the cause of Caesar better than this famous 
turncoat. Paullus as consul was able to help quietly in various 
ways. The struggle of this year was an insincere tug of war 
between parties, each move of either side being made for the 
purpose of putting the other side in the wrong. In March and 
April various dates were proposed for Caesar's retirement, but 
none of these satisfied his claim. All alike provided an interval 
in which as a private citizen he could be prosecuted by his 
enemies and ruined. Curio as tribune would allow no such 
decree to pass. Pompey fell sick, and his serious illness evoked 
public prayers in many Italian towns. Curio now openly opposed 
all motions for the recall of Caesar, and urged that both he and 
Pompey should be required to resign their provinces and armies 
for the sake of peace. This the republicans would not accept, so 
nothing was done. Pompey made an offer to resign before the 
end of his term. But this seems to have been a mere move in 
the game, made in full knowledge that the Senate would not 
allow it : at any rate he could not be induced to give it a solemn 
and binding character. 



xLi] in the succession-question 441 

569. In June it was agreed that Pompey and Caesar should 
each furnish a legion for the Parthian war foretold in a despatch 
of Bibulus. Pompey named the legion lent (in 53) to Caesar, 
and Caesar had therefore to lose two legions. Meanwhile Curio 
went on with his worrying proposals for enforcing the resignation 
of both rivals. In August the consular election was held. A 
Caesarian candidate was defeated, and two strong republicans 
were chosen consuls for 49. C. Claudius Marcellus was a cousin 
of his namesake the present consul, and brother of the consul of 
51. L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus was a bitter anti-Caesarian, 
deeply in debt. Caesar however had two resolute partisans 
among the tribunes-elect, M. Antonius and Q. Cassius. The 
rest of the year 50 was passed in intrigues and futile negotiations. 
Neither side could really afford to give way. Caesar could not 
abandon his claim to the consulship for 48. The republicans 
knew, from their experience of his former consulship, that he 
would not hold office for nothing. Either he would resume his 
former influence over Pompey, or Pompey would withdraw to his 
government of Spain. In either case they would lose Pompey's 
support, and they would be at the mercy of a most unwelcome 
master. Nor were suggestions of sending one of the rivals to 
face the Parthians a real solution of present difficulties. The 
republicans would be at the mercy of the one left behind ; and it 
was evident that these great commands were wrecking the repub- 
lican system. A keen cynical observer, such as Cicero's friend 
Caelius, could see that civil war was inevitable, and that Caesar's 
was the stronger side. It was only in the Senate that Caesar's 
cause was weak ; but it was with the Senate that the decision of 
the issue, war or not war, now rested. 

570. In September a false rumour, that Caesar was moving 
legions into the Cisalpine, betrayed the nervous vigilance of his 
enemies. What he really did was to exercise and review his army 
in Further Gaul. In November the two legions for Parthia 
reached Rome, and were sent on to Capua, being no longer 
wanted for the East. It was now the talk that Caesar's veterans 
were weary and discontented, and this false story, too easily 
believed, only increased the slackness of the tardy republicans. 
Another fatal encouragement was the discovery that the trusted 
Labienus, who was acting deputy in the Cisalpine during the 
absence of Caesar, was disloyal to his chief. Labienus appears to 



442 Course of the struggle [ch. 

have overrated the strength of Pompey's side, and the aristocrats 
to have taken him as a fair specimen of Caesar's adherents. The 
truth was that for purposes of war Caesar could rely on a number 
of effective officers, bound to him by their own interest. Some 
had, like Labienus, made fortunes in his service. Others were 
men who, having been condemned by a court or otherwise got 
into trouble, had found a refuge at Caesar's headquarters, where 
efficiency was in demand and no awkward questions asked. 
Reckless fellows of doubtful reputation might be embarrassing 
associates in civil life. But the immediate business, however 
much men might dissemble the truth, was war. Caesar was now 
ready for any event. His adversaries must either grant his 
demands, or fight at a disadvantage. He was asking something 
far less unconstitutional than the series of special privileges by 
which Pompey had been placed above the laws. What made it 
impossible for the Senate to grant his demands was the well- 
grounded conviction that under Caesar as consul the mob-ruled 
Assembly, still in strict law the sovran power of Rome, would 
again become active. The leading republicans, whether guided 
by principle like Cato, or fearing the unpleasant effects of a fresh 
batch of Julian laws, were determined to do battle while they had 
the services of a famous soldier at command. And from their 
point of view they were right. 

571. When Cicero reached Italy late in November, it did 
not take him long to discover that civil war, and with it probably 
disaster, were very near. He urged concession to Caesar, as 
being better than war. He saw that it was now too late to 
compete with Caesar in the field. Hoping for a triumph, he 
could not enter the city, but by letters and interviews he worked 
for peace. December came, and it was the turn of Marcellus to 
preside in the Senate. He at once began a vigorous attack on 
Caesar, and we come to the last stage of the struggle. Curio had 
still nine days as tribune, and he met the consul's motion for 
coercing Caesar by repeating his demand for the simultaneous 
resignation of the rival proconsuls. The House passed resolutions 
{a) that Caesar should be required to resign {b) that Pompey 
should not {c) that both should resign together. No formal 
decree could be carried. Meanwhile Caesar had returned from 
the Further Gaul, and was watching events. Negotiations, prob- 
ably insincere, certainly futile, were still going on in private. 



xLi] Vantage gained by Caesar 443 

Caesar had manoeuvred his opponents into such a position that 
they were now in a desperate hurry. Wavering senators must be 
committed to a bold policy, and Pompey (in whom they had no 
firm trust) irrevocably engaged in the republican cause. On the 
9th December Marcellus, finding the Senate still unwilling to 
declare Caesar a public enemy, took the matter into his own 
hands. He went off to Pompey, gave him a sword, and authorized 
him to take command of the troops under arms, to raise further 
forces, and march against Caesar. This was unconstitutional, and 
virtually war. But Pompey accepted the commission. It was 
not only Cicero that was staggered by this sudden stroke. He 
and others saw that the moral vantage had thereby been lost. 
To unreadiness was now added illegality. And there was no 
republican enthusiasm in Italy, or even in Rome : no sign of a 
general rally to withstand Caesar. Pompey was blindly confident. 
Antony, who was now Caesar's leading tribune in place of Curio, 
was uttering threats in Rome. Cicero felt that he would be 
driven to take the side of Pompey in a civil war, with his debt to 
Caesar unpaid, and with the dismal prospect of defeat. 

572. By the 24th December Caesar was at Ravenna. The 
act of Pompey put an end to his waiting policy. He at once 
concentrated the single legion quartered in the Cisalpine, and 
sent orders for two more to join him. Meanwhile he wrote to 
the Senate, offering further concessions, but insisting on his main 
object. He would be content to keep only a part of his provinces, 
and a legion or two, provided he might step into the consulship 
for 48 on his own terms. Doubtless he knew that Pompey and 
the Senate could not accept this proposal. They were too deeply 
committed to each other, and mutual betrayal would be nothing 
less than a common surrender. The letter ended with a threat; 
— the refusal of these terms would compel him to assert his own 
rights and the freedom of the Roman people. Thus he announced 
that he meant to pose as the defender of the constitution, forced 
to unsheath the sword against his will. The only possible reply 
was to pass the 'last decree' and thus treat him as a public 
enemy. But this could not be done without overriding the veto 
of his tribunes, which was a suspension of the constitution. In 
short, he had outgeneralled them in the campaign of legalities. 
Curio hurried to Rome with this ultimatum in time for the sitting 
of the Senate on the first of January 49. Antony read it out in 



444 War [ch. xli 

the House amid indignant comments. But Lentulus the new 
consul would not receive any motions arising directly from it, 
and declared the general debate on public affairs to be, according 
to custom, the business of the day. 

573" A number of motions followed, among them a proposal 
by a Caesarian senator that Pompey should avert a civil war by 
going to his government of Spain. In the end the motion of 
Scipio (Pompey's father-in-law) was carried almost unanimously, 
naming a date for Caesar's resignation, and declaring non-com- 
pliance an act of war. This was vetoed by Caesar's tribunes. 
The adjourned debate on the 2nd was equally vain. During the 
3rd and 4th great efforts were made to bring timid senators to the 
point of daring to vote for the ' last decree.' Even now some 
were for peace on Caesar's terms, but there were a number of 
men who saw no chance of restoring their fortunes if Caesar came 
into power. Debtors, seeking solvency through provincial extor- 
tions, were doubtless found on both sides, but their influence was 
not for peace. A meeting on the 5th, held outside the city 
precinct that Pompey and Cicero^ might attend, was still unable 
to take the final plunge. It was not till the 7th that the reports 
of Caesar's bloodthirsty intentions, and the ' now or never ' argu- 
ment of the extreme repubHcans, had their full effect. Lentulus 
announced that he would take a vote on the 'last decree,' and 
warned the obstructing tribunes that their lives would be in 
danger when it was passed. Antony and the other Caesarians 
fled to Ravenna, after a dramatic protest. The decree was passed. 
The tension of the last few days gave place to certainty. Pompey 
was instructed 'to see that the commonwealth took no harm,' 
and the civil war opened with this expression of unconscious 
irony. 

^ They had imperium only as being proconsuls, and would lose it by 
entering the city. See Index. 



CHAPTER XLII 

THE CIVIL WAR TO THE BATTLE OF THAPSUS 
49 — 46 B.C. 

574. The fate of the RepubUc was now to be settled m 
earnest. We must bear in mind that a civil war could not be 
conducted on the same principles as a foreign war, such as that 
in Gaul. Political considerations entered into it from the first. 
Whether Caesar desired it or not, he must make himself supreme ; 
otherwise he could neither carry out his policy nor secure his 
person. But it was of course not his object to destroy or lessen 
the resources of the state, which would be at his disposal in the 
event of his victory. His business then was to achieve victory 
with the least possible waste of time money and human lives. 
He had a veteran army, loyal to their chief. He was the real 
master of subordinates, who depended on him and on nobody 
else. He had a great aim in view, for it cannot be doubted that 
he had made up his mind to remodel the state so far as might be 
necessary for a thorough reform of administration. A selfish 
aristocracy were no longer to fill their own purses by corruption 
and plunder. The empire was to be ruled as an empire for the 
general good, not exploited for the profit of individuals. In 
short, Caesar was prepared to end what could not be mended, 
and to attempt the mending of the rest. Moreover he was just 
now at his very best in body and mind. On the other side there 
was no effective army in a position to deliver sharp strokes at 
once. Pompey had a fairly good force under arms in Spain. 
The troops hastily levied in Italy were raw recruits, unfit and 
unwilling to fight. Volunteers were few, and the loyalty of the 
two legions drawn from Caesar's army was doubtful. Nor was 



44^ The ready and the unready [ch. 

Pompey undisputed master in his own camp. Noble senators 
in. positions of trust were conceited and disobedient. Those 
gathered at headquarters gave endless trouble by their jealousies 
and intrigues and ill-timed criticism. They were there to employ 
Pompey, not to serve him. Besides, there was no vital unity of 
aims. The aristocrats wanted to destroy Caesar in order to avert 
reforms by which their own interests would suffer. What Pompey 
wanted was to preserve the republican system, however corrupt, 
as a system under which he could still be the one indispensable 
man. The nobles and he could not do without each other, but 
there was in truth no love lost between them. He was needed 
only to give them victory ; not to make himself their ruler, but to 
enable them to take vengeance on their enemies. Now Pompey 
himself was stale. For more than twelve years he had seen no 
active service in the field, and recent illness had impaired his 
powers. 

575. The declaration of war at once brought over Labienus 
to the republican side. Here was a practical soldier, fresh from 
a great war. But he was not entrusted with an important com- 
mand. After the 7th January preparations of all kinds were 
pushed on in a desperate hurry. Italy was full of confusion. 
Pompey still professed to believe that Caesar's troops would not 
stand by their leader. But at a very early stage of the war he 
began to collect a fleet at Brundisium, evidently doubting his 
ability to hold Italy at all. On the 17th he summoned the 
magistrates and senators to quit Rome. To this the Senate had 
to consent. With threats of punishment to all who disobeyed or 
joined Caesar they withdrew, and for the time Capua was made 
the seat of government. The evacuation of Rome was caused by 
the news from the North. Caesar had waited at Ravenna till 
Antony and the others arrived from Rome. On the nth he 
passed the frontier-stream (Rubicon) and entered Italy at the 
head of no more than some 5,300 men. Town after town 
surrendered to him with little or no resistance. The bulk of 
the resident population cared nothing for the cause of the Senate, 
and Caesar harmed nobody. In a few days he occupied northern 
Umbria and Arretium in Etruria. A vain attempt was made to 
stop him by negotiations; but, though he replied by counter- 
proposals, he pushed on. The answer to these (sent from Capua) 
was a fresh attempt to bargain with him. Caesar had not come 



xLii] Corfinium 447 

to argue, but to impose his own terms, and by the time this 
answer reached him he had advanced further without any serious 
check. The isolated detachments of Pompeian levies made no 
stand. Some fled and dispersed, others went over to Caesar. 
By the end of January he held most of Umbria and was making 
his way in Picenum. There was no local opposition, and he 
began to receive recruits. The Pompeian officers found it neces- 
sary to fall back with their remaining troops and to concentrate 
at Corfinium. 

576. Meanwhile Pompey, sorely hampered by the nobles 
around him, was learning by experience the difficulties of his 
task. He had worked hard, but Caesar left him no time to make 
an army. He was now in a dilemma. The mountain district 
about Corfinium was the best recruiting ground in Italy proper, 
south of the Rubicon. It was important to hold it. Several 
towns in that part were garrisoned, and in Corfinium there were 
not only troops enough to make up two legions, but several 
precious nobles, who must be kept safe at all costs. The com- 
mander there was the man destined to be Caesar's successor in 
Gaul, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. He was one of the most 
obstinate and conceited aristocrats, and a bitter enemy of Caesar. 
Now Pompey knew that Caesar would soon be reinforced. He 
saw that it was not possible to stop him with such troops as were 
within reach. Therefore he wrote and ordered Domitius to 
evacuate Corfinium and join him in Apulia. But he could not 
enforce his order. On the 14th February Caesar appeared. The 
arrival of two legions and other forces enabled him to invest 
Corfinium and cut off the retreat of Domitius. By the 21st the 
situation was clearly hopeless, and the troops surrendered the 
place and all within it to Caesar. Caesar addressed the captured 
persons of quality in a reproachful speech, and let them go. 
The soldiers he added to his own army. There was now no 
doubt that Pompey could not hold Italy. The question was 
whether he could withdraw his army by sea before Caesar caught 
him and brought him to battle. This he succeeded in doing. 
When Caesar reached Brundisium early in March, the consuls 
and the greater part of the army had already sailed. An attempt 
to prevent the embarkation of Pompey and the rest, by blocking 
the harbour mouth, was foiled. On the 17th the last division put 
to sea, and on the next day Caesar occupied the town. 



44^ Brundisium. Rome. Massalia [ch. 

577. Thus Brundisium became a Caesarian port, but Caesar 
had at present no fleet. He gave orders for ships to be collected 
there, but this was no easy matter. The maritime centres were 
mostly in the East and the Pompeian fleets commanded the sea. 
Their army, quartered on the opposite coast, was sure of its 
victuals. Meanwhile they held Sardinia, Sicily and Africa, and 
hoped to starve Rome into submission by stopping the corn- 
supplies. To recover these sources of supply was necessary, and 
Caesar selected officers and forces for this service. The main 
fact of the strategic position was that, while the enemy in Epirus 
were out of his reach, they were cut off from their legions in 
Spain. It was therefore Caesar's plan to deal with the western 
army first, and so to secure his rear before following Pompey to 
the East. He did not dally at Brundisium, but moved towards 
Rome, making many arrangements on the way. At the end of 
March he reached the city, but stayed there only a few days. 
After providing for the government in his absence, he set out for 
Spain. He had before leaving emptied the so-called sacred 
treasury of an emergency-fund which had. been accumulating for 
perhaps 150 years, and had been overlooked by the Pompeians 
in the hurry of their flight. This and other high-handed pro- 
ceedings are said to have caused some protests. But he had no 
time to stand on ceremony. 

578. There was trouble on the way to Spain. It was 
important to be on good terms with Massalia, but the Massaliots 
did not want to be involved in a Roman civil war. They 
professed neutrality, but were preparing for war. After refusing 
to admit Caesar into the city, they admitted Domitius, whom 
Caesar had spared at Corfinium. Caesar could not allow this 
defiant partiality. He made his arrangements for a siege, in- 
cluding the building of a fleet, and went on to Spain. Pompey 
had divided that country into three districts, in each of which he 
had a deputy. Afranius and Petreius joined forces to meet 
Caesar, leaving M. Terentius Varro in charge of the South and 
West. They were well posted at Ilerda on the Sicoris, a tributary 
of the Ebro, liable to floods. The operations that followed were 
for some time indecisive, and Caesar was in great straits. But 
he was willing to take risks, and Pompey's lieutenants were not. 
Perseverance and the skill of his men overcame his difficulties. 
At last he drove the enemy to retreat, and by cutting them off 



XL"] The disaster in Africa 449 

from water forced them to surrender. He let them all go free, 
on condition that the soldiers should be conducted back to Italy 
and disbanded. Little blood had been shed in this campaign of 
40 days. It was now Varro's turn. Caesar pushed on south- 
wards, and in a very short time was master of the country. 
Varro submitted. Caesar arranged affairs for the time, and left 
Q. Cassius with four legions in charge. The mercy and modera- 
tion of Caesar in Spain were an effective answer to the slanders 
of his opponents, who had asserted that he was coming at the 
head of savage barbarians to deluge Italy with Roman blood. 
He had skilfully and gently removed the Pompeian army of the 
West. 

579. As soon as he was free, Caesar returned to the siege of 
Massalia. The city, stoutly defended by sea and land, at last 
yielded under stress of famine. Caesar disarmed and fined the 
Massaliots, but left them 'free,' that is self-governing under their 
Greek institutions. While at Massalia he heard that he had been 
named dictator at Rome, and late in September he was able to 
start on the homeward journey. While he had been busy in 
Spain, Sardinia had been easily recovered. Sicily too was won, 
for Cato, who was in command there, could not raise a force 
sufficient for its defence. So Curio, whom Caesar had sent out 
with four legions to recover Sicily and Africa, succeeded thus far. 
Later in the year (Aug.) he rashly landed in Africa with only the 
two doubtful legions from Corfinium. The Pompeian governor, 
P. Attius Varus, was supported by Juba the Numidian king. 
The disaster that followed was a repetition on a smaller scale of 
the dreadful affair of Carrhae. Curio and his army perished. 
The province remained in Pompeian hands, but the victory was 
the victory of Juba. This failure was of course an annoyance to 
Caesar, but for the present it had not much influence on the 
fortunes of the war. 

580. Caesar was busy in Rome during the months of October 
and November. For 1 1 days he remained dictator. He held the 
elections, and became himself consul-elect for 48. He filled 
other offices with his own men, including the vacancies in the 
sacred colleges, and held the Latin Festival. Laws were passed 
for restoring civic rights to various persons hardly treated in the 
past, for granting the full franchise to the Transpadanes, and 
other purposes. An urgent need was some measure to give relief 

H, 29 



450 Caesar in Rome. Pompey's forces [ch. 

to debtors, and at the same time to restore credit, much shaken 
by the war. There was talk of a general cancelling of debts. 
But Caesar meant nothing of the kind. He ordained that repay- 
ment should be made of the capital sum owing, minus the interest 
already paid. He also provided that a debt might be discharged 
by surrender of the debtor's estate, and the creditor bound to 
accept it at a valuation. Arbitrators were to value it at the 
estimated selling price according to the state of the market before 
the war. The creditors might well submit to the loss of a part 
of their capital, having been not unlikely to lose it all. The 
plan seems certainly to have done something to reheve present 
stringency apd set money in circulation once more, and payment 
by transfer of a debtor's estate^ became in later times a regular 
part of the legal system of Rome. Another matter calling for 
attention was the means of keeping the West quiet while Caesar 
was engaged in the East. New governors were appointed to the 
provinces already won, and the Mauretanian kings Bocchus and 
Bogud were honoured with full recognition, to hold in check the 
Numidian Juba. There was of course no opposition to Caesar's 
will. The remaining senators were a mere Rump ; the Assembly 
itself was not more completely at his disposal. 

581. Meanwhile Pompey had got together a great army of 
various quality. He had nine full legions, and two more were 
coming from Syria. He had numerous auxiliary forces, drawn 
from the eastern peoples, and was therefore strong in cavalry and 
light troops. The Pompeian fleets commanded the sea, and a 
success gained against a Caesarian force at the head of the 
Adriatic had lately encouraged them. Yet there was something 
wanting. The legionaries were no doubt by this time well drilled, 
and some of those brought up from the eastern provinces were 
seasoned troops. But the forced retreat from Italy was a de- 
pressing fact. Pompey had begun badly, and the victory in 
Africa was nothing, compared with the total disappearance of 
the Pompeian army in Spain. The rank and file probably cared 
little for the republican cause. The foreign troops were rather 
vassals of Pompey the conqueror of the East, than retainers of 
the Roman aristocracy, prepared to risk their lives in doing battle 
for the Senate. To impart warm enthusiasm and soldierly tone 
to an army composed of such motley elements was hardly possible. 
^ The so-called cessio bonorum. 



xLii] Caesar lands in Epirus 451 

And, whatever might have been possible to a general of Pompey's 
capacity, if free to act for the best, was made utterly impossible 
by the magnates at headquarters. They played at Senate, passed 
resolutions, and wasted time in debate. Cato had come from 
Sicily, Cicero had at last escaped from Italy. The former was 
unpractical, the latter worried and sarcastic. The great nobles 
served only to weaken the authority of the general. The need of 
money was extreme, and all the East, client-princes as well as 
provincials, suffered in consequence. The rate of interest being 
forced up by the general insecurity made the burden greater. 
The farmers of revenues were required to pay up what was due 
to the state, and to make advances for the next year. In short, 
the fruit of Rome's eastern empire was squeezed dry. But the 
Pompeians reckoned on having plenty of time to complete their 
preparations during the winter. Pompey quartered a good part 
of his army in various places, and was himself for a while at 
Thessalonica. The naval squadrons under commanders subor- 
dinate to Bibulus were thought able to prevent Caesar from 
crossing the Adriatic till the spring. 

582. Caesar had 12 legions in Italy, but war and sickness 
had thinned the ranks. It was in the quality of his effective 
veterans that his superiority lay. They were used to bold advance 
and victory. He had Gaulish and German cavalry. His great 
difficulty was how to make the sea-passage. Two trips were 
necessary, for he had only transports enough to embark seven 
thin legions and a few horse. But it was most important to get 
a footing on the further coast without delay. Quite early in 
January 48 by the official calendar, two months earlier by the 
solar year, he gave Bibulus the slip, and landed with the first 
part of his force on the coast of Epirus. The winter was just 
beginning. For the present the Pompeian fleet was able to 
prevent his troops left behind from joining him, but the hard- 
ships of constant cruising in the vessels of those days were 
great. By occupying positions on the coast Caesar could cut 
them off from the land at many points, and thus add to their 
difficulties. Oricum and ApoUonia quickly submitted to him, 
and a large part of Epirus soon did the same. His next aim was 
to capture Dyrrachium, the port-town where the Pompeians had 
their chief depot. Pompey was on his way westwards from 
Thessalonica when he heard of Caesar's landing. By forced 

29 — 2 



452 Dyrrachium [ch. 

marches he arrived just in time to save Dyrrachium. But the 
need of hurry to meet Caesar's unexpected attack was of itself 
enough to shake the nerve of his untried army. The two armies 
now lay facing each other along the river Apsus. Insincere 
negotiations went on from both sides. The outposts conversed 
under a sort of tacit truce, and strong measures had to be taken 
to put an end to an intercourse dangerous to the Pompeian 
cause. 

583. The winter dragged on. Caesar, hard pressed by want 
of supplies, had to wait. He was not yet strong enough to take 
the offensive. Meanwhile there was some trouble in Italy. The 
praetor M. Caelius (Cicero's friend) was restless, and entered on 
wild courses tending to the cancelling of all debts. At length he 
became intolerable, and the consul Servilius had to suppress him 
by force. He then sent for Milo, who was still in exile, and the 
two attempted a brigand rising in southern Italy. Both perished, 
and Caesar's partisans still held Italy. The urgent question in 
the early months of the year 48 was, when would the second 
division of Caesar's forces reach him, if at all ? He had staked 
all on a bold venture, and had succeeded so far, but the moral 
effect of his forward strategy was being lost by inaction. Fortune 
now served him well. Antony broke up an attempt of a Pompeian 
squadron to blockade him in Brundisium, and early in April he 
put to sea. Weather favoured him, and he landed north of 
Dyrrachium with four legions. Pompey, being between Caesar 
and Antony, tried to prevent their junction, but failed. It is to 
be noted that it was a warning from friendly natives that saved 
Antony. Already Caesar was gaining goodwill by his kindly 
treatment of all, even of captured enemies, in contrast to the 
brutality of the Pompeians on several occasions. He was now 
able to take the offensive, a marked advantage, especially in 
civil war. 

584. The next stage was to send out detached forces to win 
aid and supplies in Greece, and to hold in check Scipio, who was 
bringing troops to Pompey through Macedonia. These moves 
were more or less successful; but he could not get into Dyrra- 
chium. The Pompeians drew supplies by sea, while he was 
completely isolated in a poor country. Nevertheless he under- 
took to blockade them by land with a starving army inferior in 
numbers. For more than three months he held them fast by 



xLii] Pharsalus 453 

fortified lines which were gradually built to run round them from 
sea to sea. As time went by, the loss of horses and the impaired 
health of the besieged army forced Pompey to act. But he 
could not break out until Gaulish deserters betrayed to him the 
weakness of the unfinished works at the southern end of the 
lines. By a sudden attack he broke the investment, and indeed 
gained a real victory in the ensuing battle. But he did not follow 
it up, and the advantage was lost. It soon became a disadvantage, 
for the Pompeian army was unduly elated by a moderate success, 
and the nobles at headquarters were convinced that nothing 
stood between them and final victory but the caution of their 
general, and his unwillingness to come down from his position of 
command. It was found that Caesar had marched inland, and 
pursuit was vain. To return at once to Italy and reoccupy 
Rome was tempting, but it meant abandoning Scipio. It was 
decided to rescue him and to crush Caesar. So, while Caesar's 
men toiled over rough mountains to Thessaly, recovering their 
spirits, the Pompeian army moved along the Egnatian road in 
easy confidence, and descended into Thessaly from the North. 
A detachment had been left under Cato at Dyrrachium. But of 
the two main armies that now were meeting to decide the fate of 
the Roman world, the Pompeian seems to have outnumbered the 
Caesarian by about two to one. 

585. Pompey's situation was pitiful. As a soldier he knew 
his business. Delay was all in his favour. But as the nominal 
chief of a circle of conceited aristocrats, eager to return in triumph 
to Rome and take vengeance on their adversaries, he was at a 
loss. He could not control them, for he wished to please them. 
Therefore they controlled him, and compelled him to give battle, 
against his better judgment, on the 9th August. His tactical 
scheme, for turning his superiority in numbers to account, was 
a good one, but commonplace, and easily divined by Caesar. 
The 'battle in Thessaly' as Caesar calls it, was fought near the 
town^ of Old Pharsalus, and ended in the rout and dispersion of 
the Pompeian army. The number of killed on the beaten side 
is said to have been large, but many of them were foreigners. 
Caesar did his best to stop the slaughter of Romans. A great 
number of prisoners were taken, and kindly treated, but a con- 
siderable number of fugitives escaped from the field, and were 
^ Palaepharsalus. 



454 End of Pompey [ch. 

afterwards a cause of embarrassment to Caesar's officers employed 
in lUyricum. While several of the most stubborn aristocrats 
died fighting, Pompey fled. When Caesar's men burst into the 
enemy's camp, they found preparations made for a feast in honour 
of the victory assumed certain. The chief significance of this 
dramatic battle is that a single general, absolute master of his 
own movements, overthrew one who was no more than the 
chairman of a self-satisfied and incompetent clique. In politics 
this was the tendency of the revolutionary age : the decisive battle 
expressed this tendency in simple military terms. 

586. Two main features of Caesar's strategy were a readiness 
to take great risks and promptness in following up a victory. He 
now did the first by leaving the sea still commanded by the 
republican fleets. Perhaps he guessed that they would soon be 
weakened by the desertion of some of the eastern contingents, 
and he had good reason to expect that their commanders would 
prove unable to conduct naval operations on a large scale with- 
out Pompey. He did the second by starting in pursuit of Pompey 
at once. This step led him on into unforeseen difficulties, and 
soon brought him into imminent danger of losing all that his 
splendid victories had won. While he was locked up in the 
East, the republican leaders had ample time to concentrate their 
remaining strength in another part of the world, and the really 
decisive battle had to be fought over again. 

587. But Pompey was a broken man. Without any certain 
plans he fled to the East, where none were willing to receive him. 
He sought a refuge in Egypt, hoping for protection in a country 
ruled by children of that Piper king whom his own influence had 
restored to the throne. But the young Ptolemy, to whom he 
appealed, did not want him, and the king's advisers did not relish 
the prospect of losing their present power and profit by involving 
Egypt in a Roman civil war. The end of it was that they enticed 
Pompey to quit his ship, and murdered him. Thus they got rid 
of a tiresome suppliant, and thought themselves now safe from 
the conqueror's unwelcome interference. So died the man who 
had for many years been a leading figure in the Roman world. 
His place in history is that of the man whose ambition was to be 
indispensable, to have power without seizing it. The conditions 
of Roman pofitics in his time made this impossible. The 
republicans did not really trust him ; and indeed no man con- 



xLii] Alexandria 455 

tributed more to the fall of the Republic, of which he loved to 
pose as the dignified patron. He had become a dreamer, bent 
on combining incompatible things, and so passed helplessly to 
a tragic end. 

588. There was no opposition in the East when news of the 
battle of Pharsalus arrived. Caesar passed over to Asia, and 
pushed on with a small force from Rhodes to Alexandria. He 
was disgusted at the murder of Pompey. Misunderstandings 
soon arose. He did not know the Alexandrian mob. He 
appeared as Roman consul, representing the sovran power. He 
undertook to settle a dynastic dispute between young Ptolemy 
and his sister-wife Cleopatra. It is fairly certain that he wanted 
to exact money, of which he was in great need. In a short time 
he found himself entangled in an ignoble conflict with the city 
mob, supported by the mercenary army, a motley body of ruffians, 
headed by the king's ministers. He was forced to occupy and 
barricade the palace, where he was besieged for several months. 
Few reinforcements reached him, and he had great difficulty in 
keeping open his communications by sea. In truth he was never 
in greater danger than at Alexandria. Relief did not come till 
the spring of the year 47. A certain Mithradates of Pergamum 
raised a force in Cilicia and Syria, including some Jews. With 
this he marched into Egypt and joined Caesar. The war was 
quickly ended. Submission was met with clemency, but the 
settlement of the kingdom took some time. Cleopatra, who had 
been with Caesar during the siege, was made joint ruler with her 
younger brother, to whom (the elder being dead) she was formally 
married. Some favours were granted to the Alexandrian Jews. 
To maintain order for the present, Caesar left behind him most 
of his troops when he sailed for Syria in July. 

589. The Alexandrine war had been provoked by inter- 
ference in the affairs of a protected kingdom. Eastern princes 
in general took no independent part in the Roman civil war. 
The contingents sent to Pompey's army were furnished only for 
fear of the risks of disobedience. The remnants of them were 
soon withdrawn, even as the Rhodian and Egyptian squadrons 
had left the Pompeian fleet. But Pharnaces, the ruler of the 
Bosporan kingdom, took the opportunity of the civil war to 
attempt the reconquest of the territories that had once belonged 
to his father, the great Mithradates. The new Caesarian governor 



456 Zela. The Adriatic. Spain [ch. 

of Asia tried with insufficient forces to stop him, and suffered 
defeat. For some months Pharnaces was free to work his will. 
Caesar could not afford to allow this. He hurried through the 
arrangements necessary in Syria and Cilicia, and marched to 
meet Pharnaces. The difficulty of raising troops was very great, 
for he had very few Romans with him. Some Galatians were 
sent by Deiotarus their principal chief, who was eager to win 
forgiveness for having supported Pompey. On the 2nd August 
the decisive victory of Zela put an end to the pretensions of 
Pharnaces. Then a new territorial settlement had to be made as 
a guarantee of future tranquillity. Caesar's presence was urgently 
needed in Italy, but he was not able to arrive till near the end of 
September. 

590. In turning back to see what had been happening in 
Caesar's absence, we come upon a series of operations on the 
coasts of the Adriatic and Ionian seas. The fleet of the 
republicans was still strong, but was not effectively concentrated 
and employed on a consistent strategic plan, so as to help in 
deciding the main issues of the war. In Sicily and southern 
Italy some Caesarian ships were destroyed. In the parts of 
Illyricum a more serious struggle took place after the battle of 
Pharsalus. At first it seemed as though the Pompeians would 
become masters of all the lUyrian seaboard, but in the end 
Vatinius, who commanded at Brundisium, prevailed. He got 
together a makeshift fleet, for which restored invalids provided 
good fighting crews, and gained a decisive victory. The navies 
of the period were clumsy, and naval strategy in general a 
neglected art. From the later course of the war it would seem 
that the superiority of the republicans at sea was now fast wasting 
away. Meanwhile on land there was a far worse trouble in the 
West. Q. Cassius, Caesar's deputy in the Further Spain, had 
under him the peaceful southern district, already much Romanized. 
It contained many thriving cities, and was a centre of mining 
enterprise. He had also Lusitania, less civilized, but apparently 
not now rebellious. By arbitrary and extortionate government, 
and by corrupting the discipline of his troops, he made his 
province a scene of confusion, till he provoked a conspiracy, and 
at length a military mutiny. This was a rising against Cassius, 
not against Caesar. It was not till the summer of the year 47 
that order was restored by Lepidus, proconsul of the Hither 



XL"] Troubles in Rome 457 

Spain. Cassius was removed, but the mischief done in the 
province could not be undone, 

591. In Rome Caesar's colleague Servilius kept things fairly 
quiet during the year 48. The news of Pharsalus, and then of 
Pompey's death, caused great honours and powers^ to be voted 
to Caesar. In particular he received (though a Patrician) the 
grant of full tribunician power, without holding the office of 
tribune. He was also named dictator a second time, on much 
the same footing as Sulla. He entered on this office while at 
Alexandria, and named Antony, who had taken back some veteran 
legions to Rome, Master of Horse. In idleness these soldiers 
began to be troublesome. And the year 47 began without regular 
magistrates, Caesar not having been able to send his orders. 
Some of the tribunes raised disturbances by agitating proposals 
for cancelling debts or violent opposition thereto. At last Antony 
was forced to act, and order was restored with much shedding of 
blood. Caesar was badly wanted. Before we speak of his return, 
we must note the dispersal of the Pompeians after the battle of 
Pharsalus. Beaten on land, they made their naval station at 
Corcyra their headquarters for a time. But they soon broke up 
and went different ways. Cicero in dejection returned to Italy, 
where Caesar's men treated him kindly. Scipio went to Africa ; 
and, after naval operations had failed, so did the fleet under 
M. Octavius. Cato and another party sought Pompey in Egypt, 
and at the news of his death separated. Some gave up the cause, 
and received pardon from Caesar; most of them went on with 
Cato to Africa. Africa was the centre to which other fugitives 
rallied, and when Caesar reached Rome it was already certain 
that the necessity of another campaign would leave him but a 
short respite for the despatch of urgent business in the capital. 

592. Caesar was in Rome less than three months, and there 
were endless things to be done. He dealt with the financial 
crisis by enforcing the rules laid down by him in the year 49. 
There was no remission of debts, but some temporary relief in 
the matter of house-rents. We hear also of a measure to encourage 
the investment of capital in land, and of an edict dissolving some 
troublesome clubs or gilds which Clodius had revived. To 
establish order and credit was his object. He held elections, 

^ Among ihem the right of nomination to magistracies and governorships. 



458 The great mutiny. Africa [ch. 

and filled up the magistracies for the small remnant of the year, 
thus restoring a normal state of things, and also saw to the 
elections for the next year. Money was his greatest need. He 
is said to have been driven to exact forced loans, and to sell 
confiscated estates of Pompey and others. There is no doubt 
that this policy was sorely against his will. But what was he to 
do? The veteran legions, waiting in Italy for their promised 
rewards, were clamouring for cash. Caesar wanted them for the 
war in Africa. They marched on Rome and claimed their 
discharge. Caesar met them and granted their request. He 
could not satisfy their demand for payment, but promised that 
on his return from Africa he would pay all just claims in full with 
interest. What now were the soldiers to do? Their hopes of 
reward depended on Caesar. If he perished or conquered at the 
head of another army, their prospect of reward would either dis- 
appear or be subject to rival claims. What Caesar actually did 
after their submission (for they did submit) is un-certain. The 
mass of them at least were sent to Sicily on their way to Africa. 

593. For the year 46 Caesar, still dictator, was also consul 
with Lepidus for colleague. Lepidus was to be at the head of 
the home government. Among the many appointments made at 
this time we must note that of M. Junius Brutus as governor 
of Cisalpine Gaul. He, like his uncle Cato, had been a strong 
republican, but had sought and found pardon from Caesar. He 
was now left in a most important charge, while Caesar went to 
fight against Cato in Africa. Near the end of December 47 
Caesar put to sea from Lilybaeum with six legions (only one of 
veterans) and a small body of horse. Until joined by the rest of 
his old troops, he was not able to meet the republican army 
in the field, In the space of about a year and a half his adver- 
saries had got together a large force of various quality, and had so 
cleared the country of supplies that an invading army was almost 
wholly dependent on imported food. They had also the support 
of Juba. It is true, the pretensions of the king were an embarrass- 
ment to the Roman leaders, but the Numidian army was no 
contemptible auxiliary, and with it their superiority to Caesar in 
cavalry and light troops was so marked that he could only move 
with difficulty. Of leaders there were plenty, among them 
Labienus. But the republican weakness betrayed itself in the 
choice of Scipio as commander in chief. He was a man of 



xLii] Thapsus. End of Cato 459 

ordinary abilities, not really fit to face Caesar or to guide and 
control the erratic strategy of Juba. And the energies of Juba 
were presently diverted by an invasion of Numidia from the 
West. The two Mauretanian kings, Bocchus and Bogud, had 
been attached to the Caesarian interest as a check on Juba. At 
the present time both seem to have been under the influence of 
P. Sittius, a Roman adventurer who was strongly opposed to the 
aristocratic party. Sittius now did Caesar a very timely service 
by leading a Mauretanian army into Numidia. 

594. Caesar had at first hard work to hold his ground after 
landing, and to feed his men. Even when supplies began to 
arrive, and the missing legions came, he had a wearisome cam- 
paign. That his convoys were allowed to reach him is a sign of 
the inefficiency of the enemy's naval service. Part of their fleet 
was under Pompey's elder son Gnaeus cruising in the West to 
little purpose. Caesar's main object was to force on a decisive 
battle. This Scipio avoided for some time, but Caesar attacked 
the town of Thapsus, and Scipio had to come to the relief of his 
garrison. On the 6th April 46 the battle of Thapsus was fought. 
Caesar's men were not to be restrained, and the rout of the 
republican army ended in wholesale butchery. The war was 
over. Most of the chief republican leaders fled and perished in 
their flight, but Labienus and Varus escaped to Spain, where we 
shall find them with Pompey's two sons, making one more stand 
against the fortune of Caesar. The most famous episode of the 
victorious campaign in Africa was the death of Cato. He was 
not in the battle, but in charge of Utica, the provincial capital. 
He thought that his work was done, and that it was time for him, 
acting on Stoic principles, to leave an intolerable world, and not 
to survive the Roman Republic. He read again Plato's version 
of the Socratic views on the immortality of the soul, and calmly 
killed himself. To later generations Cato was a hero, and his 
suicide a favourite topic of literature. 

595. Caesar spared the lives of captured officers, but sent 
them into exile. Numidia was divided. Part was given to 
Bocchus, and Cirta, with the district round it, formed into a 
principality for Sittius. The rest was annexed as a province 
under the name of New Africa. In the old province some money 
was raised by fines levied on the partisans of the beaten side, and 
by confiscations. In June Caesar sailed for Sardinia, and towards 
the end of July he reached Rome. 



CHAPTER XLIII 



FROM THE BATTLE OF THAPSUS TO THE DEATH 
OF CAESAR. 46—44 B.C. 

596. Rome was awaiting Caesar's return, and ready to confess 
her subjection to a single will. Honorary distinctions w^ere voted 
him, so that on all public occasions he was recognized as sovran 
head of the state. He accepted most of these honours : but the 
grant of actual powers, by which his position was rendered more 
fully monarchic, was to him no doubt more important. He had 
great designs for reforming and remodelling the government, 
which the African war had interrupted ; and time was slipping by. 
There was still one department which had so far not been placed 
under his control, that of the censorship. The office had long 
been decaying, and since Sulla it had hardly more than a nominal 
existence. Yet for Caesar's purposes it could be made useful. 
The census, the state-contracts and other matters of finance, not 
to mention the general power of interference, were things which 
it was surely convenient to bring under the master's hand. So 
he was made 'guardian of manners and morals' i^praefectus 
moribus) for three years. Having no colleague, he had the full 
powers of two censors, and for twice the usual term of function. 
Formal scruples were evaded by the change of title, and the old 
office was not abolished. Caesar's official position in the latter 
half of the year 46 was this. He was dictator on the SuUan 
footing. He was also consul with Lepidus. He had the domi- 
nant tribunician power and the rights of nomination, granted him 
in 47. Moreover he was chief pontiff for life, and thus the chief 
authority in matters of religion. Now the state religion was 



CH. xLiii] Caesar autocrat " 461 

intimately connected with practical politics, and the charge of the 
state calendar, now in dire confusion, was a duty of the pontiffs. 
The total of these powers was virtually monarchy as autocratic 
as the tyranny of Sulla. But the difference of the two men was 
immense. Caesar reassured the public by promises of a mild 
government, and he kept his word. But there is no reason to 
think that he contemplated retiring after carrying out his intended 
changes. He did not mean to resign the monarchy in favour of 
the Senate, whose incompetence he well knew. And there was 
no other possible claimant. We cannot know all his motives, 
and we cannot fairly blame him for overthrowing the republican 
system in the interests of efificiency. He at least did not evade 
responsibility when assuming power. 

597. In August he celebrated four triumphs, Gallic, Egyptian, 
Pontic, African. The first included the execution of Vercingetorix, 
the last was nominally over Juba^ though the victory of Thapsus 
was really an episode of the civil war, and Roman sentiment was 
shocked. The mere bullion displayed in these shows was of vast 
amount, more than ;^i 5,000,000 according to one story. But 
the charges to be met were enormous. We hear of common 
soldiers receiving ;^2oo or more a head. Common citizens had 
a bounty of ;^4 a head. A general feast, followed by games, 
stage-plays, shows of gladiators and wild beasts, kept up the 
entertainment for days on an unexampled scale. A novelty, the 
exhibition of an actual sea-fight {naumachid) on a lake dug 
specially for the purpose, was a very popular performance, and 
no doubt a very costly one. Rome was thronged with visitors, 
but even during this mad carnival there were signs of discontent. 
That a Roman knight acted on the stage to please Caesar, while 
others fought as gladiators, was galling to men of position, as 
reminding them that all alike were in truth slaves of a master. 
Rough soldiers would gladly have had the spending of money 
wasted on needless splendour. Some force had to be used to 
prevent disorder. But the time of excitement ended, and business 
began again. It was then that patriotic men, such as Cicero, felt 
the real weight of Caesar's autocracy. They were daily reminded 
of their utter powerlessness. There was no political life left for 
them. Caesar was considerate and polite, but he was master, and 
the views of republicans, however able and eloquent, were of no 
importance or effect. 



462 Caesar's difficulties [ch. 

598. No one could tell what Caesar might choose to do. 
That he was generous and fair, active and wise, could not be 
denied. But nothing could reconcile republican patriots to their 
own political extinction. Caesar took pains to attract the coope- 
ration of men of worth, in order to invest his usurpation with 
dignity. Such a man was Cicero, at whose request he granted 
many favours. But the conflicts of public life, in which the 
orator found his interests and won his triumphs, had ceased. 
The sensitive man despised himself for his own submission. He 
turned to literature, and produced a number of treatises dealing 
with oratory and philosophy. Others, who would feel their servi- 
tude less acutely, would also have less resources to enable them 
to bear the yoke. In short, the republican element in Roman 
society was conquered for the moment, but not finally crushed or 
tamed. Even the men pardoned by Caesar resented their sub- 
jection. And all the while Caesar was becoming more and more 
isolated. He was losing touch with men of independent views, 
for the stress of business kept him surrounded by subordinates 
and flatterers. This result could not be helped. It was under 
such conditions that the busy benevolent autocrat set about his 
work of practical reforms. A necessary preliminary was the dis- 
charge of soldiers and provision of land-allotments. This was 
carried out on principles very different from those of Sulla, for 
care was taken to avoid the planting of military settlers in con- 
tinuous blocks, and the disturbance of existing tenures. It seems 
that the allottees were incorporated in small numbers in existing 
communities, scattered over Italy proper and Cisalpine Gaul. 
It is probable that most of the land for the purpose was bought 
and paid for. The business seems to have gone through peace- 
ably and equitably, and the state can hardly have had enough 
suitable land without buying it. But it is a pity that we have not 
statistics of so remarkable a transaction. 

599. Some of Caesar's reforms were embodied in laws, 
others not. His censorial power enabled him to lessen the abuse 
of the corn-doles, an old-established evil. He revised the list, 
and cut down the number of receivers to 150,000. It is said that 
he had found it 320,000. In this matter also the details are 
obscure, but it would appear that his main object was to reduce 
the numbers of the urban mob. The servile element was always 
being recruited by manumissions. Slaves no longer worth their 



xLiii] Measures of reform 463 

keep were cheaply provided for as state-paupers. Caesar intro- 
duced a better alien element by enfranchising many medical 
practitioners and other specialists (teachers etc.), and thus en- 
couraged clever Greeks to settle in Rome. We hear of laws to 
check luxury, and to enforce the employment of more free labour 
in rural districts : vain efforts, which recorded evils that they 
could not cure. To meet financial needs, the customs-duties 
abolished in the year 60 were now restored. An important 
measure was the lex lulia municipalise probably drafted now and 
passed in 45. Part of it dealt with internal affairs of Rome, 
regulating various rights and duties with a view to improving the 
administration of the city, among them roadways, traffic, and the 
corn-doles. Another part enacted normal rules for the self- 
government of Italian municipalities. This combination of topics 
is surely a mark of Caesar's imperial views. We may fairly say 
that to him the difference between Rome and other cities of Italy 
was merely that between the capital and local borough-towns, not 
a difference in kind, but in place and degree. Whether, if he 
had lived longer, he would have taken the further step of making 
the subject-peoples poUtically Romans, we cannot tell. But the 
coming of an imperial master, with his eye on the empire as a 
whole, pointed to a general incorporation some day. That Rome 
was the capital was not a matter of doubt. When chatterers 
suggested that Caesar meant to move the centre of government to 
Alexandria, this was idle talk. 

600. Among the evils to be remedied was the ineffectiveness 
of legal penalties for public crimes, such as public violence and 
treason. The unpleasantness of exile was not enough to deter 
offenders. They kept their properties, and found pleasant places 
to live in. Caesar now imposed a forfeit of 50 7o of their 
property, 100 "/^ in cases of parricide. Other laws dealt with 
the composition of juries, removing the iribuni aerarii, or with 
restrictions on the freedom of foreign travel, and on the length of 
tenure of provincial governorships. It is chiefly as indicating the 
points in which he desired reform that these measures are 
interesting, for he did not live to carry out his policy. His 
relations with the Senate were, in their effect on the sequel, more 
important than his laws. It seems certain that decrees were 
drawn up in the Senate's name, and liberties taken with the 
names of well-known members without their knowledge. The 



464 The Calendar [ch. 

House valued its privilege of debate, but Caesar's time was 
precious, and he fell into the habit of consulting only a sort of 
select Cabinet of leading senators or private friends. Meanwhile 
his censorial action in filling vacancies was a further cause of 
discontent. Men who had lost their seats owing to condemnations 
or political troubles were restored. Thus the remnant of the 
republican aristocrats was weakened by the inclusion of members 
who owed their rehabilitation to Caesar. Later, in 45, he went 
further in this direction. But already he shewed that, while 
recognizing the Senate as a necessary organ of government, he 
did not mean to let it resume its former power as an aristocratic 
clique. 

601. We now come to the reform of the calendar. Two 
year-systems were in use.' It was by the official calendar-year, as 
ordered by the pontiffs, that days of fixed festivals and days 
available for transaction of public business were ascertained. It 
began with March. The official year of the regular magistracies 
had ever since 153 B.C. begun with January. Beside these, there 
was a roughly-computed solar year, followed by farmers, a sort of 
year of seasons. The problem was how to combine the principles 
of a lunar and a solar year. The pontiffs attempted it clumsily 
by a system of intercalation, adding an extra month in alternate 
years. Thus in a cycle of four years they could make the average 
very nearly correct. Unfortunately the inequality of years affected 
business and politics. Terms of office, nominally annual, were 
lengthened or shortened. Trials in court were hastened or 
delayed in date, and contracts ran for a longer or shorter period. 
The pontiffs were tempted to use their power irregularly, inter- 
calating or not intercalating to suit the convenience of their 
friends. Thus the official year was now in utter confusion, for 
the management had of late been peculiarly arbitrary. Caesar 
resolved to put an end to this scandal. For this as for his other 
reforms he employed qualified specialists, of whom there were 
plenty. The chief was the Greek astronomer Sosigenes. The 
official year was to be the same for calendar and magistracies, 
and the new system to be binding as from the Calends (ist) of 
January in the following year (45). By adding days to most of 
the present months a year of 365 days was made up, and the 
addition of a day to February every fourth year made a normal 
average of 365^ days. Thus the knowledge long current in 



xLiii] Acts of mercy 465 

Egypt was turned to account in Rome. To effect the transition 
from the old system to the new, 67 days were added to the 
calendar-year 46 B.C. These few details must suffice here. By 
this bold introduction of order in place of disorder Caesar con- 
ferred a boon not only on Rome but on the whole civilized world. 
In carrying it out great care was taken to respect old scruples as 
far as was possible, in particular to avoid disturbing festivals held 
on traditional dates. 

602. While Caesar was busy in Rome, and needing for his 
work a respite from unwelcome war, there was trouble in the 
West. Labienus and Varus had escaped from Africa to Spain, 
where they joined Pompey's two sons, Gnaeus and Sextus. They 
were a desperate and savage crew, and they soon found the means 
of raising a rebellion in the Further province, which had not fully 
recovered from the misdeeds of Q. Cassius. The troops quartered 
there, some of them remnants of the old Pompeian armies, went 
over to the rebels. Caesar's lieutenants could not put down the 
rising. While the preparations were being made for a campaign 
which the master loathed but could not shirk, there were matters 
to be settled in Rome. Two acts of grace were specially notable. 
Among the numerous republican exiles were the bitter and sulky 
M. Marcellus, Caesar's old adversary, and Q. Ligarius, one of the 
men pardoned in Africa. Both were interceded for, and both 
allowed to return. The sequel illustrates the temper of the anti- 
Caesarian nobles. Marcellus at first scorned the favour ; when 
at last persuaded to return, he perished on the way home in a 
private quarrel. Ligarius took advantage of Caesar's grace only 
to become soon after one of his murderers. Both these cases 
were the occasions of speeches by Cicero, who had for some time 
been silent. Another affair, the subject of Roman gossip, was 
the enrolment of Cleopatra and her boy-husband among the allies 
and friends of the Roman people. The queen had come to 
Rome, and was lodged in Caesar's garden-residence beyond the 
Tiber. The scandal ran that Caesar meant to marry her, a 
foreigner and a queen, and to rule as king at Alexandria. And it 
is to be borne in mind that in Rome the imputation of regal 
ambition was the traditional preface to a public murder. 

603. Before quitting the capital Caesar provided for the 
government in his absence. He would be dictator for the third 
time in 45, and he meant to be sole consul also. His Master of 

H. 30 



466 Munda [ch. 

Horse, Lepidus, held the election for this purpose. But, while 
Lepidus was to be the nominal head of the home administration, 
the duties of the ordinary magistrates (praetors etc.) were entrusted 
to praefecti, deputies of Caesar. This was an arbitrary arrange- 
ment, of course not popular. Its imperial nature was manifest, 
all the more as the real power lay with Caesar's confidential 
agents Balbus and Oppius, who watched all proceedings on their 
master's behalf. The position of republicans was now a peculiar 
one. No respectable patriot could wish to see the desperate gang 
in Spain masters of the Roman world. Yet there were still those 
who would gladly be rid of the present master, and so far wished 
well to the rebels. It was not easy for malcontents at that time 
to discern the truth, that order and prosperity depended on the 
control of the one strong master. 

604. Caesar started in December 46 and travelled post-haste 
to Spain. He had to meet an army more numerous than his 
own, but including native levies and liberated slaves. It was in 
fact a rebellion rather than a civil war with which he had to deal. 
The fortresses in the South and West were held by the enemy, 
and supplies were scarce. The hardships of a winter campaign 
were great, and the barbarity of Cn. Pompey and his lawless 
troops provoked reprisals, and gave a savage character to the war. 
At last Caesar was able to bring on a battle. It was at Munda, 
not far from Corduba, on the 17th March 45, that he won his 
last victory. Of the Pompeian leaders only Sextus Pompey got 
away safe, to give trouble later. The rebellion was put down, 
but there was work to be done in reconstructing the province, in 
rewarding and punishing, and in exacting much-needed money. 
To some communities Caesar granted the Roman franchise. He 
had now with him his grand-nephew C. Octavius, a youth of less 
than 18 years, whose discretion and capacity impressed the 
dictator. Caesar returned to Italy early in September, but did 
not enter the city for about a month. It was at this time that he 
made his will, and left Octavius his heir. But this decision was 
a secret from the Roman public, whatever certain persons may 
have guessed. 

605. To devise any practical extension of Caesar's autocratic 
powers was no longer possible. In granting him the entire control 
of the state treasury and the monopoly of the military imperium, 
the Senate and Assembly were recognizing facts. These and 



xLiii] Honours regal and divine 467 

other privileges were voted him as a result of the news of Munda. 
Some of the honorary distinctions are to us more interesting, 
from two points of view. The right to wear the all-crimson gown 
on public occasions, with other distinctions of dress, traditionally 
regal, suggested the revival of the ancient kingship. The right to 
bear the title imperator, not as an exceptional military honour, 
but as a first name {praenomen) to descend to his family, suggested 
the more modern type of military monarch. A house on the 
Palatine, to be built with a pediment or gable, provided a palace, 
and by its temple-model suggested deification. An inscription 
on the base of a statue of Caesar, set up in a temple, spoke of 
him as a god. In a polytheistic system one new divinity was no 
great matter ; but these, with other ceremonial honours, suggested 
the deification of kings long known in the East. We are told 
that all this invidious adulation was by many of its promoters 
deliberately meant to create odium against Caesar. On his 
return he accepted nearly everything voted him, and soon after 
he unwisely affronted pubhc sentiment by not only holding a 
triumph himself but allowing two of his Heutenants to do the 
same. Spain was a Roman possession, and these triumphs out- 
raged patriotic feelings. Caesar was in short more than ever an 
isolated autocrat, whose friends were dependants. Cut off from 
the advice of independent judgments freely expressed, he could 
only judge for himself on imperfect information, and he was not 
infallible. He had also great difficulty in dealing with claims to 
preferment. His partisans looked for their reward. But he 
wanted to conciliate the pardoned Pompeians as well. Jealousy 
tended to breed discontent, and discontent to turn both parties 
against himself. Such was the unhappy dilemma created by a 
policy of mercy. 

606. To satisfy some claims, Caesar resigned the consulship, 
and had two successors elected for the rest of the year ; and by 
raising the number of praetors to 14, and of quaestors to 40, 
further openings were found. But to unfriendly critics he 
seemed to be treating the magistracies with levity. He watched 
the provincial governors carefully, and made various arrangements 
for the following year. He was still forgiving ; a number of 
political exiles were pardoned and restored to their civic rights. 
But his health was not what it had been. He was weary and at 
times ill-tempered. And every hasty act or word was made the 

30—2 



468 Projects of Caesar [ch. 

most of by malignant gossip. Thus the number of secret mal- 
contents was increased, and to them each added honour, such as 
the title of Father of his country, was but an added provocation. 
Among the privileges voted him was one which in some form 
confirmed and extended the personal inviolability which was 
already a part of his tribunician power. In view of what was 
soon to happen, this solemn guarantee of his safety deserves 
remark. 

607. The great projects attributed to Caesar bear the stamp 
of his imperial views. His plans for roads, reclamation of marshes, 
harbour-works, and so forth, shew his designs for the improvement 
of Italy. He meant also to make Rome a capital worthy of the 
empire. He had already, as we saw^ above, done something in 
the way of public buildings, and no compliment now pleased him 
better than when the Senate voted the construction of further 
works under his direction, of course destined to bear his name- 
A grand scheme for building on the campus Marfhis,-and providing 
a new Campus beyond the river, must have implied one or more 
new bridges. Some of these works were begun, and finished by 
Augustus, others had to wait much longer. One of his designs 
was the foundation of two public libraries, Greek and Latin. 
Greatest of all was a projected Digest of the law, in which he 
would have employed a staff of skilled jurists. But this, and the 
amendment and codification to follow, were stopped by his death, 
and were not seriously taken in hand for more than 550 years. 
Caesar had already shewn his readiness to extend the Roman 
franchise beyond the bounds of Italy, and this policy he probably 
meant to continue. He had plans for a general census, and a 
survey of the empire : also for planting colonies of Roman citizens 
abroad, to promote the Romanizing of the provinces. With this 
last scheme a good beginning was made before his death. All 
tends to shew that he contemplated a grand reorganization of the 
empire. Indeed it was urgently needed, for its vast area could 
only be effectively governed and defended by a better organization 
of its powers than was any longer possible under the chaotic 
arrangements of the Republic. 

608. But this great undertaking was only possible under 
conditions of public security and peace. Foreign policy therefore 
demanded his attention, and on the north-eastern and eastern 

^ §§ 564. 565- 



xLiii] Preparations for eastern war 469 

frontiers there were signs of trouble. The Macedonian province 
had long suffered from the inroads of barbarians from beyond the 
Danube, and a recent union of these rude peoples, Getae or Daci, 
under a vigorous prince had made them more dangerous neigh- 
bours than ever. For the present the anxiety in this quarter was 
relieved. The Getic king Burebistas died, the kingdom broke 
up, and the territories of Rome and her Thracian allies were no 
longer in serious peril. On the side of Parthia things looked 
badly. Since the disaster of Carrhae the Parthians had been 
restless, and they were just now tempted to invade Syria. A 
Pompeian ofificer had raised a mutiny among the troops quartered 
there, and had destroyed the governor left there by Caesar in the 
year 47. Now that Caesar was supreme, this man was a rebel; 
and, to hold his ground, he invited the aid of an Arabian prince 
and also of the Parthian king. Forces already sent to recover the 
province had failed, and Caesar's presence was really needed. 
The duty of avenging Crassus was put forward to justify the enter- 
prise. Vast preparations were made for effecting a thorough 
settlement of the eastern question. An army was raised and sent 
over to Macedonia for training, and young Octavius placed in 
touch with it as a student at Apollonia. Meanwhile it was 
rumoured that a passage in the so-called Sibylline books affirmed 
that a king was needed to conquer the Parthians. This was of 
course taken as a proof that Caesar meant to be king of Rome. 

609. Before setting out for the East, Caesar took precautions 
to hinder malcontent senators from making mischief during what 
was likely to be his long absence. He had already put some new 
members into the House, and now he made a thorough revision of 
the roll. He struck off some unworthy members, and added 
many new ones, disregarding old prejudices. Soldiers, sons of 
freedmen, even enfranchised Gauls, were included, and the total 
(it is said) raised to 900. Roman gossip sneered at this levelling 
policy. He also had a law passed to authorize a fresh creation 
of Patricians. The genuine Patricians were now very few, and 
there were still purposes for which they were formally required. 
The chief pontiff then carried out the law. Among the new 
Patricians was young Octavius ; according to one tradition, 
Cicero was another. 

610. Among the cases heard by Caesar (for he assumed 
judicial functions) was one of some note. It was that of the 



470 Last stage of Caesar's rule [ch. 

Galatian king Deiotarus, who was tried in absence, on an old 
charge of plotting against Caesar. Caesar wanted a pretext for 
deposing him. It seems that all Cicero's eloquence could only 
avail to get sentence deferred. The affair was a mark of the dictator's 
arbitrary power. Even when he dined with the favoured Cicero, 
he avoided talking of politics, to the disgust of his host, who 
was bursting with good advice, and galled to feel himself of no 
importance. The elections for 44 were interesting, as an indica- 
tion of Caesar's policy. Antony had of late been out of favour. 
He was forgiven his offence, and Caesar, in taking a fifth consul- 
ship, took him as his colleague. To provide more posts of 
honour, the number of praetors was raised to 16 and that of 
aediles to 6, and the same course was followed with some minor 
offices. Among the praetors were two pardoned republicans, 
M. Brutus and C Cassius. Caesar himself was to be for the 
fourth time dictator. Early in 44 he exchanged the yearly tenure 
for a life-tenure. Meanwhile Octavius, now 18, was pushed to 
the front. He was already a pontiff, and it was now arranged 
that, when Caesar went to the East, he should succeed Lepidus 
as Master of Horse and act as his great-uncle's representative. 
Clearly Caesar meant to found a dynasty in the person of this 
youth. 

611. We now come to the last stage of Caesar's life, when 
those who desired to make an end of him must either act quickly 
or miss their chance. A last batch of honours, the invention of 
ingenious servility or malignity, opened the new year 44, and laid 
further stress on his position, regal and divine. It was now that 
the name of the month Quintilis was changed to Julius by decree 
of the Senate. But in truth the relations between the serious and 
over-busy autocrat and the solemn but grovelling Senate were 
more strained than ever. He could not always interrupt business 
to receive them as politely as they expected. And he was induced 
to dismiss his bodyguard. Indeed, if votes and oaths meant 
anything, he was safe enough, at least from senators. But there 
was by this time a conspiracy on foot, and no pains were spared 
to make the common people regard him as a tyrant prepared to 
assume even the hated title of King. He was soon involved in a 
quarrel with two tribunes, who had intervened to stop demonstra- 
tions in favour of his regal power. They alleged that such 
suggestions were contrary to Caesar's own wish : but Caesar would 



xLiii] The Ides of March 471 

have preferred to repudiate them himself, and was annoyed. He 
arranged to have these tribunes deposed, and the transition from 
indulgence to severity was unpopular. So bit by bit he was 
driven into a false position. On the 15th February occurred the 
famous scene at the festival of the Lupercalia, when Antony 
repeatedly offered him a crown, and the crowd cheered when he 
refused it. Of course his refusal, rightly or not, was represented 
as insincere. 

612. The prime mover of the plot against Caesar's life was 
C. Cassius, the man who had saved Syria after the disaster of 
Carrhae, and had been pardoned by Caesar for his share in the 
civil war. He was a bitterly jealous man, whom no favours could 
reconcile. The actual conspiracy began when M. Brutus was 
induced to become its respectable figure-head. He too owed his 
life and his promotion to Caesar. He was a solemn and pedantic 
being, and professed philosophic principles. As a Roman, he 
was one of the greediest of usurers ; as a student, he was familiar 
with Greek views of ' liberty ' and the duty of tyrannicide. Above 
all, he was immensely vain ; and the appeal to his vanity drew 
him to bear a leading part in the treacherous murder of his 
benefactor. Among the conspirators, more than 60 in all, were 
Caesarians such as D. Brutus, a man enjoying Caesar's peculiar 
favour, and ex-Pompeians, such as Ligarius. The dictator had 
already disregarded rumours of mischief on foot, and he did so 
still. At last a day was fixed for the deed. On the Ides {15th) 
of March the Senate was to vote on a proposal to grant Caesar 
the formal title of King for the purpose of the Parthian war. 
It was agreed that, as senators, here was their chance. No 
warnings availed to deter Caesar from coming to that meeting. 
Even a written information he laid aside unread. The assassins 
surrounded him and slew him. On his body 23 wounds inflicted 
by their daggers were afterwards counted. The senators who 
were not partners in the plot at once fled. It remained to be 
discovered whether the death of the ' tyrant ' meant the ending 
of the tyranny. 

613. It was in Caesar that the great confused movement, 
which we call the Roman Revolution, reached a logical result. 
Reformers and agitators had failed. They had weakened the 
aristocrats, whose corrupt and inefficient government was making 
a republican system impossible, but had not overthrown them. 



472 Caesar's career [ch. 

On the other hand, Sulla's reaction had also failed, and no one 
had done more to undermine the institutions of the Republic 
than Pompey. The career of Caesar is remarkable for its 
consistency. He was first and foremost a politician, and from 
first to last he was opposed to the republican nobles, who were 
exploiting the empire of Rome for their own profit and glory. 
Experience had shewn that reform could only be achieved, and 
efficiency restored, through the continuous possession of power, 
and that the necessary power could only be attained by the 
pressure, and at need the use, of military force. Otherwise there 
was nothing to be done but to acquiesce in things as they were. 
This Caesar would not do : therefore he sought in political life 
enough power to overcome opposition. For a time the coalition 
with Pompey and Crassus served his turn. When it came to an 
end, and his enemies were seeking to destroy him, he had to 
prepare for destroying them, in case they would not give way. 
He had to lay aside the demagogue for the soldier. Whatever 
may or may not have been the scope of his personal ambition, he 
had now no choice but either to become a hunted exile or to win 
supremacy with the sword. 

614. We shall see that Caesar overthrew the aristocracy so 
thoroughly that it was impossible to restore the government on 
the old footing. He might spare the vanquished, and then fall 
by their daggers ; they could not really revive the Republic. 
Granting his many signal merits, Roman opinion tended on the 
whole to justify his m.urder, as guilty of treason to his country. 
But this view we can hardly accept now. A later generation 
might idealize the republican system, and ignore the corruption 
and iniquities that made it utterly intolerable in Caesar's time. 
It might represent him as the sole author of its overthrow. We 
can see that he merely gave effect to causes long at work. We 
have seen economic changes undermining the whole fabric of 
society, and the decay of the moral forces which had of old been 
the very life-blood of the state. Greek influences had destroyed 
the old-fashioned simplicity and obedience in most of the upper 
classes : the intellectual gain was the property of few, of none 
more than Caesar. He had caught the inquiring and critical 
attitude of Greek thinkers with great thoroughness, and no 
man was better able to detect shams. It was surely in part his 
contempt for shams that prevented his becoming not only the 



xLiii] and character 473 

founder, but the builder, of the Empire. The sequel of his death 
shewed clearly that he had underrated the practical obstacles to 
the establishment of a lasting monarchy. After the long and 
bloody agonies were over, and his grand-nephew was left supreme, 
it was necessary to return to the old ways of sham and make- 
believe before the New Monarchy could be secure. 

615.' Our record depicts Caesar as tall wiry and handsome, 
in fact as looking what he was, a Patrician descended from the 
old nobility of birth. Even his enemies confessed his charm of 
manner. Soldiers and women alike worshipped him. In an age 
of excess he was temperate. In a polished society he was a 
prince of politeness. In literary company no man was more 
at home, and his whole career shews that he was well able to 
hold his own with specialists of many kinds. But no characteristic 
is more clearly marked in him than his calmness of nerve and 
freedom from vanity. He seems to have had no fear of death. 
He certainly took no pains to avoid it. Of his own loyalty and 
honour he gave frequent proofs, and from his own point of view 
he was surely a true patriot. But, when once resolved on any 
course of action, he knew few scruples, and went straight to his 
end. Take him for all in all, he was indeed one of the greatest 
men known to us in the history of the world. 



CHAPTER XLIV 

FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO RESTORE 
THE REPUBLIC. 44—42 B.C. 

616. It is impossible to give here more than a very brief 
sketch of the events by which it was made clear {a) that the 
Roman Republic was not really alive, and {p) that there was no 
power able to revive it. These two points are the subject of the 
present chapter. The later struggle, in which it was decided who 
was to be master of the Roman world, does not come within the 
scope of this book. We may begin by stating the main topics 
on which our attention will have to be fixed. They are 

(i) the rise and predominance of Antony, 

(2) the return and progress of Octavian, 

(3) the relations between Antony Octavian and Cicero, 

(4) the collapse of Cicero's policy, and the formation of the 

Triumvirate, and 

(5) the doings of the Triumvirs. 

Our record of these years comes, directly or indirectly, from 
violently partisan authorities. To ascertain the truth is therefore 
a matter of the greatest difficulty. 

617. While the conspirators, having no plans for further 
action and finding no spontaneous support, occupied the Capitol, 
the consul Antony was not idle. He could rely on a number 
of discharged veterans, and he joined forces with Lepidus, who 
had a legion at hand. Caesar's widow gave up to him all the 
memoranda and the cash left by the dictator. On the 17 th March 
the Senate met. Many were interested in the maintenance of 
Caesar's arrangements, but most were in favour of the murderers. 
The result was a compromise. A general amnesty was decreed, 



CH. xLiv] The sequel of the murder 475 

but the acts of the dictator were declared valid. Thus Antony, 
who held Caesar's note-books, was left in a position of vantage. 
It was also agreed that the will of the deceased should be read 
in public, and that he should have a public funeral. No steps 
were taken to punish the murderers. These inconsequent pro- 
ceedings stultified the policy of assassination. Caesar, it appeared, 
was after all no 'tyrant.' Antony made sure of Lepidus by 
promising him the vacant chief pontificate. Dolabella, who was 
to have succeeded to the consulship when Caesar departed for 
the East, and had been hindered by Antony, was now conciliated 
by the withdrawal of opposition. Thus a strong anti-republican 
combination was formed. 

618. Soldiers and mob were uneasy at the removal of Caesar, 
and the reading of his will only excited them more. He had 
left his pleasure-gardens as a public park, and a gift of money 
(about ;^3) to every citizen. By the will C. Octavius was adopted 
as his son, and made his chief heir. Among others mentioned 
was D. Brutus. The trust shewn in this man, and others of the 
murderers, roused popular indignation. Antony in a funeral 
speech inflamed the rage of the multitude. The body was burnt 
in the Forum, and great riots followed. The murderers fled for 
their lives, and the republican majority in the Senate were left 
in a diflficult position. They had lost their more resolute leaders, 
and could do little to check the proceedings of Antony. Antony's 
policy was to defer the coming struggle. He pleased the Senate 
by proposing the perpetual abolition of the dictatorship, by sup- 
pressing disorders in the city, and other measures. But meanwhile 
he was preparing to make profit out of Caesar's papers. He is 
said to have forged additional documents. Thus he had at 
disposal a vast number of grants of privileges and immunities, 
for which he could exact bribes and so strengthen himself 
financially. He also seized a large sum of public money stored 
in a temple. Dolabella had a share, and the two acted in 
harmony. Recent disturbances gave Antony an excuse for raising 
a military bodyguard. But in April young Octavius arrived in 
Italy, bent upon taking up his inheritance at all risks. From this 
boy (as they thought him) men feared and expected little or 
nothing. Even Cicero had no suspicion that the cool and 
subtle youth was more than a match for an old and experienced 
consular. 



47^ Octavius appears in Rome [ch. 

619. Cicero had left Rome, already disgusted with the turn 
of events. The death of the ' tyrant ' had not restored the 
Republic. The Senate had blundered. The ' heroes ' (Brutus 
and Cassius) were helpless. Though praetors, they dared not 
appear in Rome. Caesar's acts were valid, for instance the 
appointment of D. Brutus to Cisalpine Gaul, of which province 
he had gone to take possession. There was still trouble in Syria, 
and Sextus Pompey had not only a strong fleet but was now 
master of the Further Spain. So alarming was the progress of 
Sextus that Antony sent Lepidus to pacify him by great con- 
cessions. The armies abroad were commanded by nominees of 
Caesar. In the event of war all depended on their attitude; 
and war was in prospect, for Antony did not mean to leave 
D. Brutus in the Cisalpine. The veterans in Italy could not 
be neglected, and Antony tried to meet their wishes by planting 
a colony in Campania. But he soon had to return. Octavius 
had reached Rome at the end of April, and was making way 
fast. He accepted Caesar's liabilities and claimed his inheritance. 
Finding that he could not recover what Antony had already spent, 
he sold his own properties and raised loans. Then he made a 
start with payment of legacies. By this and other instances of 
discretion he inspired confidence and gained popularity. In 
short, he was already a dangerous rival to the careless Antony, 
whose generosity to dissipated associates was apt to be a mere 
waste of resources. There was much friction produced by the 
quarrel over Caesar's estate. Meanwhile Octavius was commonly 
recognized as Caesar (C. lulius Caesar Octavianus), though his 
formal adoption was not completed till August of the following 
year. 

620. Antony now wanted to get the provincial appointments 
made for the year 43. Caesar had meant Macedonia for him and 
Syria for Dolabella. But Antony wanted to have both Gauls. 
He also wanted a tenure of more than the two years allowed 
to ex-consuls by Caesar's recent law. He doubted the com- 
pliance of the Senate, and turned to the Assembly, which he 
was able to overawe. On the ist June the two Gauls were 
granted to him, and Syria to Dolabella, for six years each ; he 
was probably also given the command of Caesar's legions now 
in Macedonia. He was in a very strong position. But his main 
strength lay in the support of the veterans in Italy, and it was 



xLivJ Antony in power 477 

most important to keep his hold on them. No serious republican 
movement was on foot. Cicero was seeking an excuse to go 
abroad. The two ' heroes ' claimed credit for their peaceful 
behaviour, but the truth was they had no means of resisting 
Antony. Brutus did not even dare to shew himself in July at 
the games of Apollo, which he was bound to conduct as city- 
praetor. His outlay was to no purpose : Antony's brother 
C. Antonius presided in his stead. Antony had already contrived 
to have unimportant provinces assigned them for the year 43. 
Meanwhile they were offered the duty of procuring corn, Brutus 
in Asia, Cassius in Sicily. They were very angry, but in the end 
they had to use the commission as a way of escape to the East. 
There was in fact nothing to be done in Italy or in the West. 
In the struggle now imminent the two 'heroes' bore no part. 
Cicero, who was in Italy till the middle of July, sought some 
relief from the worries of the time in literary work. But he had 
not yet broken with Antony and Dolabella : indeed he did not 
scruple to accept favours from them, though he deeply regretted 
that Antony had not shared the fate of Caesar on the Ides of 
March. 

621. There were the faint beginnings of a hope that young 
Octavian might take up the republican cause in order to get 
the better of Antony. At present nothing came of it. In the 
summer there was a kind of lull. The manifold affairs of private 
life went on. Antony was busy exploiting the 'acts of Caesar' 
to his own profit. Brutus was vainly dreaming of regaining 
popular favour and returning to Rome. His folly and narrow- 
minded bitterness moved the contempt of Cicero, who sailed 
for Greece on the 17th July. The voyage was stopped by foul 
winds. News of a rally of republicans, and of a great meeting 
of the Senate to be held on the first of September, drew Cicero 
back to Tusculum. In Rome the shadow of the coming conflict 
was disturbing the money-market, and there was much uneasiness. 
To this we shall presently return. Meanwhile Antony and his 
two brothers, Gaius and Lucius, were in power. The Senate 
could not check his proceedings. But Octavian still firmly 
pressed his claims as Caesar's heir, and the name of Caesar 
was popular with the veterans. For his designs, Antony wanted 
more troops, so he sent for the four legions from Macedonia. 
To strengthen himself in Rome, he embarked on various projects, 



478 Antony, Cicero, [ch. 

in most cases with little or no result. Two laws were notable as 
being contrary to Caesar's legislation. One restored the third 
panel idecurid) of juries, and made it consist of centurions ; a 
shameless introduction of the military into the public courts. 
The other allowed persons condemned by juries to appeal to the 
Assembly ; a flagrant violation of the principle ' on which the 
authority of the jury-courts rested. Whatever little good the 
quaestiofies might be able to do, would be annulled by this mad 
resumption of a solemnly delegated power. 

622. On the 31st August Cicero entered Rome, and on the 
first of September the struggle with Antony began, famous in 
literary history as the occasion of the series of speeches to which 
the name 'Philippics' is given, borrowed from that of the speeches 
in which Demosthenes assailed Philip of Macedon. On that 
day Cicero did not appear. In proposing further honours to 
the deified Caesar, Antony uttered a sharp warning, that Cicero 
would not be allowed to hold back. In short, the- old statesman 
must shew his colours. Next day the Senate met again, and 
Cicero criticized the absent Antony. But his efforts to avoid 
abuse could not hide the fact that the two were irreconcileably 
opposed. He contrasted Antony's earlier acts with his later ones, 
his misuse of Caesar's note-books, his arbitrary destruction 
of the public courts. It was quite impossible for Antony to put 
up with such an attack. On the 19th he replied by a scathing 
denunciation of Cicero, exposing all the inconsistencies and errors 
of the orator's public career. Cicero feared assassination, but 
remained for the present in Rome, corresponding with some of 
the governors in command of armies abroad, and trying hard to 
induce them to lend their support to the Republic. He hoped 
to make it once more a reality, and without the aid of the 
commanders of troops he did not see his way. 

623. At the end of September Brutus started for the East, 
and Cassius soon after. Till they made head, the only hope of 
the remaining republicans lay in the chance of a breach between 
Antony and Octavian. Rumours abounded : the truth was that 
Octavian, dissembling more cleverly than Antony the intention 
to punish Caesar's murderers, allayed the fears of many, and 
gained favour. Meanwhile he was tampering with Antony's 
veteran bodyguard : in short, the young Caesar, and Caesar's 

1 See §§ 290, 442. 



xLiv] and Octavian 479 

great marshal, were rivals. In October Antony went to meet 
his four legions at Brundisium. Octavian responded by raising 
troops in Campania. Money was the chief thing needed for the 
purpose, and it is evident that he received financial support. He 
not only raised large numbers of men, but sapped the loyalty 
of Antony's troops, by his liberal largesses, far greater than those 
his rival was offering. On their way northwards, two of the four 
legions openly declared for Octavian. When the leaders met 
in Rome, there was no fighting. Octavian formed a depot in 
Etruria, where his men, young soldiers and veterans, were 
embodied and trained. He meant to make use of the Senate, 
and professed a wish to cooperate with that body. It was now 
November. Cicero, who was in the country, mistrusted his 
intentions, and was not yet prepared to come and lead the 
House on the lines of a joint policy. Antony, who was in a 
hurry to eject D. Brutus from the Cisalpine before the opposition 
became serious, and who had still difficulty in satisfying the 
demands of greedy soldiery, left Rome for the North about the 
end of the month. The republicans could now take action, 
provided they found an armed force at their disposal. 

624. Now Octavian had a force, and was willing to appear 
as defender of Rome by coalescing with the Senate. And the 
Senate was willing to use Caesar's heir against Antony. Cicero 
had just put the last touches to his Second Philippic, a written 
reply to Antony's attack on him. But this most famous of 
Roman pamphlets could do little more than provoke applause. 
The question of the moment was the policy of combination with 
Octavian. Cicero and the rest saw no other course open, and 
evidently had no notion that the ' boy ' was coolly using them 
for his own purposes. The republicans had meant to employ 
a tool : they had really accepted a master. So December went 
by ; Cicero busily writing to confirm the loyalty of provincial 
governors, such as L. Munatius Plancus in the Further Gaul, 
and urging D. Brutus to stand firm in the Cisalpine. As to the 
feeling of Italy he was under delusions. There was no real 
republican enthusiasm among the mass of the free population, 
and the wealthier burghers of the country towns were of small 
importance in a time of war. On the 20th December Cicero 
openly took the lead of policy in the Senate. He carried 
resolutions in which a state of war was recognized and opposition 



480 The situation, East and West [ch. 

to Antony provided for, with a vote of thanks to Octavian and 
the two legions that had gone over to him. In short, Antony 
was defied, Cicero had (as he says) 'laid the foundations of a 
Republic,' and was at last to all appearance the first man in 
Rome. But all this was hollow ; it meant no real strength. It 
was not for the patriot orator to confess that the Republic was 
virtually dead, and to sit down tamely without a struggle. His 
effort was splendid but futile. Even the Senate only followed 
him timidly, and there was a Caesarian minority. The one gainer 
by his policy was Octavian. 

625. Meanwhile Antony had driven back D. Brutus and 
shut him up in the fortress of Mutina. With the new year 
A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa became consuls. From the first 
to the 4th January 43 a debate went on in the Senate. Cicero 
fought hard for a forward policy, encouraging D. Brutus and 
preparing for his relief, praising the young Caesar as their loyal 
champion and granting him the imperium of a . propraetor to 
legalize his command of state troops. But the House was 
nervous and in the end it was agreed to send an embassy to 
warn Antony out of the Cisalpine on threat of war. Antony 
replied by contemptuous proposals, not meant to be accepted, 
and early in February it was at last voted that a state of war in 
Italy (tunmltus) existed. Cicero tried to rouse the Senate to 
prompt and decided action, but they were not easy to move. 
Nor was there much sign of help from provincial governors. No 
one was inclined to run great risks for the cause of the Republic. 
Plancus in Further Gaul would not cross the Alps to rescue 
D. Brutus. He was waiting to see what was most to his own 
interest. Lepidus, who held the Hither Spain and Narbonese 
Gaul, had been in league with Antony after Caesar's death, and 
was suspected of leaning towards him still. Others were either 
isolated or doubtful. And so the West was waiting. In the East 
Brutus and Cassius were making great progress. The governors 
in general were not disposed to become Antony's men. Caesar 
was dead, and Octavian's position not clearly defined or under- 
stood. The governors were senators, and the real wishes of the 
Senate were represented by Brutus and Cassius. The two had 
as yet no formal commission to raise troops and occupy provinces 
in the name of the Republic. But, in default of an autocratic 
master, the moral support of the Senate was just now of value, 



xLiv] Mutina 481 

and it soon appeared that some of the men in command were 
loth to oppose the republicans. Brutus was to secure Macedonia, 
which he did with surprising ease. In a short time he held the 
whole Balkan peninsula with a strong army. The forces stationed 
there had joined him, and he raised more. Cassius had equal 
good fortune in Syria. Early in May 43 he had 11 or 12 legions. 
A strong fleet was being got together, and vast sums of money 
wrung from the peoples of the East. The province of Macedonia 
had been assigned to C Antonius, and Syria to Dolabella. But 
the republicans treated these appointments as null, and ignored 
the minor provinces (? Crete and Cyrene) assigned to themselves. 

626. Meanwhile Cicero was facing the Caesarians in the 
Senate. He carried a motion for appointing Brutus to a general 
command in Macedonia and the adjoining countries, and hoped 
to find in his army a support against Antony in Italy. He seems 
to have been blind to the fact that Octavian was playing his own 
game, and would not wish to see the Republic saved by an army 
under Brutus. The Senate was hard to manage. They voted 
Dolabella a public enemy on the ground of his high-handed 
proceedings in Asia on his way to Syria ; but Cicero could not 
get them as yet to recognize Cassius in the same position of wide 
command as Brutus. In the early months of the year the war 
in the Cisalpine dragged slowly along. Mutina was still besieged. 
Hirtius and Octavian could as yet make no impression on Antony. 
In March Pansa also went to the seat of war. Cicero and his 
party were nervous, not without reason. Letters from Lepidus 
and Plancus advised peace : but things had gone too far for 
compromise. Antony was defiant, and a letter of his, commented 
on by Cicero, shewed that he well understood the situation. To 
Cicero it proved that no terms could be made with Antony. 
But its main point was to warn others (above all Octavian) that 
a revival of the Republic under Cicero would not suit their 
interests. It was a clever move, though it had no immediate 
effect. The war went on. Cicero still trusted Octavian, and 
hoped for some help from the young Pompey. The old statesman 
was beset with troubles. Tiresome republicans worried him by 
obstruction in the Senate. And Mutina was now (in April) nearly 
starved out. 

627. Yet the place did not fall. On the 15th a battle on 
the line of the Aemilian road ended in the defeat of Antony by 

H. 31 



482 Victory means defeat [ch. 

the armies of Hirtius, Pansa, and Octavian. Pansa was wounded. 
On the 2ist Antony was utterly beaten before Mutina, and the 
siege raised. But Hirtius fell in battle, and soon after Pansa 
died. It might seem that the republican cause had triumphed : 
in truth it was simply ruined. The three armies looked to 
Caesar's heir as their real head. Caesar's heir would have 
nothing to do with Caesar's murderer, D. Brutus. The men 
released from Mutina were quite unfit to move. Octavian would 
not move. Therefore Antony escaped. In his retreat westward 
toward Genua he was even joined by a force of three legions, 
raised in Italy by an adventurer. But the men in Rome fancied 
that they had now only to gather the fruits of victory, and they 
went to work under a complete misunderstanding of the situation. 
They declared Antony and his men public enemies. Their 
blindness was shewn in the treatment of the two surviving com- 
manders. The highest honours were voted to D. Brutus, who 
was to command the armies of Hirtius and Pansa, and to pursue 
Antony. Octavian was to have only the ovatio or minor triumph. 
Cassius was recognized as ruler of the further East, and Sextus 
Pompey appointed to the charge of the naval forces. So the 
republicans shewed their hand. To complete their victory they 
summoned Lepidus and Plancus to close in on the beaten Antony 
from the West and North. The one thing they succeeded in 
doing was in giving a warning to Octavian. The young man 
must either put up with a humble position, or shift for himself. 
They were rash enough to offer him further humiliations. Vainly, 
for the soldiers adhered to him, and scorned D. Brutus. There 
was a temporary deadlock in the North, and secret negotiations 
were carried on, by which the whole situation was dramatically 
changed. 

628. The truth was that the repubhcans had no army at 
their disposal. The death of the two consuls both hampered 
the government and transferred their two armies to the young 
Caesar. The rank and file cared nothing for political differences. 
A commander they must have, and their present commander, 
from the first devoted to his own interest, was now estranged 
from the republicans by ill-timed provocation. D. Brutus was 
helpless, indeed in great danger : this the men in Rome, mis- 
judging the intentions of Octavian, could not see. Plancus was 
waiting. He did not relish the prospect of Antony in supreme 



xLiv] M. Brutus 483 

power, but he would incur no risk. Lepidus was already in 
treaty with Antony, and actually joined him at the end of May. 
The army of M. Brutus was far off, but Cicero talked of sending 
for it to protect Italy. Two legions were expected from Africa. 
In short, the game was up. For Octavian was secretly treating 
with Antony and Lepidus, while M. Brutus had made up his 
mind not to come over from Macedonia to the support of Cicero. 
In ignorance of these things the Senate declared Lepidus a public 
enemy. His property was forfeited to the state. Money, it is 
true, was desperately needed ; but this open declaration of war to 
the death was the still more desperate act of a losing cause. 

629. Why would not Brutus come? Partly because a dis- 
agreement on a question of policy had come between him and 
Cicero. He did not share the latter's extreme hatred of Antony. 
He disliked the coalition with Octavian, and objected to the 
young Caesar's promotion. He was a pedant judging things 
from a distance, unable to make allowance for the circumstances 
that had made concessions necessary. So there was a grave 
misunderstanding between the two republicans. Brutus blamed 
Cicero for his real or rumoured dealings with Octavian : Cicero 
blamed Brutus for lenient treatment of his prisoner^ C. Antonius. 
Meanwhile their common cause was perishing in the summer 
of 43. There was another influence telling on Brutus. A half- 
sister of his was married to Lepidus. In Roman society these 
family connexions were powerful. Brutus heard that Lepidus 
was outlawed, and he was more concerned to protect the interests 
of his relatives than to march boldly at the eleventh hour to back 
up Cicero's policy, in which he detected blunders. And now, in 
July, it was doubtless too late, for things in Italy had gone too 
far. There were now three great forces under arms, waiting and 
watching. D. Brutus had at last managed to join Plancus. They 
had 13 or 14 legions of various quality and doubtful temper. 
Antony and Lepidus were at least as strong, and they could 
afford to wait, having more confidence in their men. Octavian 
in the Cisalpine had also a great army. He was popular with 
the troops, and negotiations with Antony went on. The one 
thing that all the soldiers wanted was money. Now the republican 
government in Rome, despite frantic efforts to raise money, was 

^ Captured by Brutus in Macedonia. Antony had made over that province 
to this brother. 

31—2 



484 Octavian in Rome [ch. 

practically bankrupt. There is no reason to think that cash 
abounded in the camps of Antony or Octavian. The question 
was rather, whose promises offered the best security in the event 
of their victory ? Clearly it was more easy to fix responsibility 
on individuals than on a body like the Senate. Therefore it was 
more easy for an Antony or an Octavian to retain the loyalty of 
his army, than it was for the republican D. Brutus or the wavering 
Plancus. 

630. August came. A military deputation appeared in Rome, 
to demand payment of promised bounties, and the consulship for 
Octavian. They also claimed the repeal of Antony's outlawry. 
These claims were refused or evaded. The return of the deputa- 
tion enraged the army, and Octavian marched upon Rome with 
about 40,000 men. His coming was the sign for a general collapse. 
Concessions made in the flurry of impotence were futile. The 
troops in the city went over to Octavian, and multitudes poured 
out to welcome him. Cicero fled to Tusculum. The forces 
of Brutus and Cassius were all that remained to represent the 
Roman Republic. The young Caesar took matters in hand at 
once. A special arrangement was devised for holding an election, 
at which he was made consul with Q. Pedius, his relative. Some- 
how money was found and the soldiers received their bounties. 
His adoption was formally completed, and Caesar's outstanding 
legacies paid off. A lex Pedia set up a special court for the 
trial of all concerned in the dictator's murder. Prosecutions at 
once began, resulting in outlawries and confiscations, for the 
accused mostly did not appear. Among the accusers was a 
young man afterwards famous, M. Vipsanius Agrippa. Octavian 
was now consul, though not quite 20 years of age. The Senate 
voted him the legions of D. Brutus, and urged him to raise 
more, and to march against Antony and Lepidus. There was 
now only one practical solution of the present problem, how to 
meet the immense forces collected by Brutus and Cassius. This 
was a coalition with Antony. So he returned northwards, leaving 
Pedius in charge. Plancus abandoned D. Brutus, who perished 
in an attempt to escape to the East. Pollio, from the Further 
Spain, came to terms with Antony. Antony reentered the Cisal- 
pine at the head of 17 legions. Under careful precautions (for 
there was mutual mistrust) he with Lepidus met Octavian near 
Bononia. Their interest was to agree, and two days' discussion 



xLiv] triumviri. End of Cicero 485 

sufficed to complete a scheme for taking possession of the Roman 
world. 

631. Their programme was as follows. The three were to 
be united as triumviri rei publicae constituendae formally appointed 
by law as joint holders of arbitrary power. Their functions and 
shares of empire were for the present fixed. Lepidus was to 
have Narbonese Gaul and the whole of Spain. He was to be 
consul in 42, and to remain in Italy, while Antony and Octavian 
went to meet Brutus and Cassius. Antony took the Cisalpine 
and the Further Gaul. Octavian was assigned Africa and the 
islands, a poor share at this juncture. These provinces were not 
yet in their power, and Sextus Pompey's fleet was a serious bar 
to their occupation. Yet to command an army on equal terms 
with Antony was for him more important than a better territorial 
share. Antony was of course for the moment the chief partner, 
so he took the provinces strongest in military resources. The 
soldiers were promised great rewards; particularly 18 Italian 
towns, in which they could find homes by ejecting present 
possessors. Italy was thus marked for treatment as a conquered 
country. The armies were delighted with all these arrangements, 
which were publicly announced. But the measure designed for 
effecting two of their main objects was not at once made public 
by the Three. They meant to prevent any republican reaction 
by removing all possible leaders : they would not err, as Caesar 
had erred, by an unpractical clemency. Moreover, they needed 
vast sums of money to discharge their debts and pay the expenses 
of the coming war. Therefore they had agreed on a proscription, 
A first hst of a few inveterate opponents was sent to Rome: these 
men were to be put to death at once, and among them was 
Cicero. The orator met his death bravely at the last. He had 
indeed run his course. In the coming autocratic government 
there was no place for such a man. As to his public career there 
has in modern times been much difference of opinion. I have, 
as occasion offered, tried to set forth fairly his merits and defects 
as a statesman. In the last stage of his political life he staked 
his all on the effort to revive a Republic dominated by the aristo- 
cratic class who had already deserted him once in time of trouble. 
The great houses had never any real love for the clever 'new 
man ' : that he should die in their cause, after suffering from their 
timidity and neglect, was one of the most tragic of historical ironies. 



486 Proscription [ch. 

632. Late in November the triumvirs entered Rome, and 
carried out their programme deliberately. The chief business 
was the proscription. The methods of Sulla were followed and 
improved upon in some details. An edict stated the reasons that 
had made a thorough clearance necessary, and guaranteed the 
public against disorderly massacre. All would be done in order. 
Black-lists appeared in due course. The impossibility of telling 
when the end had been reached both intensified and kept 
alive the terror. It is said that in all about 300 senators and 
2000 knights were doomed to death. The need of money was 
the underlying fact of this horrible business. Malice and revenge, 
selfish cowardice, the desire to earn rewards or to acquire coveted 
properties, all played a part as in the days of Sulla. Instances 
of treachery and loyalty, in freemen and slaves alike, supplied the 
same striking contrasts. Some were killed in mistake for others. 
Some of the destined victims managed to escape and join Sextus 
Pompey or Brutus and Cassius. Among those who perished was 
old Verres in his exile at Massalia. Among those who escaped 
was the learned Varro. A notable fact of the time was the safety 
of the wealthy Atticus. His policy had long been one of 
neutrality in this age of revolutionary changes. He had kept 
on good terms with the party at any time in power, and had 
earned the gratitude of the beaten side by timely help. He had 
protected Antony's family from the republicans. He had sent 
money to Brutus in trouble. So this judicious Friend in Need 
was able to be useful to others ; and this was his practice to the 
end of his life. 

633. But to confiscate estates was one thing; to sell them 
for a good cash price was another. Holders of ready money 
were naturally shy, and the sum realized by the sales was far 
short of the estimate. To meet the deficit, it was decided to 
tax the properties of wealthy ladies. This led to an indignant 
demonstration on their part, and a great speech of protest by 
their leader Hortensia, daughter of the orator. And they actually 
gained some abatement of the tax. But the need of money was 
still not met, and a number of other measures were devised to 
exact more. Meanwhile Italian towns were suffering from the 
presence of troops billeted in them, inconsiderate and irresistible. 
Villainous creatures of the triumvirs, freedmen and others, were 
for the time the ministers of absolute power : whatever evil deeds 



xLiv] Civil war 487 

might be done here or there, unhappy citizens had little prospect 
of redress. 

634. In arranging for the administration of provinces and 
the home government in 42, the rulers acted arbitrarily. Further 
steps were taken to emphasize the deification of Caesar. On the 
spot in the Forum where his body had been burnt a temple 
(aedes divi luli) was erected in his honour, and various special 
observances decreed. The coinage, on which in Caesar's last 
days his head had been placed by the Senate, was now stamped 
by the triumvirs, first with their family symbols, and then with 
their heads. This, as in the eastern kingdoms, was destined to 
be the normal assertion of supreme power. Meanwhile great 
preparations went on for the coming war, and Octavian tried to 
take possession of his provinces. Africa was gained by the help 
of a Numidian prince, but Sicily fell into the hands of Sextus 
Pompey, whose fleet, manned by refugees robbers and desperadoes 
from all quarters, made all the western Mediterranean unsafe. 
An expedition to dislodge him from Sicily was a failure. He had 
to be left in possession when Antony and Octavian set out for 
the East. 

635. Brutus had raised more forces in the Balkan country, 
and with his strong army had occupied Asia. Cassius had 
destroyed Dolabella, and was on friendly terms with the Parthians. 
The two met in Asia Minor, and were masters of all the Roman 
East. Their fleets commanded the sea, and their war-chests were 
filled with the money extorted from the subject peoples. They 
were ready to meet their adversaries, but the matters above 
mentioned kept Antony and Octavian long employed and delayed 
the final struggle. Brutus and Cassius were aware that a naval 
campaign would be in their favour. Indeed a republican squadron 
did operate in the Adriatic so as to annoy the triumvirs. But the 
republican leaders could not wait for concerted action with the 
freebooter Pompey. Their legionaries would not have under- 
stood such strategy, and would have imputed it to fear. To 
retain the confidence of the men it was necessary to fight a 
pitched battle. So it was decided to cross the Hellespont and 
meet the enemy in Macedonia. Brutus and Cassius were an 
ill-assorted pair, but they worked together better than might 
have been expected. The triumvirs were able to take their 
forces over the Adriatic in two trips, but had afterwards much 



488 Philippi [ch. 

difficulty in feeding them. So great was the advantage of the 
repubhcans in this respect, owing to the support of their fleet, 
that, when the armies at length lay facing each other near Philippi, 
Cassius was in favour of delaying the battle. Antony, for the 
same reason, was eager to bring matters to an issue at once. 
The camps were close to the coast, stretching across the great 
Egnatian road. Cassius on the left faced Antony, and it was on 
this side that the result was decided. Cassius had the worst of 
the first battle, and a misunderstanding led him to take his own 
life under the impression that Brutus too was beaten. Brutus 
had been victorious on the right. But with the death of Cassius 
the republicans lost their best soldier. Then followed about 
20 days of waiting, which was still in favour of the republicans. 
Brutus however had no longer the authority needed to control 
his officers and men. About the middle of November he gave 
way to pressure. The second battle of Philippi ended in the 
victory of the triumvirs after a fierce struggle. Brutus and others 
who were past mercy killed themselves or each other. Of the 
captured officers some were put to death : others, for instance 
Horace, were spared. The surviving soldiers were added to the 
armies of Antony and Octavian. 

636. The republicans had now fought their last battle. The 
settlement of the question, who was to be master in the Roman 
world, is part of the story of the Empire. A few points in the 
sequel of Philippi call for brief notice. Lepidus soon fell into 
the background. In 41 his sphere of government was limited 
to Africa. The two chief partners shared the rest. Antony took 
the East, and followed the oriental precedents of the Successors 
of Alexander. It was agreed that he should extort more money 
from the subject peoples, and his exactions, following those of 
Brutus and Cassius, were the cause of much misery. He was to 
have remitted large sums to Rome, to enable Octavian to meet 
the cost of disbanding troops and other liabilities. But his own 
extravagance and the pilfering of his worthless favourites left an 
insufficient surplus. He became the slave of Cleopatra, and 
gradually lost the qualities by which he had risen. His partner 
returned to Italy, and faced the difficulties and dangers of the 
situation. Of these the greatest was the provision for the peaceful 
discharge of more than 150,000 soldiers, some of them barbarians 
in Roman service. There was not the money to satisfy their 



xLiv] The soldiers and the land 489 

claims in cash. They insisted on allotments of land in Italy, and 
refusal was impossible. There was not the money to buy lands 
for the purpose. So there was no choice but to extend the 
promises of towns for occupation to the whole of Italy, including 
the Cisalpine, now formally recognized as Italian. It had to be 
done. A general expropriation followed. We have no lack of 
references to this cruel business. Vergil and Horace have left a 
record of their losses. But we have no statistics of the wholesale 
robbery which seems to have gone on in most parts of Italy. We 
may infer that the interruption of tillage added to the widespread 
distress. Nor surely was it from the economic point of view 
a gain that so much of the best land in Italy changed hands. 
Even if great estates were broken up, we find them again in the 
imperial age. 

637. It remained to create an effective and consistent govern- 
ment, under which the empire might recover from the wasteful 
mismanagement of the past. In Italy peace was the first necessity. 
The military system urgently needed a complete remodelling. It 
was in the frontier provinces, not in Italy, that armies were 
required. There it was a duty to assert the power of Rome; 
for the peoples that had looked on at the Roman civil wars would 
not wait passively for ever. A standing army under suitable 
conditions of regular service and provision for retirement was the 
only way of meeting the need. The provincial administration 
called loudly for reform. Individuals must no longer be allowed 
to make a temporary private profit by destroying the permanent 
resources of what were (as Cicero said) the 'landed estates of 
the Roman people.' To carry out these and other necessary 
changes, a central and continuous control was indispensable. 
The coming problem was how most surely to establish such a 
control. This problem the coming ruler, once he was found, 
must try to solve. The experience of Caesar was a warning 
against too frank and hasty a procedure. In the year 31 the 
battle of Actium gave the empire to Octavian. We will briefly 
consider below his method of creating an Empire by transforming 
the Republic, so far as it comes within the scope of this book. 



CHAPTER XLV 

LITERATURE AND JURISPRUDENCE AS ILLUSTRATING 
THE LIFE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 

638. The story of the revolutionary period, particularly the 
later part of it, differs from that of earlier times in one important 
respect. Surviving literature furnishes contemporary, or very 
nearly contemporary, evidence of the events and feelings of that 
troubled age. Some of it gives us a vivid day-to-day picture of 
public and private life. Such are many of the letters of Cicero 
and certain of his friends ; such are some of the poems of Catullus. 
The personal and partisan bias of these utterances is of course 
extreme, and they need to be used with caution, but it is always 
instructive to learn how things appeared to prejudiced observers, 
when the nature of their prejudices is not a matter of doubt. 
We have also more information as to the jurists who flourished 
in this period. And it is necessary to call attention to this most 
worthy class of men, whose quiet usefulness may easily be over- 
looked in reviewing the long noise and disorder of the revolution. 

639. The treatise on rhetoric addressed to Herennius, 
produced soon after the death of Marius in 86, is a practical 
technical work. The fact of its production is in itself important. 
It reminds us of the growing demand for oratorical training to 
meet the requirements of senatorial debates, pleadings in court, 
and popular harangues. The book contains many references to 
events of Roman history from the ' popular ' point of view. As 
most of our authorities are on the aristocratic side, the survival 
of this witness is a welcome help, especially in the period from 
the Gracchi to Sulla. In connexion with this topic we may note 
the unfortunate loss of the works of the Roman orators other 



CH. xLv] Cicero as author 49 1 

than Cicero. No department of Roman literature was so fertile 
as this. A few little fragments remain, quoted by later writers. 
But (to mention only a few great names) we can form no notion 
of the oratory of the great rivals M. Antonius and L. Crassus, 
contemporaries of Marius, or of Hortensius and Julius Caesar. 

640. There is no need to say much of the speeches of 
Cicero. As historical evidence, the utterances of a skilled 
advocate are always to be received with suspicion, for the needs 
of the moment are supreme, and we are not to look for im- 
partiality accuracy or consistency. Nor need we dwell on his 
letters more than to note the wide difference of tone between 
those written in confidence to such an intimate friend as Atticus 
and the guarded or formal epistles addressed to persons with 
whom he felt less at ease. His treatises are to be noted, not 
only from the point of view of literary merit and intrinsic value, 
but also as being his refuge and occupation in seasons of distress. 
They belong almost entirely to the years 55 — 44. For the greater 
part of that period he had little scope for oratory : helpless and 
cast down by the aspect of public affairs, he sought relief in his 
books and pen. His treatises are on various subjects. The 
rhetorical works deal with practical oratory rather than technical 
rhetoric, and are peculiarly valuable from the unrivalled experience 
embodied in them. Historically they are of great importance. 
He has large views as to the mental training needed for ensuring 
great and genuine success. No industry is too much. Among 
other objects of study, the formation of a pure and unaffected 
Latin style holds a high place. This was also a hobby of Caesar, 
and on this ground the two men could meet in sympathy. They 
fixed the standard of classical Latin. But we are not to forget 
that classical Latin was the language of a very few. 

641. Political theory was another of his subjects. In treating 
topics of this kind his remains (for no complete work survives) 
are of much less value. He is too full of Roman traditions and 
prepossessions to be a satisfactory theorist ; yet much of interest 
is to be gleaned from these writings, which enjoyed a great vogue 
in Roman society just before the great civil war. But most of 
his philosophical discourses are concerned with the moral and 
theological questions on which he sought to enlighten his country- 
men by presenting Greek thought in a Latin dress. His own 
earlier choice had led him to the New Academy, a school content 



492 Caesar [ch. 

to aim at probabilities and prefer doubt to dogma. This suited 
an orator in training : as a Roman public man he needed some- 
thing more positive. In later life he inclined to the so-called 
Old Academy, an eclectic blend of the views of several schools. 
The two schools most influential in Rome were the Stoic and 
Epicurean. Cicero's position as a writer was that of a critic. 
He had no hesitation in condemning the school of Epicurus, but 
he did not become a Stoic. He had a deep sympathy with the 
Stoic pantheism, and loathed the agnostic Epicurean theology. 
Epicurean ethics seemed to him unmanly : the lofty moral system 
of the Stoics, despite its perversity, he admired. So he treated 
of such questions as the Supreme Good and Happiness in the 
spirit of a patriot, conveying in readable form to Romans what 
he judged to be most wholesome in the philosophy of Greece. 
These works were produced in a great hurry and in circumstances 
of sorrow and depression. That he was not a profound thinker, 
and that much of his interpretation was superficial, is generally 
admitted. But the general tone, even of his minor essays, is 
good and noble, and his enduring reputation as a moral writer 
is due in no small degree to the fact that the great Roman was 
something more than a mere copyist of Greeks. 

642. Of Caesar as politician, soldier, statesman, and language- 
reformer we have spoken above. Among his lost works it is 
worth noting that he wrote Anticato, a counterblast to the 
panegyrics on Cato that appeared after that worthy's death. 
Such was Caesar's method of encountering political opposition ; 
for he was not a Sulla. We have only to consider him here as 
a witness to the events of his time and his own part in them. 
First, I would freely admit that he makes the best of his own 
case. But, while making large allowance for this bias, we must 
not lose sight of his frank recognition of his own errors and of 
the good luck by which he was on occasion enabled to retrieve 
them. His ingenuous manner may be a delusive effect of con- 
summate art. But we have no right coolly to assume that stray 
details more or less loosely reported by later writers, and somewhat 
differing from Caesar's own version, are drawn from contemporary 
sources not tainted by prejudice. These notices must be judged 
as critically as the story of Caesar. As to the main facts of his 
wars there is no reasonable doubt. Hirtius and the unknown 
writers who wrote the later narratives are far inferior in literary 



xLv] Varro 493 

merit. They are useful witnesses, and of interest also as giving 
specimens of the sort of Latin written by commonplace Romans. 

643. No writer illustrates the transition of Republic into 
Empire better than the learned M. Terentius Varro. Born in 
the Sabine country 116 B.C., he died 27 B.C., and saw through 
the whole course of events from Marius to Augustus. His public 
life was one of departmental duty, military and civil. In private 
he was an omnivorous student, a man of facts. He was a 
republican, though pardoned by Caesar in Spain and afterwards 
treated with honour, but was not one of the murderers. Pro- 
scribed in 43 for the sake of his wealth, he escaped with his life. 
When the Republic was clearly at an end, he conformed to the 
new ruler, and was protected by Octavian. His later years were 
passed in study, and he was confessedly the most learned man of 
his time. Industry and efficiency were his great qualities. He 
was never on intimate terms with Cicero : their two temperaments 
were indeed mutually incompatible. 

644. The works of Varro were numerous, and many of them 
bulky. In the earlier part of his life he produced a number of 
occasional pieces in verse or prose or mixed, under the general 
name of saturae Menippeae, miscellanies modelled more or less 
on the writings of the Greek Menippus. From the fragments 
we gather that he was a severe critic of contemporary society, as 
satirists are. But there is plenty of other evidence to bear out his 
charges. Most of his books were special treatises in various 
departments of knowledge, historical, antiquarian, technological. 
From these later writers quarried ready-made erudition. Part of 
his work on the Latin language has come down to us, bringing 
many details of great interest to students of the institutions of 
early Rome. We have one treatise practically complete. Fortu- 
nately this is that on rural industries, from which we are able to 
learn facts of importance concerning the state of rural Italy. He 
wrote it in his 80th year, and he drew from three sources, his 
own wide experience, the works of predecessors Roman Greek 
and Punic, and the conversation of practical men. 

645. The de re rustica is divided into three books (i) on 
tillage (2) on ordinary stock-farming (3) on the rearing of fancy- 
animals for profit. Profit is from first to last Varro's object. 
The villa is to be an old-fashioned country house and farm, not 
a fine modern country seat. Like old Cato, he is a foe to all 



494 Roman husbandry [ch. 

waste. In all appliances due proportion must be observed, and 
precautions taken to keep off disease and vermin. On the farm 
order and thrift must prevail. The precepts for actual manage- 
ment of the estate include medical and legal rules for avoiding 
loss. In the first two books the progress made since Cato's time 
is seen mainly in a wider knowledge of the products and usages 
of foreign lands, and the introduction of new species, particularly 
of animals. But it is to the kind of farming described in the 
third book that the great economist looks for his solid profits. 
What really pays is to keep and fatten for market the birds, 
minor quadrupeds, and fish, desired by the gourmands of Rome. 
The luxury of the age was to Varro a deplorable fact. But there 
it was. To a man able to execute at short notice a large order 
for (say) peafowl or edible snails, the extravagance of public and 
private banquets promised handsome returns. So Varro took 
things as he found them. 

646. The treatise clearly contemplates large-scale husbandry 
as normal. Small farmers are briefly referred to, and one instance 
of success on a small scale is given, that of a bee-farm. But the 
typical farm is not a broad plantation tilled by gangs of chained 
slaves, the crude system of which we hear so much in the days 
of the Gracchi. The spread of knowledge had evidently done 
something to improve agriculture, and great proprietors commonly 
owned several estates in different parts of Italy, and in the 
provinces also. Variety of soil and climate acted as some 
guarantee against total failure in any year. But the labour 
employed was almost wholly that of slaves. The free wage-earner 
only appears as employed where some special intelligence is 
required, or where unhealthy surroundings would damage the 
property of the master in the person of the slave. The bailiffs 
and overseers are all slaves, and the discipline of the whole 
company is strict. For fear of slave-mutinies it is well not to 
keep too many of the same nationality. Yet it is on hope rather 
than fear that Varro would chiefly rely for efficient labour. The 
upper slaves should have something to lose ; for the rest, the less 
use of the lash the better. 

647. In short, the system of Varro offers no prospect of 
reviving the old race of Italian yeomen. The past was past, and 
after a century of agrarian legislation and civil wars Italy was 
both economically and politically very different from what it had 



xLv] Lucretius 495 

been in the days of the great Punic war. The increase of slavery 
had degraded free labour. Choice spots were often occupied by 
the mansions and parks of the rich, who visited them only now 
and then. To such landlords Rome was the centre of all things : 
a country-house was a fancy, and some perferred a marine villa 
with costly fishponds on the bay of Naples. Those who did 
keep farms were doubtless wiser, and for them Varro wrote. But 
we are not to think of Italy as all under cultivation, whether for 
pleasure or profit. There were in the wild uplands large areas of 
summer pasture. Flocks and herds had to be ever protected 
from wolves, and brigandage was one of the recognized perils of 
the country side. Against this pest the farmer had to defend his 
own, for the government gave him no help. Such in outline is 
the Italy depicted by Varro. 

648. An observer of a different type, who yet confirms in 
various points the notices of Varro, is the poet Lucretius. He is 
said to have lived 96 — 55 b.c. His poem on the 'nature of 
things' is a splendid attempt to convert Romans to rational 
principles of life according to the system of Epicurus. To him 
the evils of contemporary society seemed the fruit of inordinate 
desires of every kind, desires created by an utter ignorance of the 
nature of the universe and the conditions of human happiness. 
Happiness depends on maintaining mental repose, which alone 
makes men capable of the refined pleasure that is to the Epicurean 
the one pure good, the guide of Hfe. Man is made up of body 
and soul, and his life is nothing but their union. Both body and 
soul are material, and mortal. Death is their separation. The 
man is dead for ever, but the matter of his body and soul does 
not die. It passes on to form part of other things, which are 
subject to dissolution in their turn. What is true of man is true 
also of the earth. The alternating process of destruction and 
construction never ceases. The sum of matter ever remains the 
same, infinite and eternal. Two things only have a real existence, 
Atoms and Void. Atoms account for the solidity of material 
objects, Void for the fact of motion. Their mixture in varying 
proportions explains the various degrees of hardness softness etc. 
detected by our senses. Now, if death and birth are merely steps 
in a never-ending series, and if man's wants are (as experience 
shews) very small, why should we not calmly bow to the inevit- 
able? Why do we not content ourselves with kindly Nature's 



496 Catullus [ch. 

boons, and pass our allotted span of life in rational comfort 
and joy? 

649. To Lucretius the vain superstitions of the popular 
mythology appeared the chief poison of humanity. To remove 
these delusions, and clear the ground for rational principles of 
life, he preached the gospel of Epicurus. Under the Atomic 
system all need of supernatural activity is eliminated, and a 
cool scrutiny reveals the unreality of popular myths. A calmer 
attitude of mind is the result. We shall be able to repress the 
passions that now make havoc of our lives. In an atmosphere of 
Epicurean serenity the mad and bloody competition of modern 
Rome will cease, the excesses of luxury and the extravagances of 
foolish love will pass away. We have no reason to think that 
the doctrines set forth in this philosophic poem, had any serious 
effect on Roman society. Its sublimity in parts reaches the 
highest level attained by any Roman author, and there is 
evidence that its merit was recognized. But to a. historian its 
chief importance lies in the bold exposure of contemporary evils. 
Lucretius was a free-spoken patriot, at times a sharp satirist. To 
judge the worth of satirists as witnesses is usually difificult. In 
the case of Lucretius we have some help. As an observer of the 
phenomena of animate and inanimate nature he impresses the 
reader by the alertness and intensity of his study. We may guess 
that he carried his watchful love of truth with him when taking 
notes among the Romans of his day. His picture strongly 
confirms the accuracy of those drawn by other writers of the 
restless and unsatisfactory life of the revolutionary age. 

650. In the occasional poems of C Valerius Catullus we see 
Roman life from another point of view. Catullus came of a 
Roman family settled at Verona in Transpadane Gaul. He went 
as a youth to Rome, and was soon absorbed into the gay and 
dissolute society of the capital. Reckless amours were the 
fashion, and he soon attached himself to a lady whom he calls 
Lesbia. There is little doubt that she was Clodia, the fascinating 
and notorious sister of P. Clodius. Catullus was but one of 
a train of ' fast ' youths whom this fickle charmer drew after her ; 
but with him passion ran deep, and the affair had a fatal effect 
on his whole life. Directly or indirectly, love is the motive of 
most of his poems. His freely-expressed feelings range from 
hope and elation to disillusionment and despair. He lived about 



xLv] Sallust 497 

87 — 54 B.C. In his later years the shameless profligacy of Lesbia 
filled him with pain and disgust. He began to take more interest 
in public matters, and his sympathies were with the republican 
aristocrats. One of his notable lampoons is a coarse and 
vehement attack on the coalition of Caesar and Pompey. But 
his chief historical importance is as a painter of fashionable 
society from the inside. He depicts not only its serious vices, 
but also its follies and trifling, and its minor social crimes and 
failings ; and has no mercy for literary pretenders and bores. 
Short pieces, among them epigrams, were the staple of his 
writing : such was the taste of the day. Like others, he was 
greatly influenced by Greek models, and he boldly adapted Latin 
to a number of Greek metres. But his wit and warmth, his 
freshness and grace, were all his own. His gross personalities 
and frank obscenity were the habit of the age : men claimed the 
right to say anything of anybody without regard for truth and 
decency. Orators like Cicero, poets like Catullus and his friend 
Calvus, must needs use their freedom, and they did. A time 
was coming when the expression of men's opinions and feelings 
would be bridled by irresistible power. For the present there 
was social anarchy. Literary freedom ran to licence, and 
put no restraint upon the utterance of love and hate, of grief 
and joy. 

651. In another department of literature Greek models were 
awaiting Roman imitation. History had as yet hardly in Latin 
got beyond mere annals or narratives of a very simple kind. In 
Greek many readable works existed, in which dramatic structure 
and moral effect were a great part of the writer's design. None 
was of more universal repute than the history of Thucydides. 
It was this famous composition that Sallust attempted to rival. 
He at least set the fashion of writing history as a work of art, and 
of placing moral purpose before detailed accuracy. He was born 
in the Sabine country, and lived 86 — 35 B.C., from Sulla to 
Octavian. There were stains on his character, but he was a 
successful man, thanks to his connexion with Caesar, and very 
wealthy. In retirement after Caesar's death he wrote his works 
dealing with Roman history. How far and in what sense his 
claim to impartiality is to be admitted, is matter of some doubt. 
He was in many respects a typical man of the transition-period. 
It is characteristic that he feels the degeneracy of the age, and 

H, 32 



49^ Civil Law [ch. 

laments the decay of the farmer class in Italy, though he has 
himself a hearty contempt for agriculture and rural life. He 
was evidently one of those whose interests were centred in 
Rome. 

652. That our record of Roman history is very imperfect 
and onesided, admits no doubt. How little we know of the 
common everyday interests, the ordinary concerns of ordinary 
men, is manifest when we reflect that the narratives of ancient 
historians very seldom refer to the civil law-courts and that only 
four of Cicero's surviving speeches deal directly with civil cases. 
Yet it is certain that, with a fev7 interruptions, the administration 
of the civil law was in full activity all through the turmoil and 
strife of the revolutionary age. The civil law in the strict sense 
consisted of the Twelve Tables, supplemented by such additions 
and changes as had been made by later statutes. But these 
taken together seem to have been but a meagre body of law, 
most of it expressed in very general terms. By far the greater 
part of the growth of the law was due not to legislation but to 
interpretation. Whenever an old principle was extended so as 
to cover a new class of cases, there was growth. The interpreters 
were originally the pontiffs, for ancient law and religion were 
closely connected. In course of time non-pontifical jurists 
appeared, but the pontiffs still held a leading place in what was 
perhaps the most consistently honoured of Roman professions. 
The skilled jurist as such held no office. He was a private 
adviser. If he happened to be a praetor, he might use his official 
powers to make some improvement in practical legal remedies, 
which would hold good during his year of office. But praetors 
were many, jurists comparatively few. The ordinary way by 
which the influence of jurists became operative was this. A 
praetor destined for juridical duty in the coming year had to 
issue a public notice {edictiini) setting forth the principles by 
which he would be guided in administering the law. Considera- 
tions of his own convenience and credit warned him not to take 
this important step without the advice of a skilled jurist. 

653. It was through the edicts that most of the development 
of the civil law took place. The process was very gradual. The 
power of precedent was great, and praetors were slow to depart 
from the policy of their predecessors. So the bulk of the edict 
(probably often the whole) was simply copied from that of the 



xLvJ and Jurisprudence 499 

last praetor. When a change did creep in, it was only of force 
for the year ; but, if adopted by successive praetors, it soon 
became itself a precedent, and passed into the legal system. The 
changes made under the influence of the jurists were generally 
in the direction of removing the hardships arising from verbal 
quibbles and too pedantic construction of the law. It was a 
great work unobtrusively carried out by men intellectually and 
morally above the average. We have above noted the attraction 
that the Stoic philosophy possessed for Roman lawyers. Now 
and then we have come upon cases of such men setting noble 
examples in various departments of public life. No more honour- 
able characters appear in Roman history than the pair of Stoic 
lawyers, Scaevola the pontiff and Rutilius Rufus, who for a brief 
space ruled the province of Asia on principles of justice. Equity 
then was the child of jurisprudence, destined to a great develop- 
ment in later times. The jurist's influence was also felt in the 
present practice of the courts. In any case where technical 
points of law were involved, the opinions of legal specialists 
could be cited or given in person. The weight of such an 
opinion would depend on the reputation of the expert who gave 
it. It was private advice, not official ruling, whether the jurist 
appeared to support the contention of a party to the suit, or acted 
by invitation as assessor to the magistrate. 

654. Among the topics that engaged the attention of jurists 
we may note all questions connected with property, matters of 
contract, transfer, title, and successions intestate or testamentary. 
The last often involved questions of religious obligation, though 
the object in view was often to devise a decent way of evading 
the performance of sacra at the tombs of forgotten ancestors. 
An important subject in ancient Rome was the law relative to 
the status of persons, such as women^ minors, and freedmen. 
The names of many of the eminent jurists of the revolutionary 
period, and the special departments in which they severally 
laboured, are known. It is enough here to mention Cicero's 
friend Servius Sulpicius Rufus, who was the first to produce large 
systematic treatises, in which he began the process of generaliza- 
tion, a stimulus to later writers. C. Trebatius Testa, also a friend 
of Cicero, was an authority on wills. He was a younger man, 
and lived to be a friend of Horace. So the civil law, soundest 
and best of Roman institutions, was kept alive, and handed on to 

32—2 



500 Capacity for reform [ch. xlv 

its development under the Empire, by the force of its practical 
usefulness and its capacity for change. In the latter respect it is 
in striking contrast with the political institutions, which, as we 
have seen, were overthrown by the sword. The obsolete con- 
stitution of a city-state had to go ; for it contained no mechanism 
for achieving its own reform. 



CHAPTER XLVI 

FROM REPUBLIC TO EMPIRE 

655. It is now well to consider briefly the state of Rome 
and the Roman dominions at the time of the fall of the Republic. 
Taking a few main points, let us see what sort of conditions the 
new government inherited from the old, and in what respects the 
disguised monarchy changed them. It will be convenient to 
begin with the city of Rome and pass on to Italy and the 
provinces. 

One would expect to learn that the capital of the civilized 
world was a splendid city. For more than 150 years Rome had 
been the centre to which the tribute of subjects had been drawn. 
In recent years the progress of annexation had been accelerated 
under the influence of greedy financiers, and the Romeward 
stream of money flowed in ever-increasing volume. Fines, war- 
indemnities, and the produce of looting, in greater or less amount 
accompanied the advance of conquest. Organization brought 
with it the imposition of yearly dues, whether fixed payments or 
percentages farmed out to speculative collectors. Yet it is certain 
that republican Rome was still a city of mean appearance, com- 
pared with the ancient splendours of Athens or the magnificence 
of later royal capitals such as Antioch or Alexandria. Even the 
statues robbed from Tarentum or Syracuse, Corinth or Pergamum, 
must have lost much of their charm for lack of appropriate 
setting : moreover they were not all exhibited in public, for the 
great nobles had appropriated some to decorate their courts and 
gardens. Here we touch the reason why no amount of wealth 
was able to make Rome a capital worthy of a great empire. It 
was not merely that in artistic sense the Roman was inferior to 
the Greek. There was also a political cause at work. In principle 



502 The city of Rome [ch. 

the Roman government might be based on popular sovranty. 
We have seen that in practice it was normally aristocratic. We 
have traced the steps by which it became utterly corrupt, and 
noted how the new nobility of rank and wealth ruled by manipu- 
lating an Assembly that more and more came to consist of an 
urban mob. This process was inevitably costly. In course of 
time it became ruinous. Coupled with the growth of private 
extravagance, it drove the Roman nobles to lay their hands on 
every resource of enrichment lawful or unlawful, and in the fierce 
competition of public life supply could not keep pace with 
demand. 

656. Legislation was powerless to check this evil. The 
revival of activity in the Assembly under demagogic leaders only 
led to more bribery and corruption, while the increase of luxury 
and refinement stimulated the rich to spend more on their own 
mansions and establishments. But this outlay did little or 
nothing to improve the aspect of the Roman streets. The new 
splendour was all on the inside. Houses might occupy larger 
sites and consist of more than a single court. The normal front 
was a dead wall with a single entrance guarded by a slave-porter. 
Behind it was a little kingdom to which the public were not 
admitted, a sphere in which, despite the relaxation of the old 
family-law, the pater fa7nilias was still supreme. Meanwhile the 
need of providing for the accommodation of a growing pauper 
population was fast changing the poorer quarters of the city, 
mostly on the lower ground. Tenement-blocks of flats or chambers 
were rising, to find room for more persons on a given area. The 
upper storeys of wood were liable to the risks of fire, the ground- 
floors of sun-baked brick were liable to give way when soaked by 
a flood : and both these dangers were real enough. Huddled 
together in these ' islands ' {insulae) the poor lived as best they 
might. The blocks were owned by rich capitalists, who drew 
substantial rents from cheaply-built tenements. So marked a 
feature of the city were they, that Caesar took them as convenient 
units when ascertaining by inquiry the number of persons in 
present receipt of the doles of corn. 

657. Small comfort was surely the lot of the dwellers in 
these ' islands ' opening on narrow streets, crowded with a noisy 
throng. The rich more and more monopolized the better sites 
on the Roman hills, which then rose far more abruptly from the 



xLvi] Public works. Forum 503 

lower levels than they do now. In the matter of public works 
the revolutionary period was a time of slackness. The public 
treasury was drained by the expense of the corn-supply as well as 
by the cost of armies. The revenues derived from the provinces 
might have been much larger than they were in fact. It was not 
the Senate's policy to burden the subjects with excessive tributes. 
It was the policy of individual senators to leave a good margin, 
from which they when their turn came could wring out fortunes 
for themselves, while enough remained to glut the appetite of the 
capitalist revenue-farmers. The mob got their share by bribes 
and entertainments which were now carried out with reckless 
extravagance. Economy had to be practised somewhere. There 
were four aqueducts, of which only one {Tepula 127 B.C.) comes 
within this period. The building of stone bridges went on very 
slowly. Only one of the public halls {basilicae) belonged to this 
age, for Caesar's basilica lulia was completed by Augustus. The 
conservative opposition to the erection of stone theatres actually 
promoted extravagance, without checking the taste of the people 
for excitement. Temporary wooden structures were very costly 
to put up and take down; above all, costly to decorate. Won- 
derful stories are recorded of scandalous outlay on such things. 
Pompey at last overcame the opposition, and erected in 55 a 
permanent stone theatre. 

658. Omitting many details, we must refer to the very 
crowded state of the Forum. In and around this low-lying space 
most of the events of public life occurred. Courts of law, Assem- 
blies for legislation, speeches addressed to mass-meetings, all 
took place there. It was far too small for the Rome of the later 
Republic. And the increase of banking establishments (for it 
was the chief centre of business), with offices planted in every 
available corner, served to cramp movement. Yet it was in the 
Forum that gladiators still fought and stands were erected for 
privileged spectators. The extension of public buildings and 
enclosures to the campus Martins beyond the walls was begun, 
but had not gone far as yet. One department of public building 
calls for special remark. Not only were the temples built in the 
period of revolution few in number : those existing were sadly 
neglected, and some were falling into decay. Even the restora- 
tion of the Capitoline temple, burnt in the time of Sulla, was 
scandalously slow. 



504 Rome and the Empire [ch. 

659. It was the work of the Empire as established by 
Augustus to improve and adorn the imperial capital. With the 
cessation of outlay on electoral corruption a great source of waste 
was closed. With better administration of the provinces the 
state enjoyed a larger and more regular revenue. Augustus not 
only employed public funds in the execution of public works, but 
encouraged wealthy men to come forward as benefactors in the 
same kind. Many of his successors followed his example, and 
by the middle of the second century a.d. Rome, that is the 
public parts of the city, was splendid enough. To enlarge on 
this topic is beyond the scope of this book. But the spirit in 
which Augustus began the building-movement is to be noted as a 
comment on the apathy of the preceding century. We find it 
expressed in the utterances of the poets, such as Horace and 
Vergil, who enjoyed imperial favour through the great minister 
Maecenas. It was their function to represent the new system as 
a golden age, a return to older and nobler ways, -in contrast to 
the selfish neglect of public duty characteristic of more recent 
times. The emperor himself boasted of his achievements, and 
before his death placed them on record in an inscription of which 
the greater part has survived. In no department was his policy 
more clearly marked than in that of the restoration and building 
of temples. In this he went beyond the schemes of his great- 
uncle : in utilitarian works the designs of Julius the chief pontiif 
were more directly his model. The provision of an organized 
fire-brigade, and measures to lessen the evil of floods by removing 
obstructions from the bed of the Tiber, were corollaries of his 
building-policy. In limiting the height of buildings he followed 
a principle which a republican reformer^ had vainly sought to 
enforce. In short, the republican government had left the 
emperor everything to do for the improvement of the city of 
Rome. 

660. The political condition of Italy in general was what 
the results of the great war of 90 — 89 B.C. and the civil war of 
Sulla had made it. Italians had now a double franchise ; the 
Roman, exercised at Rome only, and the local, exercised in their 
several places of domicile. Of the former few could make regular 
use, and its value mainly consisted in the privileges attached to 
it, such as the qualification for public office, and the legal status 

1 P. Rutilius Rufus. 



xLvi] Italy 505 

which gave to a civis Romanus a favoured position in all parts of 
the Roman world. The latter made him a burgess of his own 
local community, with a voice in its affairs. In practice the 
Roman franchise now went with the local. Local governments 
had been established even where they did not previously exist, 
and the country, unified as Roman, was well provided with 
administrative centres. Differences of title, due to past history, 
remained. But the general style was tnunicipium, and the adjec- 
tive in use for ' local ' was municipalis. The normal type of 
constitution, with its magistrates senate and assembly, was of the 
Roman model, and in practice worked as a selfish aristocracy of 
wealth. The central government seldom intervened in disputes 
between the local Boroughs, and there was in fact little or no 
central control. The reliance of the republicans in the great civil 
war, and of Cicero in the struggle with Antony, on the support of 
the municipia, was not justified by results. The local burgesses 
were locally-minded, and mostly unwarlike. Nor had Roman 
pride sincerely accepted perfect equality with citizens of municipal 
origin : the remains of old feeling now and then betrayed them- 
selves in sneers. 

661. Some change in the direction of increased central 
control was certain to come with the establishment of the new 
system. But for some time Augustus did not interfere with the 
Senate in its general oversight of the affairs of Italy. He only 
took matters in hand when compelled by necessity. But in the 
restoration of order it was impossible to overlook the chronic 
evils by which the prosperity of the rural districts was impaired. 
They were the outcome of slavery. Brigandage was an ordinary 
risk of country life. Footpads sometimes pHed their trade near 
Rome on the high roads. We have seen that runaway slaves 
were the army of Spartacus. But another horrid abuse was 
created by the demand for more labour than the slave-market 
could supply. Freemen as well as slaves were kidnapped, and 
added to the slave-gangs. That Augustus should have had to 
deal with such abominations shews us how completely the selfish 
neglect of the ruling aristocrats had made the republican system 
a monstrous anarchy. The rich man travelled with a slave-escort : 
the poor must take their chance. In the matter of the great 
land-question the chief point to be noted is the change in its 
character. The Gracchan movement aimed at planting the poor 



5o6 Provinces [ch. 

on public land resumed by the state. Its failure was followed by 
a great extension of private property. Then agrarian projects 
took the form of purchase-schemes. Civil wars introduced a new 
phase, the confiscation of private property. In this process, with 
all its cruelty, Augustus in his earlier years had borne no incon- 
siderable part. Things had now to be left to settle themselves, 
as death or arrangements between old and new holders bit by bit 
removed friction, and a stronger government gave titles more 
permanence. 

662. This is not the place to describe the changes brought 
about in provincial government by the establishment of the 
Empire. What the state of things was in the latter days of the 
Republic, we have seen above. Speaking generally, the abuses 
of the old system arose from the lack of effective control over the 
men in authority. This control the new system to a great extent 
supplied. Augustus shared the provincial patronage with the 
Senate. That the Senate was less able than the Emperor to 
control the governors of its provinces, was due to its own weak- 
ness : that it did so at all was mainly due to the irresistible 
pressure of the Emperor. The provinces had been public pro- 
perties exploited by temporary despots for their private profit : to 
convert them into well-managed estates under trusty agents, 
prosperous and bringing in a steady income to the central 
government, was not the work of a day. Governors had to be 
kept in their posts for longer terms ; they had to be paid salaries, 
and forbidden to plunder. The system of farming out the 
collection of state-dues had to be ended. The middleman must 
give place to the official, and the official taught to act as the 
servant of the state. On the whole the strong central power, 
conscious of its own interest, did effect these reforms. So far 
as an improved machinery, promoting continuity of administration 
and confidence, could add to the happiness and security of the 
provinces, the change of system was an unmixed boon. An 
important step in the process of unifying the empire was the 
improvement of communications. This meant not only the ex- 
tension of the roads, but the proper regulation of their use. 
Under the Republic influential persons procured licences to 
travel free, as though on state service, though their journey 
was really for private purposes. This was a grievous burden 
on the provincials who had to find the means of transport. 



xLvi] Army 507 

This abuse also Augustus remedied. He organized a posting- 
service on a military model, with strict regulations, the beginnings 
of a regular Imperial Post. The gradual development of an im- 
perial Civil Service was promoted thereby, and another need, 
neglected under the Republic, was supplied. 

663. Closely connected with the provincial arrangements 
was the army-question. From the lack of taking large imperial 
views the republican government had never organized a standing 
army for purposes of defence. Armies were raised by proconsuls 
for some immediate object, and kept under arms for many years. 
The men became professional soldiers, and the ever-recurring 
problem was how to reabsorb them peaceably into the civil 
population. This drifting policy was a wretched adherence to 
old notions of enlistment and service, quite out of date since 
the time of Marius. Veterans made endless trouble in Rome 
and Italy, while the frontiers of the Roman dominions were left 
open to invasion. This state of things could not have lasted 
long. Augustus, probably just in time, ended it. He created 
a standing army, quartered in strong detachments at important 
strategic points, and provided a system for regular retirement 
after fixed periods of service. This plan not only stationed the 
imperial forces where they could be most useful : it was an im- 
mense relief to Italy, which had suffered so much and so long 
from the presence both of armies and of disbanded soldiers. 
Only a guard for the Emperor as Commander-in-chief was kept 
near Rome. Under Augustus they were few, and not all quar- 
tered together. His successor brought them all to Rome, where 
they learnt their power. The doings of these famous Praetorians 
are a part of the imperial history. 

664. It is most difficult for us to grasp the situation in the 
Mediterranean world at the time of the fall of the Republic, and 
to bear it constantly in mind. From the Euphrates to the strait 
of Dover Rome had no rival. The conquered peoples had waited 
during the great civil wars to ascertain with whom the supreme 
power in the Roman dominions was to rest. They could not 
stand alone and prosper; and there was no other organized 
government to command their respect and to give them pro- 
tection. Before circumstances could force them to shift for 
themselves as best they might, Augustus took the empire in 
hand, and restored the direct control of Rome. This he did 



5o8 The Empire and Roman sentiment [ch. 

so effectively that his system remained, with small modifications, 
for nearly 300 years. That is, the empire remained one, and was 
ruled from Rome. But we must never forget that this union was 
mechanical. No Roman nation was ever formed. The empire 
was not a blending of peoples sharing common traditions and 
hopes, a vital unity from which no part could be torn without 
fatally weakening the whole. Incorporation by conquest had 
been the work of the Republic, at first unwilling, then willing : 
under the Empire it continued for some while yet. The true 
nature of the system was shewn when decay had gone so far that 
loss of territory was inevitable. Provinces had to be abandoned, 
but the main fabric of the empire remained. Constantinople be- 
came the capital. The one civilized power was still the greatest 
of single powers, and proved capable of more than one notable 
revival of efficiency. 

665. But outside Rome (now including Italy) Roman senti- 
ment was an artificial thing. It had really nothing in common 
with the stolid loyalty of early Romans, the race whose sterling 
quaHties had built up the Roman state under free institutions, 
and whose degeneration or dispersion had made the Republic 
impossible. As the armies were more and more filled with men 
of alien blood (and the process went on fast) Italy became more 
and more conscious of her own unimportance. The weakness 
already to be detected in the time of the civil wars gradually 
became sheer impotence. Augustus, a conservative wherever 
possible, made it his policy to favour Italy. But he could not 
stay the course of tendency; the central imperial land was cut 
up into provinces at last. In Rome as the capital Roman senti- 
ment of a kind lingered long among the upper classes. But it 
mainly rested on a basis of delusions. The republican freedom 
of speech was of course at an end, and men who found restriction 
galling in the present were led to idealize the past. Not content 
with worshipping Cato, who was out of date in his own day, some 
honoured the memory of Brutus and Cassius and their contemp- 
tible accomplices. A milder folly was the attempt to make Pompey 
into a republican hero, and to discover in the corrupt Senate of 
the later Republic a pure and dignified patriotic council. High- 
minded men, who would surely have loathed the abominations of 
Cicero's time, deceived themselves with these partial misconcep- 
tions, and gave respectability to the vain discontents of an Oppo- 



xLvi] Cosmopolitan population 509 

sition which Emperors could not tolerate. Conspiracies began 
under Augustus, and suspected treason was the cause of the cruel 
persecution of literature under Tiberius. A last outbreak of re- 
publican madness led to the deaths of Seneca and Lucan under 
Nero. So long-Hved was the fond belief in the virtues of the 
Republic for which Cato and Cicero had died. 

666. In the latter days of the Republic Rome was already 
on the way to become a cosmopolitan city. Manumission of 
domestic slaves added numbers of aliens to the ranks of the 
civic body, and these freedmen were a class of whom it is not 
easy to form a clear notion. We may assume that they were as 
a rule past the middle of hfe, and that they were mostly Orientals, 
with the temperament and superstitions of the Hellenistic East. 
It was mainly the slaves of this supple and ingenious type that 
were able to win the favour of their Roman lords. Under the 
Empire there was certainly no falling-off in the numbers of this 
class. And the number of free Greek adventurers, medical 
practitioners, technical specialists, and teachers of all sorts, not 
to mention astrologers and impostors in general, increased rapidly 
when once the great market for their talents was securely open 
to them in an age of Imperial peace. Among the upper classes 
Hellenism had gone far under the Republic. Learning, literature, 
arts, morals, all were under Greek influences. Yet the Roman 
nobles in general despised Greeks, and upheld the superiority of 
the Roman character. Civil wars and childless marriages thinned 
out the republican nobility. The surviving great houses could 
not play a great part in the Imperial system. The demand was 
for industrious and able men willing to be obedient and contented 
in a secondary position. Men of humbler origin fell more readily 
into place in the civil and military services, and the subordinate 
business-duties were more and more monopolized by Greek freed- 
men, who by sheer usefulness rose sometimes to great heights of 
power. 

667. Greek influences meant specializing influences, and the 
transition from Republic to Empire is perhaps most clearly to be 
noted from this point of view. What had been a tendency long 
at work in the affairs of individuals now became operative in affairs 
of state. The assumption that any citizen (in practice any noble), 
so long as he could secure enough votes, might safely be entrusted 
with any important duty, had been the guiding principle of the 



5IO Principate [ch. 

Roman aristocrats from the first. The growth of the state, and 
the greater complexity of public interests, had made this principle 
more fatally inadequate in proportion as it became more established 
as their rule of policy. The whole story of the revolutionary period 
shews the need of efficiency expressed in popular indignation at 
failures. Marius and Pompey were brought to the front when 
aristocratic mismanagement could be borne no longer. Caesar 
made efficiency the first qualification for trust, and the central 
power, once established, was of course directly interested in the 
fitness of its subordinates. It was therefore on the whole far 
better served than the old government had ever been. The 
danger of the new system lay in its tendency to crystallize, to 
become too rigid, and unable to adapt itself to changed circum- 
stances, as it departed further and further from the republican 
pattern. 

668. Augustus did not destroy the Republic. Practically 
it had come to an end under Caesar's autocracy and the trium- 
virate. He transformed it by reverting to the old Roman method 
of Make-believe. He was First Citizen {princeps). The term 
was not new : men had used it of Pompey in the days of his 
predominance. Nor was it an official title, but use soon made 
it virtually so. The Principate expressed itself by concentrating 
in a single person the essence of powers extracted from the chief 
republican magistracies, and supplementing them by a few pre- 
rogatives specially-conferred as needed. Caesar's method of 
holding several offices, in particular the SuUan dictatorship, was 
judiciously avoided. But, when the same man held the full 
tribunician power in Rome and the full proconsular imperium 
throughout the empire, the actual holders of office were placed 
in a position wholly different from that of their republican pre- 
decessors. They changed from time to time. The princeps, who 
took the style of imperator as his personal first name (praenotnen), 
went on. Augustus (to give him his honorary title) might disguise 
the fact of his supremacy in a mass of fictions. The truth re- 
mained that he was the real source of the driving-power that kept 
the imperial machine at work, and that he could at will turn it 
off or on at any point in the vast empire. Meanwhile he shrank 
from engrossing functions that others seemed able to perform, 

66g. The Senate not only remained, being indeed at first 
indispensable, but even received the added dignity of direct 



xLvi] Senate, equites. Mob 511 

legislative and judicial power. Its administrative powers have 
been referred to above. Augustus treated it with great respect, 
and was very unwilling to interfere with it. But by a right of 
precedence in speech he could give the House a lead in all 
matters of moment, and he could block any proposal by tribuni- 
cian veto. In form an honoured member, in reality he was its 
master. The Equestrian Order had some compensation for the 
lost gains of revenue-farming. A system of useful offices in the 
imperial service, distinct from those tenable by senators, was re- 
served for them. The Assembly ceased to pass laws. Of its 
judicial power it was formally deprived. It still nominally elected 
magistrates under Augustus, but this power was transferred to the 
Senate by Tiberius. These few details are enough to shew how 
effectually the republican constitution was converted into a virtual 
monarchy. Modern writers often speak of it as a Dyarchy, or 
rule of two coordinate authorities. Emperor and Senate. This 
is correct enough, provided we bear in mind that there were not 
really two sovrans. The one could always override the other in 
case of a difference. How loth the Emperor was to seem arbitrary 
is well seen in the matter of the chief pontificate. The post was 
desired by Augustus, who was bent on reviving the observances 
of the state religion. Yet he left Lepidus in possession till his 
death in 12 B.C. 

670. There was one institution, inherited from the Republic, 
which the Empire could neither abolish nor reform. It was the 
city mob. It could not be abolished. A lifeless capital of the 
great world-power would have been an absurdity. In the head- 
quarters of sovranty a populace was necessary : it was out of the 
question to erect more and more splendid buildings only to look 
down upon silent streets. Emperors had therefore to continue 
the practice of feeding and amusing the rabble, and soon began 
to build great permanent structures for popular entertainment 
and luxury. Circus, amphitheatre, baths, the imperial fora with 
their colonnades, are specimens. The presence of many thou- 
sands, however idle and worthless, had its value in the mere 
turmoil and applause that impressed provincial or barbarian 
visitors, whose reports of the doings in the great and wicked 
city were carried into far-off lands. It was only necessary to see 
that this mob of loungers did not take themselves seriously as 
populus Roma?2us and meddle with affairs of state. A few com- 



512 Conclusion [ch. xlvi 

panics of city-troops were enough to secure this, and the Emperor 
had his Guard. So order was better maintained than under the 
Republic. To reform the city mob was impossible, owing to in- 
dustrial conditions. The city swarmed with slaves, many of them 
pampered domestics ; probably a larger number were employed in 
manual labour of various kinds ; there were also many public slaves, 
serving under departmental officials. The inevitable degradation 
of free labour forbade the growth of an industrial spirit. The free 
multitude were content to live as state-paupers, with help of doles 
at a rich man's door. 

671. We have now traced in brief outline the sequel of the 
events narrated in the foregoing chapters. I have tried to shew 
how the Roman Republic, having won a great empire, had at 
length to produce an Emperor to rule it. I have tried to give 
some notion of the process by which, after horrible agonies, this 
result was attained, and the extent to which the imperial Founder 
used or discarded the old republican materials. On the vast im- 
portance of Rome, her unique central position in the known history 
of the world, it is not needful here to enlarge. It is time to bring 
my story to a close. 



INDEX 



— / 



[The numbers refer to Sections.] 



Achaeans, see Leagues. 
Acilii. 

M'. Acilius Glabrio 207, 208. 
M'. Acilius Glabrio 473. 
acta Caesaris 617, 618, 621, 622. 
acta senatus 511. 
aciiones go. 
Adoption 13, 223, 283, 462, 508, 

514, 561, 618, 619, 630. 
Adriatic, interest of Rome in no, 
118, 140, 146, 151, 239, 240, 
268, 326. 
adsidui (landholders) 20, 35, 55. 
Aediles 30, 50, 56, 278, 304, 486. 
Aemilii. 

L. Aemilius Paullus 130, 131. 
L. Aemilius Paullus 223 — 225, 

23ij 232, 233, 243, 296, 298. 
M. Aemilius Scaurus 355, 356, 

359' 361, 403- 
M. Aemilius Lepidus 451. 
M. Aemilius Scaurus 558. 
L. Aemilius Paullus 565, 568. 
M. Aemilius Lepidus 590, 593, 
S96, 603, 617, 619, 625—629. 
Aequi 32, 33, 46, 71, 72. 
Aetolians 118, 151, 159. 

(See Leagues^ 
Afranius, L. 555, 578. 
Africa 92, 165, 255. 
Africa, Roman province 261, 433, 
437, 577, 579' 59i> 631, 634, 
636. 
Agathocles 67, 74. 
ager Campanus 150, 339, 516, 535, 

537- 
ager G alliens 75, 78, no. 
age7- peregrinus 8 1 . 
ager privatus 18, 65, 315, 316. 
ager publicus 18, 26, 50, 51, 65, 

171, 172, 315—318, 350, 49°- 



ager Romanus 19, 28, 45, 78, 81, 

171, 400. 
Agriculture 87, 172, 173, 261, 272, 

302, 64s— 647. 
Agrigentum (Girgenti) 98. 
Alba Fucens 71. 
Alba Longa 8, 19. 
album iudicum 446, 554. 
Alexander the Great 67, 91, 188, 

257, 380. 
Alexander's Successors (Diadochi) 

76, 186 — 190, 380, 464, 636. 
Alexander of Epirus 67. 
Alexandria 79, 91, 189, 588, 599, 

602. 
Allies, Italian, see Rome and Italian 

confederates. 
Allobroges 498, 506, 550. 
atftbittis 293, 445, 473, 474, 484, 

493' 494- 
amici of Rome, 81, no, 198, 215, 

216, 226, 227, 229, 230. 
Andriscus 243. 
Anicius, L. Gallus 224. 
Annii. 

T. Annius Milo Papianus 531 — 
533, 534, 560—563, 583. 
anno suo I'jg. 
Antium 31. 
Antioch 188, 217, 556. 
Antonii. 

M. Antonius fthe orator) 379, 416. 
M.Antonius (' Creticus'') 453, 463. 
C. Antonius 487, 488, 498, 501, 

502, 514. 
M. Antonius (Mark Antony) 569, 
571—3' 583. 59I' 610, 6\\, 
chapter XLiv passim. 
C. Antonius 620, 621, 629. 
L. Antonius 621. 
Apollonia 79, 582, 608. 

33 



514 



Index 



Appeal, see provocatio. 
Appuleii. 
L. Appuleius Saturninus 373, 

383-388. 
Apulia 69, 70, 73, 128 — 131, 141, 

144, 400. 
Aquae Sextiae (Aix en Provence) 

326, 354, 373. 
Aqueducts 55, 89, 306, 388, 

657- 

Aquilii. 

M'. Aquilius 324, 325, 331. 
M'. Aquilius 376, 377, 419, 420. 

Aratus 183. 

Archias the Greek poet 504. 

Archimedes 142, 145. 

Archidamus 67. 

Ariminum (Rimini) 78, 116, 238. 

Aristion 420. 

Aristocracies of wealth favoured by 
Rome 64, 70, 78, 103, 133, 
135, 201, 219, 238, 247, 399. 

Aristocratic nature of Roman govern- 
ment 2, 23, 32, 54, 86, 119, 
161, 166, 168, 169, 227, 271, 
277—280, 327, 330, 348, 368, 
435. 448, 456, 478. 483. 505, 
. 65s, 667. 

Aristocratic republicans overcome by 
the Coalition 509 — 518, and 
later chapters passim. 

Aristocratic and partisan spirit of 
Roman annalists 55, 61, 68, 
123, 152, 155, 385. 

Aristonicus 324. 

Aristotle 96, 424. 

Armenia 380, 382, 464, 466, 468, 
479, 481, 559. 

Army, primitive 18, 20. 

Army, 'Servian' 20, 21. 

Army 448—367 B.C. 43, 44. 

Army 366 — 265 B.C. 63, 68, 81. 

Army 264 — 201 B.C. 99, 104, 117, 
120, 131, 132, 138, 148, 157, 
158. 169. 

Army 200 — 168 B.C. 193, 195, 203, 
212, 219, 221, 232. 

Army 167 — 134 B.C. 259, 260, 263, 
264, 266, 272. 

Army 133—79 B.C. 324, 326, 338, 
340, 345. 357. 361—364, 370, 
371. 374. 376, 378. 401, 4"— 
413, 419—423, 425—428. 

Army becomes supreme 346, 348, 

349, 364. 450, 456, 459- 
Army after 79 B.C. 450, 454, 455, 
467 — 469, 482, 507, 526, 527, 
549. 55°! 556. 564. 574, 581, 



Army after 79 B.C. (continued) 

582, 584, 585, 592, 593, 597. 
623, 629, 636, 637, 663. 

Army of Pyrrhus 76, 195. 

Army, Carthaginian 94. 

Army of the Barcids 113, 120. 

Army, Seleucid 205, 209. 

Army, Macedonian 195, 219. 

Arretium (Arezzo) 240, 575. 

Asculum Picenum (Ascoli) 400, 403, 
404, 406. 

Asia, Roman province 250, 288, 

324, 325. 336, 417. 419—423. 
466, 467, 481, 508, 517, 589. 

Asinius, C. Pollio 630. 

Assembly, popular, in general 14, 
25, 27, 59, 86, 168, 273, 274, 
280, 295, 314, 334, 348, 390, 
450, 475, 669. 

Assembly by Curies 18, 25, 41. 

Assembly by Centuries 25, 29, 33, 
34, 41, 57, 60, III, 191, 276, 
277, 290, 341, 387, 411, 412, 
449. 474, 492, "520, 532. 

Assembly by Tribes 35, 41-, 60, 

290, 327, 330, 334, 344, 387, 
411, 472, 475. 
Assembly, trials before 147, 276, 

289, 290, 334, 372, 387, 442. 
Athens i, 33, 49, 95, 181, 247, 

248, 420, 421, 424. 
Atii or Attn. 

T. Atius Labienus 525, 542, 546, 
547, 549, 550, 570. 575. 593, 
594. 602. 
P. Attius Varus 579, 594, 602. 
Atilii. 

M. Atilius Regulus 99. 
Attalids, see Pergamuvi. 
audoritas in general 11, 40, 59. 
Aurelii. 

L. Aurelius Orestes 326. 
C. Aurelius Cotta 452. 
M. Aurelius Cotta 453, 465, 466. 
Aurunci 63, 65, 66. 
Auspices and Augury 12, 25, 27, 

41, 42, 295. 
Autronius, P. 484. 
auxilitim of tribunes 26, 27, 435. 

Bacchanalia, affair of the 297. 

Balearic isles 326, 370. 

Banking and exchange 286, 417, 

473, 658. 
basilicae 306, 657. 
Baths 307. 
Battles named 

Lake Regillus 32. 



Index 



515 



Battles named (continued) 

AUia 47. 

Sentinum 73. 

Heraclea 76. 

Ausculum 76. 

Beneventum 76. 

Mylae 98. 

Ecnomus 99. 

Aegussa 102. 

Telamon 116. 

Ticinus 125. 

Trebia 125. 

Trasimene 126. 

Cannae 131. 

Metaurus 157. 

Zama 164. 

Cynoscephalae 196. 

Thermopylae 207. 

Myonnesus 209. 

Magnesia 209. 

Pydna 225. 

Scarphea 245. 

Leucopetra 245. 

Arausio 369. 

Aquae Sextiae 373. 

Vercellae 374. 

Chaeronea 421. 

Orchomenus 422. 

Tenedos 422. 

Sacriportus 428. 

CoUine Gate 428, 437. 

Chalcedon 465. 

Coracesium 476. 

Pistoria 501. 

Carrhae 559, 560. 

Ilerda 578. 

Dyrrachium 584. 

Pharsalus 585. 

Zela 589. 

Thapsus 594. 

Munda 604. 

Mutina 627. 

Philippi 635. 

Actium 637. 
Bithynia and Bithynian kings 159, 
215, 216, 219, 251, 324, 325, 

371. 380, 382, 419. 453> 465. 

481. 
Blossius 322, 324. 
Boeotia 181, 206, 220, 421, 422. 
Bojia dea 504. 
Bononia (Bologna) 240, 630. 
Bosporan (Crimean) kingdom 381, 

468, 478, 481, 589. 
Bricks 88, 306, 656. 
Bridges 19, 306, 498, 657. 
Brigandage 301, 376, 439, 647, 661. 
Britain 543, 544. 



Brundisium (Brindisi) 78, 108, 149, 

424, 427, 504, 532, 575—577. 

590, 623. 
Bruttians 49, 67, 74, 171. 
Building 47, 88, 656 — 659. 
Byzantium 185, 420, 521. 

Caecilii Metelli 329, 352. 

L. Caecilius Metellus 100, 107. 
Q. Caecilius Metellus {Macedonicus) 

243. 245, 329. 
Q. Caecilius Metellus {Bakaricus) 

326. 
Q. Caecilius Metellus (Numidicus) 

361—363, 365, 383, 386, 389. 
Q. Caecilius Metellus {Pitts) 415, 

416, 427, 428, 447, 456, 460, 

461, 493. 
Q. Caecilius Metellus {Crettczis) 

470. 476, 507- 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer 488, 

Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos 503, 

Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio 561, 

573. 584. 591. 593. 594- 
Caelius, M. Rufus 538, 569, 583. 
Caere (Cervetri) 62. 
Caesar in Gaul 

58 B.C. 525—528. 

57 B.C. 529, 530. 

56 B.C. 541 — 542. 

55 B.C. 542, 543. 
54 B.C. 544—546. 
53 B.C. 546, 547. 

52 B.C. 548—550- 
51 B.C. 551. 
50 B.C. 552. 

Succession-question 562 — 566, 568 

-573- 
Calendar 14, 90, 263, 582, 596, 601. 
Calpurttii. 

L. Calpurnius Piso 289, 308, 313. 

L. Calpurnius Bestia 359 — 361. 

C. Calpurnius Piso 470, 472 — 

474. 475- . 
Cn. Calpurnius Piso 484, 489. 
M. Calpurnius Bibulus 486, 509, 
511, 512, 516, 517, 518, 561, 
564, 567, 581, 582. 
L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus 
518—520. 
Campanians 49, 63 — 65, 68, 74, 94, 

281, 401. 
campus Martins 27, 607, 658. 
Capitalists (ste publicant) 172, 173, 
227, 249, 255, 261, 271, 272, 
286, 312, 324, 325, 336, 346, 

33—2 



5i6 



Index 



Capitalists (continued) 

347. 353. 354. 357. 360, 363. 

367. 371. 379. 388, 392—396, 

403, 410, 419, 423, 424, 429, 

433. 436, 438' 450. 453, 459. 
466, 467, 469, 471, 473, 477, 
487, 513, 521, 567. 580, 656, 
.657. 

capite censi 364. 

Cappadocia 210,212,251,324,325, 

380, 382, 419, 464, 469, 481. 
Capua (S. Maria) 48, 64, 129, 134, 

135. 141. 144. 147. 149' 150, 

339. 454. 516, 575- 
caput 7, 29, 34, 334. 
Carthage i, 32, 49, 65, 67, 71, 74, 

76. 77, 79. 91—96. 109, 113— 

115, 120, 139, 145, 158, 162, 
164, 165, 199, 205, 207, 218, 

255. 339. 342, 343. 350- 
First Punic war 97 — 102. 
Second Punic war 119 — 164. 
Third Punic war 255 — 261. 
Carthago nova (Carthagena) 113, 

152. 
Casilinum (Capua) 135, 144, 149. 
Cassii. 

Spurius Cassius 30, 32. 
L. Cassius Longinus 369. 
C. Cassius Longinus 559, 567, 
610, 612, 619, 620, 623, 625, 
626, 627, 635. 
Q. Cassius Longinus 569, 578, 
590, 602. 
Caudine Forks 69. 
Celtae, name 522. 
Celtiberians 127, 233, 264, 265. 
Censorship and censors 37, 52, 55, 

116, 163, 168, 221, 275 — 277, 

315, 329, 332, 383. 393. 409. 

441, 485, 519, 596. 
census 21, 37, 55, iii, 163, 276, 

277, 39^. 418, 457, 470. 
centuriae, see Assemblies 20, 25, 37, 

43, 409, 441. 
Centurions 44, 143, 169, 219, 528, 

621. 
cessio boftorutn 580. 
Chrysogonus 432, 447. 
Cilicia and CiUcians 189, 379, 463, 

476. 
Cilician province 379, 453,481, 521, 

534, 567- 
Cimbri, see Northern Barbarians. 
Cincius, L. AHmentus (annalist) 123. 
Cities, dependent, in the East 185, 

187, 188, 189, 198, 210, 251, 

381, 479, 480, 556. 



Citizen and alien i, 9, 16, 274. 
Citizen and soldier 43, 44, 87, 232, 

272, 301, 303, 435, 564. 
Citizens, old and new 409, 411, 413, 

414. 415, 418, 424, 426, 427, 

449. 456, 457- 
City-states i, 67, 96, 181, 183, 185. 
City precinct- 26, 27, 54, 573. 
Civil service, lack of regular 287, 

662. 
civitas 7, 9, 78, 81, 135, 274 — 277, 

281, 331. 384. 386, 391, 394— 

396, 405 — 409, 660. 
civitas, rise in value of 240, 273, 

281, 282. 
civitas, Roman and local 449, 660. 
civitas sine suffragio 46, 62, 64, 66, 

71, 74, 81, 134, 281. 
classes, ' Servian ' 20, 37, 341. 
Claudii or Clodii. 
Appius Claudius (Attius Clausus) 32. 
Appius Claudius (decemvir) 33. 
Appius Claudius (censor) 55, 90. 
P. Claudius Pulcher loi. 
M. Claudius Marcellus 116, 135, 

137, 145, 156. 
Appius Claudius Pulcher 145. 
C. Claudius Nero 151, 156, 157, 

163. 
Appius Claudius Pulcher 268, 320. 
C. Claudius Pulcher 276. 
P. Clodius Pulcher 504, 505, 508, 
514, 517—521, 531—534. 558, 
560, 561. 
Appius Claudius Pulcher 555, 567. 
M. Claudius Marcellus 564 — 566, 

602. 
C. Claudius Marcellus 565, 571. 
C. Claudius Marcellus 569. 
Cleonymus 72. 
Cleopatra 588, 602, 636. 
clientes 10, 18, 25. 
Client-kingdoms and principalities 

357. 370, 479—481, 579' 589- 
cloaca maxima 19. 
cloacae 89. 
cohortes 370. 
Coinage, see Money. 
collegia, gilds, religious 14, 15, 29, 

52, 130, 176, 295, 372, 436, 493, 

580. 
collegia, sham gilds, for political 

purposes 519, 553, 592. 
coloni 19, 31. 82. 
coloniae of Roman citizens 19, 64, 

66, 73, 75' 81, 83, 108, 236, 

240, 241, 273, 281, 331, 354, 

355- 



Index 



517 



coloniae Latinae 31, 45, 46, 66, 70, 
71. 72, 73' 75. 78. 81—83, 108, 
116, 122, 128, 133, 154, 163, 
171, 236, 240, 24X, 281, 331, 
398, 400. 

coloniae militares 389. 

Colonial schemes of the revolutionary 
age (see land-settlements) 339— 
.343. 386, 394, 607, 619. 

comitia, see Assembly r8, 25, 30, 

35. 41- 
conimercium 16, 46, 64, 82, 103, 

228, 247, 261, 312. 
concilia plebis 30, 35, 41, 60, 168. 
conscripti 2^. 
consilium in general 11. 
consilium of magistrate 442. 
consul, name 23. 
Consular provinces 341, 359, 383, 

488, 515, 518, 519, 537, 539, 566. 
Consuls and Consulship 23, 26, 27, 

28, 33. 37. 38, 50. 51. 52, 53. 
258, 263, 266, 268, 271, 278, 

279' 343—346, 357, 363. 384, 
385, 487, 498, 537, 540, 561, 
596, 603, 606, 617, 628, 630. 

contio 25, 88. 

conubium 16, 34, 42, 46, 64, 82, 
228. 

conventus 526. 

Corfinium (S. Pelino) 402, 575, 576. 

Corinth (see Fetters) 183, 194, 245. 

Corn, importation and distribution 
of 112, 153, 160, 172, 304, 335, 

337' 350. 439' 451. 454. 47i. 

472, 474, 504, 533, 538, 599, 

620. 
Corn, provincial tribute of 233. 
Corn-laws 335, 350, 386, 394, 396, 

454. 519- 
Cornelii. 
P. Cornelius Scipio 125, 127, 136, 

146. 
Cn. Cornelius Scipio 125, 127, 

136, 146. 
P. Cornelius Scipio {Africanus) 

i52> 157. 158, 161, 162, 164 — 

166, 209, 214. 
L. Cornelius Scipio {Asiagenus or 

Asiaticus) 209, 214. 
P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus 

257 — 261, 263, 266, 267, 277, 

279. 299. 307. 309' 3H. 322, 

328, 329. 
Cornelia mother of the Gracchi 

298, 314. 
P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica 321, 

322. 



Cornelii (continued) 

L. Cornelius Sulla [Felix) 364 — 

367. 37I' 373. 382, 39O' 403. 

406, 407, 410 — 413, 418, 421 — 

424, chapters XXX — xxxipassim. 
L. Cornelius Cinna 412, chapter 

XXVIII passim, § 425. 
L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus 426, 

427, 
L. Cornelius Balbus (of Gades) 

461, 506, 539' 545' 603. 
C. Cornelius 471, 473—475, 485- 
P. Cornelius Sulla 484, 504. 
P. Cornelius Lentulus 496, 498, 

499. 
C. Cornelius Cethegus 496, 498, 

499. 
P. Cornelius Lentulus Spmther 

534- 
L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus 569, 

572, 573. 
P. Cornelius Dolabella 617, 618, 

620, 625, 626, 635. 
Corsica 92, 99, 109, 171, 218, 

234- 
Country and Town 160, 273, 319, 

320, 335, 49I' 647- 
Cremona 116, 125, 160, 238, 240. 
Crete and Cretans 185, 215, 221, 

345' 370, 463. 47O' 471. 476. 
Crimes and Wrongs 14 
Criminal Law, development of 442 

—444. 
Croton (Cotrone) 135. 
curiae, see Assembly 18, 25. 
Curii. 

M'. Curius Dentatus 75, 87, 89. 
Custom (see mos), power of 23, 40. 
Cyprus 189, 254, 481, 521. 
Cyrene and Cyrenaica 79, 92, 189, 

254, 380, 453. 
Cyzicus 420, 465. 

Dalmatia 355. 

Dearth 42. 

Debt, pressure of 26, 42, 50, 51, 

60, 86, 175, 410, 417, 483, 487, 

493. 568, 573, 580, 583. 591. 

592. 
Debts of provincials, client pnnces 

etc. 423, 466, 467, 473, 498, 

521, 567. 581- 
Decern virate (451 — o B.C.) 33, 34. 
Decii. 

P. Decius Mus (cos 339 B.C.) 63. 

P. Decius Mus (cos 295 B.C.) 73. 
decretum 39. 
decumae, tithes 103, 288, 336. 



5i8 



Index 



dediticii 529. 

Deification 605, 622, 634. 

Deiotarus 481, 589, 610. 

Delegation of powers 18, 28, 603. 

Delos 224, 226, 230, 247, 249, 379, 
420. 

Dictatorship 28, 32, 33, 38, 54, 69, 
126, 129, 137, 168, (? 579), 580. 

Dictatorship, new style (Tyranny) 
434. 591. 59^5 603, 610, 618. 

dies fasti and nefasti 14, 90. 

Diplomacy and foreign policy 15, 
32, 40, 59, 68, 81, 113, X15, 
151, 159, 165, 178, 192, 193, 
201, 203, 208, 210 — 213, 215, 
227, 228, 244 — 249, 251, 252, 

255>. 270, 353—355. 357—367 
passitn, 380, 382, 419, 524, 608. 
discessio 24. 

Dispensation from laws 474, 475. 
Divorces 112, 433, 437, 504. 
dominium 315. 
Domitii. 

Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 209. 
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 354. 
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 372. 
L. Domitius Ahenobarbus 537, 
540, 555. 576, 578- 
Drepana (Trapani) 98, loi. 
Duilii. 

C. Duilius 107. 
Dyrrachium (Durazzo) 520, 532, 
582—584. 

East and West 179. 

East, influence of, on Rome 212, 292. 

Education 85, 88, 223, 298, 314. 

Egypt and the Ptolemies 79, 153, 
171, 189, 198, 205, 207, 217, 
219, 222, 224, 226, 254, 380, 
481, 485, 490, 513, 534, 554, 
587. 588. 

Elections 18, 23, 25, 41, 54, 60, 
126, 130, 137, 143, 320, 321, 
332, 384, 388, 474. 487, 488, 
493. 494. 559. 565. 569. 610. 

Elephants 76, 94, 100, 120, 165, 
212. 

Ephesus 207, 421. 

Epicureans 641, 648, 649. 

Epidemics 89, 160, 217. 

Epirus 67, 76, 206, 220, 231, "^77, 
582. 

eqziester ordo 338, see Order. 

eqiiites 20, 21, 25, 37, 43, 338, 370, 
470. 

Etruscans and Etruria 4, 5, 12, 32, 
47, 48, 62, 71, 73, 78, 89, 148, 



Etruscans and Etruria (continued) 
156, 160, 163, 400, 404 — 406, 

439' 494- 
exercitus 2 1 . 

Fabii. 

Q. Fabius RuUianus 69. 

Q. Fabius Pictor (annalist) 123. 

Q. Fabius Maximus (cunctator) 

126, 129, 132, 137, 154. 
Q. Fabius Maximus [Allobrogicus) 

354- 
Fabricii. 

C. Fabricius Luscinus 75, 85. 
Faesulae (Fiesole) 494, 495, 496. 
' Faith of the Roman people ' 207. 
Family, Roman, and Successions 

9, 12, 13, 85, 293, 294. 
Fannii. 

C. Fannius Strabo 337, 342, 343. 
Farming of state-dues, contracts etc., 

see publicani. 
fasces 23, 27, 28. 
Federal unions, nature of 5, 84, 

182, 184, 201, 208, 244, 245. 
Festivals and shows 7, 8, 28, 56, 

147, 160, 305, 437, 498. 554. 

580, 597, 601, 6ri, 620. 
fetiales 15. 
Fetters, the 3 fortresses 187, 194, 

196, 201. 
Finance 37, 40, 104, 137, 141, 163, 

232, 335. 339. 410. 417. 439. 

508. 
Financial difSculties of the Civil war 

period 577, 581, 588, 592, 595, 

599, 604, 623, 628, 629—633. 
Fines (multae) 34, 35, 51, 214, 442. 
Fires 88, 306, 657, 659. 
Flaininii. 

C. Flaminius (the reformer) no, 

III, 116, 126, 168. 
Flavii. 

Cn. Flavius 90. 
C. Flavius Fimbria 418, 422. 
foedus 16, 81, 82. 
Foreign policy, see Diplomacy. 
forT?mla togatorum 8x, 87. 
Forum 89, 658. 
Franchise, see civitas. 
Freedmen in, 170, 219, 432, 599, 

633, 666. 
Freedmen and the franchise 273 — 

277, 283. 
Freedmen Cornelii 436. 
'Freedom' granted by Rome 197, 

208, 228, 246, 324, 380, 480. 
Fregellae 33 1 . 



Index 



519 



Frentani 70, 400. 
' Friends,' see amid. 
Fufius, Q. Calenus 514. 
Fulvii. 

M. Fulvius Nobilior 211, 213, 214. 

C. Fulvius Flaccus 313. 

M. Fulvius Flaccus 326,327,331, 

3375 342, 344. 345- 
Funerals 85, 107, 305, 448, 471, 

617, 618. 
Furii. 

M. Furius Camillus 38, 43, 47, 

50. 

Gabinius, A. 471, 472, 473, 474, 
518—520, 554, 558. 

Gades (Cadiz) 91, 113, 152, 158, 
203, 461, 506. 

Galatians, see Gauls in the East. 

Gaul, Gallia, and Galli 522, 523. 

Gaul, Cisalpine 48, 116, 124, 125, 
136. 157. 202, 237 — 240, 268, 
30I5 355. 408, 426—428, 440, 
453. 488,. 515. 593. 619, 623— 
631 passim. 

Gaul, Cispadane 408, 440, 522. 

Gaul, Transalpine 124, 157, 326, 

353. 354. 369. 373, 451, 498, 
506, 508, 515, chapters xxxviii 
— XL passim, 631. 
Gaul, Transpadane 408, 440, 471, 

485* 515, 522. 564. 565. 580. 

650. 
Gauls in Italy 45, 47, 48, 62, 73, 

75, no, 116, 121. 
Gauls-'in the East 182, 190, 211 — 

213, 229, 251, 380, 382, 421, 

465, 481, 589. 
gens Claudia 32. 
gens Cornelia 152, 448. 
gens Fabia 32. 

gentes, clans 9, 13, 18, 24, 25, 41. 
Genua (Genoa) 236, 268, 355, 627. 
Germans 508, 522, 524, 525, 527, 

528, 530, 542—544. 547. 549. 

550. 582. _ 
Getae or Daci 608. 
gladiators 107, 300, 305, 343, 454, 

597, 658. 
Greek colonies 17, 381. 
Greek, court-language 186. 
Greek, dominant literaiy language 

123, 308, 393' 479' 482. 
Greek nautical skill 78, 95, 98, 99, 

123, 127, 170, 230, 379, 381, 

422, 465. 
Greek philosophy and rationalism 

296 — 299, 641. 



Greek politics i, gr, 92, 299, 314, 

334- 

Greek states, connexion of Rome 
writh no, 194, 197, 198, 200, 
201, 204 — 208, 213, 215, 217, 
218 — 222, 231, 244 — 249, 420 — 
422. 

Greek specialists 112, 189, 298, 393, 
599, 601, 666, 667. 

Greeks and Phoenicians 32, 79, 91, 
92. 94. 95, 98. 122, 189. 

Greeks, Eastern 188, 248, 251, 422, 
464, 478 — 480, 666. 

Greeks, their influence 106, 176, 
177, 223, 248, 261, 298, 299, 
380, 612, 614, 666, 667. 

Greeks, Western 4, 32, 48, 49, 67 
—70. 74. 79, 89, 91, 92, 98, 
122, 282, 312, 339, 439. 

Half-franchise, see civitas sine suf- 

f 7- agio. 
Hamilcar Barcas 102, 105, 109, 113. 
Hannibal Barcas 114, 115, chapter 

xill passim, 183, 199, 203, 205, 

209, 210, 215. 
Hanno the 'Great' 105, 109. 
Harbours 78, 108, 122, 134, 135, 

148, 149, 401. 
Hasdrubal Barcas 124, 136, 153, 

157- 
Hasdrubal (Barcas?) 113, 114. 
Helvetii 508, 525, 526, 528. 
Heraclea Pontica 185, 420, 466. 
Hernici 32, 44, 62, 71. 
Hiero I of Syracuse 32. 
Hiero H of Syracuse 77, 92, 97, 

112, 130, 132, 142. 
Hirtius, A. 551, 625 — 627. 
honor es 278. 
Horatii. 

Horatius Codes 32. 

M. Horatius Barbatus 33, 35. 

Q. Horatius Flaccus 635. 
Hortensii. 

Q. Hortensius Hortalus 447, 458, 
470, 472, 477, 498. 
hospes, hospitiu77t 16. 
Hostilii. 

A. Hostilius Mancinus 221. 

C Hostilius Mancinus 265. 
hostis, meaning of 16. 
Houses 17, 88, 292, 306, 656. 

lapygians or Messapians 4, 72, 77. 
Illyria and lUyrians no, 118, 151, 

219, 221, 224, 225, 239, 326. 
Illyricum 515, 585, 590. 



520 



Index 



imagines, portrait-masks 85, 471. 
imperator, title 567, 605, 668. 
i?nperiu?n in general 11, 14, 18, 23, 

26, 42, 346. 
imperiutn of magistrates 23, 26, 29, 

33. 37, 50, 168. 
imperium of Caesar 605. 
itnperium do7?ii and militiae 27, 35, 

282, 344, 499. 
imperium pro consule or /5ro praetore 

53> 372, 432, 441. 452, 463. 

491, 509. 555, 573, 625. 
Initiative 29, 35, 53. 
?«j«/ae,blocks of dwellings 656, 657. 
intercessio 26, 38, 50, 290, 435. 
interrex, interregnu7n 18, 23, 35, 

54, 59' 434, 54°, 559' S^i- 
Islands, annexation of 208, 211, 230, 

326, 463. 
Istria 116, 239. 
Italy, geography of 3. 
Italy, limits of 237, 268, 440, 575, 

576. 
Italy, races of 4. 
Italy, Caesar's schemes for 607. 
Italy, Roman organization of 81 — 83. 
Italy in 90 B.C. 398—402. 
Italy in 42 B.C. 660 — 661. 

Jews 189, 226, 253, 479, 480, 556, 

588. 
ludex quaestionis 446. 
judicial corruption 336, 393, 395, 

453. 458, 485. 486, 505, 508, 
.514, 554- 
indices, name 33, 290. 
indices of the standing courts 289 — 

291. 331. 338. 341, 392, 393 

—5, 410, 436, 442, 446, 450. 

452, 456—459, 475. 498, 554, 

600, 621. 
indicia publica (see quaestioiies) 289 

— 291. 
Jugurtha 267, 358. 
Jugurthine war 358 — 367. 
/ulii. 

L. Julius Caesar Strabo 403 — 405. 
C. Julius Caesar (see Caesar in 

Gaul) 433, 452, 454, 470—472, 

477, chapters XXXV — xxxvil 

passim, 525, 545, 547, chapters 

XLi — XLlii passion. 

C. Julius Caesar Octavianus {Au- 
gustus, see Octavii) 618, 619, 
and chapter xi.iv passim. 

[ulius, the month named 611. 
Junii. 

D. Junius Bnitus 264 — 267, 



Junii (continued) 

M. Junius Silanus 369, 372, 

C. Junius Norbanus 392, 426 — 
428. 

D. Junius Silanus 493, 494. 

M. Junius Brutus 521, 567, 593, 

610, 612, 619 — 621, 623, 625, 

626, 628, 629, 635. 
D. Junius Brutus 541, 612, 618, 

619, 623 — 630. 
Juries, see indices 290. 
Jurisprudence and Jurists 14, 34, 

90, 308, 39', 493, 607, 652— 

654. 
tura privata and publica 7, 46. 
itts axiA. fas 14. 

Kidnapping 371, 379, 463, 661. 
Knights, see Order, eqnites, Capi- 
talists. 

Laelii. 

C. Laelius the elder 162, 299. 
C. Laelius the younger 279, 299, 

310, 328. 
Land, i,qq ager 18, 19, 21. 
Land allotments 30, 31, 38, 45, 51, 

65, 66, 72, 82, 86, no, 281, 

315, 317, 386. 
Land-bills of Rullus and others 490, 

491, 508, 535. 
Land-laws, see hges. 
Land-question (see Country and 

Town) 26, 30, 45, 50, 51, 172, 

173, 272, 279, 315—319' 327. 

350, 661. 
Land-settlements of the revolutionary 

period (see Colonial schemes) 

438, 439, 449, 507, 516, 535, 
598, 636. 
latifundia 261, 272, 300 — 303, 350, 

.439- 
Latin becomes a literary language 

308, 640 — 642. 
Latin League 7, 8, 31, 32, 46, 

62 — 64, 82. 
Latins 4, 6, 7, 10, 32, 44, 65. 
Latins, proposal to put into Senate 

137- 
Latins, status of 45, 66, 81, 82, 135, 

137, 171. 240, 111—1-n, 281— 

283, 331, 340, 342, 343. 391. 

398, 522, 527, 564. 
Law and legal system 13, 14, 34, 90. 
Law of the Twelve Tables 33, 34, 

35, 652. 
Law, scheme of Caesar 607. 



Index 



521 



t.aws declared invalid 396. 
Leagues, Italian, in general i, 3, 

5, 7, 16, 68, 71. 
Leagues, Greek (see Federal Unions) 

181, 187, 217, 247, 248. 
Achaean 183, 184, 187, 194, 198, 

200, 204 — 206, 208, 213, 215, 

217, 220, 231, 244 — 247. 
Aetolian 159, 182, 184, 187, 192, 

196, 198, 200, 204 — 209, 211, 

231. 
Lycian 217, 481. 
legationes liber ae 492. 
Legends 8, 22, 31—33. 36, 46, 47- 
leges. 

Valeriae Horatiae 35, 60. 

Canuleia 42. 

Liciniae Sextiae 50, 51, 52, 316 — 

318. 
Ogubita 52. 

Valeria (300 B.C.) 54, 86. 
Piiblilia 60. 
Hortensia 60, 86. 
Claudia (218 B.C.) 112, 172. 
Oppia 143, 
Villia 278, 279, 435. 
law forbidding reelections 279. 
Porciae 282. 
Claudia de sociis 283. 
Calpurnia de repetundis 289 — 291 . 
Baebia de ambitu 293. 
sumptuary laws 293. 
Furia testamentaria 2g4. 
Voconia 294. 
Aelia et Fufia 295. 
Sempronia {agraria) Tib. Gracchi 

318—320. 
luitia Fenni 330. 
Semproniae C. Gracchi chapter 

XXII passim. 
Acilia 341, 443. 
Liviae Drusi (122 B.C.) 340, 342. 
Laws upsetting Gracchan legisla- 
tion 350. 
Servilia de repetundis 356, 383, 

443- 
Domitia 372, 436. 
Appuleiae 386, 387. 
Caecilia Didia 390. 
Licinia Mucia 391. 
Liviae Drusi (91 B.C.) 394 — 396. 
Varia 403. 

lulia (90 B.C.) 405, 408. 
Calpurnia (89 B.C.) 408. 
Plautia Papiria (89 B.C.) 408. 
Pompeia (89 B.C.) 408. 
Plautia iudiciaria 410, 417- 
Sulpiciae (89 — ^8 B.C.) 411. 



leges (continued) 

Valeria Flacci de acre alieno 417. 
Valeria Flacci de dictatu7-a Sullae 

434- 

Corneliae Sullae ^■3^^— 1^^6 passim. 

Plautia de vi 446. 

Terentia Cassia 454. 

Atirelia L. Cottae 459. 

Gabiniae (67 B.C.) 472, 473. 

Corneliae (67 B.C.) 473 — 475. 

Calpurnia de ambitu 473, 474. 

Manilla 477. 

Papia 485. 

Tullia de a?nbitu 494, 498. 

Strange bribery-law 505. 

luliae (Caesaris, 59 B.C.) chapter 
XXXVII passit7i. 

Fufia (59 B.C.) 514. 

Vatiniae (59 B.C.) 514, 515. 

lulia repetundartim 518. 

Clodiae (58 B.C.) 519 — 521. 

Pompeia (55 B.C.) 554. 

Licinia Crassi (55 B.C.) 554, 558. 

Pot?ipeiae (52 B.C.) 562, 563. 

luliae (49 B.C.) 580. 

Luliae (46 — 45 B.C.) 599, 600. 

Antoniae (44 B.C.) 621. 

Pedia 630. 
legio_ 20, 43. 
Legions, see Army 370. 
Legislation 14, 15, 25, 33, 35, 41, 
59, 60, III, 278, 279, 283, 293, 
295, 386—388, 396, 472 — 474, 
512, 514, 516, 519, 562, 563. 
lexi charter 81, 285, 313. 
liberti and liber tini (see Freedmen) 

III. 
Libraries, public 607. 
Licinii. 

C. Licinius Stolo 50, 51. 

P. Licinius Crassus 220. 

L. Licinius LucuUus 263. 

P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus 322, 

324- . 
L. Licinius Crassus (the orator) 

35i> 39i> 39^' 395- 
C. Licinius Nerva 376. 
L. Licinius Lucullus 421, 422, 

448, 453. 462, 465—469. 478, 

504, 507, 511, 513. 
L. Licinius Murena 423, 447. 
M. Licinius Crassus 427, 428, 

455—457. 470. 484. 485. 487— 
489, 496, 498, 499, 505, 506, 
508, 509, 513, 531, 532, 534, 
536—540. 545. 547. 555. 556, 
559- 
M. Lucullus, see Terentti 462. 



522 



Index 



Licinii (continued) 

C. Licinius Macer 454. 

L. Licinius Murena 493, 494, 498. 

P. Licinius Crassus 530, 532, 559. 
lictores 23. 

Ligarius, Q. 602, 612. 
Liguria and Ligurians 4, no, 158, 
202, 218, 235, 236, 268, 326, 
370, 400. 
Lilybaeum (Marsala) 76, 98, loi, 

T03, 138, 145, 593. 
Literature (see Oratory, Rhetoric), 

Livius Andronicus 112. 

Cn. Naevius 112. 

T. Maccius Plautus 177, 308. 

Q. Ennius 177, 281, 297, 308, 

309- 
P. Terentius Afer 298, 308. 
M. Porcius Cato 298, 302, 308. 
M. Pacuvius 308. 
L. Accius 308. 
C- Lucilius 309. 
Cicero's writings 458, 554, 557, 

567.^598, 624, 640, 641. 
Caesar's writings 551, 642. 
Varro 643 — 647. 
Lucretius 648, 649. 
Catullus 650. 
Sallust 651. 
Livii. 

M. Livius Salinator 156, 157, 

163. 
M. Livius Drusus 339, 340, 342, 

343: . 
M. Livius Drusus 394 — 396. 
Local governments 103, 134, 247, 

284, 449, 516. 
Local independence 5, 68, 81, 270, 

331. 34^- 
Locri in Italy 135, 161. 
Lot, use of 23, 58, 233, 341, 359, 
372, 411, 441, 446, 453, 470, 
488, 505. 
Luca (Lucca) 236, 536. 
Lucanians 49, 67, 69, 74, 400, 408. 
Luceria 69, 70. 
ludi (see Festivals) 278. 
Lusitanians 263, 264, 460, 590. 
lustrum, lustratio 21, 37, 277. 
Lutatii. 

C. Lutatius Catulus 102, 107. 
Q. Lutatius Catulus 373, 374, 

432. 
Q. Lutatius Catulus 451, 470, 
472, 477, 485, 486, 503, 511. 

Macedon and the Antigonid Kings 
67, no, 118, 140, 151, 159, 164, 



Macedon etc. (continued) 

181—183, ^87, 197, 198, 204, 

206 — 208, 209, 210, 215, 216, 

228. 
Second Macedonian war 192 — 

196. 
Third Macedonian war 218 — 225. 
Macedonia a province 243, 247, 

355, 378, 421, 422, 454> 462, 

488, 519, 608, 620, 625, 626. 
Maelius, Spurius 42. 
magister poptdi, see Dictatorship 28. 
Magistracy, equal power of colleagues 

23, 26, 29, 37, 58, 276, 383. 
Magistracy, numbers of the 58, 107, 

112, 203, 435, 606, 610. 
Magistracy, term of office 23, 26, 

37, 601. 
Magistracy, rules as to qualifying 

age, reelection, etc. 258, 266, 

278, 279, 320, 328, 333, 366, 

372, 384, 388, 435, 456. 
Magistracy and Pro- Magistracy, see 

Pro- Magistracy,. 
Magistrate's year 102, 263, 314, 

333^ 343, 489, 571- 
Magistrate, presiding, power of 24, 

25, 39, 168, 558. 
Mago Barcas 158, 162, 163. 
Mago the writer on agriculture 303. 
maiestas [minuta, treason) 387, 389, 

392, 403, 444, 445, 485, 558- 
Make-believe 11, 13, 668. 
Matnertini 74, 76, 77, 92, 97. 
Mamilius, C. Limetanus 361. 
Manilius, C. 477. 
??ianipuli 43, 195, 370. 
Mania. 

M. Manlius (Capitolinus) 42, 47. 

T. Manlius (Torquatus) 62, 63. 

Cn. Manlius Vulso 211 — 214. 

Cn. Manlius (or Mallius) Maximus 

369- 

C. Manlius 494, 495 — 497. 
manus (power, control) 13, 294. 
Marcii. 

Q. Marcius Philippus 220, 222. 

L. Marcius Philippus 375, 394, 

395, 396- 
Marii. 

C. Marius 267, 352, 361 — 367, 
chapter xxiv passim, 383 — 390, 
403, 404, 411, 412, 415, 416, 

432- 
C. Marius the younger 428, 429. 
Marriage, see conubitim 13, 16, 42, 

294, .437, 514- 
Marrucini 72, 400. 



Index 



523 



Marsi 71, 72, 400, 406, 408. 
Masinissa 146, 157, 158, 162, 164, 

165, 169, 171, 194, 199, 207, 

218, 219, 255 — 258. 
Massalia (Marseilles) 79, 98, 125, 

127, 152, 171, 235, 268, 326, 

353^ 354. 458- 522, 523. 563, 

578, 579- 
Matius, C. 545. 
Mauretania 357, 365—367, 376, 

580, 593. 
Medicine and surgery 112, 292, 

298, 599. 
Memmti. 

C. Memmius 359. 
7)tercatores 286, 357, 523. 
Mercenary soldiers 49, 72, 74, 76, 

94, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 109, 

145, 164, 181, 182, 185, 189, 

205, 2ir, 219, 251, 254, 345, 

523, 588- 
Mesopotamia 479, 556, 559. 
Messana (Messina) 74, 92, 97. 
Mines 203, 228, 267, 590. 
Minucii. 

M. Minucius Rufus 129. 
Mithradates Eupator (see Pontits) 

381, 407, 447, 461, 478. 
Mithradates of Pergamum 588. 
Monarchy i, 179, 186 — 189, 228, 

270, 464, 465, 468, 478, 480. 
Monarchy, early Roman 11, 18, 19, 

22. 
Money, metallic 34, 89, 100, 104, 

i75> 396, 402, 410, 417, 634. 
Moral force, strength of, in Rome 

58, 84, 85, 614. 
mos maiorum 11. 
Mticii. 

Q. Mucins Scaevola 391, 392, 
428, 653. 
Mummii. 

L. Mummius (Achaicus) 245, 246. 
Munatii. 

L. Munatius Plancus 624, 625, 
627 — 630. 
Municipal system in Italy 408, 449, 

516, 660. 
Municipal statute of Caesar 599. 
municipia 81. 

Murder etc., Court of 445, 447, 486. 
Mutina (Modena) 240, 625—627. 

Names, Roman 9, 605. 

Narbo Martins (Narbonne) 354, 

522. 
Narbonese Gaul, see Gaul, Trans- 

alpme 474, 522, 551, 625, 631. 



Navy and naval affairs 56, 68, 74, 
98, 99, loi, 102, 120, 125, 127, 
138, 143, 145, 153, 163, 170, 
192, 209, 219, 224, 230, 379, 
420—422, 463, 465, 466, 474, 
476, 530. .54i> 543, 544> 575. 
577, 578, 581—583, 586, 590, 
594, 627, 631, 634, 635. 

Neapolis (Naples) 49, 53, 68, 82, 
134, 141, 144, 241, 401, 428. 

negotiatores 286. 

'New men' 278, 363, 369, 458, 
470, 483, 487, 488, 489, 631. 

nobilis 52. 

Nobility of birth 6, 10, 13, 20, 

24—5, 32- 
Nobility, new, of wealth and office 
52, 60, 86, 271, 277 — 280, 327, 

329- 
Nobility, post-Sullan 448, 473. 
Nola 70, 135, 141, 407, 411, 413. 
Nomination 29, 37, 54. 
Noricum 369. 
Northern barbarians 355, 366, 

chapter XXIV /aj-WOT, 462. 
Nuceria 70, 83. 
Numantia 265 — 267. 
Numidia and Numidians 146, 158, 

162, 169, 194, 220, 258, 332, 

357—367, 404, 433, 437, 579, 

580, 593, 595, 634. 

Octavii. 

M. Octavius Caecina 319. 

M. Octavius 350. 

Cn. Octavius 412, 414, 416. 

C. Octavius (see lulii) 604, 608, 
609, 610, 618, 619. 
Octavian, see lulii. 
Oligarchy not Roman but Greek 84. 
Opimii. 

Q. Opimius 268. 

L. Opimius 331, 337, 342—345, 
351. 
Oppius, C. 545, 603. 
optimates and populares 327, 329 — 

332, 351, 363, 372, 383, 478, 
483, 484, 486 — 489, 502. 

Oracle of Delphi 135, 176. 

Oratory 308, 443, 447, 458, 470, 
491, 492, 538, 539, 622, 633, 639. 

Order, Patrician, see Patricians. 

Order, senatorial 59, 338, 394—396, 

436, 458, 459- 
Order, equestrian 338, 346, 383, 

393—396, 431, 436, 450, 453> 
458, 459, 470, 475, 492, 597, 
669. 



524 



Index 



Orders, harmony of the 390, 475, 

483.. 488, 504, 508, 517, 567. 
Oscan dialect 4, 49, 64, 398, 402, 

439- 
Ostia 19, 415, 471. 
Outlawry (aquae et ignis interdictio) 

334> 386, 445. 520. 

Paeligni 71, 72, 400, 402. 

Palaepharsalus 585. 

Panhormus (Palermo) 98, 100, 102. 

Paphlagonia 324, 380, 382, 481. 

Papirii. 

L. Papirius Cursor 69. 

C. Papirius Carbo 327, 331, 350, 

Cn. Papirius Carbo 369. 

Cn. Papirius Carbo 415, 418, 

425—428, 433, 437. 
Papius, C Mutilus 402, 404. 
Parthia and Parthians 253, 380, 

382, 464, 468, 479> 536, 556, 

559, 567, 608, 635. 
patres ri, 24, 59. 
Patricians 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 

24, 25, 26, 32, 33, 34, 37—42, 

50. 52, 57> 59. 78, 271, 356, 

364, 412, 433, 470, 497, 508, 

591, 609. 
Patricians become Plebeians 411, 

5H- 

patroni 25, iii, 443. 

peculattis 445. 

pecunia 34. 

Pedius, Q. 630. 

perdiiellis, perduellio 14, 147, 276, 
387, 442, 492. 

peregrinus (see hoshs) 107, 330. 

Pergamum and the Attalid kings 
151, 159, 171, 190—193, 205, 
207, 209 — 212, 218, 219, 222, 
224, 229, 250, (see Asia) 320, 

324- 
Perpernae (or Perpennae). 
M. Perperna 324. 
M. Perperna 451, 452, 460, 

461. 
Petreius, M. 501, 555, 578. 
Pharnaces 478, 480, 589. 
Philopoemen 183, 205, 213, 215. 
Phoenicians 91, 93, 96, 97. 
Phrygia 325. 
Picentes and Picenum 72, 75, 77, 

406, 427, 497, 575. 
Pirates and Piracy no, 118, 185, 

236, 239, 249, 371, 379, 423, 

447. 451. 455. 461—463. 471. 

472, 474. 476. 



Placentia (Piacenza) 116, 125, 160, 

238, 240, 268, 355. 
Plancius, Cn. 520, 558. 
Plebeian claims lo, 24, 25, 26, 35, 

37—42, 50. 51. 52, 57. 60, 107. 
phbs 10, 18, 19, 26, 30, 60. 
Polybius 95, 96, 104, 117, 123, 163, 

182, 219, 222, 224, 232, 244, 

248, 260, 267, 297, 299. 
pomerium i"]. 
Pompaedius, Q. Silo 402, 404, 406, 

413- 

peii. 

Cn. Pompeius Strabo 404, 406, 
411, 412, 415, 416. 

Q. Pompeius Rufus 41 r, 412. 

Cn. Pompeius (Magnus) 406, 427, 
428, 433, 437, 447, 448, 451, 
452, 455—457. 461, chapter 
XXXIV passi?n, 483, 484, 490, 491, 
chapters xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxix 
passim, 545 — 547, 552, chapter 
XLI passim, 574 — 587 passiiJi. 

Cn. Pompeius (the younger) 594, 
602, 604. 

Sex. Pompeius 602, 604, 619, 626, 
627. 
Pomponius, T. Atticus 424, 632. 
Pontiffs 14, 29, 34, 90, 107, 130, 
321, 324. 356, 372, 437' 493. 
533. 596, 601, 617, 652, 669. 
Pontius the Samnite (4th cent. B.C.) 

69. 73- 
Pontius the Samnite (ist cent. B.C.) 

428. 
Pontus and Pontic kings 251, 324, 
325, 380—382, 419—422, 462, 
464 — 466, 480. 
Popilii. 

C. Popilius Laenas 226. 
P. Popilius Laenas 334, 351. 
popuhis 7, 18, 27, 30, 35, 41, 50, 60. 
Porcii. 

M. Porcius Cato (the censor) 203, 
207, 213, 230, 233, 255, 258, 
275. 276, 289, 296, 298, 302, 
303. 308. 
M. Porcius Cato 483, 486, 494, 
SCO, 503—505. 507, 508, 511, 
512, 516, 518, 519, 521, 536, 

537. 539. 540. 543. 555. 558, 
561, 564, 571, 579, 581, 584, 

591—594- 

posses sio, possidere 50, 172, 315 — 

319... 328, 350. 
Postumii. 

Sp. Postumius Albinus 268. 

Sp. Postumius Albinus 360, 361. 



Index 



525 



praefecti (iuri dicundo) 81. 
praefecti, Caesar's deputies 603. 
praefectus nioribus 596. 
praefectus tirbi 28. 
Praeneste (Palestrina) 46, (>Qy 82, 

282, 428, 429. 
praerogativa 341. 
praetor, name 23, 50. 
Praetors and Praetorship 50, 52, 

54, 107, 112, 147, 203, 233, 

234, 410, 435, 440, 446, 475, 

606, 610, 620. 
Praetor's edict 475, 652, 653. 
Precedent, creation and force of 40, 

59, 282, 288, 653. 
princeps 668. 
princeps senatus 356, 434. 
Prodigies 12, 130, 153, 495. 
Pro-magistracy 53, 54, 68, 143, 280, 

341, 346, 440, 441, 555, 560, 

563-. 
proscripti and Proscriptions 431, 

432, 436, 486, 631—633. 
proscriptoruni filii 436, 489, 492. 
Provinces, Roman 103, 112, 178, 

203, '233. 234, 243, 285—288, 

354j 44O' 526. 
Provinces, the 5 years interval in 

succession to 560, 563, 565 — 

567- 
Provinces, abuses in the 233, 286 — 

288, 347, 392, 454, 517, 518, 

662. 
Provinces, staff of governor 286. 
provincia 103, 112, 178, 235, 341, 

472- 
Provincial policy 227, 228, 237, 

243, 247, 262—267, 325, 354, 

379, 380, 440, 441, 453, 461, 

462, 476, 477, 480, 481, 524. 
Provincial taxation 261, 267, 287, 

288, 336, 655. 
provocatio 14, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 54, 

282, 290, 331, 342, 442, 621. 
publica (state contracts) 37, 276, 

601. 
publicani (see Capitalists) 37, 141, 

143, 147, 174, 227, 271, 276, 

286, 287, 336, 352, 508, 513, 

558, 581- 
Publilii. 

Q. Publilius Philo 68. 
Puteoli (Pozzuoli) 144, 241, 438, 

448. 
Pyrrhus 76, 91. 

quaestiones extraordinariae (special 
judicial commissions) 289, 322, 



quaestiones etc. (continued) 

331. 332, 334. 356, 361, 372, 

387, 403, 442, 504, 505, 562, 

630. 
quaestiones perpetuae (standing courts) 

289—291, 338, 387, 442—446, 

458, 459' 621. 
qtcaestiones, reform of procedure 514. 
Quaestorship and Quaestors 29, 30, 

37, 56, 286, 326, 364, 426, 435, 
.458, 470> 471. 520. 
Qtiinctii. 

T. Quinctius Flamininus 193, 194, 

196, 200, 201, 205, 206, 208. 
quirites 7. 

Rabirius, C. 492 

Ravenna 572, 573, 575. 

Records 47, 163, 486, 511, 518. 

Religion and religious affairs 12, 14, 
20, 21, 23, 25, 29, 37, 41, 42, 
52, 60, 126, 130, 135, 137, 147, 
160, 176, 295—297, 356, 372, 
437> 493> S04> 5i9' 59^, 605, 
654- 

Reporting 499. 

Republics and monarchies i, 2, 80, 
166, 185, 230, 270, 299, 420, 
465, 466, 478. 

Responsibility 29, 35, 37, 57, 214, 

344. 387- 
rex sacrorum 23. 
Rhegium (Reggio di Calabria) 76, 

77, 150, 241. 
Rhetoric, teaching of 393, 639. 
Rhodes 71, 79, 159, 171, 185, 189, 
191, 192, 205, 207, 209, 210, 
217, 2i8, 220, 222, 226, 230, 
249. 379' 420, 422, 428, 588, 
589- 
Rich and Poor 20, 25, 29, 30, 38, 
42, 50. 5I' 52, 86, 184, 219, 
271, 306, 307, 420, 421, 475, 
656, 657, 670. 
Roads 78, 237, 240, 267, 337. 
via Appia 55, 70, 471, 561. 
via Flaminia 116. 
via Aemilia Lepidi 240, 627. 
via Postuniia 268, 355. 
via Domitia 354. 
via Aurelia 355. 
via Aemilia Scauri 355. 
via Egnatia 584, 635. 
Roads, travelling on 662. 
rogatio 38. 

Roman conservatism ri, 23, 41, 60. 

Roman constitution and its working 

52, 60, 86, 104, 108, 119, 168, 



526 



Index 



Roman constitution etc. (continued) 
271—283, 310, 317, 319—321, 
344—348, 384, 385, 390, 392— 
396, 418, 450—453, 456—459, 
474) 475i chapter XVIII /ai'jm. 

Roman mob 160, 273 — 275, 303, 

304. 335. 343. 346, 399. 561, 
568, 599, 655, 657, 670. 
Roman people, habits and occupa- 
tions of 8, 17, 87, 89, 304, 305, 

307- 
Roman population 304. 
Roman private life 85, 292, 299, 

307. 392- 

Roman public life, corruption of 
213, 214, 229, 267, 278, 287, 
291, 292, 293, 334, 348, 356, 
358—361, 367, 473, 518, 657, 
558, 567. 655, 656. 

Roman thrift 85. 

Rome and Italian confederates (to 
201 B.C.) 5, 16, 32, 44, 45, 46, 
48, 62, 68, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78, 
80 — 83, 93, 103, 104, 114, 116, 
117, 121, 122, 128, 133, 135, 
137. 147' 154. 163, 171. 
(after 201 B.C.) 191, 203, 232, 241, 
270, 273 — 277, 281 — 284, 316, 
319, 328, 330, 331, 340, 342, 
343. 347. 370, 384. 391. 394— 
396- 
(the great Italian war and its 
sequel) chapter xxvii passim. 

Rome champion of Italy against 
Gauls 48, 72, 73, 75, 80, 116, 
117, 121, 239. 

Rome protector of Greeks 68, 77, 
79, 122, 130, 133. 

Rome, limits of history of i. 

Rome, origin of 6. 

Rome, policy of incorporation 2, 8, 
10, 12, 19, 32, 36, 62, 64, 78, 
277, 281, 284, 398. 

Rome, early government 15. 

Rome, regal period 18 — 22. 

Rome, the Coalition or ' First Trium- 
virate' 509 — 518, chapter xxxix 
passim, 545, 547, 553—556. 

Rome, fall of the Republic 555, 557, 

561, 569. 570. 571. 572. 585, 
587, 596—598, 613, 614. 

Rome, the second or formal Trium- 
virate, 631 — 634, 636. 

Rome, city of, position and site 3, 6. 

Rome, city of, appearance 88, 306, 
655. 656. 

Rome as Head of Italy 80 — 83, 
284. 



Rome imperial 171, 178, 210, 226, 
227, 241, 242, 281, 357, 398, 
402. 
Rome capital of empire 599. 
Rupilii. 

P. Rupilius 313. 
Rutilii. 

P. Rutilius Rufus 267, 361, 365, 

370. 392, 393. 653, 659. 
P. Rutilius Lupus 403, 404. 

Sabellians 4, 5, 49, 69, 71, 72. 

Sabines 4, 6, 7, 8, 32, 33, 74, 78. 

sacra 12, 654. 

sac7'amentum (military oath) 44. 

sacramentum (deposit in court) 289. 

sagiitn 87. 

Saguntum 113, 115. 

Sallentini, see lapygians. 

saltus 315. 

Samnites 4, 48, 49, 62, 63, 67 — 71, 
73. 76—78, 398, 400—402, 404, 
407, 408, 413, 415, 427—429, 

439- 
Sardinia 92, 99, 109, 139, 140, 171, 
218,234,326,433,451,577,579. 
Scipionic Circle 299. 
Scribonii. 

C. Scribonius Curio 565, 568, 

569, 571. 572, 579- 
secessio plebis 26, 33, 60. 
Seleucids, see Syrian kingdo7ii. 
Sempronii, 

Tib. Sempronius Longus 125. 
Tib. Sempronius Gracchus 137, 

233. 234, 263, 276. 
Tib. Sempronius Gracchus 257, 

265, 267, chapter xx passim. 
C. Sempronius Gracchus 267, 320, 
326, 330 — 332, chapter xxil 
passim. 
C. Sempronius Tuditanus 326. 
Senate, growth of power of 40, 53, 

57, 59, 86, 119, 168. 
Senate of early Rome 11, 18. 
Senate 509 — 449 B.C. 24, 28, 29. 
448—367 B.C. 37—40. 
366—265 B.C. 53—55. 57. 
59, 68. 

264 — 201 B.C. 103, 104, 108, 
112, 119, 130, 132, 137, 
166, 168, 176. 

201 — 168 B.C. 191, 201, and 
chapters XV, xvi passim. 

167 — 134 B.C. chapter xvii 
passii)i, 270, 271, 274, 
276, 280, 285, 295, 297, 
298, 303. 



Index 



527 



Senate (continued) 

133— 79 B.C. 314,320—322, 
327= 334. 338. 339> 341, 
344—347. 35^. 357—364. 
376, chaTpter XXVI passim, 
403, 412, 425, 426, 434— 
436, 441. 
after 79 B.C. chapter xxxii 
passim, 469, 492, 495 — 
497, 499, 500, chapter 
XXXVI passmi, 511, 559, 
560, 565. 566, 569—573. 
596, 600, 609, chapter 
XLiv passim, 661, 669. 
senatus audoritas 39. 
senatus consultuni 39. 
senatus consultuni ultimw?t, last order 
or decree 344, 351, 388, 492, 
496, 499, 561, 572, 573. 
senteniiam dicere 24. 
Sentius, C 378, 421. 
Sergii. 

L. Sergius Catilina 431, chapter 
XXXV passim. 
Sertorius, Q. 371, 415, 416, 426, 
427. 433. 447. 451. 452, 460, 
461. 
Servilii. 

Cn. Servilius Geminus 126. 

Q. Servilius Caepio 264. 

C. Servilius Glaucia 356, 383— 

388. 
Q. Servilius Caepio 369, 372, 392. 
Q. Servilius Caepio 404. 
P. Servilius Vatia {Isauriais) 451, 

463- 
P. Servilius Rullus 490. 
P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus 583, 

S9I- 

Sextii. 

L. Sextius 50. 

C. Sextius 326. 
Sibylline books 534, 608. 
Sicily 4, 32, 49, 67, 74, 76, 77, 91, 

92, 97 102. 

Sicily a Roman province 103, ri2, 

132, 151, 171, 172, 304, 218, 

377, 433. 437. 454. 458, 577, 

.579. 634- 

First Sicilian slave-war 311 — 313. 

Second Sicilian slave-war 376, 

. . 377- 

Sidicini 63. 

Signet rings and seals 156, 499. 

Sittius, P. 489, 593, 595. 

Slaves and slavery 7, 9, 85, 94, 95, 
99, III, 170, 172, 173, 231, 234, 
236, 249, 271, 272, 292, 300, 



Slaves and slavery (continued) 

311— 313. 371. 375—377, 379, 
416, 454, 455, 463, 495, 530, 
544, 567,. 599, 661, 670. 

Slaves as soldiers 132, 604. 

Slave-agriculture 172, 173, 261, 272, 
300—303, 312, 335, 371, 375, 
376, 439, 454, 599, 646, 647. 

Slaves employed in political rioting, 
civil war etc. 321, 345, 388, 
412, 415, 495, 519, 531. 

socii (non-Italian) 103, 230. 

socii (Italian) and cives 81 — 83, 128, 
281, 398. 

sodalicia 554, 558. 

Spain 91, 109, 113— 115, 124, 127, 
136, 139, 146, 151, 152, 157, 
158, 171, 203, 218, 233, 262 — 
267, 326, 352, 369, 373, 378, 
460, 461, 471, 484, 489, 506, 
536. 578. 59O' 602, 604. 

Sparta 181, 200, 204, 205, 208, 213, 
215, 244, 245, 247. 

Spartacus 455. 

Statues 89, 261, 306, 655. 

stipendiitm (see decumae) 261, 287. 

Stoicism and Stoics 297, 299, 361, 
392, 393. 483. 498. 594, 641, 
653- 

Struggle of the Orders, see Plebeian 
claims 36, 37. 

Successor-kingdoms, see Alexander. 

Sulpicii. 

Servius Sulpicius Galba 263. 
P. Sulpicius Rufus 411, 412. 
Servius Sulpicius Rufus 493, 494, 
498, 564, 654. 

Survivals 23, 28, 59. 

Syi-acuse 32, 49, 67, 76, 77, 92, 98, 
103, 142, 145. 

Syria, province 479 — 481, 519, 536, 
567, 608, 620, 625. 

Syrian kingdom and Seleucids 188, 
192, 193, 198, 199, 215 — 217, 
219, 222, 226, 251 — 253, 380, 
464, 479. 

Tarentum (Taranto) 49, 67, 69, 70, 
72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 82, 144, 147. 
148, 153. 154, 339- 
Tarquins, the 22, 32, 
Temples 88, 163, 282, 306, 345, 

447., 503, 6r8, 658, 659. 
Terentii. 
C. Terentius Van-o 130 — 132, 168. 
M. Terentius Varro Lucullus 454, 

456, 462. 
M. Terentius Varro 578, 632, 643. 



528 



Index 



Teutoni, see Northern Ba7-barians. 

Theatres 554, 657. 

Thessaly 181, 182, 187, 206, 207, 

220, 584, 585. 
Thessalonica (Saloniki) 520, 581, 

582. 
Thrace and Thracians 188, 198, 

212, 213, 219, 455, 462, 468, 

608. 
Tiber, river, and floods 3, 8, 47, 

88, 306, 656, 659. 
Tibur (Tivoli) 62, 66, 82. 
Tigranes, see Armenia 464. 
Tigurini, see Northern Barbarians. 
Timoleon 67. 
toga 87, 522. 
Transplantation of conquered people 

236, 264. 
Trebatius, C, Testa 654. 
Trials of public men 214, 233, 263, 

372, 376, 377, 392, 458, 484, 

485- 514' 517. 558, 562, 563. 
Tribes, 3 primitive 18. 
Tribes, 'Servian' 21. 
Tribes 509—449 B.C. 30, 35. 
448—367 B.C. 41, 45. 

366 — 265 B.C. 55, 72, 81. 
264 — 201 B.C. III. 
200 — 134 B.C. 273 — 277. 
133—79 B.C. 409, 410, 441. 

after 79 B.C. 449, 554. 
Tribes, 17 of 35 372, 493. 
tribuni plebis and Tribunate 26, 27, 

30» 33, 35» 38, 39. 41. 42, 57. 
168, 271, 274, 279, 314, 319, 
321, 329, 335, 337, 343, 344, 
346, 348, 359—361, 373, 435, 
452, 456, 457, 469—475, 489, 
503, 508, 566, 571—57.3, 611. 

tribunician power (without the office) 
591, 596, 606. 

tribuni aerarii 459, 600. 

tribuni viilitum consiilari potestate 
37—39, 42. 

tribuni milttum 44, 56, 219. 

tribus, urbanae and rusticae 55, 
III, 273. 

tributum 138, 232. 

Tullii. 

M. Tullius Cicero 447, 458, 470, 

477, chapters XXXV, XXXVI pas- 

sim, 511, 514, 517, 520, 531— 

535, 537—539, 545, 554> 567, 



Tullii (continued) 

571, 581, 591, 597, 598, 602, 

610, 618 — 631 passim. 
Q. Tullius Cicero (brother of the 

orator) 537, 538, 545, 546. 
tumulttis 48, 625. 
Tusculum (Frascati) 46, 621, 630. 
tutor 294. 

Umbrians 4, 71, 72, 73, 77. 
Utica 256, 261, 594. 

Valerii. 

L. Valerius Potitus 33, 35. 

M. Valerius (Corvus) 62. 

L. Valerius Flaccus 276. 

L. Valerius Flaccus 417, 418, 422. 

L. Valerius Flaccus 434. 

L. Valerius Flaccus 517. 

C. Valerius Catullus 650. 
Varius, Q. {Hybrida) 403. 
Vatinius, P. 514, 515, 540, 558, 590. 
Veii 32, 43, 45, 47. 
venatio 305. 

Veneti 48, 116, 125, 160, 238, 239. 
Veneti of Gaul 530, 541. 
Venusia 73, 131, 400, 404. 
Vercingetorix 548—551, 597- 
Verres, C. 426, 454, 458, 632. 
Vestini 69, 72, 400. 
Vettius the informer 517. 
Vibius, C, Pansa 625 — 627. 
villa 302, 645. 
Vipsanius, M., Agrippa 630. 
Viriathus 264. 

Volsci 31, 32, 45, 46, 62 — 65, ^^. 
Voting in groups 18, 25, 35, 93, 

III, 184, 275—277, 334, 409. 
Voting by ballot 293, 446. 
Voting of juries 446, 514. 

Wall, ' Servian ' 19, 47. 
Weapons 20, 44, 195, 326, 370. 
Wills 34, 293, 294, 604, 617, 618. 
Women, position and habits of 9, 

13, 85, 87, 293, 294, 307. 
Women taxed, B.C. 43 633. 
Wood, use of 88, 305, 306, 656, 

657- 
Writmg, use of 33—35, 39. 

Xanthippus 99. 



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